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The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility (1983)

Chapter: FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

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Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
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Page 29
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 30
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 31
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 32
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 33
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 34
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 35
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 36
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 37
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 38
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 39
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 40
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 41
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 42
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 43
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 44
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 45
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 46
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 47
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 48
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 49
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 56
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 57
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 58
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 59
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 60
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 61
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 62
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 63
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 64
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 65
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 66
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 67
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 68
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 69
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 70
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 71
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 72
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 73
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 74
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 75
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 76
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 77
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 78
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 79
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 80
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 81
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 82
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 83
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 84
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 85
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 86
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 87
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 88
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 89
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 90
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 91
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 92
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 93
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 94
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 95
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 96
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 97
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 98
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 99
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 100
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 101
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 102
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 103
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 104
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 105
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 106
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 107
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 108
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 109
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 110
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 111
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 112
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 113
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 114
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 115
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 116
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 117
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 118
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 119
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 120
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 121
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 122
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 123
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 124
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 125
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 126
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 127
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 128
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 129
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 130
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 131
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 132
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 133
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 134
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 135
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 136
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 137
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 138
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 139
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 140
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 141
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 142
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
×
Page 143
Suggested Citation:"FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL." National Research Council. 1983. The Determinants of Brazil's Recent Rapid Decline in Fertility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/680.
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PART I FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL CHAPTER 1 THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF E ERTILITY The objective of this chapter is to analyze Brazil's accelerated fertility decline in demographic terms. Demographic theory indicates that two sets of variables are important: one is population composition, particu- larly age structure and marriage patterns, both of which mediate the relation between individual reproductive behavior and birth rates observed in a population; the other is comprised of the Davis-Blake (1956) ~ intermedi- ate variables, ~ such as frequency of intercourse, fertility control, breastfeeding, and abortion, which d irectly affect reproductive outcome. This chapter uses a standardization approach to identify compositional effects, and Bongaarts ' (1980) method for decomposing natural fertility into its proximate determinants to identify intermediate variables. This chapter is based on the available data for Brazil, which are fragmentary in both regional and time coverage. The approach is therefore essential detective work, piec- ing together clues from a variety of sources in an attempt to draw a picture at the national level. Changes In mar- r iage patterns and age structure are always prime suspects in declining birth rates; therefore, the discussion begins by assessing changes in the distribution of women by mar- ital status and in mean age at marriage, and then applies standardization techniques to check whether these changes and those in age structure played a major role in Brazil's fertility decline. The available evidence suggests that they did not. This suggests in turn that the primary factor in the decline was one of the intermediate vari- ables affecting marital fertility. The Bongaarts frame- work is then used to explore this possibility. There are three potential factors responsible--breastfeeding, contraception, and abortion. Among these, the limited 29

3a Degree to which the f irst is practiced in Brazil is sufficient to eliminate it as a primary influence. The evidence implicating the second is stronger, though admittedly fragmentary. Finally, although the evidence is clearly circumstantial, i t is strong enough to implicate abortion as an important, though necessar fly indeterminate, influence on Brazil' s fertility decline. MARITAL STATUS AND MEAN AGE AT MARRIAGE As noted above, the reporting of marital status in Brazilian data is problematic. The reported percentage distribution of Brazilian women aged 15-49 by marital status in the 1950, 1960, and 1970 censuses and in the 1976 PNAD survey are presented in Table 5; preliminary results of the 1980 census are also reported. Four marital status categories are shown--married, divorced and separated, widowed, and single. Each of these categories presents its own set of problems. First, in the married category, there is a problem in the reporting of women in consensual unions. According to Henriques (1980), women in consensual unions account for an important share of Brazilian births, though Brazil has a lower proportion of such births than a number of other Latin American countries However, although Brazilian data include women in consensual unions as a subcategory of married women, there is strong evidence that a number of those who report themselves as single may in fact be in "=nsensual unions {Si}va, 1979:14). This is suggested by data in Table 6, which shows the percent of women in the single category who reported having had a birth from age 15-19 to 40O49 in the censuses and P=D survey. Brazilian census authorities have attempted to improve on the reporting of consensual unions by broadening the number of categories of mar ital status to include the type of union. In 1950, when there was no subcategory for consensual unions, nearly four out of ten single women reported a birth by the end of their reproductive years, suggesting that most of these unions were grouped in the single category (Al~'nann and Wong, 1981a:3561. This contrasts with 1960, when the consensual union category was introduced and the proportion of single women reporting a birth dropped Deco 11 percent. It should be recalled that tabulation of the 1960 census was delayed until the late 1970s because of administrative

31 TABLE 5 Reported Percent Distr ibution of Women by Marital Status and Age, 1950-80: Brazil Divorced, Age Marr ieda Separated Widowed S ingle Total 1950 15-19 14 ~ 8 0 0 ~ 0 0 1 85 ~ 1 100 20-24 51.9 ~ ~ O 0 0 7 410 4 100013 25-29 70~4 001 lc8 27~7 100~0 30-39 7tje3 002 501 18~4 100~0 40~49 7102 Oa3 1401 1404 . 1Ot)~0 1960 15-19 14~0 (1~3) 007 0~1 8502 100~0 20-24 53~3 (3~6) 2~6 004 43~7 10000 25-29 7400 (5~1) 304 101 2105 - 10000 30~39 80~9 (504) 3~9 3~1 12~1 10000 40~49 76~2 t409) 408 1001 8~9 100~0 1970 15-19 12~0 (1~4) 0~5 0.1 87.4 100~0 20-24 46~9 (3~9) 2~0 0~3 50~8 10t)~0 25-29 71~3 (5~4) 3~0 009 24~8 100~0 30~39 80 ~ 2 (5 ~ 7) 4 ~ 1 2.8 12.9 1000 ~ 40~49 `6~2 (4~9) 5~6 8~9 9~3 100~0 1976 lS-19 11~2 (109) 0.6 001 88.1 10000 20-24 46~2 (504) 2~0 002 51~6 100~0 2S-29 69~8 (6~8) 3~0 0~8 26~. 100~0 30~39 19~5 (7.4) 4O9 2~6 13~0 10000 40-49 77.7 (6.6) 5.9 804 800 100.0 lg80 15-19 16~3 {3~5) 0~5 OoO 83c2 100~0 20-24 53~2 (8~0) 2.a 0~3 44~5 100~0 25-29 72e 6 ( 9. l) 3.2 0 0 7 23 ~ 5 100 ~ 0 30_39 79, 9 ( 9 ~ -2 ) 4 ~ 5 2.3 13 ~ 3 100 ~ 0 40~49 77~0 (7~7) 6~3 7~7 9~0 100~0 aFigures in parentheses represents when in consensual unzoned as a percent of all women, when reported. bThe total excludes women who did not report marital status. Sources: 1950-80 from population censuses' 1976 from PLED survey. breakdowns, and that procedures used in reconstructing it may have biased the results. The repot ted trend from 1960 to 1976 is puzzling, since it suggests that births to single women increased. It is possible that PEAS interviewers, who were more highly trained than census interviewers, were more careful in identify sng single mothers.

32 TABLE 6 Percent of Single Women Who Report Having Had a Child, by Age, 1950-76: Brazil Age Group 1950 1960 1970 1976 15-19 1~7 0~4 0~7 1~5 20 24 10~0 2~4 3~8 6~0 25—29 22 0 3 5 e 5 8. 7 10 . 2 3~)~39 34O3 8~8 14~6 17~9 40 49 363 0 7 10 ~ 9 16 0 3 23 ~ 5 Source: Published tabulations of census and survey data. The impact of misreporting of women in consensual unions appears to be greatest among younger women. For women aged 20-24, the proportion reported as married increases from 51.9 percent in 1950, when consensual unions were not included as a subcategory, to 53. 3 percent in 1960 ~ when the subcategory was introduced. To illustrate the possible influence of consensual unions on reporting, the percentage of women in the consensual union subcategory is indicated in parentheses in Table 5 next to the percent married after 1960 (the basis of this percentage is all women in the age category). The proportion of women aged 20-24 reported as married decreases from 1960 to 1976 0 then increases sharply to S3O 2 percent (about equal to 1960) in the 1980 results. At the same time, the percent of women in consensual unions increases, particularly ire 1980, when the f igure is 8 percent of all women ( IS percent of marr fed women) . Published tabulations of the preliminary 1980 results do not supply enough information to determine whether, in editing, single women with births may have been reclassi- fied as being in consensual unions. The evidence suggests either that consensual unions have been increas ing or that reporting of such unions has improved. In all likelihood, results for earlier periods understate the proportion of younger women reported as married. Such underreporting would bias the age-specific marital fertility rate for these women upward if that proportion were used in the calculation of the rate; it would also add a further bias to the extent that consensual unions were recognized when a woman gave birth to a child.

33 Although the impact of the underreporting of consens~al unions is reduced by grouping all single women with births in the married category, it is not eliminated. One is still left with the problem of women in informal unions who have no children, but should be included in the denominator when fertility rates are calculated. Thi omission could bias calculation of rates for younger women, particularly when the beginning of an informal union is not clearly demarcated and the birth of a child leads to recognition (or admission) of the union. Including in the married category only those Musingly women who had births will lead to overstatement of marital fertility rates. One way to compensate for this is to assume that the proportion of single women sat risk. Is equal to that of married women; that is, if SO percent of married women aged 20-24 report a birth, then assume that the single women aged 20024 reporting a birth represent 50 percent of the single women at risk. This at-risk group can then be added to the married category. s _. . . . . . This procedure will be employed later in calculating the denominators for marital fertility rates. The issue of type of union and its relationship to fertility at the local level is explored in detail in Part II of this report. A second problem of consistency in the Brazilian data on marital status relates to the reporting of separated and divorced women. Because Brazil legalized divorce only in 1977, its effects cannot be observed directly even in the 1976 survey. However, reporting of foreign divorces, legal separations, and a special Brazilian legal substitute for pre-1977 divorces (desquites) was increasing in the years prior to actual legalization. The contrast is sharpest between 1950, when practically no divorces and separations were reported, and the other data points. Because divorce was not legally recognized, it was fairly common practice for women who had entered a second union after separation to be declared as separated rather than married, leading to further underreporting of the proportion of women in unions. Such problems with the reliability of marital status data suggest that considerable caution is required in the calculation and interpretation of measures incorporating those data. This applies not only to the proportion of women in unions, but also to measures of the average age at marriage and marital fertility rates. Table 7 sum- mar izes the results of calculations of the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM), which is based on the proportion

34 TABLE 7 Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM), by Region, 1950-76: Brazil PNAD Reg ion 1960 1970 1976 1. Rio de Janeiro 22.92 23.17 23.93 2 0 Sao Paula 22.25 23.30 23 0 47 30 Southern States 21.66 22.17 22.80 4. Hinas/13spirito Santa 22 0 36 23. 36 23 ~ 66 50 Northeast Stabs 22.lB 22 23013 6. Brasilia 20.4S 23.38 23.73 7. 1?~tier States =.~] 22.04 °- Brazi.1 Marriage First Birth 22 .1l 22. 91 23.3 3a 22.42 23.28 23.84a aThe Brazil f igure for 1976 excludes rural areas of Reg ion 7, which was not included in the PNAD survey. Source: SMa~ calculated from census and survey distribu~cions of women by marital status considering single women who reported having had children as married. First-birth measure based on same computation as SMAM, but substituting the proportion of women reported as childless. of women reported as single at different ages. In order to reduce the impact of underreporting of consensual unions, single women reporting a birth were considered mart fed . SMAMs were calculated for the PNAD reg ions and Brazil as a whole ire 1960 Of 1970, and 1976. For Brazil as a whole, the data indicate a comparatively late average age at marriage and suggest that this average increased by more ~chan one year between 1960 and 1976. Most of this increase came between 1960 and 1970, and resulted from a more than 6 percentage point rise in the propor- tzan reported as single between the two dates. It was Dot Audible tc' include single women with births in the <:a'=ulati~ of t~ SW~£ for 1980; nevertheless, with the

35 decreased proportion reported as single in the prelimi- nary results, the average age at mart iage dropped back to the 1960 level of 22.1 years. It should also be noted that the preliminary 1980 results are not fully comparable to those for earlier dates since it was necessary to use 10-year age groups for women over age 30. The breakdown of SMAlls by region indicates a fairly homogeneous pattern, with lower average ages in the Southern and Frontier states, and higher average ages in the Southeastern states (Regions 1, 2, and 4). The largest increase in average age at marriage is found In Region 6 (Brasilia); it may be observed that the compo- sition of Brasilia's population changed significantly from the 1960s, when it was being constructed, to the 1970s, when it began to function fully as the national capital. For the remaining regions, increases range from .5 to 1.0 years in 1960-70 and .2 to .6 years in 1970-76. Since there are questions about the reliability of the mar ital status data on which the SMAMs are based, another way of looking at the age at which exposure to the risk of childbear ing starts is to consider the mean age at first birth. This can be derived from data on the proportion of women who remained childless at different ages us ing the same computational procedure employed in calculating SMAMs. The resulting index, calculated only for national-level data, is shown in the second row of results for Brazil in Table 7. For 1960 and 1970, the average age at first birth is .3 years higher than the age at marriage. This increases to .5 years in 1976. The 1980 average, not shown in the table, is 22.1 years, just equal JO the average age at marriage. MARITAL FERTILITY How much did changes in the proportions married and age at marriage contribute to the acceleration of Brazil's fertility decline? Table 8 attempts to link total and age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) to total marital fertility and age-specific marital fertility rates (ASMFRs) using the 1960, 1970, 1976 ~ and 1980 data. The f irst column of the table shows ASFRs and total fertility rates calculated for the Brazil report of the Committee on Population and Demography, National Academy of Sciences. The total fertility rates are the same as those reported in Table 2, showing declines of about 6 percent from 1960 to 1970, 24 percent from 1970 to 1976,

36 TABLE 8 Age-Specif ~c And Total Mar ital Fertility Rate Calculations, 1960, 1970, 1976, and 1980: Brazi 1 Age Group ~sppa Percent Mar r iedb ~ a ~ ~ b ~ ASMP Rc ASMP~ 1960 15-19 e0799 14 ~ 0 15 ~ 3 ~ 354 20-24 ~ 2719 53.3 57 ~ 4; 0 472 25 29 03150 74~) 7908 0395 30~34 02615 8003 87cS .299 35 39 01935 81. `e 90 ~ 8 ~ 213 40 44 . - 08 77 O 9 910 7 ~ 099 45-49 .0239 74.3 92.7 .026 Total 6~18 58~9 65~7 9~29 1970 15-19 20-24 25-29 3 0~34 35~39 40~4 45~49 ~otal 1976 15-19 20-24 2So29 30~34 35~39 40~~. 45~49 Tota1 1980 15-19 20-24 25 -29 30~341 35-39 40—44 4 5 - 49 Pota1 .0753 2564 2971 0 2466 ol821; ~ 08S6 .0225 5~83 .0733 0 2062 0 2240 0 1814 .1292 0 OS88 oO108 ~o45 ~ 0850 4 20S. 0 2071 D ~L604 c 1030 .0Je188 ~ 0093 4.10 1200 46~9 7103 80~2 8101 77~8 741~3 55~5 11~3 46~3 69~8 7808 8003 79~d 75~7 55~2 .163 S32 .726 799 799 770 .770 S6~5 13 o7 51~6 77~6 87~3 91~0 9200 92~8 62~8 14~1 52~3 760S 8704 9106 93~7 94~2 63~3 ~ 168 .555 765 867 ~ 867 .910 .910 64!~8 . 373e .497 .383 ~ 282 0 200 .093 0024 9~27 · 295e .394 0 293 0214 o 141 eG63 ~ 011 7~06 0 278 0 370 0 271 ol8S 119 054 oO10 6~. 352e ~ 469 .384 ~ 287 .209 ~ 102 .033 .l8 . 284e ~ 379 .292 0222 ol47 a071 .015 .05 Sources s ASF8s Ag~specific fertility rates Pancl on Brazil. Cc~itte. on Population and ~raphy, Mational Acaday of Scienece. Pctcent ~rried: in coluan ta) as reported in published h^h""tione, in colu~ (b) adjusted to include all everqrried wa~n' and, except for 1980 when data not available, single wa~n ·st risk- ~ expla~d in text. ASMYRs Ag repecific earitsl fertility rates co~put.d using ASEa and percent carried, verdant (b). AS~FRs Age-specific easite1 fertility rates coo puted fro specla1 e~bolation of birthe in previous year for ever-aarried wooen, and and adjust d by P/P ratios for all wo.en tl.32 in 1970 and 1.22 in 1916). Not available for 1960 and 1980. ASMFR for 15-19 cooputed as .75 ASMFR for woann aged 20-24.

37 0.5 0.4 LU a: a: 0.3 - - CC up Cal - C: 0.2 In Al Or 0.1 o —_ _ Santa Cruz-U rban Parnaiba-Rural /N I ~ / / \ \ >_ 1 40 45 50 1 5 20 25 30 35 AGE FIGURE 5 Age-Specif ic Fertility Rates, 1975: Brazil and about 8 percent from 1976 to 1980. As can be seen in Figure 5, the shape of the age-specific fertility rate profile became somewhat flatter with the decline, which was substantial for all age groups except the youngest. The largest absolute decline occurred at ages 25-29, with larger proportional declines among the older age categories. A first attempt was made to translate ASFRs into age-specific marital fertility rates by using data on

38 marital status from published reports, as shown in column (a) under percent married" in Table 8. Because of the underreporting of women in consensual unions, ASMFRs appear to be biased upward, particularly for women in their twenties. In 1970, for example, the ASMF~ for the 20-24 group would be .547; this would mean that the fertility of Brazilian women exceeded that of the Hutter- ites' one of the populations on whose experience standard natural fertility schedules are based. To reduce this bias' the proportion ~married. was adjusted to include all everom~rried women, single women who reported a birth, and a prorated number of single women eat risk" based on the proportion of married women reporting a birth, as shown In column (b) under percent married. in the table. This adjustment raised the percent married by about 7 percentage points for each observation; although this did not reduce the decline of about 5 percentage points in the proportion married among women 20-24 between 1960 and 1970, it did narrow the differences between 1970, 1976, and 1980. The increase in the proportion marr fed among women in older age categor ies ar ises f rom the addition of widowed, separated, and divorced women. Even with these adjustments, the ASMFas and total marital fertility rates for 1960 and 1970 are quite hiah - nearlv 9~3 for both dates. By 1976, total marital _, ~ fertility falls to 7.06, a decline of 24 percent, with a further decline of 9 percent to 6O44 in 1980* While total marital fertility shows little change between 1960 and 1970, the rate for women aged 20-24 increases. This occurs because the decline in the ASFR for that group is less than the decline In the proportion married, even after adjustment. The rate for women aged lSol9 is similarly affected since it was calculated as .75 of the rate of those aged 20024. Because these rates are so high, total marital fertility is very sensitive to such differences, which are as likely to be the result of differences in reporting (or editing, as suggested above ) as they are to be real. Thus considerable caution is required in interpreting the 1960-70 period. Access to public use sample files for the 1970 and 1976 data made it possible to tabulate the observed nether of births by marital status in the year prior to interviews; this provided a check on the rates calculated from ASFRs. Observed births were adjusted by the IF ratios used in ad j usting A5FRs for that date. The resulting ASMF" and total marital fertility rates are shown in the last column of Table 8. These rates are not

39 exactly comparable to those calculated directly f rom ASFRs s ince the ad j us~ment of observed births used in deriving ASFRs also included a factor to account for the one-half-year dif ference between women' s reported age and their age when births actually occurred. Because it is inappropriate to apply this factor when the denominator is limited to ever-married women, the age prof files of ASHFRs differ with the two approaches. The main d~ffer- ence is that rates based on the tabulations are lower for women under 25 and higher for women over 30. Total mar- ital fertility is slightly lower in 1970 and virtually the same in 1976 in the tabulated results O compar ison of the two sets of rates suggests that the decline in mar- ital fertility probably was close to 24 percent over the 1970-76 period; however, there is a need to be cautious about both the level and age profile of marital fertility rates . The age category most seriously affected is 20-24. Two factors could account for an overstatement of the age-specific marital fertility rate for this group. One is the underreporting of married women discussed above. The other is that the adjustment factors derived using the Brass technique may be too hzgh for this group. Estimates of ASMFRs using model marital fertility schedules suggest that this may in fact be the case (see Berquo and Leite, 1979; Altmann and Wong, 1981a; Leite, 1981~. One way to visualize the extent of possible bias is to compare observed ASMFRs to model schedules, as shown in Figure 6. Both of the 1970 ASMFR schedules from Table 8 are plotted against these model schedules. The models are based on a total marital fertility rate of 9.25, with the Coale-Trussel index of fertility control set at three levels: 0.0, the natural fertility level, and O.3 and 0.S, indicating moderate fertility control. The model schedule with the index set at 0.5 provides a very close approximation to both of the observed 1970 ASMER schedules for ages 25-29 to 40-44. The observed rates for age 20-24 exceed the model schedule, though the second schedule (estimated from births reported for ~married. women, broadly defined) is closer than the rate calculated from dividing ASFRs by the proportion married. The compar ison suggests that the 1970 base for calcu- lating declines between 1970 and 1976 among the younger age groups may be too high, resulting in an exaggeration of declines for women in these age categor ies.

40 100 80 60 x c, a - AGE FIGURE 6 Age-Specific Marital Fertility Rates (ASMFR2 5-2 9 = 100) ~ Six Contexts: Brazil V>~ _ Natural Fertility ''it' \ · 40 20 25-29 ~34 35-39 ........ Recite, 197S —— Cachoeiro, 1975 —·—Conceicao do Araguaia, 1975 t . I I 1 ~ 4044 4445

41 DECOMPOS ITION OF CHANGE IN BIRTH RATES Standardization techniques to decompose the contributions of changes in marr iage patterns and age structure and in marital fertility to declines in the general fertility rate (GFR) and crude birth rate (CBR) are described in United Nations Manual IX, The Methodology of Measuring the Impact of Familv Planning Programs on Fertility (United Nations, 1979)0 The standardization method takes account of the contr ibution of shif ts in age structure within the reproductive ages, as well as changes (for the CBR) in the proportion of women of reproductive age among the total population. All the measures required for these techniques are found in the Brazilian data for 1960, 1970, and 1976. However, considerable caution is required in interpreting results because of the poor reporting of marital status and possible overstatement of marital fertility rates discussed above. For the GFa, the decomposition is as shown in Table 9. For the 1960-70 interval, there is a decline of 15 per 1,000 in the GFR. Of the three factors contributing to that decline, shifts in the marital status distribution account for the largest share ( 8 per 1, 000 ) . This reflects the reported decline in the percent married from 66 to 63 percent shown in Table 8; it should be viewed as skeptically as other measures depending on the marital status reporting of the 1960 census data. Marital f ertility accounts for the smallest part of the decline in the GFR ( 2 per 1, 000 ), while shifts in age structure within the reproductive ages make up the remaining 5 per TABLE 9 Decomposition of Change in General Fertility Rate, 1960-76: Brazil Component 1960-70 1970-76 GER, base year 189.18 174.18 GFR, end year 174.18 136.42 Observed change (per 1, 000) -14. 99 -31.76 Reproductive age structure -4.89 0.78 Marital status distribution -8.10 0.B8 Mar ita1 fertility -2 .06 -40 .49 Interaction 0. 06 1.07

42 1,000. The composition of the much larger 1970-76 decline in the GFR (nearly 38 per 1, 000) contrasts sharply with that of 1960-70. Marital fertility accounts for the entire decline; in fact, the decline would have been greater had not the marital status and age structure f actors been slightly of f setting . The standardization approach can also be used to decompose declines in the CBR with the addition of a factor to account for shifts in the proportion of women of reproductive age among the total population. For the two periods being studied a the breakdown is as shown in Table 10 ~ The proportional contr ibutzons of the three components of the GFR to changes in the CBR remain the same, with marital status accounting for most of the change in 1960-70 and declining marital fertility being the only reason for the 1970 76 decline. The interesting addition in 1970-76 is the offsetting effect of the propor~cion of women of reproductive age among the total population. The larger cohorts born during the years of Brazil' ~ peak birth rates entered the reproductive ages after 1970; their impact dampened the effect of the decline in marital fertility on the birth rate by about a fourth--2.3 out of 9.7 per 1,000. ROLE OF PP~XIlIAT13 VARIABLES Further insight into the nature of recent fertility trends in Brazil can be gained by examining the role of TAB" 10 Decomposition of Change in Crude Birth Rate, 1960 76 Brazil Component 1960-70 1970-76 . . CBR, base year CBR, end year Observed change (per 1,000) Reproductive age women ( total) Reproductive age structure Marital status distribution Marital fertility Interaction 45.3 41.6 03.7 —O ~ 12 —~ o 17 -1.93 -0.49 +0.01 41.6 34.4 —7. 2 2.28 0.19 0.21 —9.72 +~.30

43 the proximate variables identified in the Davis-Blake (1956) framework, and more recently in Bongaarts' (1980) method for decomposing the difference between natural fertility and observed total fertility rates into four proximate determinants. Bongearts' technique involves the computation of four indices: (1) Cm = the index of the proportion married, which equals one if all women of reproductive age are married, zero if none are; (2) Cc = the index of noncontraception, which equals one in the absence of contraception and zero if all women use 100 percent eff entice contraception; (3) Ca = the index of abortion, which equals one in the absence of induced abortion and zero if all pregnancies are aborted s and ( 4 ) Ci = the index of postpartum infecundability, which equals one in the absence of lactation and postpartum abstinence and zero if the duration of infecundability is infinite. Observed total fertility is linked to natural fertility t the number of births a women would have during her reproductive lifetime if none of the inhibiting factors were operative) by multiplying the n''=her of births that would occur in a natural-fertility regime by each of the indices in succession: TEE = 15.3 x Cm x Ca x Cc x Ci, where 15.3 represents an estimate of the total fecundity rate. It should be noted that the use of a single value to estimate the fecundability level of a population, set at 15.3 children per woman, has been questioned in light of the heterogeneity of populations in relation to a number of factors, such as state of health, duration of cohabitation, and so on. Thus, other values have been proposed for use in estimating this parameter for specific population subgroups (see Lesthaeghe et al., 1981 and Gaisie, 1981) . In this report, however, 15. 3 will be used. Data requirements for calculating the four indices are geared to national-level fertility surveys, such as the World Fertility Survey, which include questions on breast- feeding and abortion as well as current contraceptive use. Census and survey data do provide enough information for calculation of the marriage index, which is the ratio of the total fertility rate to the total marital fertility rater and which remained constant at a level of .63 from 1970 to 1976. In the absence of any nationally repre- sentative Brazilian data on the three remaining variables, the best that can be done is to piece together a national ~guesstimate. from the fragments of subnational survey data that are available.

