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CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF BRAZIL'S RECENT FERTILITY DECLINE During the 1970s, marital fertility in Brazil declined by about 30 percent. Previously, it had been stable or decreased only slightly, though there were declines among women in higher-income classes. What accounts for this major shift in Brazilian reproductive patterns? A wor}c- ing hypothesis is that the change was triggered by the convergence of two sets of forces. One of these was the increased availability of effective means of contracep- tion, particularly for lower-income groups and regions of the country that had not participated in the earlier fertility decline. The other was the emergence of socioeconomic conditions conducive to smaller family norms, which motivated couples to use available contra- ception to reduce, delay, or end childbearing O The decomposition of the Brazilian fertility decline during the 1970-76 period presented in Chapter 2 of this report identified increased use of effective contraception as the key proximate variable determining that decline. The questions raised by this finding relate to the way access to fertility control increased in a country pro. viding no official support for fertility control at the national level, as well as what factors motivated people to make use of available contraception when previously they had not. Rapid fertility decline began during a period (1967-73) when the Brazilian economy was experiencing a very rapid rate of growth in aggregate income per capita, and accel- erated when the boom faltered as a result of rising energy costs after 1973. In this period, Brazil also made major str ides in achieving increased educational attainment for women (and men); moreover , important changes in social structure were occurs ing, including very rapid urbaniza- tion, increased female labor force participation, and 79

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80 increased exposure to mass communications. At the same time, declining fertility took place in a society charac- terized by a very unequal distribution of the benefits of g rowth, and among groups that prof ited least from the boom and whose relative economic position may actually have deter iorated dur ing this per iod. This raises the question of how modernizing forces, combined with changes in the capability to realize childbearing and other eco- nomic and social expectations' have influenced reproduc tive norms and behavioral patterns among the groups that contributed to fertility decline. Brazil's diversity of regions and social classes' together with associated differences. in the level and pace of change in demographic var tables, would suggest that multiple changes in socioeconomic and demographic variable" led to the accelerated fertility decline of the 1970s. This chapter examines hypotheses and supporting evidence used to explain recent shifts in Brazilian repro- ductive behavior, focusing on the spread of contraceptive use to women in lower and middle socioeconomic classes who accounted for much of the accelerated decline, and on socioeconomic changes that might explain this change in contraceptive use. First, it explores hypotheses linking socioeconomic conditions to fertility decline. Next' it examines the available data on changes in Brazilts contraceptive patterns, and on socioeconomic factors associated with those changes. Finally, because of the essential institu- tional differences between urban and rural women, the hypotheses and data linking socioeconomic factors to fertility decline are applied separately to these two groups. H~E:SES LINKING SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS TO E ERTILITY DECLINE A number of hypotheses about the effects of changing socioeconomic conditions on Brazil fertility decline can be formulated. One of these, coming under the general heading of ~modernization,. refers to the influence on reproductive behavior of rising income, changes in the costs of children relative to other goods, and shif ts in social norms and aspirations. This hypothesis emphasizes the role of income and costs of children and other goods, focusing on tradeoffs between ache number of children and other goods ( including child quality) . These tradeof f s

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81 are influenced by increases in the value of women's time as they achieve higher levels of education, by related changes in the opportunity and direct costs of children (who are time-~ntensive compared to other goods), and by changes in overall household consumption patterns as a result of increased income and changing tastes. The logic of this hypothesis can be used to show that such changes lead to reduced demand for children and increased motiva- tion to use family planning, particularly when the subjec- tive and monetary costs of fertility control have fallen below those of an unplanned additional pregnancy. A limitation of this framework is that there is no easy way to assess the inf luence of institutional forces at both the family and societal levels on reproductive norms and aspirations. This limitation is particularly iTapor- tant when f er tility change is occurs ing in a context of rapid socioeconomic change. When only a few measures reflecting such changes are available, it may be difficult to identify the causal relationships between such vari- ables and fertility. Female educational attainment and labor force participation are good examples. Education is strongly associated with fertility differentials, and is used in economic models as a measure of the value of time. However, education may also embody attitudes about women ' s roles, the value of children, and the practice of contraception. Increases in female labor force participa- tion may indeed be responding to changes in female educa- tion and household income, but institutional forces that influence the labor markets in which jobs for women are available may also play an important role. An institutional factor of particular concern in the Brazilian case is the distribution of income. It is tree that dur ing the period in which the decline of fertility accelerated, the rate of growth of per capita income was around 7 percent per annum; however, it should also be remembered that the distr ibution of the benefits of this growth was highly skewed. It is estimated that two-thirds of household income in Brazil accrued to She top 20 per- cent of households in 1972, with only 7 percent going to the lowest 40 percent (World Bank, 1981:Table 253. The 20 million people (20 percent of the Brazilian population in the early 1970s) with incomes growing more rapidly than Brazil's already impressive national average repre- sent a substantial force in the direction of moderniza- tion, whose impact on fertility was clearly evident in the data presented In Chapter 2.