44 'the two main sources of survey data for the 1970s are the 1ocal-level CEBRAP National Investigation on Human Reproduction (NIHR) and the state-level Contraceptive Prevalence Surreys (CpS), mentioned in Chapter 1. The NIHR interviews were conducted during 1975 in the states of Sao Paulo, Espirito Santa, Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco, Piaui, and Para (Berquo, 1976). The first CPS was conducted in Sao Paulo in 1978, followed by Pisui in 1979, and Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, and Bahia in 1980 (Rodrigues et al., 1981a). Additional survey work was being conducted in Southern Brazil in 1981. Prior to these inquiries, the data were limited to a handful of surveys in specific localities: Rio de Janeiro was included in the comparative study of fertility and family planning in nine Latin American cities con- ducted by CELADE in 1963 (CELADE, 1972), and CEBRAP interviewed women in the municipality of Sao Paulo in 1965 (Berquo et al., 1977a); two other surveys include Martiness 1969 interviews of poor women who were using the services of a maternity clinic in Rio de Janeiro (Martine' 1975) and Etges' survey of women in Porto Alegre and two other localities in Rio Grande do Sul in 1973 (Etges, 1975). The subsections that follow assemble information on current contraceptive use, abortion, and breastteeding f rom these surveys in a form that will permit calculation of the Bongaarts' indices. Contraceptive Use The index of noncontraception requires information on the percent of fecund married women of reproductive age cur- rently using contraception, as well as a breakdown of methods by type to measure contraceptive effectiveness (Bongaarts, 1980). The available national-level Brazilian data are summarized in Table 11; as noted in Chapter 9, these data are paralleled by local-level NIER data. The 1965 Sao Paulo survey is reported (Nakamura et al., 1979) to indicate that 66 percent of eligible women were using contraception, a higher proportion than was reported for Rio de Janeiro (38 percent) ~ year earlier. However, it is not apparent from reports on the Sao Paulo survey (Berquo et al., 1977a) whether the figure refers to current or ever use; if it is the latter, then 66 percent probably overstates current use. Both surveys indicate that methods other than the pill and sterilization were predominant. Martine's 1969 data on poor women in Rio

4s no, U x i: ~ -_1 a: ·. a) Sat :3 en o So a a, ~9 ·_0 Q. c) o u ED - c) - o s A: at: o o ~ · - ·~0 ~ AS N V U] P4 ·. en ~ 00 ~ C, 3 so ~ W P. O Q. a : U) o ._t U) to · ~ ~ cat ~ \0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Cat tD a' ~ ~ fir ~ ~ a, ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ en · ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ lo ~ \0 US · ~ ~ · · ~ · · ~ · ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ · ~ 0 ~ ~ a' ~ ret ~ ~ co ~ ~ lo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ rot 1— ~ · co an al ~ ~ ~ co ~ ~ al an al · ~ · ~ · ~ ~ ~ · · ~ ~ e ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c' e~ ~ ~ a, ~ ~ ~ ~ O · · O · · · · · ~ - ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ CD ~ ~ ~ c~ ~o ~o 0 ~ ~n ~ e 0 0 0 · 0 0 · 0 e · 0 C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ \0 U~ C~ \0 ~ U~ ~ ~P ~ C~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O `0 ~ e O e ~ e 0 0 0 ~ 0 ° e ~ [~ U~ ~0 t— ~ ~ ~ ~ \0 I~ ~ ~ t~ \0 ~r a, ~ 0 0 0 a' ~ c~ ~ · ~ · ~ · e e ~ · 0 · e e a~ ~ d~ ~ ~ ~ a~ ~ u~ ~ I~ eq ~ ~ \0 U~ ~ C~ U~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C~ ~ a' a, ~ ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 \0 r. ~ ~ ~ r. ~ a~ co a~ ~ a~ a ~0 Q ~o C) ~ a: s~ O dJ 1 1 0 3 ~ ~ tU O ~ ~ :> ,~ c, ~ ~ O O U] ~ ~ ~ ~ Z 0 0 0 a~ c: ~ ~ u~ ~ ~ O ~ ~— ~ ~ O O _ ·— ~ tQ ~; tll ~ ~1 0 ' 8,~ ' ~ L O O ~ ~ U o —t mI E~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ n=~ ~ ~ ' '~ ~ ~ ~ ' '= o4 a. _ _ ~ a~ C~ C~ ~ to ~ ~ ~ C: `: 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 os S ~ _ _ _ ~ Io _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ to ~ ~ o: U) U: P P. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ P~ . x · X · ~ U · - OQ U] s e 0 ~ ~ c) O ~Q ~o X U :: 0 ~ . - 0 ~ _ ~ 0 ~ 0 — S~ 1 - ·- -~ o2 a, O ~- - ~ ~ ~ Q c, C `4 o o tQ x x == ~ :: tQ 3 ~n O t~ _ ,= ~4 ·- le U~ ~ - - U' ,Q 54 ~ ~ ·. z: ~ . _ ·— - C~ ~ - r~ ~ ·e ~ C~ :J _ ~ ~ ·- V O a, 1 .- tD E~ ·. _ ·e ~ 0 a~ ~ ~ dJ ·e _. ~ U~ ~ Ll ~ e O - - tq — ~ ~ _

46 indicate a sharp rise in pill use in the late 1960s; however, his survey is not comparable with the others since it did not include women who had been sterilized The data on Rio Grande do Sul also show increased use of the pill, as well as a contraceptive use rate of nearly 65 percent. The 1978 Sao Paulo CPS indicated that 63 percent of currently married women aged 15-44 were using contracep- tives in the city of Sao Paulo, a figure slightly lower Than that cited in the survey taken a decade earlier. Even if current use really was 66 percent in 1965 f the 1978 survey indicates an important increase in effective contraception because of a shift to more effective methods, with the pill and sterilization accounting for nearly two-thirds of users in 1978 compared to less than one-f if th in 1965. The 1978 survey also indicated that contraceptive use was nearly as high in the rest of Sao Paulo, including rural areas, as it was in the capital city. The second CPS survey, conducted in 1979, shifted from Brazil's most developed to its least developed state, Pisui. Current users accounted for AS percent of women in the capital city of Teresina and 29 percent in the rest of The state, which is predominantly rural. The most noteworthy feature of the Piauz data is the very major role played by sterilization, which represented 63 percent of all fertility control; the figure for the rest of the state was 47 percent. The 1980 Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte surveys tell a similar story: over 50 percent of women in Recife were currently using a method, with sterilization accounting for 57 percent of the total; in urban Rio Grande do Nor te, sterilization and the pill were used in equal proportions. Finally, it should be noted that prevalence rates in general were higher in the rural areas of these states than in Piau i and Bahia, a ref. lection of the impact of community-based family planning programs organized by BEMFAM in coopera- tion with state governments (Rodrigues et ale, 1981a). The last two columns of figures in Table 11 provide estimates of the index of noncontraception (Cc ) for each of the surveys for which the needed information was available. Computations were based on Bongaarts' formula: Cc a 1 - (S x E x U), where ASH is a correction factor for sterility, ~E. is a measure of average contraceptive effectiveness based can the share of each method in the total, and BUS is the proportion of married women cur- rently using a method. The sterility correction factor was set at 1.1, Bongaarts' recommendation for less .

47 developed areas. Values of U were taken from the column showing the percent of current users. The value of E was determined from the three columns showing percent of total use for pills, sterilization. and other methods, with effectiveness ratings of 1.0, 0.9, and 0.7, respectively. Index values for the late 1970s range from about .3S for Sao Paulo to . 70 for Bahia state, exclusive of Salvador. The information in Table 11 falls far short of what is required to compute values of the index of noncontracep~ tion for Brazil during the 1970s. Most of the informa- tion relates to the later years of the decade, and only a fraction of the total population is represented. At best, these data are a rough guide to the extent of regional differentials, and serve as a basis for guesses at what the trends may have been. For illustrative purposes, they have been used to calculate national-level estimates of the index for three dates (1970, 1976, and 1980). The first step in making such calculations was to determine values for S. E, and U for the three dates, as shown in Table 12. National-level estimates of these measures were derived as follows. The sterilization index was assumed not to vary by region, and was set at l.1 in 1970, then raised to 1.125 as the prevalence of steril- ization increased. Values of U and E were assigned to each of six subdivisions of the Brazilian population, which was broken down by region (Northeast, South and Southeast, and North and Central-West) and by rural-urban residence. Those assignments were based on speculation about levels of these measures that would be consistent with the fragmentary trends suggested by the survey data. For 1970, effectiveness was assumed to vary from .75 in the rural North and Northeastern regions to .85 in the urban Southeast. It was assumed that E converged on .90 for urban areas and on .85 for rural areas in 1980 as cc~ntracentive use spread. The user rate was assumed to range from .05 for the rural North and Northeast to .55 in the urban Southeast in 197G, and was increased to .35 and .60 for the 1980 assumptions. It should be stressed again that these are merely illustrative f igures ; they are based on speculation about possible regional patterns . . . Of contraceptive use and effectiveness derived from the fragmentary evidence presented in Table 11. Actual numbers on which to base such an assessment simply do not exist. These illustrative figures will be incorporated below in the calculation of overall national-level estimates of the proximate determinants of fertility once similar speculative estimates of the prevalence of abortion and breastfeeding have been described. 1

48 o U. o ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a' a' ~ a' · · · · · · ~ U] o ~ co a, U] :D . - N Sit a: ·e to `:: · Il3 ~ 1 In S ~0 : a, ~ \0 O Cot - o o Cal MU o X I:: o I: o C~ E~ ~: . - 3 ~Q o ,l U] s :~ o ~: o ~ o ~ o U~ · · ~ · ~ · ~ x a, U] tn a' ~ 0 ~r ~o ~ ~ ~ o ~ o o o tQ · · · · ~ ~ · . - ~:s ~n CD o ~ U~ o ~ O a' 0 ~ a, a) ~ a' ·.- ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q. tn U] o ~ o o o U~ ~ . ~o ~ ~ c~ ~r · · ~ - - · ._1 U] 0 ~n ~ ~ l— C~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~r ~ 0 0 - 0 ~? · · · · · · ~ a uo ~ o ~ u~ o E~ co a, ~ ~ a' e 0 0 ~ e _1 0 u~ U~ u~ O IO c~ ~ 0 ~n ~ ~ 0 · · · · · · ~ O O e - ~r: GS ~ 1 1 S 1 0 0 U] U] ~ ~ U] ~ S S I~ ttS ~YJ O O Z Z · — tn u, c: t8 :: a: 1 1 tn ~n 3 3 · e C) U ~: ~ ~ N O O Le ~Z ~ C U] a, 4 O O o ~ o S~ a a ·0 SJ o U)

49 Abor t ion Abortion is illegal in Brazil, and the Brazilian penal code carries a sanction of several years of imprisonment at hard labor for both abortionists and women who practice it (Milanesi, 1970:12-13). However, the code is rarely invoked, except as a legal ploy in such efforts as the attempt to block the importation and use of the IUD as an ~abortifacient. n A ~ rtion is believed to be widespread; rates of mortality and hospitalization resulting from abortion-related infections are high, though not well documented. There are no reliable statistical data on abortions at the national level in Brazil, though there are reported estimates (based on some rather implausible extrapola- tions from the experience of hospitals in a few locale i ties ) . According to these estimates, the annual number of abortions runs as high as three million per year, which would mean eight abortions for every ten live births (Rodrigues et al., lB75; Carvalho et al.' 1981). The hand evidence that does exist suggests that ~ or, urban, and noncontracepting women are more likely to resort to induced abortion, and that only a fraction of there women identify themselves when the question is asked in survey interviews. Martine ( 1975) suggests that another reason for low observed abortion rates is the high mortality rate among women having abortions who, as a consequence, would not be accounted for. Questions on abortion have been asked in a number of fertility surveys conducted in Brazil since the early 1960s, including the NIER and CPS; these provide a basis for calculation of the abortion index. The way the incidence of abortion is reported varies by survey. For purposes of calculating Bongsarts' index of the effect of abortion on fertility, the ideal would be the total induced abortion rate; thin is analogous to the total fertility rate and indicates the number of abortions a woman would have during her reproductive lifetime if current rates prevailed. Either annual age-specif~c abortion rates or the total number of abortions for women who have completed their reproductive life cycle could be used to calculate such a rate. Bows ever, samples are rarely large enough to give reliable estimates by the first method, and in only a few of the Brazilian studies are rates broken down by age. Varia- bility in measures affects both the numerators and denominators of rates. In some cases, numerators refer

so to induced abortion, in others to all abortions (spontane. ous and induced); some numerators indicate the number of abortions, others the number of women ever having had an abortion. Denominators include the number of women of reproductive age (usually restricted to women in unions) and/or the total number of pregnancies reported by these women. Table 13 summarizes available statistical information on abortion in Brazil. Hutchinson's data on Rio de Janeiro in 1963 indicate that 9 percent of married women of reproductive age had experienced an abortion, while a 1965 REWRAP study of Sao Paulo reveals that 18 percent of pregnancies ended in abortions, about one-third of which were induced. Martine's data on poor women in Rio de Janeiro in 1969 suggest a substantially higher incidence of abortion amona low-income arouDs. _ Etges' study of three municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul in 1973 shows a higher rate of induced abortions as a percent of all pregnancies in Porto Alegre than in two smaller municioal° ities that he sampled. Questions on abortion have been included in all six of the CPSs for which tabulations are available. Women were asked how many abortions (spontane- ous and induced} they had experienced, and whether their last abortion was spontaneous or induced. The proportion of induced abortions in the ~978 Sao Paulo survey was much lower (closer to one ninth) than the one°third figure of ache 1965 Sao Paulo survey: this suggests (l) that induced abortion is underreported in the CPS data, and/or (2) that a higher level of contraceptive use in 1978 Nay have resulted in a substitution of contraception for abortion (Nakamura et ale, 1979:17). The proportion of women reporting having had an induced abortion was hither in urban areas of Sao Paulo. In other CPSs, the propor- tion of women reporting that they had ever had an abortion was higher in rural areas, but the proportion of preq- nancies ending in abortion was higher in urban areas. CPS abortion data have been tabulated by women's age; this permitted a rough approximation of the total abortion rate, which was calculated as the proportion of the difference between the total pregnancy rate and the total fertility rate that could be attributed to induced abortion. This difference averaged . S7 per woman in the Northeast, where the total fertility rate was 6. 3 per woman. If the reported 10-}5 percent share of induced abortion were accepted, the total abortion rate would be a very low .06 to .08 per woman; if all reported termina- tions of pregnancy were attributed to induced abortion,

51 then the total induced abortion rate would be .57 per woman. Berquo {1980) has calculated total abortion rates for the nine localities included in the NIHR survey. These range from .068 abortions per woman in Santa Cruz-Urban in the state of Rio Grande do Sul to .735 in Parnaiba- Rural in the state of Piaui. There is no consistent rura1-urban pattern, though there is a suggestion that abortion rates are higher in larger cities and in poorer reg ions . I ~ is also pass ible to speculate on total abortion rates using CPS data on the proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion. In Salvador, Bahia, for example, assuming that one-third of reported abortions are induced and the total fer tility rate is about 4, the total induced abor tion rate would be about 0 2 per woman, for Bahia-RuraL, with a total fertility rate of 7, the total abortion rate is about the same. For Recife, calculation based on a total fer tility rate of 4 yields an abor tion rate of . 25 per woman, about half of the rate indicated in the NIHR data; this is again consistent with the interpretation that tl) the CPSs underreport abortion more than does the NIMR survey, and/or ( 2 ) increased contraceptive use is being substituted for abor tion. The Bongaarts index for measuring the effect of abortion on- the fertility rate is defined by the expression Ten C_ ~ ~ a ~ TFR ~ 0.4 {Lou) TAR _, where "u. is the parameter already estimated when calcu- lating the contraception rate. Ca becomes zero if all pregnant yes are abor ted, and is equal to 1 if all at e successful. In applying this index to recent Brazilian fertility trends, one can at best speculate on orders of magnitude suggested by these survey results for the total induced abor tion rate. There are several qualif ications to be noted here. First, it is very likely that the survey data presented above greatly understate the abor- tion rate. Second, in addition to showing the prevalence of abortion, war iation in 80ngsarts ' abortion index also reflects the level of fertility and of contraceptive use ( to the extent that both, in turn, are related to the potential number of pregnancies to be abor ted) . Thus abor tzon, contraception, and fertility must be balanced in any calculations. Finally, uncer tainty about the level of the abor tion rate also relates to the impact of

52 - o U] _t N ·o C) L. U] o a 3 U] o o I' lo: ~ _ _ o' ~n ~ ~ CS: .. .. 1— ·e a ~ _ _ —_. O 0C V 5: · U' — _ · - ·. ·. U~ U~ U~ _ _ _ O O :' ~ ·-o ~r Ll Ld J ~ ~ v ~ m x: ~ ~ c o - ~5 o o U' 1 o r~ 3 n ·. ·— _ _ 0° E v a' Z ,. 3 y 2 Cl _ u' ~ ,n ~n ~o ~ ~ `xs ·....... E~ ~ U U U ·- a, co ~ a' o~ ~ ~4 ~ ~4 _. - · JJ ~ ~ a~ oo a' ,6 _ ~ ~ ~o Y ~ Q ~ ~ 2 e; ~ D; C' E- E~ ~ ~ ~ ~4 #~ a~ ~ a~ _ _ _ _ · · · · ~ —~ d _I _ 18 .o ~ (0 ~ 0 ~ :3 ~ ~ ~ :5 ~ ~ 0, _ - 4 _ _ _ 0~] C ~ ~ ~ 0 O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ —~ ~ _ _ _ U O ~ U U c a~ c~ c c c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ q~ t,O {Q C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~r ~r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~r a' ~ c ~ ~ ~ c c I ~ I t I ~ _ I I . - -4 h4 ~ V ~ ~ ~ ~ U~ U~ U~ ~ U U ~ ~ t) m ~ ~ ~: 3 ~ ~ ~— ~: ~::~— C C 0 `4 ~ h4 ~a ~ ~ a, o, C ~ ~ a, ~ C C C C C ~ C C C C :: `` m`~` ~ ~ Ql :, · - ~ · ~ - ~ £ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ E ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ JJ O O O O O ~o ~ O O ~ L l~l Q ~ ~ ~ 3 o Q << ~ << `~` ~ o ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ o o ~ ~ ~ ¢ ¢ ~ ~ ~ 4J ~ ~ 4J' - ~ 4~ ~ 4 'C Ll ~ h4 ~ ~d ~o Ll ~ ~ )d O ~ ~ O =~ ~ 0 0 0 O ~ O n ~ 0 0 83 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Zi v U U -: U u~ U U ~: ~ ~ ·: ~ ~ ¢ ~ Q ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _1 A _~ —~ _~ ~ ~ —~ d e ~:~4 c c e C~ ~ A e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ¢ ¢ ¢ ~ ~ ~ ~ -: ¢ ¢ ~c ~' 43 X . . ~ eo a~ a~ m. ~ ~ ~. 0 0 JJ ~ \0 10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ cr' ~ ~ ~ ~ cr, a ~ .- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r~ ~ u' ~ ~ C~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 u' ~p · · · · · · · · · ~ o o c ~ . . o ~ lom ~ - ~ ~ - ~ to ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ co cr ~ ~ ~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - :' ~n o cn - = o o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~S - - ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ - eQ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ ~— V o o o o ~ o X o o o o tn a: u: ~ Pt O0 ~ tn ~n ~ P S: ~ e A ~ ~ 0 L~ ~ h4 ~ ~: 1 1 1 1 O O O O 0 Z ~ Z Z ~ O O O O _ tO ~ ~a I iV '~ C C 1 _ _ C, C, ~ V :3 :, O O O O _ _—~ _— _ P4 ~ ~ o: ~ ~

53 be:] D ~ "a D D a' a, En EN En ~ En he ae ·e ~ ·- oe D D D. D S: D ~ ID ~ (D ~ ~ o`m mm mm _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D D ~ D 0 E~ E~ E E 4J ~ ~ ~ 4J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m0' ~ ~ o`m 0 al ~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~o ~ o9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 —————— 3 :~ ~ :~ ~ ~ 3 ~ :~ :~ :~ ~ m. mm mm m. mm - m O O O O O O _ ~ _ _ _ ~ _— ~ —_ :, _ :, :~ :, :, ~o ~ ~ ~o = - ~ ~ ~ ~ =~= ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ Q ~ ~ ~: ~ ~ P a: a: ~ ~ c:: ~ ~ ~ m m m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ q, - - - 4 ~ ~ ~ ~1 D n ~ ~ D ~ ~ 41 ~ ~ 41 E~ ~ E E" E~ ~ ~ e~ ·e == D 3 D ~ —~ _1 ~ _1 ~ ~ _ a~ - ~D ~ ~ a, ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ o' ~ Ch ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~D D E~ ~ E~ o' _ _ _ O O O :, q, mm ~ 4~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ OQ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C t:: C C: ~ C ~ C ~ - ~r ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 _ _ _ 1 1 1 _ ~ _. _ _ _ _ —_. _ _ — U~ U~ ~ U U U ~ U~= U U U C C C ~ ~ ~ C: C C ~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 a 0 C, 0 a 0 0 0 c c e ~ c e c e c c e c~ ~ D~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m O O 0 4 ~ ~ O O O ~ ~ ~ =~= ~ == ~= ~ :~ ~ 04 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D' p. `~` `~` U U U ~ U ~ U · e ~ O e e ~ e e e ~ e :~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~ :~ ~ dJ ~ ~ ~ ~ dJ ~ ~ ^) ~ q:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ hd ~ t: ~ C ~ e ~ e ~ c g ~ ~ ~ ~ g g h ~ ~ ~ ~ _~ _~ —~ A _I ~ _1 _1 ~ _~ _I _~ ~ V ~ ~ ~ JJ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~C ~C e ~ E°~ e° ~° ~ ~° ~ r. ~o 0 ~o r~ ~ ~ c~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ · e 0 0 ~ e e ~ e e e e e e e e O e O 0 - 1 Y, ~ ~ ~ O— ~ I ~ ~ c~ ~ 4~ ~ EO. ~ ~o \0 C~ `0 e ~ e O o O o O O O O O O O O ~ U1 u~ ~n u~ u~ ~ u (D ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r. ~ ~ ~ ~ r. 0101 0\ °\ 01 ~ mm 01 ~ ~ ~ ~ 01 CR ~ ~ 0 _1 ~ ~ ~ _t e c Q 9 64 Ll :D :D ~ 64 _ ~ ~ _ U ,` Le 0= U O U D De C P P _ ~ _ ~Q ~ ~ _ ~ ~ o0 U) ~ ~ _ _ ~ ~ _ _ .. .. S:: C — U, ~ — ~ ~ C~ — _ _ Q 9 ¢: ~ 41 ~ ~ ~ us ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ an ~ e :'—~ `:— ,, O ~ 0 a ,5~ ~ ,,, Ll ~ O c .e ~ ~ :' U U U—~ ~C ~ _. S ~ ~ ~ :3 1 C ~ O— ~ 1 :' ~ :, ~ ~ ~ ~ 4` :' ~ ~ ~ ~ _ i~ 5m °= mO' ~ 8 ou ° ° I —~ == ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ W ~ ~ ~ ~ C ~ C— —— ~— ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U 3 C f:: S~ ~ S C U C ~ O ~ U dJ ~ ~ 43 ~ ~ ~ 41 ~ ~ ~ ~ 18 ~ d. O o.P. ~m mm mm—o ma~ mm ~o o.P.