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82 Nevertheless, lower-income groups experienced ache most rapid fertility declines after 1970. To use the term Modernizations to characterize the social and economic changes that accompanied these declines seems incongruous with the living conditions implied by their position in Brazil's income distribution. While there is still con- siderable debate about the interpretation of Brazilian income distribution data, particularly with reference to nonmonetary items and the impact of inflation on the welfare of the poor, there is general agreement on points that are relevant to the question of fertility decline. One is that there are substantial numbers of people and families who are poor in the absolute sense of Living with substandard levels of health, housing, nutrition, and other basic needs. Lluch (1981) estimates that the lowest three defiles of families classed by family income per capita in 1910 fell into this category, and that they were located in both rural and urban areas. A second point is that inflation has had an adverse impact on the buying power of lower-income groups. This is a result of the way in which the Brazilian system of wage and price indexing operated during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the indices that controlled prices-and credit obligations being allowed to increase more rapidly than the wage index. Lower-income groups suffered the most from this, and particularly hard~hit were urban working class families ~ the lower-middle income defiles), whose incomes were more closely linked to the wage index by virtue of employment in sectors governed by minimum salary arrangements. The fact that fertility declines in the early 1970s were concentrated among the absolute poor and the lower- middle income families has suggested alternative hypotheses about the link between deterioration in buying power and reproductive behavior. Berquo (1980) has argued that the living conditions of the poor deteriorated so reach during this period that their psychological and physiological capacity to reproduce was affected--a sort of ~ immiseration. hypothesis. She suggests that poor nutrition, fatigue associated with the need to work long hours to earn enough income to buy food, and poor nuts i- tion may have caused a loss of the will to reproduce, a reduction in coital frequency, and a possible reduction in fecundity. However, assessment of such effects would require much more in-depth interviews than those avail- able from the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS). Certainly, the threshold at which amenorrhea and anovu- .

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~3 ration are caused by malnutrition and psychological stress is high enough that such effects would be observed only in extreme circumstances. Still, it is possible that the fecundity of very low-income Brazilian women could have been affected by poor nutrition. A national nutrition and household consumption survey taken in 1974-75 provides nutritional indices for children under age 18. That survey indicated that 37 percent of Brazil- ian children were affected by first degree malnutrition (average body weight 76 to 90 percent of FAD/WHO norms), 20 percent by second degree malnutrition (61 to 75 pert cent of the norm), and 1 percent by third degree malnutri- tion ( less than 60 percent of the norm) (World Bank, 1979 ) . While data on mothers were not provided, such indices suggest that subfecundity may have affected a portion of low-income women. The possibility that physio- logical and psychological factors were involved in the fertility decline among Brazil's low-income groups should therefore not be ignored; however, it appears unlikely that they would account for a significant share of that decline . Another hypothesis draws on elements of the moderniza- tion f ramewor k outlined above, but stresses increased economic pressures on the buying power of low- income households as a key determinant of changes in reproductive behavior. Carvalho et al. (1981) have argued that pres- sures to preserve living standards in the face of adverse economic conditions have forced poor families to adapt by delaying or curtailing their reproductive aspirations. In such circumstances, couples recognize that they cannot afford another child because of its direct impact on their 1 imited income, as well as its opportunity cost in the time of mothers who must work to supplement family income. W ith increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contraception, fertility control is one of the few options available as ~ survival strategy; the decline of fertility among lower-income families is seen as an indication that they are choosing this option. Extending this argument, it has been suggested that lower- and middle-income families, particularly in urban areas, raised their consumption expectations during early stages of Brazil's economic boom and were beginning to realize those expectations through increased purchases of housing, consumer durables, and even automobiles. Most of these purchases were made with small down-payTaents and required extended installment payments that were subject to Brazil's indexing system. Unequal treatment of credit

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84 obligations and wages in the indexing process forced these families to allocate an increasing share of their monthly income to those installment payments. In these circum- stances, atJoidin'3 the expense of an additional child, again given increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contsa.ception, was an option. The rapid decline of fertility among these groups suggests that this may indeed have been their response. ~ The hypotheses sugar ized in the preceding paragraphs suggest a number of mechanisms through which changers in socioeconomic condition" in Brazil dur ing the 1970s could have contributed to the acceleration of fertility decline. These hypotheses suggest differing views of the process in that the ~modernization. hypothesis focuses on changes in couples' reproductive aspirations and their ability to realize ~em, while hypotheses focusing on economic pres- sures and structural change place greater emphasis on institutional forces. However, the various hypotheses are not necessarily competitive. In fact, given the range of changes in fertility observed at both the regional and socioeconomic class levels, it is likely that recent experience reflects a combination of reinforcing factors rather than any -single mechanism. Data with which to test-any of there hypotheses are very limited. Most of the evidence provided by the 1970 census and 1976 survey data consists of broad measures having a bearing on several of the hypotheses; none of these measures offers the precision-needed to specify causal models in support of one hypothesis to the exclu- sion of the others. At the same time, the data suggest that socioeconomic changes consistent with such explant tions were in fact occurring. The next two subsections examine the data available on the primary aspects of the hypotheses presented atone: increased accessibility, knowledge, and acceptability of contraception, and sorrow economic factors related to changing patterns of contraceptive use. Increased Access to Fertility Control While Brazil is one of the few developing countries without a national policy in support of fertility control, Brazilian women are not necessarily denied access to fertility control. In fact, the private sector has played a major role in increasing the availability of contraceptives in Brazil, both through commercial channels

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85 and through pr ivate agencies, the most important being Brazil' s International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) aff iliate Sociedade Civil Ben-Estar Familiar no Brasil (BEMFAM). Commercial distr ibution networks were an important factor in the fertility decline among Brazilian middle- and upper-income classes prior to 1970, with pills, condoms, and surgical sterilization being the most common means adopted. Pills are manufactured in Brazil, with an increase in annual production from lo 7 million cycles in 1964 to 61.2 million in 1980. The largest percentage growth occurred during 1964-70, when there was an eight- fold increase to 13.5 million cycles ~ The fo' lowing six years, 1970-76, brought a larger absolute increase to over 49 million cycles, nearly four toes the 1970 level. This trend is shown graphically in Figure 9. Regionally, the mar ket for pills has been concentrated in the Southern and Southeastern states . Reg tonal shares of the total market are also shown in the f igure, with separate panels for Sao Paula, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, the three Southern states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana), and the remaining states in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-West regions. Sao Paulo alone accounts for over 30 percent of the market; when its share is combined with that of Minas.Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, the figure is close to 60 percent The contri- bution of traditional methods such as withdrawal and periodic abstinence is also significant, even though these are less en festive means. BEMEAM has played an important role in extending access to modern methods' particularly the pill, to lower-income groups and regions. According to industry sources, 9 percent of pills produced in Brazil in 1976 were distributed to BEMFAlS. Several state governments, including f ice in the Northeast, have entered into coops erative agreements with BEMFAM for the provision of community-based family planning services. While the number of women served by such programs is not large enough to account for all of the increase in contracep~ tive use that has been observed, BEMEAM's impact is clear from a comparison of data for states in which it is active with those in which it is not. - Another important factor in increased access is what appears to be a significant but not highly publicized shift in the attitude of the Brazilian public health care system toward the provision of family planning services and surgical sterilization. Though the Brazilian govern-

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86 70 60 50 - ~n a . _ ._ em ._ 40 LLJ J C' 0 30' CI: LU m Z 20 10 _ . _ _ it/ / O _ 1965 1970 1 975 YEAR FIWRE: 9 National and Regional Trends in Commercial Distribution of Contraceptive Pills,. 1965-81: Brazil / ~ Rio de Janeiro J iSouthern Region r Sao Paulo Mines G - ais - - - - _ _ - Northe - . North, ContraI- Wost R - ions ,1 , 1 ,, , 1980 ment has not yet adopted a national health plan that would eventually include family planning among its services, the health care system appears to have adopted a more 1 iberal approach than it had before, at least in allowing private physicians working within the system to prescribe oral contraceptives and perform sterilizations. The main sources of statistical data on contraceptive use in Brazil are the state-level Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS) and the local-level CEBRAP National Inves- tigation on fireman Reproduction (NIHR) . S ince the latter

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~7 is discussed in detail in Part II, the present chapter focuses on the CPS results. It should be noted that because none of these surveys was conducted pr for to 1976, they provide an ex post view of the impact of increased access to family planning on fertility decline. Table 22 presents the percentage distributions in f ive of these surveys of mart fed women aged 15-44 by household income level and contraceptive use status. The f irst row of f igures for each survey shows that the percentage of women currently using contraception increased with house- hold income ~ which is broken down in multiples of the average monthly minimum salary. The contraceptive use dif ferential between women in upper- and lower-income g roups was least in Sao Paulo, Brazil ' s most urbanized and industrialized state, and greatest in Bahia, located in the lower Northeast. The remaining states shown in the table are also located in the Northeast. Through cooperative arrangements with state governments, BEMFAM has operated cormunity-based family planning programs (CBPs) in Rio Grande do Norte since 1973, followed by programs in Pernambuco and two other Northeastern states in 1976, and ire Piaui in 1979. Survey results for Rio Grande do Norte, the state in which the CBPs had been operating longest, indicate that the differential between higher- and lower-income women was less than that in Piaui and Bahia, states in which such programs did not exist prior taco the survey O As for contraceptive methods, a higher proportion of women in upper-income groups had been sterilized, particularly in the Northeast; Pills were more important relative to other methods among lower- income women . This is especially evident in Rio Grande do Norte, where pill users accounted For 43 percent of women currently contracepting in the low-income group, and 25 percent of high~income contra- ceptors. Sterilization, in contrast, accounted for 22 percent of low-income current users and 47 percent of high-income users. Other methods, mainly rhythm and withdrawal, were also important among low-income current users; these methods, along with condoms, were important as well among low-income women in the state of Sao Paulo. When educational attainment i" substituted for income as the measure of socioeconomic differences in contra- ceptive use, the results are virtually identical, at least for the four states with available tabulations on which to base a comparison. Table 23 shows the percentage of currently married women aged 1S-44 using contraception for four education categories, ranging from none to some