54 nonmarriage. It is one thing to assume that most births accrue to women in unions; it is quite another to assume that all pregnancies, particularly those that are aborted, are within unions. In all likelihood, a significant fraction of abortions may be experienced by women who are not in unions. To the extent that these abortions are understated, the estimate of nonmarriage may be over- stated. FOE illustrative purposes, a range for the total abortion rate of 0.5 to 1.5 per women may be assumed. With an estimated 1976 fatal fertility rate of 4.4, yielding about 3.75 million births in Brazil, a range estimate of between 500, 000 and 1, 2SO, 000 annual induced abortions is implied. While these figures fall well below the 3 million annual abortions derived by extrapolation from newspaper and other reports, they seem more plaus- ible than the very low abortion rates yielded by survey data. Breastfeedinq/Postpart~m Amenorrhea Statistical data on breastfeeding and postpartum amenor- rhea in Brazil are also quite deficient. Questions on breastfeeding were included only in more recent inquiries ~ the NIBR and CPSO However, the data are more consistent for the purpose of calculating Bongaarts' index of the effect of postpartum infecundibility on fertility than was the case with abortion. Mean or median months of breastfeeding are provided in reports on the NIBR and CPS by Anderson et al. (1981) and Berquo (1980}, as shown in Table 14. Calculation of the Bongsarts index requires a transformation of mean or median months of breastfeeding to months of postpartum amenorrhea, which i s the ~ i. in the formula for the index: Ca ~ 20/18 . ~ ~ i. Anderson calculated i for Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Nor te, and Paraiba using the Lesthaege-Page model schedules, and a formula based on this schedule was used to transform the remaining observations. While not representative of the entire Brazilian population, the data in Table 14 do span a broad enough spectrum of experience, from poorer Northeastern areas to the industrialized Southeast and the more developed rural areas of the South, to permit speculation about a plau- sible national-level index. The index values in the table, as well as the breastfeeding data on which they are based, show that the practice of breastfeeding is

55 TABLE 14 Reported Breastfeeding, Su~ary of Survey Data: Brazil Plonthe of Breset- feeding Monthe of A~nor- rhea Index S ite of Survey Date Meen ~dian Median Ci . Sao Paulo~Urban 1978 < 1 20 0 .97 Sao Paulo~Rural 1978 7O. dO. .87 Pinui, Teresina 1979 3 0 3 2 0 7 0 94 Pieui- - st 1979 901 So3 ·84 Bahia p Salvador 1980 ~O 8 ~ ~ 2 ~ 9 . 93 Bahia-Rest 1980 9. ~ 3 0 B 4.0 .89 Paraibe-Urban 1980 4.7 <1 2. ~ .96 Paraiba-}tural 1980 5.5 10 8 3 0 2 . 92 Pern~-huco, Recife 1980 3O7 <1 2.2 .97 Pernambucs - Rest l9BO ~O ~ < 1 2 01 . 9? Rio Grande do tiorte-Urban 1980 4.2 <1 205 .95 Rio Grande do Norte-Rural 1980 5.0 <1 2.8 .g. Cachoeira-Urban (ES) 1975 8.5 5.0 .85 Santa Cruz-Urban (~;S1 1975 4.2 3OO O93 Santa Cruz-Rural (RGS) 1975 S.5 3.6 .9a Sao Jose-Urban (SP) 1975 6.0 3.8 .90 Sertaosin~Rural (SP) 1975 7.3 4. ~ .87 Recife-Urban (PB) 197S 3.3 20 7 .94 Conceicso A.-Rural (PA) 1975 8.5 5.0 .85 Parnaiba-Urban (P$) 1975 4.8 3.3 .92 Parnaiba-Rural (PI) 1975 603 3O9 .89 Sources: 1975 data froa Berquo (1980sTa:bl. II) S all otb'ar data fro. Anderson et a1. (1981:Table 5J. very lin~ited. Indeed, Brazil falls at the very low end of the spectrum of <:ountries for which breastfeeding data are available, including Latin American countries, which have low rates compared to other regions of the world (Kent, 1981~. The index values range from .84 to .97, with lower values (higher breastfeeding ~ in rural areas and higher values in the cities. Values are also higher in areas in which contraceptive use is higher, suggesting that the practice of breastfeeding decreases as contracep- tive use increases. These values are much more co~ar able to tho~e of o~er industtsalized countries than to those of developing countries' they are high even in comparison with other Latin American countries that also have higher values in comparison with other developing regions. ~For purposes of computing an index of postpartum infecundabili~cy at the national level, an initial 1970 level of 4 month e was assumed. Since there is evidence

~6 to suggest that increased contraceptive use leads to a decrease in breastfeeding, the assumption was reduced to 3.5 months in 1976 and 3 months in 1980 in the national- level estimates of proximate determinants that follow. A Speculative Overview of Trends in the Proximate Determinants of Total Fertility Rates, 1970-80 Table 15 links estimates of the total fertility rate to the total fecundity rate (assumed to be 15.3 births per woman) ~ using the evidence on contraception, abortion, and postpartum amenorrhea presented in the previous three sections on Bongsarts' indices for each of these proximate determinants It also incorporates the information on marriage rates discussed earlier in this chapter. Two variants are preseOnted for each of the three observation points: one assumes the lower value in ache range of estimates of the total abortion rate, with higher levels of contraceptive use (lower levels of the index of non- contraception); the other assumes lower contraceptive TABLE 15 Estimates of Proximate Determinants of Total Fertility Rate, 1970-80: Braz il 1970 1976 1980 Measure and variant A B A B A B Assumptione Percent users (U) 0032 0.25 0.47 0.~l 0052 Oe`46 Effectiveness (E) 0 0 80 0 0 80 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 Sterilization factor lelO loll 1~125 1~125 10125 1~125 Months of infecundity 4~0 4.0 3.5 3.S 3~0 3.0 Tom abortion rate 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.5 Besultea Total fecundity rate 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 Infecundity index ~ .89 0.89 0.91 0.91 0. 93 0 0 93 Natural Bar ital fertility 13 0 6 13. 6 13 0 9 13. 9 14 . 2 14. 2 Abortion index Q. 96 0.88 0.94 0.84 0 O 93 0.82 Contraception fertility 0.72 0.78 0.54 0.60 0.49 0~55 Total ~aarital fertility 9.34 9. 39 7 e 04 7 0 03 6 ~ 42 Be 42 Non~rriage index 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 Total Fertility Rate 5.89 5.92 4.43 ~ . 43 4.11 4.11 aData in se<:ond panel have been rounded s total fertility rate based on data before rounding.

57 use, and the higher estimate of the total abortion rate. This is only one of several tradeoffs that a range of values in the abortion rate implies. Higher abortion rates could also imply less effective contraception, as well as ~ lower impact of nonmar r iage to the extent that abortions are used to terminate the pregnancies of women outside of unions. The underlying assumptions are summarized in the first panel of the table. The contraceptive use and effective ness rates in van iant #A. are based on Table 12 0 The reduction in the contraceptive use rate in variant ABE is proportional to the increase in the abortion index implied by the higher total abortion rate. Both variants assume that there is a decline in postpartum infecundity of about 0.5 months from 1970 to 1976 that relates to increased contraceptive use, with a similar decline for 1976 to 1980. No change is assumed between 1970 and 1976 in the index of nonmarriage, which is consistent with the observed trend for that period, while a small increase is shown for 19800 In variant ~A., the main factor accounting for the decline in the total fertility rate from its level of around 5.9 in 1970 to 4.4 in 1976 is the decrease in Cc; this reflects increased contraceptive use, as well as increased effectiveness deriving from a higher propor- tion of more effective methods (the pill and steriliza- tion) among those used. To the extent that variant ~A. understates the abortion rate, this conclusion should be modified by assuming a smaller increase in contraceptive use, less improvement in contraceptive effectiveness, or a lower level of nonmarriage. variant ABE illustrates the first of these possibilities. Extrapolating to 198G, the table suggests that the pace of the decline in total fertility could be slower in the last half of the decade. This is partly a result of using levels of Cc in 1976 large enough to account for the 1970-76 decline, combined with Cc values for 1980 that are consistent with the survey results reported in Table 11. Variant ABE suggests an even slower decline in Cc, assuming that abortions played a greater role in the decline in total fertility than is implied in variant ~A. ~ It is worth noting that special tabulations of the 1977 and 1978 PNAI) survey data in fact suggest a slowing of the pace of the decline of total fertility (l~eite, 1981). An alternative hypothesis is that flange in the design of the 1976 survey produced an overstatement of the decline, a point that will prove difficult to test

58 until data for making alternative estimates of fertility during the decade become available (ye., 1980 census data, for which the own-children method could be applied). CONCLUSIONS . The 1970s brought a significant acceleration in the decline of fertility in Brazil: the crude birth rate fell from 41 per 1~000 in the late 1960s to 34 per 1,000 in the late 1970s, the total fertility rate, a more refined measure of fertility, declined from around 508 births per l,OOO women around 1970 to around 404 births by 1976. Of the three demographic factors that could account for a decline in the birth rate (proportions married, age structure, and marital fertility), declining marital fertility was clearly responsible for the change. Assessment of the effect of nuptiality on fertility is complicated by the questionable reliability of reported marital status in the availat~le census and survey data. A number of factors suggest that the proportion of younger women (up to age 25) reported as married has been under- stated. Doubts about the proportions married remain even after adjustments to include single women reporting births and separated women who might have entered into a second union and did not report it because divorce was not legally recognized. The whole question of pregnancies to women not in unions and the termination of such preg- nancies remains a major area of doubt in examining the prox ~ te determinants of Brazil's fertility decline. Calculations of the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) from census and survey data indicate a rise of about 0.8 years in the mean age at marriage between 1960 and 1970, and about half that from 1970 to 1976. An alternative measure of Me age at which women begin being exposed to the risk of childbearing, the singulate mean age at first birth, reveals a similar trend. Even after adjustment of the marital status data to account for possible undero reporting of the proportions married among women in their early twenties, there is little evidence of change between 1970 and 1976; this suggests that changes in marital status had only a limited effect on fertility decline during that interval. Because of the demographic echo of increased births in the l9SOs and 1960s, the age structure of the Brazilian population had a slightly positive impact on birth rates.

59 Thus, on the basis of an admittedly speculative recon- s traction of What could have happened. when Brazil' s accelerated fertility decline is decomposed into demo- graphic components and into the proximate determinants of fertility, it can be concluded that a decline in marital fertility was the primary factor responsible. This decline in marital fertility can in turn be traced to an increased use of effective contraception, combined with an indeterminate abortion component both within and outside of marriage. Though national-level data on the proximate variables are lacking, survey data can be used to construct a nat$onal-level index of noncontraception, which declined from . 72-0 78 in 1970 to . 54-. 60 in 1976 and ·49.O55 in 1980, suggesting that increased contracep~ tion played a major role in the decline. Survey data also indicate a very low prevalence of breastfeeding, and suggest a moderate attenuation of the fertility-reducing effect of postpartum amenorrhea as contraception increased. The major unknown variable is abortion. The more one accepts the f ragments of evidence that abortion is widespread in Brazil, particularly among low~income g roups, the more one must ad just the importance attached to increased contraception and no change in marriage r ates. Finally, it should be emphasized that doubts remain about the reliability of data on marital status, particle larly since a significant number of pregnancies mung women not in unions may be terminated by abortion, and informal unions may be formalized only after a live birth. Census and survey data on the proportion of women in unions may therefore reflect after-the-fact social adjust- ment processes more than ache exact demographic accounting needed to decompose the proximate determinants of fertility.

CHAPTER 2 SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFE=NTI=S IN FERTILITY TIae evidence presented in Chapter 1 indicated that fer- tility had already declined prior to 1970 in more developed regions such as the Southeast, particularly among higher-income groups, but not Hong lower-income groups and regions. It also suggested that the overall accelerated decline after 1970 probably resulted from the spread of lower fertility to those latter groups. The objective of the present chapter is to identify these groups more precisely. This should make it possible to focus an explanation of the post-1970 accelerated decline more sharply on particular groups, and on specific socio- economic changes that may have affected their reproductive behavior c Evidence presented in this chapter is based on data from the public use sample of the 1970 census and the 1976 PNAD national sample survey, both of which include questions on average parity and on births in the year prior to the interviews Responses were tabulated by household income, education of women, rural-urban resi- dence, and region. Indirect estimating techniques were used to derive total fertility rates for women in differ- ent education and income categories. Considerable caution is required in interpreting the results since most of the assumptions on which the techniques are based are violated in such an exercise. This problem is complicated by the fact that the severity of these violations can vary between categories of income and education into which the population has been grouped. For example, the assumption of constant fertility would be violated to a greater extent among higher income and education groups if they had been experiencing more rapid fertility decline than lower income and education groups--the situation in Brazil in 1970. Moreover, once the population has been 60

~1 divided into education and income classes, these cannot be cons idered ~closed. populations, another requirement for valid application of the techniques. Sampling error is a further problem when such divisions are made, par- ticularly for repor ted bir ths in the year pr for to the interview. These biases can be reduced but not eliminated by us ing fewer categor ies of each vat table to increase settle size. In the study of fertility differences by income category cited in Chapter 1, Carvalho and Paiva ( 1976) reported that such a procedure reduced the impact of interclass mobility on their estimates. This problem may be less ser ious for breakdowns of the population by education than by income since most women, except the small proportion with university education, would have completed the it education by the time they reached thei r late teens. E OUCATION AND FERTILl rY DECLINE To examine the relation between Per tility and education, women were divided into three broad education categories, with education defined according to years of schooling completed: women with no schooling, those with 1-4 years of schooling, and those with ~ or more years. This break- down sect if ices some specif icity among higher educational groups for a reduction in sampling error and in the mobil- ~ty bias mentioned above. In preliminary tabulations, the effect of education on fertility varied by ruralo urban residence, suggesting that rural and urban women should be separated in the discussion of educational difo f erences. To reduce the sampling error that resulted from having so few rural women with more than 4 years of schooling, only two rural education classes were created: ~none. and many education.. Computations of total fertility rates for women in different education groups are based on the adapted Brass methodology described in Indirect Techniques for Demo graphic Estimation tUnited Nations, 1983); in this method, r eference per Sod error in the reporting of bit ths during the year pr for to the census or survey is corrected using a f actor der iced f tom compar isons between repot ted par ity at different ages and the parity that would accrue if current fertility were cumulated (P/F ratios). Although reference per iod error would be expected in the 1970 data, which are based on a question about births In the last year, that error should have been minimal in the

62 1976 survey, which recorded the date of the lash birth. Estimates prepared for the Panel on Brazil indicated an average P/F of 1.32 for Brazil in 1970 and 1.22 in 1976; this falls to 1.07 in estimates of total fertility based on advanced tabulations of the 1980 census. The 1976 P/F ratios suggest that reference period error was still present; one reason for this is that the survey was con- ducted over several weeks, and the year interval identi- f fed in Me tabulations may have excluded recent births e The Panel on. Brazil elected to employ the P/F ratio ad justment in 1976, as discussed further in its report. Them problems, as well as the others mentioned above (interclass mobility, interclase differentials in recent fertility decline, and sampling error), have undoubtedly affected the results reported in Table 16, which presents entitles of total fertility for women grouped according to educational attainment and rural-urban residence. The results are arranged in separate panels for 1970 and 19760 The first row in each panel shows unadjusted rates based on reported births in the precarious year; the second row gives the average P/F ratio f or women aged 20-24 and 25-29. The unadjusted data suggest a strong negative correlation between years of schooling and total fertil- ity. The question arises of whether reference period error was higher among less-educated women. In L970, the Pi/? ratio was 1.37 for urban women with no education and about .10 lower for urban women with some education. It is doubtful that enough women in their twenties shifted from the ~none. class to the 1-4 group for interclass shifts to have accounted for this. On the other hand, it is possible that the P/F ratio for the 5+ group may be exaggerated since these women had been experiencing more rapid fertility decline prior to 1910. Although the 1916 results suggest that fertility decline has indeed spread to lower education groups, problems arising from P/F ratios make it very difficult to determine how much. Interclass shifting of women may have had a greater effect since P/F ratios dropped from 1.21 in the ~none. group to 1.07 in the 5+ group at the Bum. time that the percent of women in the ~none. group declined from 13.6 in 1970 to 9.5 in 1976; the 5+ cate- gory increased from 220L to 30.7 percent. The 1976 results could also reflect higher reference period error among less-educated women. That survey's enumerators were better trained and supervised than those of the census, a point which suggests that reference period error, if present in 1976, could be related to the

~3 TABS 16 Total Fertility Rates by Years of Schooling, 1970-76: Brazil Years of Schooling Urban Rurs1 Year and Measure Total cone 1-4 5+ None Sow 1970 1976 Unadjusted TFa 4.37 5~02 3et7 2~28 6031 5~27 P/F Ratio. 1033 1~37 1~26 1027 1~32 1~32 Adjusted TPR 5081 6090 4.74 2091 8031 6094 Percent Distribution 100.0 13~6 27~6 22~1 20~8 lSo9 Unadjusted T~ 3.64 4~51 3~26 2~22 5099 lo63 P/F Ration 1~22 1~27 1024 1007 1031 1.12 Adjusted TFR 4~42 5070 d.06 2037 7084 5018 Percent Distr ibution 100. 0 9.5 28 0 2 30.7 12.9 18 0 7 Percent Decrease Unadl~u~t~ 16~7 l0~2 13~5 2~6 501 12~1 AdjUSt" TO 2309 17~3 14~5 18~6 5~7 25~4 Mean web at Flrst Birth 1970 1976 23028 21~86 22~7Ei 2SoO. 2ct.95 23~48 23 0 84 2lo 91 22.30 26.08 22.08 23 ~ 70 aAdjus~nts b"ed on mirage of P/F ratios for - _n aged 20-24 and 2S-29. bBased on reported percent of coven with zero par ity, af ~ r al Badry correction of nonreporting woven (~e United cations, 1983). Sources s Be rived fray 3~970 census arid 1976 P - D s~1e files. ability to recall the date of the last bir=. If so, education, rather than the quality of interviewing, would account for differentials in reference period error. However, if fertility actually did decline more rapidly between 1970 and 1976 among less~educated women, this, too, could have inflated their P/E ratio. Educational differentials in fertility with and without the P/F adjustment can be humanized according to differences between rates for women reporting a given level of education and women with no education. In 1970, unadjusted total fertility for urban women with 1-4 years of school was 1.25 children lower than for women with no schooling, and 2.74 lower for women with 5 or more years of schooling. These differentials increased to 2.15 and

64 3.99 children, respectively, when rates were ad justed using observed P/F ratios. The dif ferential between rural women with no education and some education was one child when unadjusted data were used, and 1.37 children with the ad justment; though rural P/F ratios are equal, the adj ustment process increases the dif ferential between the two groups because of the larger base rate for women with no education. In 1976, the differential between unadjusted fertility rates for urban women with no educe tion and those with 1-4 years of schooling was again 1. 25 children, but decreased to 2.29 children for the 5+ group. With the adjustment, the differentials were 1.64 children and 3. 33 children, respectively. Either way, educational differentials In fertility appear to narrow among urban women (when these differentials are expressed in numbers of children). For rural women, the opposite is true, since the 1976 differential was 1.36 with unadjusted data and 2. 66 af ter ache ad j ustment ~ see Figure 7 ) . The pattern of differentials in fertility decline between 1970 and 1976 is highly sensitive to P/F adjust- ments. For urban women, the category that appears least affected is the 1-4 group, whose decline was about 14 percent; however, its P/F ratios could have been biased upward both by fertility decline and by popula~cion shifts. For women with no education, the decline increases from 10 percent in the unadjusted rates to 17 percent after adjustment. For women with 5+ years of schooling, the decline increases from 3 percent to nearly 19 percent; the P/F ratio drops from 1.27 in 1970 to 1.07 in 1976 for that group. Although the result for rural women with no education are not affected by the adjustment, it causes the decline for rural women with come education to double. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about educa- tional differentials in fertility decline from these results. For urban women, unadjusted data suggest that declines were greatest for women with 1-4 years of school. Adjusted results suggest that declines were greater among women with 5 or more years of schooling. since there is reason to suspect that the 1970 P/F ratio for women in the 5+ group was biased upward by declining fertility, the 1970-76 decrease indicated by the adjusted data is probably exaggerated. A conclusion, tentative at best, is that urban fertility decline was probably more rapid among women with less education, leading to a narrowing of educational differentials among urban women; for rural women, those with no education experienced the least decline, leading to a widening in these differentials.

61 ~ 4 o 10 9 8 F UR BAN None (17) - - '- 5 . G I _ ul tto 4 Y - n _ (151 5+ Years o 1970 65 1976 1 970 YEAR RURAL _ \ Some (253\ 1976 FIGURE t Total Fertility Rate by Years of Schooling, 1970 and 1916: Brazz1 Note: Percent decreases shown in parentheses.

66 I t is also important to observe that the total per- centage fertility decline between 1970 and 1976 exceeded the decline in all but one education/residence category ( the ad justed rates for rural women with some education) O This is because the percentage distr ibution of women among education/residence categories changed between 1970 and 1976. The percentage of women in the urban ~none. class declined from 1306 percent to 9.5 percent, while the rural ~none. dropped from 20.8 percent to 12.9 percept e The shares of the urban 5+ class increased from 2201 percent to 3007 percent, while the rural ~some. group rose from 15.9 to 1807 percent. The urban 1-4 group was more stable in percentage terms though it is important to recognize that this stability masks cons siderable shifting into and out of the group as a consequence of changes in the shares of adjacent groups. Because of these changes in composition, the average decline for all classes combined exceeds percentage declines within classes. Insights into the relationship between education and fertility that can be extracted from tabulations of questions on children ever born and children born in the last year are not limited to computation of total fer- tility ratese Tabulations of f irst bir~che from these data mate it possible to measure educational differences in the singulate mean age at first birth using the tech. nique described earlier. These averages are shown in the last panel of Table 160 In 1970, there is a difference of less than one year between urban women in the tenoned category and those with 1-4 years of schooling. A much larger difference, 2. 3 years, separates the 1-4 and 5+ groups. There is a differential of about 1.5 years between rural women with no schooling and those with some schoolinge The main change in 1976 is that the average age at first birth for urban women in the 5+ group increases to 26.1 years, while the average for women in the 1-4 group drops slightly, increasing the difference between these groups to nearly 4 years. Since the reliability of these measurements could have been affected by the shifting of women from one education group to the next, by declining fertility, and by semolina error. caution is required in interpreting them. . Ilowever, it is probably safe to say that these difference" in age at first birth are one of the main features of educational differentials in Brazil- ian fertility. This could be the result of later mar- riage, labor force participation, and other aspects of

67 the changing roles associated with increased education. Educational differences in the singulate mean age at marriage measure were not computed because of previously mentioned doubts about the reliability of the reporting of marital status. FAMILY INCOME Published results of the 1976 PNAD survey included tabu- lations of fertility questions according to household income categories (in multiples of the monthly salary at the time of the survey). Berquo (1980) has co ~ area estimates of total fertility based on these tabulations to estimates of fertility by minimum salary groups in 1970 census data, with results as shown in Table 17. These estimates suggest that the greatest decline in total fertility between 1970 and 1976 occurred among the lowest-income groups. This suggests important changes in the pattern of ~ncome-related fertility differentials in Brazil because declines prior to 1970 clearly had been concentrated in h~gher-income groups. These changes have stirred considerable interest in the question of why rapid fertility decline spread to low~income women. Before this question is explored in detail in subsequent chapters, the remainder of the present chapter describes more precisely TABLE 17 Total Fertility Rates by Family Income Level (multiples of monthly minimum salary), 1970 and 1976: Brazil Monthly Income: Multiples of the Minimum Salary Total Fertility Rate Percent 1970 1976 Decline <1 1.66 6.11 20.2 - <1 to <2 6.20 5.94 4.2 <2 to <5 4.35 4.07 6.4 - >5 2.60- 2~54 2.3 Source: Berquo (1980)' using 1970 census and 1976 PNAD survey data.