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88 TABLE 22 Percent Distribution of Married Women Aged 15-44, by Contraceptive Use Status and Household Income: Brazil Multiples of Minimum Salary State and Date <1 1-2 2-4 5+ Total Sao Paulo (1978)a Currently Using 4704 57.4 67.4 6805 63.9 Orals 60 4 28 0 9 340 0 22. ~ 27 0 8 Sterilization 5.4 11.0 150 2 220 0 16 c 1 Other 3506 27.5 1802 2405 2000 Not Using 53.6 42.6 32 0 6 31. S 36 o 1 Total 100.0 100.0 lOOo O 100- 0 100 - 0 Rio Grande do Norte (1980) . Cur Gently Using 37.0 46. 6 53. 4 12. 9 47. 0 Orals 15.9 18.2 20.9 22.9 17.9 Sterilization 8.4 17.3 23.1 34. 4 17.4 Other 12. 7 11.1 9 0 4 15. 6 11. 7 Not Using 63 0 0 53.4 46. 6 27.1 53.0 Total lOOe O 100.0 100.0 lOOo O 100 e P _ (1979) Currently Using 25.1 30.5 42.6 57.0 30.9 Orals 9.3 10.5 12.7 17 o 1 10 0 0 Sterilization 9. 9 14.9 25. 5 34.1 15.4 Other 509 5.1 2~4 5.8 5~5 Not Using 74.9 69.5 57.4 43.0 69 01 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOOo O Pern~co (1980) Currently Using 26.2 32.4 46.5 62.9 41. 4 Orals 8. 0 10. 6 13.0 16.4 12. ~ Sterilization 9.1 12.9 22.9 40~2 18.9 Other 9.1 8.9 10.6 6.3 10.0 Not using 73 .8 61. 6 53. 5 37 .1 58. 6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0

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89 TABLE 22 (continued) Multiples of Minimum Salary State and Date < 1 1-2 2-4 S+ Total Bahia (1980) Currently Using 18.7 28~4 4208 65.9 31~1 Orals 6.9 1305 150 3 150 7 110 7 Sterilization 7.1 7O 4 13.2 260 3 9O 6 Other 507 7.5 1403 2308 908 Not Using 81 O 3 7106 5702 3401 68.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 . . . . aSource breaks Sao Paula data by more detailed income classes. Weighted averages were used to collapse income categories for Sao Paulo into classes that were comparable to those reported for other states. Since cell weights were not available, f igures may differ from those derived from direct tabulation using collapsed income classes. Source: Rodrigues et al. (1981a:Table 7). secondary or more, in Pisui, Pern~mhuco, Rio Grande do Nor te, and Bahia. Percentages for the ~none. group are quite similar to those for the lowe^`c-income groups in the respective states, with Chose for the secondary and overt category falling somewhat below what was observed for the 5+ minimum salary group. The CPS data presented in Table 22 support the view that access to family planning has spread to women of lower socioeconomic classes in the industrialized South- east and to a lesser extent in the Northeast. Differences in contraceptive use in the Northeast appear to be related, at least in part, to whether organized family planning programs were operative. These programs appear to have f illed the gap in access between lower- and higher-income women, with the latter being able to rely more heavily on private physicians, clinics, and pharmacies . Further partial information on access is provided by tabulations of CPS survey data on sources of services for two of the main methods, surgical sterilization and oral contraceptives. - Table 24 shows that for Sao Paula, where

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104 the question of whether the relationship between work status and average parity changed between 1970 and 1976, or whether the narrowing reflects changing composition by educational attainment that occurred dur ing this interval. This question is addressed using multivar late regression analysis in the next chapter. Differences in average parity by migration status, again controlling for age and educational attainment, are shown in Table 33. Age and education influence the direc- tion of differences by migrant status. Overal}, there are no differences between migrant and nonmigrant women under age 35, but higher averages for migrant women in the 35-39 and 40~44 age groups. When the data are broken down by education, younger nonmigrant women have higher average parity in the ~none. education and 104 years of schooling categories. A shift to higher averages for migrant women in the two upper age groups also occurs in these categories. There are no differences between migrants and nonmigrants in the 5-9 education group, bu t h igher averages show up again for three of the four cells TAB" 33 Average Number of Children Ever Born for Migrant and Nonmigrant Women, by Age and Educational Attainment, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Education None l-4 , S~9 Migrant 10+ All Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 1970 1976 2024 2.7 2.2 1~8 le7 led led 0~7 0~7 1~8 1~7 25-29 4.a 3~6 3~1 3~1 2e4 2.4 1.5 1.4 3.0 2~9 30-34 5.1 4.9 4.O 4.3 3.2 3.2 2.3 2.1 4.0 4.1 35-39 6.2 6,1 4.7 5.3 3.8 3.7 3.1 304 408 502 40-~4 6.6 6.9 5.0 5.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 308 5.1 5.8 2024 2.1 109 led 1~6 1~2 1~2 0~7 0~6 1~5 1~4 25-29 3.6 307 2.7 2~6 2~1 1~6 1~3 1~2 2~4 2~2 30-34 4.9 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.1 I.7 3.5 3.3 35~39 6~2 7.3 4.4 4.6 3~5 3.3 2.6 3.l 4.4 4.6 40 - 44 6.3 7.7 4.9 6.S 3.6 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.1 6.1 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files.

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105 containing older migrant women in the 10+ education cate- gory. The higher average parity among older migrant women probably reflects the fact that these women made recent moves as members of a family unit, whereas a large share of the moves of recent younger migrants may have been associated with or occurred before marr iage; this could explain why nonmigrants with lower educational attainment had higher average par ity. The data on links between selected measures of the socioeconomic status of currently married urban women and differentials in their average parity raise several issues for further analysis. After controlling for age, the greatest differentials in average parity are those asso- ciated with educational attainment, with significantly lower levels of average parity being observed among women with higher levels of education. Since there were impor- tant shifts of women to higher education categories between 1970 and 1976, increased education stands out as a key factor among the socioeconomic variables associated with fertility declines during that interval. However, the question remains of whether the impact of education was mainly a change in the distribution of women by educational attainment, or whether and how education may have interacted with other variables, perhaps with changes in its relationship to fertility differentials resulting from changes in those variables. For example, average parity was lower among working than nonworking women, but the nature of this relationship was conditioned by educa- tion. Work status itself was closely associated with educational attainment' with a greater proportion of working women among those with higher education. However, increases in the percentage of women working between 1970 and 1976 were greatest for those in lower educational categories. One effect of this was a narrowing of the differential in average parity between working and non- working women between 1970 and 1976. This suggests that something beyond changes in educational composition may have been at work, perhaps along the lines of the argument suggested earlier about increased world to maintain house- hold income or to finance increased consumption of con- sumer durables. Though the census and survey files pro- vide little supporting evidence for this idea, the data on increased ownership of televisions among less-educated women support such a view. Although the links between migrant status and differences in average parity are less clear, those that do appear were conditioned by education and age.

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106 Currently Married Rural Women For currently married rural women, differences in average parity may reflect not only variation in individual and household characteristics, but also institutional factors such as availability of and access to land, land tenure, and dif f erences in modes of agr icultural production. Again' Brazil' s regional diversity is important. Tradi- tionally, high rural fertility in Brazil suggests that children have been an important asset to rural families; research on subsistence farmers ire the Northeast has revealed that even very young children contr ibute to household production (Alameda, 1977)0 A number of hypotheses have been suggested about the e f feats of recant socioeconomic changes in Brazil on rural fertility differences. One is that increased scarcity of land in more settled areas has reduced the value of chil- dren as farm laborers and made it more difficult for chil- dren to acquire a farm through inheritance. Research based on data from the 1970 population and agricultural censuses indicated that fertility was lower in more settled regions of Southeastern Brazil and higher on the agricultural frontier. However, the link between fer- tility and land availability was also conditioned by institutional factors, particularly Brazil ~ s unequal distribution of land (Merrick, 1978~; rural fertility in Northeastern Brazil was much less responsive to land scarcity as a consequence (Merrick, 1981) . Paiva (1982) has argued that the proletarzanization of rural labor (the shift of farm labor out of smallholder status into wage labor as a result of the consolidation of land into larger holdings) has contributed to Brazil' s recent fertility decline. He suggests that the effects of proletarianization in Brazil differ from the European experience described by Tilly (1978) and others, where fertility increased because the formation of new farm f amilies was linked to having a plot of land. These hypotheses will be discussed further in Chapter 4. The remainder of the present chapter explores differ- ences in the average parity of currently married rural women in Brazil, using cross-tabulations that control for age and other socioeconomic variables. Subsamples for rural women were extracted from the 1970 census and 1976 survey data files. Since the 1976 survey did not include rural areas in the Northern and Central-Western regions of Brazil, the data on rural women are restr icted to the Northeastern, Southeastern, and Southern states. Regional