68 changes in the relationship between income and fertility in Brazil. There are several ways in which the rates reported in Table 17 are ambiguous or might have been distorted. One relates to the effect of changes in the composition of women by income class. Again, in no group, including the lowest-income, does the decline exceed the 24 percent average for all groups combined, suggesting that changing composition has been at work. The effects of changing composition by income class are more complicated than the changes in education described above. There is an added problem of definition: the meaning of minimum salary categories as indices of poverty or wealth changed over the period from 1970 to 1976 because of deterioration in the purchasing power of the minimum salary; thus fer- tility changes observed for a particular minimum salary class could reflect the movement of women into or out of the class, or changes in the way that the class reflects income distribution. In 1970, 39 percent of families reported income levels of one minimum salary or less, and 21 percent had two or more. By 1976, the share of families with less than one minimum salary had fallen to 21 percent, while those with two or more had increased to 54 percente The extent to which these shifts represent interclass mobility rather than changes in the meaning of minimum salary classes is ambiguous. Either could explain why the largest fertility declines seem limited to the lowest minim salary group. Nearly half of the worn in the one-two class in 1976 belonged to the less than one class in 1970, which means Mat they could well have experienced a decline from 7066 to Se94 (22 percent), a figure that is closer to the national average. Another ambiguity relates to the extent to which these changes in composition, as well as interclass differen- tials in prior fertility decline and sailing error, may have distorted P/F ratios used to adjust total fertility rates reported in Table 17. If the tabulations by educa- tional level are a valid indication, there could be major problems. A third ambiguity, also suggested by the education results, arises from the possible marking of quite dif- ferent rural and urban patterns in income group averages that combine rural and urban women. Access to the raw data files for both the 1970 census sample and the 1976 PNAD survey make it possible to experiment with alternative tabulations by income class aimed at reducing, or at least clarifying, these distor-

69 tions. To avoid the def initional problem arising from categorizing income groups according to minimum salary, families were regrouped into family income deciles (with f amilies in multifamily households considered as separate units). In doing this, a choice had to be made between total family income and family income per capita. Neither measure was entirely satisfactory: for a given level of income, grouping by total income understated the relative prosperity of smaller households, whereas grouping by income per capita led to a clustering of higher-fertility women in the lower-income category. When total fertility rates for women categorized as low-income by both definio tions were compared to results for women with no educa- tion, the rate for the low per capita category was higher, enough so that the grouping by total family income was selected. In tabulating questions on fertility for different family income defiles, decile categories were grouped to reduce sampling error and the impact of interclass mobility. The following groups were adopted: in urban areas, deciles 1-3 were labeled ~low,. deciles 4-6 ~middle,. and defiles 7-10 ~high.; in rural areas, the top two groups were combined because of sampling error arising from the limited n ~ er of cases in the 7-10 category. Interclase mobility is reduced but not eliminated by this grouping since The defiles refer to the distribution of all families, and the composition of groups could change as a result of changes in the distribution of women by place of residence or income. Total fertility rates calculated from responses to fertility questions tabulated for groups of family income deciles are presented in Table 18. The format of the table is similar to that of Table 16, which described fertility differences by educational level: unadjusted rates in the first row, followed by observed P/F ratios, adjusted rates, and the percentage distribution of women in 1970 and 1976. The table also shows percentage decreases in rates from 1970 to 1976 and singulate mean ages at first birth for both dates. In the unadjusted rates for 1970, total fertility for the urban low group was actually .4 children less than for the middle group. The reason Mat this did not show up in Table 16 is Mat in 1970, the majority of low-incoI'ae women resided in rural areas, which weighs heavily in the overall low-income average. Unadjusted total fertility for urban women in the high-income class was over 2 chil- dren lower than for those in the middle class, and in

70 TABLE 18 Total Fertility Rates by Family Income Dec iles, 1970-76: Brazil F~ily Inca" Decile Urban Rure1 Year and Measure To"1 ~ Middle Eligh ~ Eligh . . ... . _ . _ . 1970 1 O7~ Unad] usted T~ ~ 0 3t ~ 0 36 ~ 0 75 2.69 6 71 ~ 0 99 P/P Batioa 1033 1038 1022 loU 1019 1053 AdJusted TF~ 5081 5.99 5.82 3088 8.00 7.66 Percent Distr ibution 100.0 10. 8 16.5 35 .8 17. 8 19 .1 Adjusted TFR 3064 3.98 3.9S 2.08 6.50 ~oll P/l' Ratio. 1022 1.10 1014 1.45 1.03 1045 Adjusted SFR dod2 do3~7 4~52 3~02 6070 5~86 Percent Dlatribution lOOoO 12~2 18~6 37~7 13~4 ,8~1 Percent Decrease UnadJusted TFR 16.1 8.7 16.8 22.7 3.1 17.6 Adiusted SPR 23.9 27.0 22.3 22.2 16.3 22.2 Mean Aoeb at First Birth 1970 23 o28 22.03 21e 46 25 0 16 20 ~ 51 24 ~ 28 1976 23.84 21. 32 21. S2 26 ~ 30 20.48 24 0 70 aAdjus~nts b~d on average of P/F ratioa for - _n agQd 20-~. - ~l 25-29. bBased on reported perc~t of ~_n with zero p—~ty, af~r E1 R~ry correction of nonreporting wc_n (~ United Nations, 1983). Sources' Derived fr~ 1970 ce~u~ and 1976 PRaD ~p1e files. rural areas about 1.7 children lower for middle and high deciles combined. Unad3us ted total fertility declined by about 17 percent overall from 1970 to 1976. Rates for the urban low and middle groups were about the same, and the pattern of differences ~mong other groups was similar to that of 1970. The rural low group declined feast g however, the weight of this group decreased, while that of low urban women increased. The unadjusted rates suggest that fertility decline was greater am~ng the middle- and highoincome groupa. The picture changes considerably when rates are adjusted using the observed P/F ratios: incame differen- tials narrow for both urban and rural women because of the high P/F ratios of high-income women. This is surely a distortion that reflects the declining fertility of

71 women in this group. Because 1976 P/F ratios were lower for all women except those in the urban high-income group, the adjusted rates suggest more rapid declines than do the unadjusted rates. The pattern of fertility decline by income class also changes, with the adjusted rates indicating that decline to have been greatest among low- income urban women and least among low-income rural women. Though the P/F ratio of high-income women is probably distorted, there is little change in it from 1970 to 1976; thus the percentage decline for the group is unaffected. The insights provided by these results about income class differentials in the level and percentage decline of fertility between 1970 and 1976 are thus clouded by distortions in the P/F ratios. However, they do suggest a need to modify the conclusion reported earlier that fertility decline was concentrated in the lowest-income group and that little or no decline occurred at higher levels. Moreover, the results indicate that if fertility decline was greater among low-income women, it was among low-income urban women; in fact, they suggest that the rate of decline was lowest among low-income rural women. Otherwise, the evidence reported here indicates that fertility decline was more evenly spread across income classes. If this is so, education may have played a more important role than income In differentials in the rate of decline between 1970 and 1976. There may also be an interaction between education and income; that is, fer- tility change may be related to a woman's level of educa- tion, but the nature of this relation may vary by income class. The last bit of information about income class differs entials in fertility relates to the measure of mean age at first birth. The patterns here are similar to those observed in the educational breakdowns, with a differ- ential of about 3 years separating high-income women from other groups in 1970 and an increase in this differential to about 4 years for urban women in 1976. This again raises the question of what socioeconomic forces led to increases in age at first birth for these women and not for women in lower income and education groups; it also raises the question of how differences by income and education relate to each other. A partial answer to the last question is provided by an examination of joint percentage distributions of women by educational attainment and family income level, as shown in Table 19. The base for the percentages is the total number of women aged 15-49; thus each cell in the

72 TABLE 19 Percent Distribution of All Women Aged 15-49 by Income Deciles, Years in School, and Rural-Urban Residence, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Yearn of Schooling Urban Rural Year and Income Decile alone 1-4 5+ None Some 1970 _, Urban I.ow 4.78 4.46 1.52 Urban Middle 4.93 8.27 3.26 -- Urban High 3.83 14.83 17.29 ~ — Rural Low ~ -- 12.20 5. 54 Rural Bigh ~ 8.73 10. 36 1976 Urban' Low 3.74 5.79 2.62 -- Urban Middle 3.46 9034 5.79 °- ° Urban High :!o32 130113 22.27 — ~ Rural Low °~ -a 7.21 6020 Rural Bigh - 5.69 12. 44 Sources: Tabulations of 1970 census and 1976 survey data files. table shows the percent of women in a particular income/ education group, with the sum of all cells rather than either rows or column" adding to 100 percent. The dis- tributions show that there is a loose correspondence in the data, but hardly an exact fit, between income level and educational attainment. This correspondence ~ mea- sured by comparing percentages in each cell, is closer when one examines the distributions of educational attainment within income groups (reading across rows); the picture is less clear in the distribution of women by income level within education categor ies ( reading down COlUmnS)e There is a closer correspondence in rural areas and at higher levels of income and education in the urban population: for example, the majority of women with higher educational attainment are found in higher- income defiles. This is not true of urban women with

73 lower educational attainment, who appear to have a better chance of attaining the middle- or upper-income decides. This indicates a need to take account of the role of education and other features of the urban environment (particularly labor force participation) in examining differentials in fertility by income class, and vice versa. TEE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF INCOME DIFFERENCES The regional dimension of decliner in total fertility by income level is examined in Table 20.1 Rates were cal- culated for three groups of PNAD regions, which were combined to preserve an adequate sample size in the tabulation by income defiles. Regions 1 and 2 (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo), which represent the highest levels of income and socioeconomic development in Brazil, were combined and are labeled as ~RJ-SP.. A second combination consists of PNAD regions 3 and 4 (Parana/ Santa Catarina/Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais/Espirito Santo), which represent intermediate levels of income and other development indicators and are labeled as ~Other.. Region 5 consists of Brazil poorest region, the North- eastern states, so labeled. PNAD regions 6 and 7 are not shown because only their urban population was available in the 1976 sample. Family income groups were also con- ~olidated to reduce sampling error: in urban areas, the lowest six and highest four deciles were combined, and all rural women were combined. The discussion is limited to unadjusted total fertility rates. In 1970' previously observed (Chapter 1) patterns of interregional differentials in fertility were maintained within each broad category of family income. Fertility was lowest in the high-income region and highest in the low-income region. Interregional differentials were greatest among low-income urban women. Within regions, the differential between low- and high-income urban women was greatest in the Northeast and least in Rio and Sao Paulo. However, the differential between low-income urban women and rural women generally {most of whom are lower-income) is greatest in the middle group. In 1976, the pattern charged e Most Importantly, rates for women in middle-income regions moved closer to those for women in Rio and Sao Paulo. In fact, the rates for urban low-income women were lower in the "other. region, so that the within-region differential for urban women

74 TABLE 20 Unadjusted Total Fertility Rate by PNAD Region and Income Decile, 1970 and 1976: Brazil PNAD Reg ion Year and RJ-SP Other Northeast Decile (1-2) (3-4) (S) 1_ I_ Urban/Low-Middle 3 . 85 4 0 27 SO 41 Urban/Middle 20 47 2. 67 30 37 Rural/All 4.82 5. 62 6.39 Urban/Low-Middle 3 . S1 3. 32 4. 8S Urban/lligh 2.01 2.04 4.43 Rural/All 4.42 4.43 6.06 Percent Decrease . ~ Urban/Liow-Middle 8 e 8 22e 2 It) o 4 Urban/Bigh 18.6 23 0 6 2901 Rural/All 8 ~ 3 21e 2 5 o 2 Source: Unadjusted total fertility rates derived from special tabulations of census and survey files. was less for this region than for R;r-sp. The reason for this is that fertility rates for all classes of women declined more rapidly in the former. Declines were least rapid in Rio and Sao Paula since their rates were lower to begin with in 1970. The greatest percentage decline occurred awns high-income urban women in the Nor~cheast, while the lowest percentage decline was mung rural women in that region. In assessing these patterns, it is also important to take account of the relative size of each region's income classes, since both the percentage decline and weight of each group in the total namer of women account for their contributions to the overall fertility decline. Table 21

f 5 TABLE 21 Percent Distr ibution of Women Aged 15-49 by PNAD Region and Income Deciles, 1970 and 1976: Brazil PNAD Reg ion Other Northeast Year and R3-SP Decile (1-2) (3-4) {5) (6-7) Total ~ . , . 1970 1976 Urban/Low-Middle 708 7.8 9.2 2.5 27.3 Urban/High 19.9 9.0 4.7 202 35.8 Rural/~11 4. 6 150 5 160 8 a 36.9 Total 32.3 32.3 30~7 4.7 100.0 Urban/Low-Middle 9.7 8.1 9.7 3.1 31.2 Urban/High 19.1 10.7 4.7 2.3 37.4 Rural/All 3~7 13.2 14.5 a 31.4 Total 33.1 32.6 28.9 5.4 100.0 .. aRegions 6-7 included for comparison, but rural population of these regions not included in total. Source: Special tabulations of census and survey data files. shows the percentage distributions of women aged 15-49 by region and income class for 1970 and 1976. The total number of women at each date is the base of the percant- ages. The group with the largest share {nearly 20 per- cent) of women--the higher-income deciles in Rio and Sao Parlor had an 1B.6 percent fertility decline. Although this was below the national average since this group already had comparatively low fertility in 1970, it was important because of the weight of this group in the total. The group with the greatest percentage decline in fertility--the higher-income women in the Northeast-- accounted for a relatively small share (less than 5 percent) of women (see Figure 8~. The important groups in terms of larger weight in the total and higher percentage declines were women in the middle-income ~other. region. They accounted for a little less than one-third of all women, and experienced

76 40 30 20 10 o Rural/MI Income Groups UrbanlHigh Income UrbanlLow-Middle Income 1 ~ 100 ~ _ .~.......... ................ ................ :-:-:-:-:-:~:-:-:-:- ...~.~........... ..~...~......... ....~............ :::::::::: . ~ ::::::::.: .............. .. .................. ...22".22.2. _ .-.:.: :-:-: _ -~ CL l_ 20 TOTAL RIO DE JANEIRO OTHER NORTH- SAO PAU LO EAST 80 60 40 o FIGURE 8 Distribution of Women Aged lS-49, by Region and Income Group, 1976: Brazil fertility declines of 21-24 percent. Rural fertility decline in this region was about 22 percent, and these rural women accounted for about 14 percent of the total. This contrasts with rural women in the Northeast, whose decline was only 5 percent, and who accounted for a roughly similar percentage share of all women. These comparisons add further weight to the conclusion stated earlier: that the spread of fertility decline to new regions and income groups, combined with its continua- tion among women experiencing pre-1970 declines, accounted for the accelerated fertility declines of the 1970~.

77 These comparisons also suggest that in the future, fertil- ity decline at the national level will depend to an even greater extent on declines among low-income groups in both urban and rural areas. Fertility decline among urban middle- and upper-middle defiles, which contributed substantially to the declines of the 1970s, will be more limited since the fertility of these groups has reached comparatively low levels. CONCLUSIONS The objective of this chapter was to identify differences in fertility among Brazilian women according to levels of educational attainment and family income in 1970 and 1976, as well as differential rates of fertility decline between these two sets of data by education and income. A further objective was to determine the possible effects of changes in the distribution of women by education and income on the overall rate of decline and to pinpoint which groups contributed most to the decline because they had greater percentage decline-, greater weight in the total number of women aged 15-19, or both. The main finding of the chapter is a confirmation of the hypothesis stated in Chapter 1 about ache reason for Brazil8s accelerated fertility decline in the 1970~: during the 197Os, there was continued, though slowing, fertility decline mung middies and upper-income women in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paula {women who had experienced declines prior to 1970), combined with the spread of fertility decline to women in lower- and middle-income regions that had experienced only limited decline before 1970. The chapter also suggests a number of lines of analysis that might indicate why the 1970" brought the particular combination of fertility declines that it did. These data, while basically descriptive, suggest that interactions between income level, educational attainment, age, and other aspects of the socioeconomic environment should be studied In greater detail. An examination of links between female labor force partici- pation, migration, and household conduction patterns is warranted, with account taken of regional and rural-urban dimensions of these changes. These factors will be in- cluded in the analyses presented in the next two chapters. The present chapter has also raised a namer of method- ological questions, particularly about the reliability of data on births in the year prior to the interview as

78 tabulated for subpopulations like the income and education groups identif I'd here. The distortions in P/F ratios associated with the shifting of women between groups, dif- ferential fertility between groups, and sampling error are so severe that adj ustments based on these ratios are questionable if not misleading. Though it would be desirable to use data on current rather than cumulative fertility in analyzing recent changes, the questionable reliability of current fertility measures as applied to subpopulations suggests that data on parity by age and other characteristics are more likely to yield unbiased results O Imaginative use of these data ~ such as a focus on childIessne"s and on cohort changes ([OK example, the difference between the average parity of women in a par- ticular education/income class who were 20024 in 1970 and the parity of the same group at age 26~30 in 1976) may be a way to compensate for some of the information on recent fertility that is lost by not using the data on births in the last year.

CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF BRAZIL'S RECENT FERTILITY DECLINE During the 1970s, marital fertility in Brazil declined by about 30 percent. Previously, it had been stable or decreased only slightly, though there were declines among women in higher-income classes. What accounts for this major shift in Brazilian reproductive patterns? A wor}c- ing hypothesis is that the change was triggered by the convergence of two sets of forces. One of these was the increased availability of effective means of contracep- tion, particularly for lower-income groups and regions of the country that had not participated in the earlier fertility decline. The other was the emergence of socioeconomic conditions conducive to smaller family norms, which motivated couples to use available contra- ception to reduce, delay, or end childbearing O The decomposition of the Brazilian fertility decline during the 1970-76 period presented in Chapter 2 of this report identified increased use of effective contraception as the key proximate variable determining that decline. The questions raised by this finding relate to the way access to fertility control increased in a country pro. viding no official support for fertility control at the national level, as well as what factors motivated people to make use of available contraception when previously they had not. Rapid fertility decline began during a period (1967-73) when the Brazilian economy was experiencing a very rapid rate of growth in aggregate income per capita, and accel- erated when the boom faltered as a result of rising energy costs after 1973. In this period, Brazil also made major str ides in achieving increased educational attainment for women (and men); moreover , important changes in social structure were occurs ing, including very rapid urbaniza- tion, increased female labor force participation, and 79

80 increased exposure to mass communications. At the same time, declining fertility took place in a society charac- terized by a very unequal distribution of the benefits of g rowth, and among groups that prof ited least from the boom and whose relative economic position may actually have deter iorated dur ing this per iod. This raises the question of how modernizing forces, combined with changes in the capability to realize childbearing and other eco- nomic and social expectations' have influenced reproduc tive norms and behavioral patterns among the groups that contributed to fertility decline. Brazil's diversity of regions and social classes' together with associated differences. in the level and pace of change in demographic var tables, would suggest that multiple changes in socioeconomic and demographic variable" led to the accelerated fertility decline of the 1970s. This chapter examines hypotheses and supporting evidence used to explain recent shifts in Brazilian repro- ductive behavior, focusing on the spread of contraceptive use to women in lower and middle socioeconomic classes who accounted for much of the accelerated decline, and on socioeconomic changes that might explain this change in contraceptive use. First, it explores hypotheses linking socioeconomic conditions to fertility decline. Next' it examines the available data on changes in Brazilts contraceptive patterns, and on socioeconomic factors associated with those changes. Finally, because of the essential institu- tional differences between urban and rural women, the hypotheses and data linking socioeconomic factors to fertility decline are applied separately to these two groups. H~E:SES LINKING SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS TO E ERTILITY DECLINE A number of hypotheses about the effects of changing socioeconomic conditions on Brazil fertility decline can be formulated. One of these, coming under the general heading of ~modernization,. refers to the influence on reproductive behavior of rising income, changes in the costs of children relative to other goods, and shif ts in social norms and aspirations. This hypothesis emphasizes the role of income and costs of children and other goods, focusing on tradeoffs between ache number of children and other goods ( including child quality) . These tradeof f s

81 are influenced by increases in the value of women's time as they achieve higher levels of education, by related changes in the opportunity and direct costs of children (who are time-~ntensive compared to other goods), and by changes in overall household consumption patterns as a result of increased income and changing tastes. The logic of this hypothesis can be used to show that such changes lead to reduced demand for children and increased motiva- tion to use family planning, particularly when the subjec- tive and monetary costs of fertility control have fallen below those of an unplanned additional pregnancy. A limitation of this framework is that there is no easy way to assess the inf luence of institutional forces at both the family and societal levels on reproductive norms and aspirations. This limitation is particularly iTapor- tant when f er tility change is occurs ing in a context of rapid socioeconomic change. When only a few measures reflecting such changes are available, it may be difficult to identify the causal relationships between such vari- ables and fertility. Female educational attainment and labor force participation are good examples. Education is strongly associated with fertility differentials, and is used in economic models as a measure of the value of time. However, education may also embody attitudes about women ' s roles, the value of children, and the practice of contraception. Increases in female labor force participa- tion may indeed be responding to changes in female educa- tion and household income, but institutional forces that influence the labor markets in which jobs for women are available may also play an important role. An institutional factor of particular concern in the Brazilian case is the distribution of income. It is tree that dur ing the period in which the decline of fertility accelerated, the rate of growth of per capita income was around 7 percent per annum; however, it should also be remembered that the distr ibution of the benefits of this growth was highly skewed. It is estimated that two-thirds of household income in Brazil accrued to She top 20 per- cent of households in 1972, with only 7 percent going to the lowest 40 percent (World Bank, 1981:Table 253. The 20 million people (20 percent of the Brazilian population in the early 1970s) with incomes growing more rapidly than Brazil's already impressive national average repre- sent a substantial force in the direction of moderniza- tion, whose impact on fertility was clearly evident in the data presented In Chapter 2.

82 Nevertheless, lower-income groups experienced ache most rapid fertility declines after 1970. To use the term Modernizations to characterize the social and economic changes that accompanied these declines seems incongruous with the living conditions implied by their position in Brazil's income distribution. While there is still con- siderable debate about the interpretation of Brazilian income distribution data, particularly with reference to nonmonetary items and the impact of inflation on the welfare of the poor, there is general agreement on points that are relevant to the question of fertility decline. One is that there are substantial numbers of people and families who are poor in the absolute sense of Living with substandard levels of health, housing, nutrition, and other basic needs. Lluch (1981) estimates that the lowest three defiles of families classed by family income per capita in 1910 fell into this category, and that they were located in both rural and urban areas. A second point is that inflation has had an adverse impact on the buying power of lower-income groups. This is a result of the way in which the Brazilian system of wage and price indexing operated during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the indices that controlled prices-and credit obligations being allowed to increase more rapidly than the wage index. Lower-income groups suffered the most from this, and particularly hard~hit were urban working class families ~ the lower-middle income defiles), whose incomes were more closely linked to the wage index by virtue of employment in sectors governed by minimum salary arrangements. The fact that fertility declines in the early 1970s were concentrated among the absolute poor and the lower- middle income families has suggested alternative hypotheses about the link between deterioration in buying power and reproductive behavior. Berquo (1980) has argued that the living conditions of the poor deteriorated so reach during this period that their psychological and physiological capacity to reproduce was affected--a sort of ~ immiseration. hypothesis. She suggests that poor nutrition, fatigue associated with the need to work long hours to earn enough income to buy food, and poor nuts i- tion may have caused a loss of the will to reproduce, a reduction in coital frequency, and a possible reduction in fecundity. However, assessment of such effects would require much more in-depth interviews than those avail- able from the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS). Certainly, the threshold at which amenorrhea and anovu- .