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107 breakdowns follow the grouping adopted in Chapter 2, with the f irst consisting of the Northeast, the second includ- ing the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (labeled RJ-SP), and the remaining states (Mines Gerais , Espir ito Santa, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul) constituting a third group labeled "other. n In Chapter 2, unad Ousted total fertility rates for rural areas of these three groups of states showed that while fertility was lowest in Rio and Sao Paulo in 1970, fertility decline between 1970 and 1976 was most rapid in the Bother ~ group, which fell between WASP and the Northeast in level of socioeconomic development. The same pattern appears when average parity is broken down by region, with controls for age and education. Table 34 presents data on the mean number of children ever born for currently married rural women in the three regional groups, with women grouped according to whether they had no education or reported any years of schooling completed. Average parity in 1970 was uniformly higher in the Northeast, with no apparent difference between those with none and those with some education. In 1970, the latter category accounted for only 26 percent of women in the region; this proportion increased to 39 percent in 1976, at which time differences by educational attainment also became observable. For example, there was only 0.1 difference for women aged 25-29 in 1970, but a . 8 dif ference in 1976. In the other two regions, half of the women reported having some education in 1970, with the proportion rising to 65 percent in RJ-SP and 67 per- cent in the Bother ~ group in 1976. In 1970, average parity was lower for rural women with some education in both regions, and this differential widened in 1976: for women aged 25-29, the dif fe~ential was . 4 in 1970 for the Bothers group, increasing to 1.0 In 1976; for RJ-SP, it increased from .8 to 1.0. This indicates a more rapid fertility decline in the former region, which is con- sistent with the findings reported in Chapter 2. To what extent does variation in other socioeconomic characteristics of rural women relate to differences in average par ity? Table 3 5 presents the percentages of currently married rural women according to three charac- teristics; two of these (work status and migration status) were also examined for urban women, while the third (pro- letarianization) was defined to explore the hypothesis that shifts of the rural population into wage labor con- tributed to recent fertility declines. To measure prole- tarianization, women were grouped according to whether

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108 TABLE 34 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Marr led, Rural Women by Reg ion, Educational Attainment, and Age, 1970 and 1916: Brazil Education Northeast RJ-SP Age Group Ott er None Some None Some None Some 1970 20-24 2.48 2.28 2.18 10 84 2.36 1.85 (.06) (.09) (.16) (.09) (.07) (.06) 25-29 3.91 3.79 4.08 3.26 3.83 3.38 (.08) (.13) (.20) (.14) (.09) (.07) 30-34 5.72 ;.57 5.04 4.2S s.4a 4069 (.12) (.16) (.22) (.18) (.12) (.10) 35-39 6.96 6.79 6.47 5.31 6.51 5.99 (.13) (.23) (.26) t.26) (.13) (.15) 40-44 7.46 8.~S 6.77 6.01 6.89 6.62 (.~7) (.32) (.30) (.35) (.16) (.17) N (unweighted) 4 ,111 1, 435 741 742 2, 939 2, 939 Percent (weighted)a 74.1 25.9 50.3 49.7 50.0 50.0 1976 20-24 2 ~ 46 1 ~ 97 2.18 1.67 2e 27 1.59 teG8) (~08) (~14) (~05) (~09) (~04) 25-29 4 ~ 12 3 0 29 3 ~ 80 2.83 3 ~ 78 2. 78 (oO9) (olO) (ol6) (o{)8) (ol(3) (~06) 30-34 5077 5049 s.ao 4O03 5~11 4~19 ( o 12) ( e 14 ) ( ~ 21 ) ( .12) ( ~ 14 ) ~ ~ 08 ) 35-39 7013 7.07 6.03 4.64 6~51 Se43 (~14) (~19) (~23) (~14) (ol4) (~11) 4 0~44 8 ~ 41 1 e 25 6 ~ 74 5 ~ 56 6 ~ 98 6 o 16 (~18) (~253 (~21) (~22) (~17) (~14) N (unweighted) Percent (weighted) a 3,143 1,987 61~3 38~7 35~1 823 1~916 1, 913 64e9 33~3 66.7 Note: Standard errors of means in parentheses. aPercentages refer to distribution within each region. Source: Tabulations of subeamples of census and survey data f iles .

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1~39 TABLE 35 Percent of Currently Married, Rural Women in Proletarian Households, Percent Working, and Percent Migrant, by Age and Region, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Reg ion Northeast R J-SP Other Age Group and Status 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1976 Work ing Migrants 20-24 605 15~2 2~8 6~9 5O7 19~8 2S - 29 902 16e6 4~8 15~4 6~G 22~8 30~34 8~9 24~0 3~2 13~2 6~6 2609 35~39 800 24~0 5~0 20~6 5~6 2805 40~44 9~2 26~4 3~8 19~3 7~5 21~5 20-24 8 ~ 6 11.3 23.7 32.3 22.7 21.5 25-29 Be ~ 10e 9 22e 0 25o ~ 19e 5 16. ~ 30~34 6~9 806 20~5 25~2 17~9 17~4 3S-39 6~2 5~1 14~6 16~1 14~7 13~1 40~44 6~7 5~9 18~0 14~9 13~2 10~3 Proletar fan 20-24 25 ~ 0 38 ~ 9 64.8 81.0 25. ~ 46 ~ 1 25-29 IS o 4 37 O 1 58 ~ 6 74 ~ 1 26 O 1 41e 6 30~34 23~9 36~0 53~0 6703 2208 37~7 35~39 2103 3107 510 ~ 60 - 5 24 ~ 8 38 O 9 40~44 20 ~ 6 31 ~ 1 48 ~ 8 66 ~ 0 2103 3204 Source: Tabulations of subsamples of census and survey data files. the head of the household in which they resided was a wage laborer or not, with ache former considered proletarian. Migrant status and work status were defined as they were for urban women: women who had resided in their present municipality for 5 years or less were considered migrants, and work status was established according to the census and survey data. The earlier caution about differences in the way these sources define labor force participation is particularly important here, since a higher proportion of rural than urban women fall into the grey area defined by the census as not working and by Me survey as working.

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110 The proportion of rural women reported as working was below 10 percent for all of the age groups in all of the regions in 1970, ranging from 3 to 5 percent in Rio and Sao Paulo to 6 to 9 percent in the other two regions. When these figures are compared to the 1976 data, substan- tial increases are indicated. While it is impossible to tell how much these increases represent definitional differences. it does appear that increases may have been greater for women over age 30. . I t is also dif f icult to ~ uage whether the lower rates In RJ-SP represent true differences in work status or some sort of regional variation in reporting. In the case of migration ~ the highest proportion of women reported as migrants in both 1970 and 1976 is found in Rio and Sao Paulo, and the lowest in the Northeast. There is a slight increase in the migrant proportion in both regions between 1970 and 1976. As would be expected, migration rates are higher among women in their twenties than among those in their thirties. Rates in the mothers region are somewhat lower than those in the RJ-SP in 1970, but drop slightly between 1970 and 1976. Regional differentials in socioeconomic characteristics are greatest in the proportion of women in proletar fan households. In 1970, the shift to wage labor among house- hold heads had progressed furthest in Rio and Sao Paulo,. with the highest proportions being reported for younger women, these f igures ranged from 65 percent for women aged 20-24 to 49 percent for those aged 40-4A. The proportions were about equal in 1970 in the other two regions, ranging from 20 to 26 percent. . ~ Between 1970 and 1976, the great- est percentage point increases in proletarianization occurred in the ~other. region, though the highest level of proletar ionization continued to be that of RJ-SP ~ In the latter, the percentage ranged from 81 percent for women aged 20-24 to 66 percent for those 40-44, compared to 46 and 32 percent, respectively, in the former. This . suggests that proletarianization mav have been a factor in the lower fertility observed in Rio and Sao Paulo in 1970, as well as in the more rapid fertility decline observed in the Bother ~ region between 1970 and 1976. To what extent are these differences in socioeconomic characteristics reflected in average parity? Table 36 presents the mean number of children ever born by age and reg ion for women in proletar fan and nonproletar fan house- holds. Neither 1970 nor 1976 results suggest that average parity is significantly lower among the former group. Indeed, their averages are more often higher than lower; _,

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111 TABLE 36 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Married, Rural Women Aged 20-44, by Region and Proletarian Status, 1970 and 1976: Brazil Region Northeast RJ-SP Other Proletarian Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes 1970 1976 20-24 2.4 2.6 1.8 2.i 2.1 2.0 25-29 3.8 4.0 3~4 3.7 3.6 3.6 30-34 5.6 6.0 4.5 4.7 5.1 4.8 35-39 608 7.0 5.8 6.6 603 6~2 40-44 7.6 7.7 6.5. 6.6 6.8 6.8 20-24 202 2.3 1.8 1~7 108 108 25-29 3.8 3.8 2.8 302 300 3.2 30-34 5.6 5.8 4~0 4.5 4.4 407 35~39 609 7.S 5.0 5.3 506 6.0 40-44 8.0 8.3 505 6.5 6.5 6.5 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files. they are consistently higher in RJ-SP, where the pro- portion of proletarian women in the total is highest. This is puzzling in view of the relationship between fertility levels and the level of proletarianization at the regional level. It suggests that the effect of proletar ionization on fertility may operate through a complex of other var tables whose ef fects are manifested in such regional differences, or that proletarianization itself may be a manifestation of changes in another variable or set of variables.