~3 ration are caused by malnutrition and psychological stress is high enough that such effects would be observed only in extreme circumstances. Still, it is possible that the fecundity of very low-income Brazilian women could have been affected by poor nutrition. A national nutrition and household consumption survey taken in 1974-75 provides nutritional indices for children under age 18. That survey indicated that 37 percent of Brazil- ian children were affected by first degree malnutrition (average body weight 76 to 90 percent of FAD/WHO norms), 20 percent by second degree malnutrition (61 to 75 pert cent of the norm), and 1 percent by third degree malnutri- tion ( less than 60 percent of the norm) (World Bank, 1979 ) . While data on mothers were not provided, such indices suggest that subfecundity may have affected a portion of low-income women. The possibility that physio- logical and psychological factors were involved in the fertility decline among Brazil's low-income groups should therefore not be ignored; however, it appears unlikely that they would account for a significant share of that decline . Another hypothesis draws on elements of the moderniza- tion f ramewor k outlined above, but stresses increased economic pressures on the buying power of low- income households as a key determinant of changes in reproductive behavior. Carvalho et al. (1981) have argued that pres- sures to preserve living standards in the face of adverse economic conditions have forced poor families to adapt by delaying or curtailing their reproductive aspirations. In such circumstances, couples recognize that they cannot afford another child because of its direct impact on their 1 imited income, as well as its opportunity cost in the time of mothers who must work to supplement family income. W ith increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contraception, fertility control is one of the few options available as ~ survival strategy; the decline of fertility among lower-income families is seen as an indication that they are choosing this option. Extending this argument, it has been suggested that lower- and middle-income families, particularly in urban areas, raised their consumption expectations during early stages of Brazil's economic boom and were beginning to realize those expectations through increased purchases of housing, consumer durables, and even automobiles. Most of these purchases were made with small down-payTaents and required extended installment payments that were subject to Brazil's indexing system. Unequal treatment of credit

84 obligations and wages in the indexing process forced these families to allocate an increasing share of their monthly income to those installment payments. In these circum- stances, atJoidin'3 the expense of an additional child, again given increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contsa.ception, was an option. The rapid decline of fertility among these groups suggests that this may indeed have been their response. ~ The hypotheses sugar ized in the preceding paragraphs suggest a number of mechanisms through which changers in socioeconomic condition" in Brazil dur ing the 1970s could have contributed to the acceleration of fertility decline. These hypotheses suggest differing views of the process in that the ~modernization. hypothesis focuses on changes in couples' reproductive aspirations and their ability to realize ~em, while hypotheses focusing on economic pres- sures and structural change place greater emphasis on institutional forces. However, the various hypotheses are not necessarily competitive. In fact, given the range of changes in fertility observed at both the regional and socioeconomic class levels, it is likely that recent experience reflects a combination of reinforcing factors rather than any -single mechanism. Data with which to test-any of there hypotheses are very limited. Most of the evidence provided by the 1970 census and 1976 survey data consists of broad measures having a bearing on several of the hypotheses; none of these measures offers the precision-needed to specify causal models in support of one hypothesis to the exclu- sion of the others. At the same time, the data suggest that socioeconomic changes consistent with such explant tions were in fact occurring. The next two subsections examine the data available on the primary aspects of the hypotheses presented atone: increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contraception, and sorrow economic factors related to changing patterns of contraceptive use. Increased Access to Fertility Control While Brazil is one of the few developing countries without a national policy in support of fertility control, Brazilian women are not necessarily denied access to fertility control. In fact, the private sector has played a major role in increasing the availability of contraceptives in Brazil, both through commercial channels

85 and through pr ivate agencies, the most important being Brazil' s International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) aff iliate Sociedade Civil Ben-Estar Familiar no Brasil (BEMFAM). Commercial distr ibution networks were an important factor in the fertility decline among Brazilian middle- and upper-income classes prior to 1970, with pills, condoms, and surgical sterilization being the most common means adopted. Pills are manufactured in Brazil, with an increase in annual production from lo 7 million cycles in 1964 to 61.2 million in 1980. The largest percentage growth occurred during 1964-70, when there was an eight- fold increase to 13.5 million cycles ~ The fo' lowing six years, 1970-76, brought a larger absolute increase to over 49 million cycles, nearly four toes the 1970 level. This trend is shown graphically in Figure 9. Regionally, the mar ket for pills has been concentrated in the Southern and Southeastern states . Reg tonal shares of the total market are also shown in the f igure, with separate panels for Sao Paula, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, the three Southern states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana), and the remaining states in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-West regions. Sao Paulo alone accounts for over 30 percent of the market; when its share is combined with that of Minas.Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, the figure is close to 60 percent The contri- bution of traditional methods such as withdrawal and periodic abstinence is also significant, even though these are less en festive means. BEMEAM has played an important role in extending access to modern methods' particularly the pill, to lower-income groups and regions. According to industry sources, 9 percent of pills produced in Brazil in 1976 were distributed to BEMFAlS. Several state governments, including f ice in the Northeast, have entered into coops erative agreements with BEMFAM for the provision of community-based family planning services. While the number of women served by such programs is not large enough to account for all of the increase in contracep~ tive use that has been observed, BEMEAM's impact is clear from a comparison of data for states in which it is active with those in which it is not. - Another important factor in increased access is what appears to be a significant but not highly publicized shift in the attitude of the Brazilian public health care system toward the provision of family planning services and surgical sterilization. Though the Brazilian govern-

86 70 60 50 - ~n a . _ ._ em ._ 40 LLJ J C' 0 30' CI: LU m Z 20 10 _ . _ _ it/ / O _ 1965 1970 1 975 YEAR FIWRE: 9 National and Regional Trends in Commercial Distribution of Contraceptive Pills,. 1965-81: Brazil / ~ Rio de Janeiro J iSouthern Region r Sao Paulo Mines G - ais - - - - _ _ - Northe - . North, ContraI- Wost R - ions ,1 , 1 ,, , 1980 ment has not yet adopted a national health plan that would eventually include family planning among its services, the health care system appears to have adopted a more 1 iberal approach than it had before, at least in allowing private physicians working within the system to prescribe oral contraceptives and perform sterilizations. The main sources of statistical data on contraceptive use in Brazil are the state-level Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS) and the local-level CEBRAP National Inves- tigation on fireman Reproduction (NIHR) . S ince the latter

~7 is discussed in detail in Part II, the present chapter focuses on the CPS results. It should be noted that because none of these surveys was conducted pr for to 1976, they provide an ex post view of the impact of increased access to family planning on fertility decline. Table 22 presents the percentage distributions in f ive of these surveys of mart fed women aged 15-44 by household income level and contraceptive use status. The f irst row of f igures for each survey shows that the percentage of women currently using contraception increased with house- hold income ~ which is broken down in multiples of the average monthly minimum salary. The contraceptive use dif ferential between women in upper- and lower-income g roups was least in Sao Paulo, Brazil ' s most urbanized and industrialized state, and greatest in Bahia, located in the lower Northeast. The remaining states shown in the table are also located in the Northeast. Through cooperative arrangements with state governments, BEMFAM has operated cormunity-based family planning programs (CBPs) in Rio Grande do Norte since 1973, followed by programs in Pernambuco and two other Northeastern states in 1976, and ire Piaui in 1979. Survey results for Rio Grande do Norte, the state in which the CBPs had been operating longest, indicate that the differential between higher- and lower-income women was less than that in Piaui and Bahia, states in which such programs did not exist prior taco the survey O As for contraceptive methods, a higher proportion of women in upper-income groups had been sterilized, particularly in the Northeast; Pills were more important relative to other methods among lower- income women . This is especially evident in Rio Grande do Norte, where pill users accounted For 43 percent of women currently contracepting in the low-income group, and 25 percent of high~income contra- ceptors. Sterilization, in contrast, accounted for 22 percent of low-income current users and 47 percent of high-income users. Other methods, mainly rhythm and withdrawal, were also important among low-income current users; these methods, along with condoms, were important as well among low-income women in the state of Sao Paulo. When educational attainment i" substituted for income as the measure of socioeconomic differences in contra- ceptive use, the results are virtually identical, at least for the four states with available tabulations on which to base a comparison. Table 23 shows the percentage of currently married women aged 1S-44 using contraception for four education categories, ranging from none to some

88 TABLE 22 Percent Distribution of Married Women Aged 15-44, by Contraceptive Use Status and Household Income: Brazil Multiples of Minimum Salary State and Date <1 1-2 2-4 5+ Total Sao Paulo (1978)a Currently Using 4704 57.4 67.4 6805 63.9 Orals 60 4 28 0 9 340 0 22. ~ 27 0 8 Sterilization 5.4 11.0 150 2 220 0 16 c 1 Other 3506 27.5 1802 2405 2000 Not Using 53.6 42.6 32 0 6 31. S 36 o 1 Total 100.0 100.0 lOOo O 100- 0 100 - 0 Rio Grande do Norte (1980) . Cur Gently Using 37.0 46. 6 53. 4 12. 9 47. 0 Orals 15.9 18.2 20.9 22.9 17.9 Sterilization 8.4 17.3 23.1 34. 4 17.4 Other 12. 7 11.1 9 0 4 15. 6 11. 7 Not Using 63 0 0 53.4 46. 6 27.1 53.0 Total lOOe O 100.0 100.0 lOOo O 100 e ° P _ (1979) Currently Using 25.1 30.5 42.6 57.0 30.9 Orals 9.3 10.5 12.7 17 o 1 10 0 0 Sterilization 9. 9 14.9 25. 5 34.1 15.4 Other 509 5.1 2~4 5.8 5~5 Not Using 74.9 69.5 57.4 43.0 69 01 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOOo O Pern~co (1980) Currently Using 26.2 32.4 46.5 62.9 41. 4 Orals 8. 0 10. 6 13.0 16.4 12. ~ Sterilization 9.1 12.9 22.9 40~2 18.9 Other 9.1 8.9 10.6 6.3 10.0 Not using 73 .8 61. 6 53. 5 37 .1 58. 6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0

89 TABLE 22 (continued) Multiples of Minimum Salary State and Date < 1 1-2 2-4 S+ Total Bahia (1980) Currently Using 18.7 28~4 4208 65.9 31~1 Orals 6.9 1305 150 3 150 7 110 7 Sterilization 7.1 7O 4 13.2 260 3 9O 6 Other 507 7.5 1403 2308 908 Not Using 81 O 3 7106 5702 3401 68.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 . . . . aSource breaks Sao Paula data by more detailed income classes. Weighted averages were used to collapse income categories for Sao Paulo into classes that were comparable to those reported for other states. Since cell weights were not available, f igures may differ from those derived from direct tabulation using collapsed income classes. Source: Rodrigues et al. (1981a:Table 7). secondary or more, in Pisui, Pern~mhuco, Rio Grande do Nor te, and Bahia. Percentages for the ~none. group are quite similar to those for the lowe^`c-income groups in the respective states, with Chose for the secondary and overt category falling somewhat below what was observed for the 5+ minimum salary group. The CPS data presented in Table 22 support the view that access to family planning has spread to women of lower socioeconomic classes in the industrialized South- east and to a lesser extent in the Northeast. Differences in contraceptive use in the Northeast appear to be related, at least in part, to whether organized family planning programs were operative. These programs appear to have f illed the gap in access between lower- and higher-income women, with the latter being able to rely more heavily on private physicians, clinics, and pharmacies . Further partial information on access is provided by tabulations of CPS survey data on sources of services for two of the main methods, surgical sterilization and oral contraceptives. - Table 24 shows that for Sao Paula, where

so TABLE 23 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey Data on Percent of Currently Married Women Aged 15-44 Using Contraceptives, by Education: Brazil Education Pr imary, Pr imp By, Secondary State None Incomplete Complete or More Pisui 2203 2903 4406 4700 Pernambuco 27 . 8 36 . 6 50 . 2 600 0 Rio Grande do Norte 3700 45.2 45.1 6101 Bahia 16. ~ 32.9 40 ~ 7 S9e 9 . . . . . Source: Rodrigues et al. tl981a:Table 6). Organized programs are more limited, 97.S percent of pill users relied on priorate physicians; this is also true of Bahia. In Rio Grande do Norte, Pern~mbuco, and Paraiba, where CBPs had been operative, the BEMFAM-State/Municipal Hospital system provided around 60 percent of services. Table 24 also shows a similar, though less differentiated, pattern for surgical sterilization: again the contribu- tion of private hospitals and clinics is highest in Sao Paulo and Bahia, whereas public-sector sources play a greater role in Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, and Pernam- buco. One reason that the pattern for sterilization is not as sharply differentiated as that for pills is that sterilization is state/municipal hospitals is not provided through the CBP program This may be a factor in the lower share of sterilizations mung low-income women reported in Table 22e (Sample-size limitation. prevented tabulation of the data in Table 24 by source and income level.) Socioeconomic Factors Increased use of contraceptives in Brazil during the 1970s was accompanied by a var iety of socioeconomic changes, particularly among the regions and income groups responsible for the acceleration in fertility decline. This raises the question of how these two sets of forces may have interacted to bring about that accelerated decline. Important socioeconomic shifts include the

91 fir 1 us a a) 3 ~5 .,. s" ~: tn V - ut S:: ~Q ·,. Q Q cn - V' ,. ~: ~: :^ ~ A - 1 N O ·- :~ U) o a~ d' C~ ~ ~ U) E~ ~ o ~C a~ m o :~ ~ 0 o4 ~ 53 . - ns 0 Ll P4 L. 0 z o O a: 0 a: - ~ r~ P4 o ~D o r~ cn tD \0 ~ ~ O ~ O ~ ~ O · ~ · e ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ t— ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ O a' 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 a' ~ 0 ~— c~ ~ \0 I,{) ~ 0 ~ e e · e e 0 e ° ~ ~ C~ ~ ~ O C~ ~P O ~ O lO t" O ~t ~ C`l O _t —~ u' ~ 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~n 0 · ° ~ · C ° O ·' 0 ~ 0 0 a' ~ 0 ~ r~ ~ 0 0 U~ ~ O ~ ~ C~ O c~ ~ ~ ko o ~ ~ ~ (o o · a ~ ~ ~ e 0 ~ e C~ ~ C~ ~ O O ~ ~ _I O a' 0 _1 ~ ~ ~ O · 0 e e e e e e c ~ U~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ `0 0 0 ~ In 0 ~ c~ 0 :> - 'U o o ~ ~O-tU~ ~ O ~F O~ ~ 0 1 · e D e e e 0 0 e · 0 O O ~ t~ O O ~ `° ~ ~ O e ~ O ~ ~ t~t O _ ~C _1 a, _ O U £ _1 C ~ . e ·n ~ 0" ~ ~ ~ s V e s ~ z ~ u c ~ ul ~ s z ~ U s 1 ~n ~ ~ o4 0 ~ ~ u~ ~ P. O ~ O p u2 E~ u~

92 changing status of women, as reflected in their educa- tional attainment and labor force participation, as well as changes in household income and consumption patterns, such as the diffusion of consumer durables like television receivers, ref r igerators, and gas stoves among lower- income groups. These changes could have reduced the desire to have more children and increased motivation to use the means of fertility control that were becoming more available O Data presented in Chapter 2 on differences in the level and percentage of fertility decline by years of schooling revealed signif icant increases in the educa- tional attainment of women during the 1970s. The data also revealed a close, though not exact, correspondence between the distribution of women by educational attains ment and household income defiles (Table 19)e In examin- ing socioeconomic changes, the present chapter does not repeat that breakdown by income defiles. Moreover, such a breakdown is not used in the present discussion of the relationship between education and labor force participa- tion. To do so would introduce a circularity arising f rom the contr ibution of women ' s earnings to the income of their households: it would create the misleading impression that the proportion of women who work is higher hong households in higher-income deciles, when in fact one of the reasons that such households fall into those higher deciles is because these women work. The relevant income variable is household income without these women's contributions. At this point, the discu"- sion focuses on changes in educational attainment and their relationship to differences in labor force par- ticipatione fable 25 suggests that increases in female educational attainment were greater in the 1970s than in the 1960s. The table shows the proportion reporting no schooling among women aged 20-49 by five-year age groups, in 1960, 1970, 1976, and 1980. For women in their twenties, the proportion with no schooling was around 40 percent in 1960, declining to about 33 percent in 1970 ~ and to below 20 percent by 1976. Increased female school enrollment during the 1960s accounts for part of this increased decline in the proportion with no schooling. Another factor is various types of adult education programs, including adult literacy classes and special courses leading to certification of equivalency at various grade levels. Many employers in the formal sector require such certif ication, even for semiskilled labor, and these

93 TABLE 25 Percent of Women Reported as Having No Schooling, by Age, 1960-80: Brazil Age Group 1960 1970 1976 1980 . 20-24 39.1 30.6 1S.8 16.9 25-29 42.7 35O4 21.7 -19.6 30-34 44.4 38.1 24~8 ~ 35-39 52.2 42e 5 30 ~ 8 ~ 26e 9 40-44 54~5 45.S 35O4 ~ 45-49 S7.0 49O8 39.3 136.7 Source: Population census 1960 and 1980. courses have helped women to move from informal-sector jobs such as domestic service to formal-sector employ- ment. Data from preliminary tabulations of the 1980 census are also shown. While they confirm the changes that occurred during the 1970s, they also suggest that the 1976 survey may overstate improvements, either through underrepresentation of less-educated women or inconsistency between the survey and census reporting of educational attainment. Table 26 uses tabulations from the 1970 census and 1916 survey data files to present further detail on the changes that occurred during that interval. For each five-year age group, the percentage of women in each of four educational attainment categories (none, 1-4, 5-9, and 10+ years of schooling) is shown. Again there is a reduction in the percentage of women in the ~none. cate- gory and increases in other groups. Only a part of this decline represents a ~cohort" effect, where succeeding higher-attainment groups replace those with lower attain- ment. A contributing factor in increases for the 10+ category among women aged 25-29 in 1976 is the fact that some of them were still in school in 1970. Adult educa- tion could also account for the changes observed among older women. However, the caution suggested above about the representativeness of the 1976 data and the consis- tency of reporting in the survey and census sources should be applied to the flaunt of increase in educa- t~onal attainment indicated by the table.

94 TABLE 26 Percent Distr ibution of All Women Aged 20-44 by Age and Years of Schooling, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None 1-4 5-9 10+ Age Group 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 . 20-24 300 4 150 6 410 8 3g.9 170 3 27.1 10.5 170 5 25~29 3502 21~2 42~3 4203 1309 19.6 806 1609 30O34 38 0 3 24 0 2 420 4 47.9 12.9 16 ~ 4 6.4 11. 5 35O39 42.2 3Gol 4lol 47.0 11.9 14.0 4.8 809 40-44 450 2 34. 4 38. S 45.2 11.9 13.2 4. 4 7.2 - Note: Each row adds to 100 percent for each year. Source: Tabulations of census and survey sample data files. The 1970s also brought increases in f eagle labor force participation. Table 27 presents tabulations of the per- centage of women reported as working by age and educate tional attainment. The education categories are the same as those in Table 26. Rates are shown for all women and for currently married women. In comparing data on labor force participation from the census and survey, it :s important to recognize that the two sources def ine par- ticipation differently in ache census, a person was considered active if market work was his or her principal activity during the year prior to the interviews in the survey, a person who worked during the week prior to the interview was considered active. The census definition tends to understate economic activity for those employed part-time or on an intermittent basis, generally younger and older people and women more than middle-aged males {for further discussion of this point see Merrick and Graham, 1979 :167) . This could lead in turn to an over- statement of increases in labor force participation for such groups when the census and survey data are compared. Data for all wooers in Table 27 indicate that in 197G, women with higher educational attainment (10+ years of schooling) were three to four times as likely to' be working as women with no education. Increases in labor force participation among women in lower educational attainment categories narrowed this differential to a

9s TABS 27 Percent of Women Reported as Working, by Age and Years of Schooling, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None 1-4 5-9 10+ Age Group 1970 1976 1970 1976 . All Women 1970 1976 1970 1976 20-24 18.0 29.2 26.4 35.5 35.1 40.5 52.9 5505 25-29 14. 8 24.8 19.4 28 0 9 300 7 36.9 66.3 63 0 3 30-34 14.6 28.1 17.7 28.3 29.7 34.9 66.0 6504 35-39 15. 3 28. 9 18 0 7 29.5 30 0 0 37.2 66.8 67 0 8 40-44 16.4 28.S 18~3 27.6 28.6 33.9 66.S 64.8 Cur rentlv Mart fed Women 20 - 24 Se7 L2.2 6.3 13.0 13.4 16.6 39.9 38.5 25-29 6.2 15.0 B.0 17.2 15.5 21.9 54.1 47.5 30-34 6~9 20~5 9~7 20.2 18.O 24.0 56.4 55.0 35-39 8.2 21.6 11~3 22~7 21~0 29.3 58.9 59.5 40-44 7.8 2a.9 11.0 21.5 19.5 26.2 S6.1 56.4 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files. li ttle more than two times in 1976 . Percentage pain t increases in both the tenoned and 1-4 education categories For women in the 10+ eaucac~ona~ attainment category, the percent reported as were greater for women over age 30. ~ ~ . . . . . . . active declined in three of the f ive age groups. These increases in labor force par ticipation among less-educated women, par titular ly those over age 30, show up even more strongly in rates for currently married women, as shown in the second panel of Table 27. In 1970, only 7-8 percent of mar r fed women over age 30 in the anode ~ education group were working; in 1976, this proportion increased to over 20 percent. Similar increases can be observed in the 1-4 year education group, though there was less change for women over 30 because they star ted f tom a slightly higher base in 1970. In the 10+ education group, rates declined for the f irst three age groups and increased only slightly for the other two. AS a consequence, the magnitude of dif- ferentials in par ticipation rates between women with no

g6 education and those with 10+ years of schooling decreased from 7 or 8 to 1-2 or 3-1. Increased educational attainment, higher labor force participation among more-educated women, and the narrow- ing of differentials in participation between more- and less-educated women between 1970 and 1976 combined to double the proportion (from 15 percent to 30 percent) of women who were working during the six-year period under study a Although caution is required because of possible upward bias in the 1976 data resulting from definitional d if f erences mentioned above, the data suggest that impor- tant changes in women' s roles were occurring. Increases in labor force participation, associated with increases in the proportion of women with higher levels of educa- tion, suggest an improvement in these women' s status; on the other hand, these trends among women in the lower education classes may mean that more women were working out of economic necessity. SOCICECONC1MIC FACTORS AND E ERTII`ITY DECLINE AMC)NG URBAN AND RURAL WOMEN While the hypotheses about relationships between Ohio economic factors (modernization ~ increased economic pressures on families) and fertility decline in Brazil outlined above are broadly applicable to both urban and rural women, differences in institutional factors suggest that these groups be examined separately. For example, increased ownership of televisions, while not exclusively an urban phenomenon, is much more pronounced in urban areas. Likewise, the influence of land availability and increased proletarianization of farm labor is probably more direct in rural areas. While indirect effects could reach urban areas via migration, they are much more diffi- cult to capture with the census and PNAD survey data files. Based on separate samples for urban and rural women extracted from these files, the next two subsections present a more detailed examination of the characteristics of currently married urban and rural women, and how these characteristics relate to dif ferentials in average par ity . The focus in both subsections is restricted to currently mart fed women because the analysis of proximate determi- nants of fertility presented in Chapter 1 identified declining marital fertility as the main component of the recent decline in Brazilian birth rates.

97 Currently Marr fed Urban Women Data presented in Chapter 2 on levels and changes in fertility rates by socioecc:'noic class revealed that major dif ferentials were associated with female educational attainment. To see how these differentials are reflected in the average parity of currently married urban women, and to permit further comparisons by other characteristics of these women, subsamp~es of about 17,000 women each were extracted f rom the census and survey data f iles . tcost considerations dictated the decision to use sub- samples. ) Table 28 presents tabulations of the mean number of children ever born to currently married urban women in 1970 and 1976 by age and educational attainment O S tandard errors of means for the age/educatzon breakdowns of the two subsamples are also shown. While most cells TABLE 28 Mean and Standard Error (s)a of Number of Children Ever Born, Currently Married Urban Women, by Age and Educational Attainment, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None 1-4 5~9 Age 10+ Group Mean ($) Mean (a) Mean (a) Mean (a) 1970 20-24 20 51 ( ~ 08) 1.79 ( ~ 04) 1e 43 ( ~ 05) 0 ~ 70 ( ~ 06) 25—29 3 0 91 ( ~ 09) 3 0 07 ~ e 05) 20 39 ~ ~ 06) 10 50 ( · 06) 30~34 5004 (~10) 4~08 (~06) 3~20 (~08) 2~30 (~07) 35~39 6016 (~12) 4075 (~08) 3~82 (~10) 3~12 toll) 40~44 6~64 (~15) 5~11 (aft)) 3~7S (~12) 3~20 (~16) N (unweighted) 4~059 8~081 3~252 1~396 Percent (weighted) 24.2 48.1 19. ~ 8.3 19?6 20-24 2.07 ( . 08) 1. 72 ( . 04) 1.23 ( . 03) 0.69 ( . 04) 25-29 3.65 (.10) 2.69 (.04) 1.99 (.04) 1.30 (.04) 30~34 4~86 (~12) 3~70 (~05) 2.99 (.01) 2.03 (.05) 35~39 6~26 (~14) Je.57 (~07) 3~44 (~08) 2~68 (~08) 40~444 6~47 (.16) 5.00 (~08) 3.58 (.11) 2.78 (.10) N (unweighted) 2,632 8,019 4,205 2,828 Percent (weighted) 16.0 47.9 22.1 14.0 a($) is standard error of sable Mans. Source: Tabulations of subsamples of census and survey data files.

98 are large enough at this level to minimize sampling error further breakdowns could be affected, particularly when a small percentage of women fall into a given category. Further tests of the signif icance of educational and other dif ferences in the number of children ever born are presented in the next chapter using multiple regression. The basic pattern of educational differences in the mean number of children ever born is similar in 1970 and 1976: comparing women in the age 40-44 category, the mean number of children ever born in 1970 drops from 6.6 children for women with no education to 3.2 children for those with 10+ years of schooling; in 1976, the figures are 6.5 children for women with no education and 20 8 for those with 10+ years of schooling. The earlier average age at marriage of women with no education is a major factor in differences among younger women, who had 2.5 births in 1970 compared to 0.7 for the 10+ group, and 2.1 compared to the 3~0+ group's 0.7 in 1976. The values for older women with 10+ years of school are a problem in that the average of 2.8 for women aged 40-44 in 1976 is lower than the 3 .1 reported for those aged 35-39 in 1970 . Sampling error is the 'cost likely culpr it ~ since the . 9 5 conf ideate intervals of the standard errors of the two means intersects Shifts of women from the S-9 class in 1970 to the 10+ class in 1976 could not account for this since they would bias the 1976 figure upward rather than downward. Mow do other characteristics such as work status and migrant status affect fertility differentials? The generalizations in the previous section about increases in educational attainment and labor force participation hold for currently married urban women O From 1970 to 1976, the proportion of urban women reporting no education declined from 24.2 percent to 16.0 percent, while that of women with 10+ years of schooling increased from 8.3 to 140 0 percent. Patterns of ~ abor force participation by level of educational attainment are similar to those shown in Table 27, though the differences between education categories are less. The top panel of Table 29 presents participation rates for urban women. Part of the large differential between more- and less-educated women in Table 27 resulted from the lower educational attainment and labor force participation of rural women. For urban women, the order of magnitude of dif ferences between the top and bottom education categories was four to f ive , narrowing to a range of three to four in 1976. Larger proportional increases among less-educated women over age

99 TABLE 29 Percent Working and Percent Migrant Among Currently Married, Urban Women, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None 1-4 5~9 10+ Age Group 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 Percent Working 20-24 6~8 8~1 6~1 11~0 12~l 1301 32~; 3708 25 - 29 6~8 12~1 9e2 1500 15~8 2006 5001 46~8 3 0-34 7. 5 150 6 10 ~ 2 19 ~ 4 17 ~ 8 22 0 7 54 ~ 9 54 0 5 35~ 39 10.9 19e 8 1` ~ 5 2201 210 3 26 0 5 5J. 01 57 ~ 2 40~44 8~3 16~7 12~5 19~0 19~4 2doO 56~6 55~6 Percent Migrant 20-24 31 ~ 3 310 9 28 ~ 0 28e 7 31.0 24.1 34 ~ 4 30. 25-29 26e 0 24.0 22.1 21.7 17.5 20 ~ !; 28 0 3 25e 7 30~34 213.6 17~2 17~0 15~9 15~7 12~8 21~9 16~7 35~39 14~ 6 10~ 7 12~ 1 1~~ 7 1~~ t) 10 ~ 2~ 0 I1~ 47 40~44 13~3 12~6 10~5 9~7 8~0 7~1 7~0 12~8 Source: Tabulations of census and survey cats f iles. 30 are observed, but they are not as great as in Table 27. This suggests that definitional differences affect- ing 1970-?6 comparisons may have introduced greater bias in the reporting of work status for rural women. Another potential source of variation in fertility among urban women is migration, particularly if work status were related to fertility differences and if migrants were more likely to be working than nonmigrants. To assess the possible impact of migration, women were classified by migration status, with those who had resided in their municipality of current residence for less than 6 years being considered migrants. The second panel of Table 29 shows the percentage of currently married urban women who qualified as migrants according to this definition for each of the age and education categories previously identified. The percentages of migrants are greatest for the 20-24 are category and for the lowest and highest education groups. by age is much greater than that across education cate- gories. The limited amount of variation by education raises questions about the link, mentioned above, between Tne variation

100 migrant status, work status, and fertility. Tabulations ( not shown) of the percentage of currently married women repor ted as work ing by age and migration status revealed no dif ferences between migrants and noruaigrants. This suggests that motives for migration other than work--most probably marriage--account for the var iation in the pro- portion of migrants shown in the table. Returning to the question of increases in female labor force participation and educational attainment, the ques- t ion of whether these increases indicate Changes in women' s socioeconomic status can be further clarif fed by examining the k inds of j obs involved in the increased proportions reporting employment. For this purpose, the occupations of employed women were grouped into four broad status categories: (1) high-status service occupations, including managerial, technical, and professional posi- tions, as well as higher-status jobs in the commercial and f inancial sectors; ( 2) low-status service occupations, including domestic and per sonal services, as well as low- status commercial jobs, counter attendants, waitresses, and clerks; (3) occupations in manufacturing; and (4) others, consisting of nonmanagerial public-sector jobs, any primary-sector jobs held by urban women, and poorly def ined occupations. Table 30 presents the percentage distributions of currently married urban women according to these status categor ies and their educational attainment O The status distributions also include the proportion of women not working (columns sum to 100 percent), indicating which status categor ies absorbed employment increases in each educational group between 1970 and 1976. Education can be seen to determine the kinds of jobs women hold: of ache 802 percent of women in the ~none. education category who were working in 1970, 6.8 percentage points (83 per- cent of workers) were in the low-status service and other categories; of the 50.8 percent working Mung women in the low education category, 49.3 percentage points (97 percent of workers) were in the high-status service categories. Increases in labor force participation Tong less-educated women consisted mainly of more jobs in the same category as their 1970 employment. The participation rate of women with no education increased by 6.8 percent- age points between 1970 and 1976, with low-status service and other occupations accounting for 90 percent of jobs held by this group. Lower status-jobs also accounted for most of the increases in employment in the middle two education classes, though manufacturing also contributed

101 TABLE 30 Distribution of Currently Married Women Aged 20-44 by Occupation, Wor k Status, and Educational Attairunent, 1970 and 1976: Brazil education Occupation and Work Status None 1-4 5-9 10+ All 1970 1976 High Status 0.3 2.0 9.9 49.3 7.1 M - nufacturing 1.1 208 202 003 2.1 Low Status 5.1 3.8 3.2 0.3 307 Other 1.7 108 1.9 0.9 1.7 Not Working 91.8 89.6 82.8 49.2 85.d Total LOO. O 100.0 100.0 100. ~ 100. ~ High Status 0.8 2.5 10.3 49.d 10.5 Manufacturing 2.3 5.7 5.3 1.0 4.4 Low Status 8.5 7.2 4.8 1.6 6.1 Other 4.4 3.t 2.3 1.1 301 Not Working 84.0 80.9 77.3 46.9 75.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data f Ian. a small a~unt. These data suggest that if improvements in women ' s status occurred through employment, they did so because of increased participation among women in higher educational attainment categories rather than the opening of higher-status jobs to women with lower educa- tional attainment. The fact that increased employment among women with lower or no education consisted mainly of low-status jobs suggests that increased employment for these groups may indicate not so much a return on invest- ment in education, but a desire to maintain or increase household income. The census and survey data files on which this chapter is based permit only the broadest sort of speculation about changes in household consumption and earning pat- terns that may be behind these increases in the employment of married women. It was suggested earlier that increased purchases of consumer durables on credit, combined with an inflationary squeeze on household income-generating capacity, may have contributed to increased employment among married women in lower socioeconomic groups. The data files provide information on ownership of a few consumer durables (televisions, gas and electric stoves, refrigerators, and automobiles) , but no information on whether the purchase was with cash or credit; however,

102 given the widespread use of credit and the high cost of most of these items relative to the average Monthly earnings of lower-class households, it is likely that most of these purchases were made on credit. Data on television ownership illustrate the diffusion of consumer durables among lower socioeconomic groups during the early 1970s. Table 31 shows the percentage of currently married urban women residing in households with a television, again broken down by age and educational attainment. Although increases are observed among all of the education groups, the larger proportional increases are concentrated in the two lower groups. Among women aged 25-29, the percent with TVs increased from 12.2 in 1970 to 29.5 in 1916 for the ~none. education group, and from 36 . O to 62. 7 for the 1-4 group. Similar, though less dramatic, increases were found in the ownership of Gas and elects ic stoves and of ret r igerators, though tabulations for those i tems are not shown. While ~mpres- sionistic, such evidence supports the view that diffusion of consumer durables among lower-income groups and the resultant increased demands on family budgets may have <:ontributed to the increases in labor force participation observed among women in lower socioeconomic groups. Did such increases in labor fores participation have any influence on fertility? Data on average par ity suggest that differences between working and nonworking .women were greater in 1970 than ita 1976. Table 32 TABLE 31 Percent of Currently Married, Urban Women Living in Households Reporting Ownership of a Television, by Age and Education, 1970 and 1916 Brazil Education None 1-4 5 Age . _ Group 1910 1976 1970 L976 1970 1976 1970 1976 20-24 11.8 240 7 29.0 47.6 48.2 67.6 77 O 1 87. 6 25-29 12.2 29.5 3600 62.7 60.1 80.0 82.9 94.4 30-34 ^5. 8 2?. 4 41.3 68. 6 66.6 840 5 88.7 97 O O 35-39 17.2 37.8 45.7 7a.s 7200 B6.0 89.9 96O5 40-44 21.3 37.3 51.4 73.7 73.6 91.Z 93.3 98.3 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data riles.

103 TABLE 32 Average Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Married, Urban Women, by Age, Education, and Current Employment Status, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None 1- 4 . Currently Employed Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 5 - 9 10+ All 1970 _. 1976 20-24 2~5 2~5 1~8 1~3 1~5 1~1 0~8 0~; 1~8 1~3 25-29 3~9 4~0 301 206 2~4 2~1 1~7 1~3 3~1 202 30~34 5~1 4~0 402 Id 3~3 2~8 2~4 2~2 402 300 3S-39 6~3 504 4~8 405 3~9 3~6 3~3 3~0 5~0 `col 40~44 6~7 5~5 5~2 4~2 3~8 3~4 3~6 2~9 5~4 309 20-24 2~0 2~7 1~8 104 1~3 0~9 0~8 0~6 1~5 leg 25-29 3~7 3~5 2~7 2~4 2~1 1~6 1~5 1~1 2~6 1~8 30~34 4~9 4~8 3~8 3~5 3~0 3~1 2~1 2~0 3~6 3~1 35~39 6~3 6~3 4~5 4~2 3~5 3~4 2~7 2~7 4~6 4~0 40~44 6~5 6~3 5~0 5~0 3~6 3~5 3~0 2~6 5~0 Jea4 . . . . Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files. presents averages of the number of children ever born for working and nonworking currently married women by their age and educational attainment. In 1970, the average num- ber of children was generally lower for working women. For all education groups combined, the neither of children ranges from 1.8 for ages 20-24 to S.4 for ages 40O44 among nonworking women, compared to 1.3 to 3.9 for working women. The effect of work status varies according to the level of educational attainment and age. For women with no education, average parity is lower for working women after age 30. For women who reported some schooling, the averages are Lower for all age categories, with the largest absolute differences ( .5 to 1.0 children) occur- r ing in the 1-4 class. In 1976, there is an overall narrowing of dif ferentials between working and nonworking women: '"~ ~~ ~ ~~ ' enere IS no cil$~:erenCe tor women with no educa- tion, and the differences for women in the 1-4 group are reduced to less than .4 children per woman; for women with 5-9 and 10+ years of schooling, dif ferences are also r educed. This overall narrowing of differentials raises

104 the question of whether the relationship between work status and average parity changed between 1970 and 1976, or whether the narrowing reflects changing composition by educational attainment that occurred dur ing this interval. This question is addressed using multivar late regression analysis in the next chapter. Differences in average parity by migration status, again controlling for age and educational attainment, are shown in Table 33. Age and education influence the direc- tion of differences by migrant status. Overal}, there are no differences between migrant and nonmigrant women under age 35, but higher averages for migrant women in the 35-39 and 40~44 age groups. When the data are broken down by education, younger nonmigrant women have higher average parity in the ~none. education and 104 years of schooling categories. A shift to higher averages for migrant women in the two upper age groups also occurs in these categories. There are no differences between migrants and nonmigrants in the 5-9 education group, bu t h igher averages show up again for three of the four cells TAB" 33 Average Number of Children Ever Born for Migrant and Nonmigrant Women, by Age and Educational Attainment, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None l-4 , S~9 Migrant 10+ All Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 1970 1976 20—24 2.7 2.2 1~8 le7 led led 0~7 0~7 1~8 1~7 25-29 4.a 3~6 3~1 3~1 2e4 2.4 1.5 1.4 3.0 2~9 30-34 5.1 4.9 4.O 4.3 3.2 3.2 2.3 2.1 4.0 4.1 35-39 6.2 6,1 4.7 5.3 3.8 3.7 3.1 304 408 502 40-~4 6.6 6.9 5.0 5.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 308 5.1 5.8 20—24 2.1 109 led 1~6 1~2 1~2 0~7 0~6 1~5 1~4 25-29 3.6 307 2.7 2~6 2~1 1~6 1~3 1~2 2~4 2~2 30-34 4.9 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.1 I.7 3.5 3.3 35~39 6~2 7.3 4.4 4.6 3~5 3.3 2.6 3.l 4.4 4.6 40 - 44 6.3 7.7 4.9 6.S 3.6 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.1 6.1 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files.

105 containing older migrant women in the 10+ education cate- gory. The higher average parity among older migrant women probably reflects the fact that these women made recent moves as members of a family unit, whereas a large share of the moves of recent younger migrants may have been associated with or occurred before marr iage; this could explain why nonmigrants with lower educational attainment had higher average par ity. The data on links between selected measures of the socioeconomic status of currently married urban women and differentials in their average parity raise several issues for further analysis. After controlling for age, the greatest differentials in average parity are those asso- ciated with educational attainment, with significantly lower levels of average parity being observed among women with higher levels of education. Since there were impor- tant shifts of women to higher education categories between 1970 and 1976, increased education stands out as a key factor among the socioeconomic variables associated with fertility declines during that interval. However, the question remains of whether the impact of education was mainly a change in the distribution of women by educational attainment, or whether and how education may have interacted with other variables, perhaps with changes in its relationship to fertility differentials resulting from changes in those variables. For example, average parity was lower among working than nonworking women, but the nature of this relationship was conditioned by educa- tion. Work status itself was closely associated with educational attainment' with a greater proportion of working women among those with higher education. However, increases in the percentage of women working between 1970 and 1976 were greatest for those in lower educational categories. One effect of this was a narrowing of the differential in average parity between working and non- working women between 1970 and 1976. This suggests that something beyond changes in educational composition may have been at work, perhaps along the lines of the argument suggested earlier about increased world to maintain house- hold income or to finance increased consumption of con- sumer durables. Though the census and survey files pro- vide little supporting evidence for this idea, the data on increased ownership of televisions among less-educated women support such a view. Although the links between migrant status and differences in average parity are less clear, those that do appear were conditioned by education and age.

106 Currently Married Rural Women For currently married rural women, differences in average parity may reflect not only variation in individual and household characteristics, but also institutional factors such as availability of and access to land, land tenure, and dif f erences in modes of agr icultural production. Again' Brazil' s regional diversity is important. Tradi- tionally, high rural fertility in Brazil suggests that children have been an important asset to rural families; research on subsistence farmers ire the Northeast has revealed that even very young children contr ibute to household production (Alameda, 1977)0 A number of hypotheses have been suggested about the e f feats of recant socioeconomic changes in Brazil on rural fertility differences. One is that increased scarcity of land in more settled areas has reduced the value of chil- dren as farm laborers and made it more difficult for chil- dren to acquire a farm through inheritance. Research based on data from the 1970 population and agricultural censuses indicated that fertility was lower in more settled regions of Southeastern Brazil and higher on the agricultural frontier. However, the link between fer- tility and land availability was also conditioned by institutional factors, particularly Brazil ~ s unequal distribution of land (Merrick, 1978~; rural fertility in Northeastern Brazil was much less responsive to land scarcity as a consequence (Merrick, 1981) . Paiva (1982) has argued that the proletarzanization of rural labor (the shift of farm labor out of smallholder status into wage labor as a result of the consolidation of land into larger holdings) has contributed to Brazil' s recent fertility decline. He suggests that the effects of proletarianization in Brazil differ from the European experience described by Tilly (1978) and others, where fertility increased because the formation of new farm f amilies was linked to having a plot of land. These hypotheses will be discussed further in Chapter 4. The remainder of the present chapter explores differ- ences in the average parity of currently married rural women in Brazil, using cross-tabulations that control for age and other socioeconomic variables. Subsamples for rural women were extracted from the 1970 census and 1976 survey data files. Since the 1976 survey did not include rural areas in the Northern and Central-Western regions of Brazil, the data on rural women are restr icted to the Northeastern, Southeastern, and Southern states. Regional

107 breakdowns follow the grouping adopted in Chapter 2, with the f irst consisting of the Northeast, the second includ- ing the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (labeled RJ-SP), and the remaining states (Mines Gerais , Espir ito Santa, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul) constituting a third group labeled "other. n In Chapter 2, unad Ousted total fertility rates for rural areas of these three groups of states showed that while fertility was lowest in Rio and Sao Paulo in 1970, fertility decline between 1970 and 1976 was most rapid in the Bother ~ group, which fell between WASP and the Northeast in level of socioeconomic development. The same pattern appears when average parity is broken down by region, with controls for age and education. Table 34 presents data on the mean number of children ever born for currently married rural women in the three regional groups, with women grouped according to whether they had no education or reported any years of schooling completed. Average parity in 1970 was uniformly higher in the Northeast, with no apparent difference between those with none and those with some education. In 1970, the latter category accounted for only 26 percent of women in the region; this proportion increased to 39 percent in 1976, at which time differences by educational attainment also became observable. For example, there was only 0.1 difference for women aged 25-29 in 1970, but a . 8 dif ference in 1976. In the other two regions, half of the women reported having some education in 1970, with the proportion rising to 65 percent in RJ-SP and 67 per- cent in the Bother ~ group in 1976. In 1970, average parity was lower for rural women with some education in both regions, and this differential widened in 1976: for women aged 25-29, the dif fe~ential was . 4 in 1970 for the Bothers group, increasing to 1.0 In 1976; for RJ-SP, it increased from .8 to 1.0. This indicates a more rapid fertility decline in the former region, which is con- sistent with the findings reported in Chapter 2. To what extent does variation in other socioeconomic characteristics of rural women relate to differences in average par ity? Table 3 5 presents the percentages of currently married rural women according to three charac- teristics; two of these (work status and migration status) were also examined for urban women, while the third (pro- letarianization) was defined to explore the hypothesis that shifts of the rural population into wage labor con- tributed to recent fertility declines. To measure prole- tarianization, women were grouped according to whether

108 TABLE 34 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Marr led, Rural Women by Reg ion, Educational Attainment, and Age, 1970 and 1916: Brazil Education Northeast RJ-SP Age Group Ott er None Some None Some None Some 1970 20-24 2.48 2.28 2.18 10 84 2.36 1.85 (.06) (.09) (.16) (.09) (.07) (.06) 25-29 3.91 3.79 4.08 3.26 3.83 3.38 (.08) (.13) (.20) (.14) (.09) (.07) 30-34 5.72 ;.57 5.04 4.2S s.4a 4069 (.12) (.16) (.22) (.18) (.12) (.10) 35-39 6.96 6.79 6.47 5.31 6.51 5.99 (.13) (.23) (.26) t.26) (.13) (.15) 40-44 7.46 8.~S 6.77 6.01 6.89 6.62 (.~7) (.32) (.30) (.35) (.16) (.17) N (unweighted) 4 ,111 1, 435 741 742 2, 939 2, 939 Percent (weighted)a 74.1 25.9 50.3 49.7 50.0 50.0 1976 20-24 2 ~ 46 1 ~ 97 2.18 1.67 2e 27 1.59 teG8) (~08) (~14) (~05) (~09) (~04) 25-29 4 ~ 12 3 0 29 3 ~ 80 2.83 3 ~ 78 2. 78 (oO9) (olO) (ol6) (o{)8) (ol(3) (~06) 30-34 5077 5049 s.ao 4O03 5~11 4~19 ( o 12) ( e 14 ) ( ~ 21 ) ( .12) ( ~ 14 ) ~ ~ 08 ) 35-39 7013 7.07 6.03 4.64 6~51 Se43 (~14) (~19) (~23) (~14) (ol4) (~11) 4 0~44 8 ~ 41 1 e 25 6 ~ 74 5 ~ 56 6 ~ 98 6 o 16 (~18) (~253 (~21) (~22) (~17) (~14) N (unweighted) Percent (weighted) a 3,143 1,987 61~3 38~7 35~1 823 1~916 1, 913 64e9 33~3 66.7 Note: Standard errors of means in parentheses. aPercentages refer to distribution within each region. Source: Tabulations of subeamples of census and survey data f iles .

1~39 TABLE 35 Percent of Currently Married, Rural Women in Proletarian Households, Percent Working, and Percent Migrant, by Age and Region, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Reg ion Northeast R J-SP Other Age Group and Status 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 Work ing Migrants 20-24 605 15~2 2~8 6~9 5O7 19~8 2S - 29 902 16e6 4~8 15~4 6~G 22~8 30~34 8~9 24~0 3~2 13~2 6~6 2609 35~39 800 24~0 5~0 20~6 5~6 2805 40~44 9~2 26~4 3~8 19~3 7~5 21~5 20-24 8 ~ 6 11.3 23.7 32.3 22.7 21.5 25-29 Be ~ 10e 9 22e 0 25o ~ 19e 5 16. ~ 30~34 6~9 806 20~5 25~2 17~9 17~4 3S-39 6~2 5~1 14~6 16~1 14~7 13~1 40~44 6~7 5~9 18~0 14~9 13~2 10~3 Proletar fan 20-24 25 ~ 0 38 ~ 9 64.8 81.0 25. ~ 46 ~ 1 25-29 IS o 4 37 O 1 58 ~ 6 74 ~ 1 26 O 1 41e 6 30~34 23~9 36~0 53~0 6703 2208 37~7 35~39 2103 3107 510 ~ 60 - 5 24 ~ 8 38 O 9 40~44 20 ~ 6 31 ~ 1 48 ~ 8 66 ~ 0 2103 3204 Source: Tabulations of subsamples of census and survey data files. the head of the household in which they resided was a wage laborer or not, with ache former considered proletarian. Migrant status and work status were defined as they were for urban women: women who had resided in their present municipality for 5 years or less were considered migrants, and work status was established according to the census and survey data. The earlier caution about differences in the way these sources define labor force participation is particularly important here, since a higher proportion of rural than urban women fall into the grey area defined by the census as not working and by Me survey as working.

110 The proportion of rural women reported as working was below 10 percent for all of the age groups in all of the regions in 1970, ranging from 3 to 5 percent in Rio and Sao Paulo to 6 to 9 percent in the other two regions. When these figures are compared to the 1976 data, substan- tial increases are indicated. While it is impossible to tell how much these increases represent definitional differences. it does appear that increases may have been greater for women over age 30. . I t is also dif f icult to ~ uage whether the lower rates In RJ-SP represent true differences in work status or some sort of regional variation in reporting. In the case of migration ~ the highest proportion of women reported as migrants in both 1970 and 1976 is found in Rio and Sao Paulo, and the lowest in the Northeast. There is a slight increase in the migrant proportion in both regions between 1970 and 1976. As would be expected, migration rates are higher among women in their twenties than among those in their thirties. Rates in the mothers region are somewhat lower than those in the RJ-SP in 1970, but drop slightly between 1970 and 1976. Regional differentials in socioeconomic characteristics are greatest in the proportion of women in proletar fan households. In 1970, the shift to wage labor among house- hold heads had progressed furthest in Rio and Sao Paulo,. with the highest proportions being reported for younger women, these f igures ranged from 65 percent for women aged 20-24 to 49 percent for those aged 40-4A. The proportions were about equal in 1970 in the other two regions, ranging from 20 to 26 percent. · . ~ Between 1970 and 1976, the great- est percentage point increases in proletarianization occurred in the ~other. region, though the highest level of proletar ionization continued to be that of RJ-SP ~ In the latter, the percentage ranged from 81 percent for women aged 20-24 to 66 percent for those 40-44, compared to 46 and 32 percent, respectively, in the former. This . suggests that proletarianization mav have been a factor in the lower fertility observed in Rio and Sao Paulo in 1970, as well as in the more rapid fertility decline observed in the Bother ~ region between 1970 and 1976. To what extent are these differences in socioeconomic characteristics reflected in average parity? Table 36 presents the mean number of children ever born by age and reg ion for women in proletar fan and nonproletar fan house- holds. Neither 1970 nor 1976 results suggest that average parity is significantly lower among the former group. Indeed, their averages are more often higher than lower; _,

111 TABLE 36 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Married, Rural Women Aged 20-44, by Region and Proletarian Status, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Region Northeast RJ-SP Other Proletarian Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes 1970 1976 20-24 2.4 2.6 1.8 2.i 2.1 2.0 25-29 3.8 4.0 3~4 3.7 3.6 3.6 30-34 5.6 6.0 4.5 4.7 5.1 4.8 35-39 608 7.0 5.8 6.6 603 6~2 40-44 7.6 7.7 6.5. 6.6 6.8 6.8 20-24 202 2.3 1.8 1~7 108 108 25-29 3.8 3.8 2.8 302 300 3.2 30-34 5.6 5.8 4~0 4.5 4.4 407 35~39 609 7.S 5.0 5.3 506 6.0 40-44 8.0 8.3 505 6.5 6.5 6.5 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files. they are consistently higher in RJ-SP, where the pro- portion of proletarian women in the total is highest. This is puzzling in view of the relationship between fertility levels and the level of proletarianization at the regional level. It suggests that the effect of proletar ionization on fertility may operate through a complex of other var tables whose ef fects are manifested in such regional differences, or that proletarianization itself may be a manifestation of changes in another variable or set of variables.

112 One such important variable may be work status. Table 37 presents average parity for working and nonworking women by age and region. The table suggests that average parity was slightly lower for working women in the Northeast and "other" regions in 1970, but not in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paula; there were so few working women in the latter two states in 1970 that none of the averages for that group were signif icantly different from those of nonworking women. In 1976, the pattern of differences between working and nonworking women was even less clear: there were still no differences ire RJ-SP, while working TABLE 37 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Married, Rural Women Aged 20-44, by Region and Work Status, 1970 and 1976: Brazil - Region Northeast RJ-SP Working Other Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes , . .. 1970 1_ 20824 204 2~5 2~0 106 2~1 1~9 25 29 309 304 3~6 4~1 306 3~3 30-34 5~7 5~5 407 3~0 5~1 4~3 35~39 6~9 6~1 600 5.i 6c3 Se5 40-44 7.6 7.4 6.5 7.9 6.~9 Sa8 20-24 2~3 200 1~8 1~9 1~8 1~7 25-29 3~9 3~3 3~1 2~8 3~2 2~9 30~34 506 5~9 4~3 4~6 4~4 406 35~39 7~2 6~8 So2 5~1 6~0 5~3 40 44 8~2 7~8 6~2 6~1 6~6 6~4 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files.

113 women showed slightly lower averages for all but the age 30-34 group in the other two regions. The lack of any difference in the RJ-SP group and the reduction in the mother n group between 1970 and 1976 suggest that the effect of work status on fertility differences is reduced as proletarianization increases. Another potential covariate is migration; however, tabulations of average parity by migration status revealed no significant differences, and the results are not presented here. This leads us back to education, which was the only socioeconomic characteristic of rural women for which a consistent and statistically significant pattern of dif- ferences in average parity was observed. It is tempting to conclude that education accounts for most of the dif- ferentials, as well as the changes in rural fertility observed between 1970 and 1976. A problem with the second point is that levels of educational attainment increased almost equally during that period in the RJ-SP and ~other. regions, yet fertility decline was more rapid in the latter. Either the evidence is only circumstantial that relative increases in proletarianization in that region were also greater, or there may have been interaction between the education and proletarianization variables, and others as well. Since further presentation of data in tabular form would be an awkward way to address this issue, that task is undertaken in the next chapter using multiple regressions. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this chapter was to examine evidence on the spread of contraceptive use to women in lower and middle socioeconomic classes who accounted for much of the acceleration in the decline of Brazilian marital fertility in the early 1970s, focusing on changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of these women that could have increased their motivation to control fertility. Because there are no nationally representative data on contraceptive use or socioeconomic character istics, data on contraceptive use from recent state-level surveys were pieced together, while changes in socioeconomic variables and their relation to differences in average parity were examined based on 1970 census and 1976 PNAD survey data f iles. Analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility in Chapter 1 identified increased use of contraception (or

114 contraception combined with abortion) as a key factor in Brazil's accelerated fertility decline in the 1970s. Baseline data that would permit measurement of the extent to which this increase represented the spread of fertility control among lower- and middle- income groups are lacking; however, data from contraceptive surveys taken later in the decade show signif icant percentages of contraceptive use among these groups. This, along with evidence in Chapter 2 showing that these groups exper fenced the mos t rapid fertility decline during the decade, supports the conclusion that their use of fertility control had indeed increased O While Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys show that differences in contraceptive use between higher and lower income and education groups remained, the percentage of use among the latter was far from negligible. Survey data also show that organized family planning programs contr ibuted to a reduction in socioeconomic class dif fer - entials in contraceptive use in a number of Northeastern states. This occurred during ~ period when signif leant changes in socioeconomic conditions af fecting the status of women were taking place in Brazil. The proportion of women reporting no education was reduced, and there were signif- icant increases in the proportion reporting higher level s of educational attainment in both urban and rural areas. Increased proportions of married women were also reported as working, though it is difficult to determine to what extent this reflects differences in the way census and survey data defined labor force participation. Increased ownership of consumer durables was observed among women in urban households, while rural households were becoming increasingly reliant on wage labor, or proletarianized. Such changes are consistent with a number of hypotheses about the reasons for increased motivation to control fertility. Increases in educational attainment represent a powerful modernizing force, and the relationship between differences in average parity and education noted in this chapter is clearly very strong. However, this relation- ship was complicated by signif leant collateral changes relating to increased economic pressures on low-income urban households and increases in rural proletar ianiza- tion. The multivariate regression analysis in the next chapter permits further examination of hypotheses linking d if ferences in average par ity to these var. tables, as well as a decomposition of changes in average parity from 1970 to 1976 as they relate to changes in population composi- tion and in the impact of the different variables on f ertility.

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL This chapter uses multivariate regression analysis to explain how changes in average parity among married women in Brazil relate to their changing socioeconomic charac- teristi~s during the accelerated fertility decline of the early 1970s. In so doing, it attempts to provide a more systematic assessment of the hypotheses presented in the last two chapters, supported by tabular evidence, about socioeconomic differences in fertility decline in Brazil and the forces behind those dif ferences. The decision to focus on variability in the average parity of married women was based on several considera- tions. First, fertility was measured according to average par ity rather than the last birth reported because of the questionable reliability and comparability of the latter in studying changes over time among different socioeco- nomic groups. Second, analysis of the proximate deter- minants of the decline in the total fertility rate between 1970 and 1976 indicated fertility control by married women to be the major factor involved; this conclusion was also supported by evidence on the diffusion of contraception among new regions and income groups. Third, accelerated fertility decline coincided with a number of important socioeconomic changes that could have had an impact on the motivation to control fertility, including increases in female educational attainment and possible aggravation of inflationary pressures on the economic resources of low- and middle-income households. The last two points sug- gested a working hypothesis about the acceleration of fertility decline: that it was triggered by the conver- gence of two sets of forces--increased availability of effective means of contraception and the emergence of socioeconomic conditions conducive to smaller family norms . 115

116 Because there is a lack of nationally representative data combining information on contraceptive use and socio- economic characteristics, the analysis in this chapter is 1 imited to the second set of forces. The pr inc~pal aues- tion addressed is the extent to which the effects on reproductive behavior of such modernizing forces as increased household income and f emale educational attain- ment (as measured by average parity) combined with other factors affecting household behavior, particularly those reflecting such major structural dimensions of the Brazil° Ian economy as inflation and income distribution. Differs ential patterns of change among rural and urban areas sug- gested a division of ache chapter into separate sections for these groups, though work on the latter was even more rests i<:ted by data limitations . URBAN WOMEN As noted earlier, the acceleration of fertility decline in Brazil coincided with a period during which lower- and middle-income urban households were raising their consump- tion expectations end beginning to realize them through increased purchases of housing and other consumer dur ables, including televisions and automobiles, with most purchases made on the installment plan O Unequal treatment of wages and credit obligations in Brazil's indexing sys- tem made it more difficult for families to keep up with payments, and even to purchase basic necessities during periods of high inflation. As was suggested earlier, this, combined with increased knowledge of and access to contraception, may have reduced family-size desires. This explanation does not compete with a modernization frame- work, but extends it to incorporate other structural changes. Along the research questions that need to be addressed are the Following: (1) What measures in the available data files can be used as appropriate indices of the mod- ern~zing forces and economic pressures discussed above? ( 2) Mow should the relationship between these measures and average par ity be specif led? Are the relationships line ear? Should interactions be taken into account? (3) Can the analysis be pushed beyond explanation of differentials in average parity in 1970 and 1976 to an assessment of the sources of change in fertility during that interval? In other words, do declines in average parity reflect changes in the composition of the population of married women . . . ~

117 according to modernizing characteristics, or is it more a case of changes in the parameters that ref lect the impact of these var tables on par ity? The 1 atter are likely to reflect structural changes, and one of the tasks here will be to incorporate in the specif ication variables for which such changes would be indicative of the specific struc- tural forces hypothesized above, that is, increased eco- nomic pressures on household resources. It is important to recognize that questions In censuses and large-scale surveys do not provide a great deal of conceptual precision for the measurement of modernization and its inf luence on fertility. Most of ache measures in this chapter have appeared in the presentation of tabular evidence in earlier chapters; these include income and education, as well as age. A new variable that attempts to measure households' relative economic positions has also been added. Table 38 lists the variables that have been selected for the analysis of data on urban women. Variable labels and a summary of var table def initions are shown. Average parity (CEB), the dependent variable, is listed first. In accounting for variation in this variable, the amount of exposure to the risk of conception needs to be con- trolled. This risk is associated with marital duration Data on age at marriage are Provided only in the 1976 data rile; maternal age is a less satis- factory substitute, particularly at earlier ages when there is greater variability because the marriage is recent. To maintain comparability between 1970 and 1976, regressions were run using maternal age (AGE) as a control for exposure to risk. Women were first separated into three broad age categories, with AGE used as a control variable for each: (1) 20-24, (2) 25-34, and (3) 35-44. To test the sensitivity of results to marital duration (MDUR), the 1976 data were then run using the AGE control variable. The next two variables on the list relate to moderni- zation. It has become fairly standard practice in analy- tical approaches inf luenced by household economic theory to use women' s average educational attainment (MED) and their own and their husband's earnings (HINC) as variables in analyzing differences In average parity (see Schultz, 1976). Women's earnings and educational attainment reflect the opportunity costs of childrearing vis-a-vis other uses of their time, while the earnings of husbands and wives measure their available resources for child- r ear ing and other activities. Theoretically, the effect and maternal age.

118 TABLE 38 Var table Labels and Def ~ notions, Urban Women: Braz il Var table Def inition CB AGE MED HINC MDUR GAP Average parity: number of live children ever born as reported in 1970 census and 1976 PNAD survey. Mother's age: in years. Mother's education: natural logarithm of the number of years of school completed, def ined as follows: MED-log (years +1), so that log (0 years) "O. Monthly earnings of the head of household: natural logarithm of amount in 1970 cruzeiros. Duration of marriage in number of years for currently marr fed women . Estimated log of head' s monthly earning (PINC) minus log of observed earnings (ZINC). PINC ~ p man, EXP, TAX), where : For ~ years of school completed by head. EXP ~ head ' a age years of school completed - 6 . TAX - natural logarithm of value added tax per capita of state in which woman resides. On the number of children should be negative for cost factors and positive for resource factors; in fact, how- ever, both often turn out to be negative because increas- ing income is usually accompanied by changing attitudes about family size, including a preference for quality rather than quantity of children. Tabular evidence in earlier chapters indicated that differences in average parity in Brazil negatively cor- related with both income and education. However, the question was raised of whether parity changes between 1970 and 1976 mainly reflected changes in the educational and income levels of married women of reproductive age, or whether other variables related to inflation and income distribution also contributed to fertility decline. The available census and survey data files provide only a few threads of evidence on the latter. Increased ownership of televisions, particularly among low-income households

119 likely to have purchased them on credit, suggests that such factors could have been operative; increased female labor force participation suggests that economic pressures might have contr ibuted to the delay or termination of ch ildbear ing . However, exploratory attempts to incorporate television ownership and female labor force participation in the specif ication of the relationship between female educa- tional attainment, husband's earnings, and average par ity yielded unsatisfactory results. The problem was in iden- tifying the endogenous effects of the employment and earn- ings of women in reproductive ages on their fertility, vis-a-vis the exogenous influence of those women's educa- tion and their husbands ' earnings. The data f iles did not provide other exogenous variables that could be used to estimate fully identified parameters for female employment and earnings. Consequently, the analysis was limited to estimation of reduced-form coefficients; that is, only exogenous variables were included on the r~ght-hand side of the regression equation. In view of this, and to permit continued pursuit of a specification that would capture the effect of the rela- tive economic position of a woman's household (as well as possible changes in that position) on her fertility, an approach based on the concept of relative income was adopted. A households income is relative in that it may be greater or less than the income stream that would be expected on the basis of that household's human capital endowments. A gap between observed and expected income, if it existed, would indicate whether a household was more or less vulnerable to outside economic pressures such as inflation. The approach is consistent with Leibenstein's ( 1974 ) point about the relationship between income and fertility: that while the overall relationship may be negative, it may be positive within specific reference groups, with higher fertility among higher-income house- holds within a particular group. This approach was operationalized by first estimating the expected earnings of husbands using standard earnings equations, and then determining what each husband's earn- ings would be given his particular characteristics. The estimates were based on husband' s earnings rather than household income for s:mplicity's sake (estimates could then be based on the characteristics of one individual without consideration of household size and structure as well as other income sources). Some of the limitations of this approach are offset by the fact that the analysis

120 was restr ic ted to mare fed women with husbands present who were living in single-family households. Earnings are measured in logarithms of 1970 Cruzeiros per month . The dif ference between repor ted (HINC) and estimated (PINC) earnings provides a measure of the gap described above. Variables in the earnings equation include husband's education in years of schooling com- pleted (HED); husband's experience (current age minus years of schooling minus six [EXP1); and an index of the level of industrial output in the state of residence, which consists of the amount of value-added tax on manu- f actur ing per capita in the state (TAX) . The latter variable was added as a control for regional differences in labor market conditions, which are known to vary widely in Brazil. Earnings equations were estimated for 1970 and 1976, with the following results: 1970: PINC = 3.837 + .149 HEDUC (85.3) (74.S) + .0008 EXP + .249 TAX (1.13 (31.~) 1976: PINC = 4.013 + .158 aEnuc (77.2) (79.0) + .011 EXP ~ .232 TAX (10.9) (25.8) R2 = .38 R2 = .37 Values of the t-statistic are shown In parentheses beneath regression coefficients. A new variable (GAP) was defined as the difference between PINC and HINC. Other variables omitted from the analysis of indi- vidual-level data studied in this chapter were infant and child mortality. Mortality measures for use in analysis of individual records can and have been der ived f rom these data f iles (Metrics, 1981); however, the process of trans- forming ratios of surviving children to children ever born into a normally distr ibuted, jointly dependent var. table would require controlling these ratios for length of expo- sure to risk of mortality using parity progression ratios. It was impossible to specify a statistically meaningful causal relation between fertility and mortality in such circumstances. Unweighted means and standard deviations of the var$- ables used in the regression analysis of differences in average parity are presented in Table 39. The data are broken down according to the three broad age categor ies described above. Exploratory analysis of the relationship between MEI) and CEB suggested a nonlinear specif ication.

i21 mABLE 39 Meansa (standard deviations) of Variables Used in Analysis of Differences in Average Parity for Urban Women, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Age Year and Variable - 20-24 25-34 35-44 1970 CEB 1.78 3.47 5.00 (1.51) (2.43) (3.51) MED 1.31 1.29 1.17 (0.79) (0. 83) (0. 84) AGE 22.19 29 0 52 39.17 (1. 37) (2. 8S) (2. 84) HINC 5.60 5.76 5.75 (0.92) (1.06) . (1.21) GAP 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 (0. 72) (0. 81) (0. 97) N 2,749 7,532 6,494 1_ CEB 1.45 2.89 4.61 (1. 21) ( 2. 01) t3. 11) MID 1. 67 1. S9 1. 38 (0. 71) (0. 78) (a. 81) AGE: 22.26 29.38 39 e29 (1. 37) (2.76) (2.76) HINC 6.13 6.31 6.27 (1. 02) (1. 07) (1.11) MI)UR 3. 20 8. 23 16.74 (2.26) (4.51) (5.94) GAS 0. 09 -0 .04 -0. 02 (0.86) (0.15) (0.92) N 2, 939 7, 691 6,491 aUnwe ighted sample means.

122 Consequently, MED was def ined as the logar i thm of a woman's years of schooling completed plus one, so that the logar ithm of zero years of schooling would equal zero. As indicated above, HINC is also measured in logar i thms . S ince GAP is the res idual of the estimated value of ZINC, it has a zero mean for the total study population, but varies slightly from zero ~ n specif ic age categories. Current earnings of husbands of younger women averaged slightly higher than their estimated earnings' while the average GAP for older women fell slightly below zero. I t should also be noted that there are signif icant negative correlations (.7 to .8) between HINC and t:;AP; this indi- cates a tendency for current earnings to be lower than expected earning among husbands with lower earning levels, and for current earnings to exceed expected earns ings by larger amounts among husbands with higher earn- ings. A check of outliers in the earnings equations indicated that these high zero order correlations were a statistical artifact produced by cases at extremes calf the income distr ibution: overestimation of earnings when husbands repot ted zero earnings and underestimate ion when they repot ted very high earnings. These correlations disappeared when extreme cases were omitted; however, it was decided not to exclude such cases from the analysis cuff fertility differentials because the impact of the dif- ferential between ZINC and PINC was of interest over the entire range of the income distr ibution. The data In Table 39 on average marital duration tM=R) in 1976 suggest that analysis of fertility differentials among younger women is likely to be quite sensitive to differences in exposure to the r isk of conception because of the selectivity within that age group toward women who moor ~ -~ "arIV. The ever ace are at mar r iage for women aged ~ ~ _ _, ~ _ —,, , _ _ _ ~ ¢ _ _ 20-24 in 1976 was 19.1 years, `:o~arec1 ~o ADOS y="L. I. women aged 25-29. Relative variation in MUIR is also greater among younger women: the coefficient of variation for that group was 71 percent compared to 55 percent for 25-34 and 35 percent for 35-44. Caution is suggested in interpreting results for the youngest age category when MOOR cannot be controlled. Analysis of Urban CEB Differentials in 1970 and 1976 Results of ordinary least squares regression analyst s of differences in CER for women grouped by broad age cate-

123 gories are presented in Tables 40 (1970) and 41 (1976) Three alternative regression equations were estimated for each data set. In each equation, the AGE var table was included in an attempt to control for length of exposure to r isk of conception within the broader age groups; an additional equation substituting MDUR for AGE in the last alternative is also shown for 1976 . Logar ithms of both MED and HINC were employed af ter initial tests revealed nonlinearity in the relation between these variables and CEB. An education-income interaction term was also int-~o- duced to determine whether the slope of CEB with respect to income shifted with increases in education. Interpretation of regression coefficients for MED and HINC is facilitated by the logarithmic specification, which makes them equally proportional to elasticities (the percentage change in CEB for each one percent change in MED or HINC) e Dividing either coefficient by the mean of CEB gives the elasticity. Comparison between elasticities calculated from the first regression equation for each of the age groups in Tables 40 and 41 and averages for groups of lower- and higher-income countries reported by Schultz (1976) suggests that the responsiveness of BAR to changes in MED and HINC among urban Brazilian women was at an intermediate level, and that it moved in the direction of higher-income countries from 1970 to 1976. Schultz found that elasticities of average par ity with respect to both mother's education and father' s earnings became increas- ingly negative as the level of development increased. This same tendency is observed in the Brazilian data Elasticities for MED are greater (more negative) for younger women, and increase f ram 1970 to 1976. The results for HINC fall more clearly within the range of Schultz's higher-income countries. A spry of the results is as follows: Age Group MAD 1_ BINC 1_ 1970 1_ 20-24 -.30 -.38 -.08 -~07 25-34 -.22 -.31 -,07 -.05 35-44 -.20 -.23 -.07 -.09 Lower -.17 to -.06 +.05 (Schultz) Higher -1.1 to -.19 -.11 to +.28 (Schultz) .

124 He o m L. a) ED 5: o _I _I N \,. ~ m Ld U] to he O ~ :~ ~ he O ~ Q 00 to a: ~ A HE ~e 1 C) C" ~ _ - O~~ I~ 0- - IY 41 S Po Yl \0 · e O ~ 1 — O ~4 e~e ~ _ ~r _ 1 o o O · . O _ U~ o o '_4 0 · ~ ~ _ ~0 `0 ~ 0, 0. ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ _ O _ ~ _ 01 _ ~ ~ ~ ~ \0 ~4 C 4 C~ ~ —~ 1^ ~t ~ O ~ O ~ O t~ · 0 · · · e O ~ 0 ~4e 0 t~ ° ~ Oe ~ O ~e _d _~ —~ ~ C~ ~ _ _ _ ~ _ r _~ · e 0 r~ 1 _I - _ _ 1

125 .- o o . ,. . ~ AS .- ~ _ ~ : ~ ^ : ~ ~ .- ~ a. ~ ^ o _ ^ =.! a ~ O Z~ ~ ^- ^ ~ . . . . ~ -= ~ O ~ . I . ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ^ · . · . . · . . ~ ~ e ~ : : . ~ 0= ~ = ~ 2. ~ O ~ ~ :D ~ a = 0 ._ = 0 ~ == ~ O ~ ~ e e ~ ~ ~ =.

126 At 1970 mean levels of MED and CEB, the 48 percent in- crease in the average number of years of schooling achieved by women in the 2S-34 age group (recalling that MED = log [years of school + 11 ) would account for an 11 percent decline in CEB . While these results suggest the t Brazilian experience during the early 1970s was consistent with patterns observed among lower-middle income coun- tries, the elasticities of CEB with respect to father's earnings appear to lean more toward the negative values character istic of higher-income counts ies than do those for MED. One Seaport for this could be the earnings gap hypothe- sis discussed above: that the effects of earnings on CEB can be positive within a given reference group even if the overall relation between CEB and ZINC is negative. The second set of regression equations I which incorporates the GAP variable, confirms this. The regression coefficient for GAP is negative ~ implying that the more husband ' s estimated earnings (PINC) exceed actual earnings (HINC), the lower is the average observed CAR. In a society like Brazil in which income differentials are associated with a variety of sociocultural factors that could influence reproductive behavior, it makes sense to look for the effect of income on fertility within rather than between specific reference groups. Similar considerations raise the question of whether an interaction with sociocultural factors associated with differences in educational attainment affects the regres- sion results for ME:D and HINC. The third set of regres- s ion equations includes an interaction term. This term is statistically signif leant in both 1970 and 1976 for women in the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups because of the large sample size; addition of the variable affects only the third digit of it-square. The term's positive sign indicates that with increases in MED, the negative impact of HINC on CEB is attenuated, as is the effect of MED as HINC increases. This Is what one would expect gives the variety of sociocultural influences described earlier. As noted above, the variable AGE was included in a U three variants of the regression equations as a control for differences in the risk of exposure to conception within each of the broader age groups. Marital duration is a better measure of such risk, but was not included in the 1970 census. However, it was incorporated in the 1976 survey, and equation (4) in Table 41 substitutes MDUR for AGE to provide some measure of the effect of using AGE as the measure of exposure to risk. As one would expect, AGE

127 appears to be least satisfactory for younger women, for whom both absolute and relative variation in CEB was more sensitive to MDUR than AGE. It is interesting to note that while the coefficients for MED and HINC increased in negative magnitude with the addition of MDUR, the impact of GAP was reduced; this suggests that the effect on CEB of the relative status captured by GAP may be tied to marital duration. Among younger women whose husband's earnings fall below the expected level, lower CEB could be the result of longer intervals between mart iage and f irst birth, a point that deserves further exploration. Concern about MDUR is warranted because of its ~pli- cations for interpreting changes in CEB from 1970 to 1976. The extent of this concern will depend on one's confidence in the conclusions derived earlier from census and survey data: that average ages at marriage and first birth did not change substantially between 1970 and 1976, and that most of the decline in total fertility can be attributed to a decline in marital fertility rather than to changes in the proportions married. The issue is less important to determining how much changes in socioeconomic status contributed to declines in AIR than to examining how those changes were translated into declines via the proximate determinants of fertility. Sources of Change in CEB from 1970 to 1976 Regression analyses of differences in ran also can be used to identify sources of change in CEB from 1970 to 1976. As noted earlier, an important question is whether such change resulted from a redistribution of women according to socioeconomic characteristics or from a shift in the parameters relating these characteristics to CEB. One approach is to evaluate the regression coefficients reported in Tables 40 and 41 using sample means, and then examine changes in the contribution of each variable to the level of FOB for the two dates. With two sets of regression results, there are three ways that one can proceed: forward using 1970 coefficients with means for both dates, backward using 1976 coef f icients with both sets of means, or by comparing means and coefficients for each date. Changes in the average value of rEB could be the result of changes in educational attainment or other variables included in the regressions, changes in regres- sion coefficients, or shifts in conditions that are not measured, but are reflected in the constant term. The

128 first two variants of this approach hold the coefficients constant, but will give different results to the extent that coefficients have changed; by definition there is no change in the constant term. The third variant allows for change in the constant, but confuses changes in composi- tion with shifts in coefficients. An alternative approach is to reestimate coefficients and include both a dummy variable for time to capture shifts in the constant term, and interaction terms for time and each of the variables in the regression to measure changes in regression chef f~cients. The new estimators can then be evaluated at both sets of sample means to determine the contribution of changes in composition to observed changes in the level of CEB. Both of these approaches have been attempted. Table 42 presents the f irst approach: the f irst column represents changes with the 1970 regressions; the second column represents changes with the 1976 regressions; and the third column shows the difference between the evalua- tion of 1970 regressions with 1970 means and the 1976 regresszons-with 1976 means. The third set of regressions in Tables 41 and 42 (with the interaction term) was used for the two older age categories where interactions were s ignif ~ cant. The total of changes in each group of coef- ficients adds to the estimated change in CEB for that group; by definition' the estimated change in CEB equals the actual change in the last column. In the first two variants, estimated changes exceed the actual in all cases, especially using the l9?o coeffici- ents and in the case of-older women; this suggests some combination of change in coefficients and in the constant term. Changes in the average level of husbands' earnings appear to have had a greater impact than maternal educa- tion, more so In 1970 than in 1976, which suggests an attenuation in the importance of the earnings effect. An important fraction of ache negative effects of MED and aINC is offset by the positive MED*lIINC interaction term. Com- pared to MED and HINC, changes in the GAP variable had little effect; in fact, a slight narrowing of the average GAP contributed a slightly positive impetus to average CAB. Shifts in age composition also raised CEB for older women. The third variant is useful mainly in illustrating how the combined effects of changes in composition and in coefficients relate to changes when coefficients are held constant. For example, the effect of changes in the HINC coefficient and the average level of HINC would have con- tributed to an increase of .562 in CEB among women aged

129 TABLE 42 Changes in Contribution of Independent Variables to Levels of CEB, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Age Group 1970 Regression 1976 Regression Co~ined and Variable Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 20-24 CONSTANT O O O . 914 AGE 0.014 0.011 -1.072 MED -O o 152 -O .143 -O 0 112 ZINC -O . 220 0 . 20 8 -O 0 09 ~ GAP -0.006 -00006 +o.oas Can -0.351 -O.335 -0.332 25-3 4 CONSTANT O O -O . 998 AGE -0.021 -0.022 +0.206 M" -O .309 -O .357 -O .564 ZINC - -0.566 -0.462 0.562 GAP 0.027 00022 0.021 INTI~ACTTON 0.245 0 .236 ~ . 210 CEB — -O .624 -0 . S83 -0.563 35 - 44 CONSTANT O O O . 696 AGE 0~008 0~011 1.261 M" -O .379 -O .530 -1. 340 HINC -O 0938 -1.OS4 -2.213 GAP -O .027 -O .026 -O .029 INTERACTION 0.409 0.595 1.029 Con -O.929 -1.004 -O 0 363 25034 had there not been offsetting changes in MED and the constant. Since both types of <change are clearly opera- tive, the alternative approach to decomposition using reestimated coefficients with dub variables for inter- actions with time should be helpful, particularly for the 25-34 age group. Table 43 presents estimates of the regression coef- ficients using the combined 1970 and 1976 data files. Four additional variables have been added: a dummy for time, and one interaction term each for time and MED, HINC, and GAP. These four variables should account for changes in the constant term and in coefficients for those three variables. These regressions confirm what Table 42 suggested about changes in coefficients for women in the middle and upper age categories. For women in the 25-34 age group, the negative effect of husband's earnings is

130 TABLE 43 Regression Analysis and Test for Interactions, Merged 1970 and 1976 Data Files: Braz il Age Group Var fable 20-24 25-34 3S-44 CONSTANT -0.103 3.628 11.704 (0 O 3) (9 ~ 8) (18. 6) MED TO o 425 —10 017 —1 e 74 0 (110 1) (7 0 0) (7 0 9) HINC -0 . 398 -~:1 0 96 5 -1 0 64 1 (8.3) (1S.2) (16.9) i\Gl3 ~ o 23L2 0.203 0.083 (1?.6) (35.6) t8.7) GAP -O .363 -0.797 -1. 34 B t6.7) (15.6) (15.9) INTERACTION - - 0. 092 0 . 20 3 (3.6) (5.3J TIME -0 c 057 -0 . 781 1. 97 0 (002) (105) (205) BINC*17IME 0 0 002 0 o 183 -0 . 20 5 (0O0) (1.9) (104) MED*TSME 0 - 035 -0 O 150 -0 O 666 (0.6) (0.7) (2.~) 04P-T~ Go 027 0.147 0.068 (0.4) (2.1) (0.6) INT=AC$*T$= - - 0 . 007 0 . 08 8 (0.2) (0.6) R2 (MSE) 0.18 (~.58) 0.23 {~.05) 0.16 (9.65) F (F>P) 159.6 ( . 0001) 459. ~ ( . 0001) 248.1 (. 0001) attenuated. This shows up in the BINC*TIME coeff icient, as well as in INTE:BACTION*TIME:; the MED*TIME: coeff ~ cient is not signif icant. For women aged 35-44, there is a s ignif icant increase in the constant term and a decline in the impact of education. When the regression results for the merged f lies are used to decompose change, the results are consistent with

131 those reported ~ n Table 42 in the relative impact of the var tables . The main point that stands out In Table 44 is that the decline in the negative impact of husband' s earnings over time for women aged 25-34 results f rom a change in the value of the regression coefficient, as does the rather large increase in the impact of earnings for women aged 35-44. This, plus changes in the constant TABLE 44 Decomposition of Changes in Average Parity from 1970 to 1976 Using Regression Coeff icient for Merged Data: Brazil Age Group Variable 20-24 25-34 35-44 MED -O. . 124 -O. . 308 -O .378 HINC -0.217 -O .567 -O.939 AG3: 0. 013 -O. .022 O.009 GAP 0.006 0.027 -a. 027 INTERACTION O . 246 O. 413 TIME -O 0 057 -O. .781 1.970 MED*T~ O . 059 -O. . 243 -O. .922 HI=*T~E O 0 021 1.162 - 10130 GAP*q'~ —O. .003 -O. .006 -O. .002 INTERAC r*q7IM13 -O. . 068 -O. . 77 2 CEB ° EsThMATEDa —O. . 331 - 0 . 559 - 0 . 402 CEB - OBSERVED -O .332 -O . 563 - 0.363 Note: Interaction term not significants see text. aTotals may vary due to rounding.

132 term (as reflected in the change attributed to TIME), suggests that some important structural shifts the changes in composition by MED and HINC and to declines in CEB. accompanied contributed What is puzzling is that these shifts do not show up in the GAP variable, which, despite its importance in explaining differentials in CEB, does not appear to con- tribute much to changes in CEB between 1970 and 1976. One reason for this could be that changes in the average level of GAP are not the appropriate place to be looking For the effects of changes transmitted through that variable. GAP was introduced to measure the effect of inflationary cons ditions and changes in the distribution of earnings on the economic position of households. Therefore ~ changes in the average level of GAP should be less relevant than changes in its distr ibution O Table 45 examines changes in the distribution of GAP between 1970 and 1976 and indicates the possible impact of such changes on CEB. The table shows the percent of women in each age category, broken down by deciles of f amily income, residing in families whose husband ' s earn- ings fall more than one standard deviation from the mean level of GAP for that age group. The table also shows in parentheses the relative weight (as a percent of all women in the age group) of these women in total CAR. These data suggest that for certain groups (ergot ages 25 34 in middle-incoste defiles) there may have been a greater dis- pension of GAP in 1976. However' the table also shows that this increase in dispersion was probably not great enough to have made a major difference in changes in the average level of CEB over the period under study. In this connection I it is important to note that the relative earnings effect expressed in GAP does appear to make a difference in the explanation of differentials in CEB in both 1970 and 1976. The point is that GAP (and the struc- tural changes it measures, perhaps quite inadequately) does not appear to account for much of the change in CEB between 1970 and 1976. Thus our assessment of the components of changes in r~n from 1970 to 1976 indicates that increases in the educa- tional attainment of married women in Brazil and increases in their husbands ' earnings contributed significantly to the decline of average CEB. At the same time, structural change is not ruled out. Clearly, the role of that change i s suggested by the signif icant and somewhat erratic shifts in the values of the regression coefficients for aTNC, as well as changes in the constant terms in regres-

133 TABLE 4 5 Percent of Women with GAP Greater than One Standard Deviation from Mean, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Income Deciles Age Group All and Year 1-3 4-6 7-10 Groups 20-24 1970 29.8 (306) 6.5 (2.5) 3~4 (1.7) 7.8 1976 21.5 (3.4) 5.5 (2.1} 2.6 (1.2) 6.7 25 1970 35.3 (3.8) 404 (~.4) 3.6 (2.~) 7.2 1976 32.2 (4.1) 8.9 (2.8) 2.9 (1.6) B.5 35-44 1970 31.4 (3.1) 5.8 (1.5) 2.3 tl.5) 6.1 1976 34.3 (3.3) 12.7 (3.4) 3.8 (2.4) 9.1 Note: The relative contributions of each group to total children ever born, expressed as a percent of all #en in the age group, are mom in parentheses. signs for the 2S-34 and 35-44 age groups. It is also clear that the conceptual limitations of census and multipurpose national sample survey data do not permit a detailed pursuit of the nature of these shifts. RURAL WOMEN Prior to 1970, fertility rates among rural Brazilian women were constant or rising at the national level. Regional declines in the South and Southeast were offset by con- stant or increasing rates in the Northeast and Frontier areas. The impact of this sluggishness in rural fertility decline on overall fertility rates was offset by declines in the share of rural areas in total population: rapid out-migration from rural areas more than offset the higher rural rate of natural increase. With the advent of a decline in natural increase in rural areas, the.rural population declined absolutely during the 1970~. The rural exodus that has characterized the last three decades of Brazilian demographic experience was triggered

134 by a combination of social, economic, and political forces, many of them longstanding features of rural Brazilian society. One of the most basic of these is the combination of a limited supply of good land and increas- ing population pressure; droughts and infertile soil have plagued areas with a high concentration of rural popula- tion, particularly in the Northeastern states . A second force is the unequal distribution of land, with substan- tial proportions of rural families being forced to eke a subs~sten`:e out of minifundia holdings of fewer than f ive hectares. A third is that there has been increased con- solidation of land holdings ac:companyirtg the co~nmerciali Nation of Brazilian agriculture; this process has received additional stimulus from the energy crisis and Brazil's resultant need to raise foreign exchange through agricul- tural exports and increase production of alcohol as a sub- stitute for petroleum imports. This lack of opportunity in rural areas, combined with hopes of paid employment and urban amenities, has motivated Brazil ' s rural-urban migrations While migration was the primary demographic response to adverse socioeconomic conditions among the masses of Brazil's rural population, other d~rahic processes were affected, including fertility and family formation. Chap- ter 3 suggested several hypotheses about how such changes might be affecting rural fertility in Brazil. All focus in one way or another on the role of children as both immediate productive resources and longer-term ~nves~ents for rural families, and on how changes in rural socioeco~ nomic and institutional conditions could have affected this role e One hypothesis relates to land availability. As the amount of land available to farm families in core densely settled areas is reduced, several forces that could moti- vate not only out-migration, but also lower fertility are set in motion. For families remaining in agriculture that wish to transmit land to their children through inkier zL- ance, large numbers of children will lead to an uneco- nominal subdivision of plots; this can be avoided only by having fewer children, forcing children to start their own families later, Or encouraging the children' s migration. The value of children as immediate productive resources will also be affected to the extent that smaller plots reduce the need for child labor. The influence of these forces on reproductive behavior is mediated by institutional f actors and by the availabil- ity of new land in other areas. Research on land avail-

135 ability and fertility in rural Brazil using data from the 1970 censuses of population and agriculture found that fertility was lower in more densely settled regions of Southeastern Brazil and higher in areas of new rural set- tlement in the Central-Western region (Merrick, 1974). An extension of that research to Northeastern Brazil and to the frontier settlements in the Amazon region did not reveal similar patterns (Merrick, 1981). Several reasons for this were suggested: get underway until after 1970, and the very- unequal dis- tribution of access to land in the Northeast was not as conducive to the pattern observed in the South, here a higher proportion of family farms were owner~operatede Research with 1970 data also revealed the very severe limitations of population census data for dealing with links between rural demographic changes and socioeconomic and institutional factors affecting those changes. These limitations were overcome to some extent by combining pop- ulation census data with information from the agricultural census. Analysis of changes during the 1970s will have to await the availability of detailed information from the 1980 censuses of agriculture and population. Onfortu- nately, the PNAD surveys taken during the 1970s do not provide the geographic detail required for linking them to results of Me 197S agricultural census; moreover, the PNAD sample does not include rural areas of the Central- West and Amazon regions, so that the potential positive effects on fertility of frontier settlement in those regions during the 1970s cannot be examined. Some features of the relationship between fertility decline in rural Brazil during the 1970s and socioeconomic change in the areas included in the PNAD surveys can be studied. One of these relates to an institutional factor mediating the response to increasing economic pressures, such as scarcity of land and consolidation of land in larger holdings, on Me demographic responses of farm families. This factor is rural proletarianiiation, or the shift from an owner~operator and farm family labor mode of production to wage labor. As noted earlier, European experience, as well as evidence from Southern Brazil, indicates that lower fertility is more likely to result from a scarcity-of land when farm families own their land and reduced fertility allows them to maintain control of the land. Rural proletarianization weakens this motiva- tion. As noted in Chapter 3, Paiva (1982) disagrees with this interpretation for Brazil. Be argues that prole- tarianization reduces the value of children as farm Amazon settlement really did not

136 laborers and provides incentives for reduced fertility, including increased market work for both women and chil- dren. The potential value of market work would be increased by education, and by a shif t toward quality rather than quantity of children. The data with which to evaluate these two interpreta- tions of Brazilian exper fence are scant. Tabular evidence presented in Chapter 3 indicated that average parity was indeed lower in reg ions with higher levels of proletar ian- ization (measured according to the proportion of rural household heads reported as employees ); irt the same tables, however O average parity was higher rather than lower for proletarian households within those regions. While one must be caret ul to avoid the f allacy of compoo sition, one must also be careful about biases ar ising f ram the location of families when their characteristics have For rural areas, those data detect only that proportion of the proletar- been measured in census and survey data. ionized population remaining at the time News were conducted; those who moved (either to urban areas or to other rural areas) and who may well have had lower fer- tility would not be included. Another aspect of change in rural fertility relates to the socioeconomic differentials observed in Chapter 2. Bile these differentials were not as great as those observed in urban areas, the data presented in Chapters 2 and 3 indicated that rural women with some education had lower fertility than those with no education, and that the proportion of rural women with some education increased from 1970 to 1976. Also, rural women with no education as a percent of all women aged 15-49 declined from about 21 percent to about 13 percent, a result of some comb~na- tion of increases in ectuca~zona~ acca~rmer~c arcane Lucas women, out-migration, and possible underrepresentation of less-educated rural women in the PNAD survey. Such evi- dence suggests that the role of education should not be neglected in examining rural fertility differences. Analysis of Rural CEO Dif ferentials in 1970 and 1976 As indicated above, neither the 1970 census nor the 1976 PNAD survey provides many meaningful measures of concepts relevant to the analysis of changes in rural fertility in Brazil. The multivariate analysis that follows is pre- sented primarily to illustrate how the relationships between differences in average parity and socioeconomic

137 vat tables descr ibed for urban women compare to the case of rural women. No pretense is made of even approximating a comprehensive explanation of changes in rural reproduc- tive patterns based on these data . Table 46 lists the variables included in the analysis. Average parity (FOR) iS the dependent variable, and educa- tion of women (MED) Is included in logarithmic form as it was for urban women. Census and survey measures of income and earnings had so little conceptual content for the r ural population that they were quickly abandoned O lIuso band' s education (=n) has been substituted as a proxy measure of earnings potential, but no attempt was made to calculate the gap between actual and potential earnings. Two additional dummy variables were employed: one for residents of Northeastern states (NE:) F included to pick up the effects of regional differences in economic and social structure not reflected in education, and one to indicate if the household was proletarian {PROL), based on whether or not He husband's status was reported as employee or paid farm laborer. Unweighted means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in Table 47. Average CEB declined by 12 percent for married women aged 20-24, 6 percent for TABLE 46 Variable Labels and Definitions, Rural Women: Brazil van table Def inition - C~R AGE MED HEI) NE PROL Average par itys namer of live children ever born as reported in 1970 census and 1976 CHAD survey. Moocher 's age: in yews. Mother's educations natural logarithm of the nudger of yews of school completed, defined a. follows Clog (years +~), so that log (O years)-O. Father's educations nat=^ logarithm of the number of years of school completed, defined ~ follows HED-log (years Al), so that log (0 ye~)-O. Northe~ts day Variable equal to one for residents of northeastern states. Proletarians day variable equal to on. when es~plo~nt stat" of father is rural wage labor.

138 TABLE 47 Meansa (standard deviations) of Variables Used in Analysis of Differences in Average Parity for Rural Women, 1910 and 1976: Brazil Age Group Year and Variable 20-24 25-34 35-44 1970 1976 CEB 2.21 4.42 6.79 (1070) (2071) (3.82) MED 0. ~2 0.53 0 0 41 (DO 66) (0. 67) (0. 61) HED 0.53 0.56 0.49 (0. 66) (0. 67) (0. 64) AGE 22.07 29.17 39.01 (1.42) (2.87) (2.79) NE 0. 45 0.43 0. 43 {0. 49) t O. 50) (0. 50) P - L 0.31 0.30 0.26 (0046) (0.46) (0. 44) N 2,456 4,880 4,108 CEB 1.95 4.14 6.73 (~.50) (2.57) (3.62) ME 0O90 0.78 0.61 (0. 75) (0 O 74) (0 O 70 3 lIED 0.84 0 0 76 0. 65 (0.74) (0.73) (0.71) AGE 22 a 17 29 ~ 26 39 ~ 21 (lo42) (2~85) (2~89) NE 0~32 0~33 Oc31 (Oe47) (0~47) (0~46) PROL 0.48 0.43 0. 38 (0. 50) (0. 49) (0. 48) N 2~344 5~247 4~615 al;lnweighted sample means.

139 those aged 25-34, and less than ~ percent for those aged 3 5-44. Relative var iation in average Rapt was somewhat lower for rural than for urban women. For women in the 2 5-34 age group Of the coef f ic lent of var iation ( ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) was 0.61 in 1970 com- pared to 0.7 for urban women. In 1976, relative variation increased, and was close to the level observed for urban women. There was a greater proportional increase in aver- age education for women than for men, with the greatest increase occurring among ages 20-24. The Northeast was represented less in 1976 because of a smaller sampling fraction for that region in POND (as well as possible underrepresentation in the Samoyed. ~__, The proportion of women in proletarian households increased for all three age groups, again with the greatest increase among younger women. Multivariate regression results for 1970 are presented in Table 48, and those for 1976 in Table 49. Separate regressions were run for each of the three broad age categories, with a control for age within each category as cell. Three regressions were selected for each group: the first includes, in addition to AGE, the education variables MED and ~ the second adds the dub variable for the Northeastern states (NE); and the third includes the dummy variable for proletarian households (PROLl. Since both MED and "D enter in log form, their regression coefficients are again proportional to elasticities (which are derived by dividing the coefficients by the sample mean value of I). A sugary of the elasticities of If with respect to average MED and BED is as follows: Year 20-24 25-34 3S-44 . MED ID MED BED ME ID 1910 -.16 -.06 -.10 -.02 -~04 -.01 1976 -. 16 - .10 ~ .15 -. 06 -.07 -. 08 Compared to the results for urban women, the responsive- ness of CEB to increases in MED is one-third to one-half as great for rural women, and the increase in responsive- ness from 1970 to 1976 is smaller. Compared to results for the range of countries reported by Schultz (1976), results for older rural Brazilian women are close to the bottom of the range of elasticities for lower-income coun- tries (-.17 to -.04) and for younger women near the top. Although addition of the dummy variable for residence in Northeastern states (the second set of equations) does not add significantly to the amount of variance explained,

140 ~, _ - m C) - _ ~4 d . - C) o ~4 Q L. C. ~Q ·~4 U; :- ·e O fo ~: ~ ~ ' O ~ · ~o ~o O ~ 3 E~: ·d m E~ x: a 3' z 8 o~ ~ o a: V ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U. o o o o o o o o, o o o o o o ~ ~ ~ o ~ o ~o o ~ o o o ~ o ~ o ~ o ~ o ~ ~ ~La _ ,_~ _ <7~~ _ ~~ _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ a, ~o U1 ~ iD ~ ~ ~. ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~' C'4 ~ _. ~ ~ ~ _ _ 01 ~ ~ ~ O O \0 0 \0 ~ `0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ O ~ O ~ ° a O O C-4 0 O4 0 C~ O ~ O \0 0 `0 0 ~ O ~ O ~ _~ _ _ _ _ O _ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 r~ · a · 0 a a O ~ O ~ O O _ _ _ 0 _ a~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ o. _ ~ _ C~4 ~ C~ \0 ~ U' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ `0 - 4 `0 ~ 1— ~ r~ ~ r~ ~o ~ ~o ~ · a 0 0 · 0 ° · · a a a O _. O _' O ~ O ~ O U' O 1^ - - - - - - a, _ ~ ~ r~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ ~ ~ ~4 — ~ — ~ — 0 ~ 0 ~ O ~ ~ u1 ~ r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~o r~ ~ ~ ~ co ~ ~ ~ \0 ° a ~ ~ a ~ ~ a 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ O ~ O r~ _t _l _1 C~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r" _ ~o _ ~ _ c~ _ r~ _ ~ _ ~ _ \0 _ ~ _ 0 \0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~D O (D ~ ~ co ~ ~ (D u~ C— u~ U1 ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ r~ 0 ~ ~4 0 0 ~ O r~ a ~ a · a · ~ a e a 0 c~4 0 r~4 0 r~ 0 ~ 0 ~ a ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 I _ t — I _ I _ I _ I _ I _ I _ I _ o _ ~ ~ O O _ ~ _ ~ _ O _ ~ _ ~ _ _ . _ ~ ~ ~ S N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ q. ~ ~ - 1 0` O1 ~ C~ ~ ~ ~ · · · e ~ ~ 0 0 ° a ~ · O 0 C O ~ O ~ O ~t O ~ O `0 ~ 0 O4 0 ~ O N 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — a. `: 4S ~ ~ ~ _ In _ r~ ~ ~ _ u' _ ~ _ ~ _ u~ _ —4 '0 ~ ~ _~ _~ ~ ~ ~ r~ d t~ t~ ~ ~ ~ O {m ~— t~ ~n ~@ ~ (~ ~o \n c~ ~ ~ ~ (D O ~ O · a ~ a 0 ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _1 ~ C~ ~ C~ O O O O O O 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 _1 1 ~ 1 _. — — — _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ ~ ~ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C~ ~ 1 _ _ — 1 _ _ — 1 _ _ _ O - ·~~ U~ O1 as - o z

141 CD - ~: s~ o s~ ~ — - c~ cn a: x: - o. O ~ ~ Z z s" . N ~ m - £ :~ o a~ at 0 _ m 6 ~ ~ ~: o o o · ~ ~ _ In _ ~ _ ~ U' ~ O4 r~ ~ r. o ~ o ~ o ~ o ~ _ _ y ~, ~o z o o. :, o C' o o O4 o · . r. — - 0 r" r~ ~4 · ~ o U~ - o o o · — o _ - o O4 r~ · ~ O U1 - o o o · ~ ~ _ U' o O4 · ~ o ~ o o mo · . ~ _ o cr. o ~ · ~ o ~ - o ~ · ~ o ~ - _ ~ _ r~ _ ~ _ ~o _ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ o~ 0 ~ ~o ~r~ ~o t~~. ~ _~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 r~ 0 ~ ~ ~ o, ~ ~ r~ ~ c.4 ~ r~ ~ ~ c*4 ~ r~ ~ ~ e ~ · e · ~ · ~ ~ · · e ~ · · O ~ O ~ O ~ O \0 0 ~ O ~ O ~ O ~ O 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — _ ~ O _ O _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ C~ ~ — ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ —~ O ~ O `° ~ 10 10 eC ·q ~ ~ t_ ~ r— ~0 ~ 40 /X~ ~0 ~ 1^ ~ ~ ~ O · ~ e ~ · ~ · ~ 0 ~ · ~ · O ~ O \0 0 \0 0 ~ O _. O _. O 10 0 It' O It, 11, 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 _. ~ _' 1 _1 1 — 1 — 1 — _ _ _ ~ _ ~ _ O O ~ ~ _' 0 ~n · 0 · ~ ~0 1 — ~ _ ~ _ C~ ~ 1 _ o r~ I_ — 1 r~ 0 ~ 0 ~ r~ - 4 o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ · · · · · ~ ~ ~ o o o o c) ~4 r~ o ~q :n

142 the regression coefficient is signif icant for the two older age groups. This indicates an interaction between education and residence rather than an additive effect. Tests for the interaction suggested that MED slopes were lower in the Nor the es t, though so few rural women in the t region reported any education that it was difficult to judge the signif icance of the results. The third set of equations attempted to assess the impact of proleSar ionization on average CEB. The results were consistent with the tabular results in Chapter 3, which suggested that CEB was slightly higher in praletar- ian rural households c When other var tables were con- trolled, however, this difference was signif icant only f or women in the 25-34 age group in 1976. These results conf irm the point made earlier that an adequate test of the proletarian hypothesis will require a more precise measurement of the process of proletar ionization that captures present and previous res idence and occupational status, as well as a r icher depiction of the institutional forces underlying that process. Changes in Rural CEB from 1970 to 1976 The change in average CEO from 1970 to 1976 that can be accounted for in the regression analysis results from increased educational attainment. In this connection, it should be recognized that mos t of the observed change is not explained by changes in the var. tables included in the regressions. It Is hoped that the case study data reported In Part lI of this report w~11 provide richer insight into the nature of changes in rural fertility than do aggregate census and sample survey data. CONCLUSIONS Most of the variance in average par ity that can be explained by application of multi~rar late regression anal- ys is to data on individual mar r fed women f rom the Braz il- ian census and PNAD survey relates to modernization variables--education and average earnings. Most of the change that can be accounted for betweer~ 1970 and 1976 relates to increases in these two var tables. The attempt to incorporate a var table measur ing the relative economic position of urban households indicated that there was a positive association between fer tility and relative eco-

143 nomic status; that is, CEB was higher on average for women whose husbands' current earnings exceeded the level of earnings that would be expected given their education and other characteristics. However, decomposition of changes in CEB from 1970 to 1976 did not show that a change in GAP contributed to fertility decline. These regression results do not suggest that increased modernization was the only reason for the change in Bra- zilian fertility. Changes in regression coeff icients and in constant terms in the regression equations suggested that a variety of unmeasured factors could account for the unexplained variance. Measures that were available in the census and survey data provided little insight into the nature of such changes, whether related to increased access to contraception through public or private chan- nels, or to institutional changes associated with shifts in the Brazilian raodel of socioeconomic development. It should also be recognized that average parity is a poor measure of fertility for purposes of accounting for change. It is a cumulative variable, and comparisons of averages for different groups at different dates measure the result of a demographic process rather than the pro- cess itself. As noted above, it would have been better to use current fertility as measured by births reported for the year prior to the interview' however, as reported in Chapter 2, the performance of that measure inspired more confidence in its robustness for work with subgroups of the population. Attempts to derive other measures (such as the length of the first open birth interval) from these data files procured equally unrewarding. Data limitations curtailed even further the analyst s of differences and the decomposition of changes in the average parity of rural women. The main finding for these women was that increased educational attainment contri- buted most to the explanation of variance, though only a limited portion of the total variance was explained by the regressions. Some doubts were raised about the hypothesis that proletarianization contributed to fertility decline; however, caution was suggested about the validity of using data on rural women classed as proletarian at the time of the interview to test this hypothesis, rather than using the experience of the proletarianization process. It was also impossible to link what the census and sur- vey data reported about the demographic characteristics of individual rural residents and their families to eco- nomic characteristics of their farms and institutional features of their localities. For this reason, the study

144 could not explore hypotheses relating fertility decline to changes in land availability, reduced need for child labor, and increased nonfarm economic activity for rural women and children. The census and survey data f iles did include questions on school attendance that mer feed fur- ther study. Information on child labor was included In agricultural censuses, but not In the demographic censuses and surreys. If Brazil is ever to conduct a fertility survey patterned after the World Fertility Survey, it would focus ideally on these elements of rural socioeco- nomic structure, as well as those aspects of change in urban areas that are not covered by currently avail able census and survey data.

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