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112 One such important variable may be work status. Table 37 presents average parity for working and nonworking women by age and region. The table suggests that average parity was slightly lower for working women in the Northeast and "other" regions in 1970, but not in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paula; there were so few working women in the latter two states in 1970 that none of the averages for that group were signif icantly different from those of nonworking women. In 1976, the pattern of differences between working and nonworking women was even less clear: there were still no differences ire RJ-SP, while working TABLE 37 Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Currently Married, Rural Women Aged 20-44, by Region and Work Status, 1970 and 1976: Brazil - Region Northeast RJ-SP Working Other Age Group No Yes No Yes No Yes , . .. 1970 1_ 20824 204 2~5 2~0 106 2~1 1~9 25 29 309 304 3~6 4~1 306 3~3 30-34 5~7 5~5 407 3~0 5~1 4~3 35~39 6~9 6~1 600 5.i 6c3 Se5 40-44 7.6 7.4 6.5 7.9 6.~9 Sa8 20-24 2~3 200 1~8 1~9 1~8 1~7 25-29 3~9 3~3 3~1 2~8 3~2 2~9 30~34 506 5~9 4~3 4~6 4~4 406 35~39 7~2 6~8 So2 5~1 6~0 5~3 40 44 8~2 7~8 6~2 6~1 6~6 6~4 Source: Tabulations of census and survey data files.

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113 women showed slightly lower averages for all but the age 30-34 group in the other two regions. The lack of any difference in the RJ-SP group and the reduction in the mother n group between 1970 and 1976 suggest that the effect of work status on fertility differences is reduced as proletarianization increases. Another potential covariate is migration; however, tabulations of average parity by migration status revealed no significant differences, and the results are not presented here. This leads us back to education, which was the only socioeconomic characteristic of rural women for which a consistent and statistically significant pattern of dif- ferences in average parity was observed. It is tempting to conclude that education accounts for most of the dif- ferentials, as well as the changes in rural fertility observed between 1970 and 1976. A problem with the second point is that levels of educational attainment increased almost equally during that period in the RJ-SP and ~other. regions, yet fertility decline was more rapid in the latter. Either the evidence is only circumstantial that relative increases in proletarianization in that region were also greater, or there may have been interaction between the education and proletarianization variables, and others as well. Since further presentation of data in tabular form would be an awkward way to address this issue, that task is undertaken in the next chapter using multiple regressions. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this chapter was to examine evidence on the spread of contraceptive use to women in lower and middle socioeconomic classes who accounted for much of the acceleration in the decline of Brazilian marital fertility in the early 1970s, focusing on changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of these women that could have increased their motivation to control fertility. Because there are no nationally representative data on contraceptive use or socioeconomic character istics, data on contraceptive use from recent state-level surveys were pieced together, while changes in socioeconomic variables and their relation to differences in average parity were examined based on 1970 census and 1976 PNAD survey data f iles. Analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility in Chapter 1 identified increased use of contraception (or

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114 contraception combined with abortion) as a key factor in Brazil's accelerated fertility decline in the 1970s. Baseline data that would permit measurement of the extent to which this increase represented the spread of fertility control among lower- and middle- income groups are lacking; however, data from contraceptive surveys taken later in the decade show signif icant percentages of contraceptive use among these groups. This, along with evidence in Chapter 2 showing that these groups exper fenced the mos t rapid fertility decline during the decade, supports the conclusion that their use of fertility control had indeed increased O While Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys show that differences in contraceptive use between higher and lower income and education groups remained, the percentage of use among the latter was far from negligible. Survey data also show that organized family planning programs contr ibuted to a reduction in socioeconomic class dif fer - entials in contraceptive use in a number of Northeastern states. This occurred during ~ period when signif leant changes in socioeconomic conditions af fecting the status of women were taking place in Brazil. The proportion of women reporting no education was reduced, and there were signif- icant increases in the proportion reporting higher level s of educational attainment in both urban and rural areas. Increased proportions of married women were also reported as working, though it is difficult to determine to what extent this reflects differences in the way census and survey data defined labor force participation. Increased ownership of consumer durables was observed among women in urban households, while rural households were becoming increasingly reliant on wage labor, or proletarianized. Such changes are consistent with a number of hypotheses about the reasons for increased motivation to control fertility. Increases in educational attainment represent a powerful modernizing force, and the relationship between differences in average parity and education noted in this chapter is clearly very strong. However, this relation- ship was complicated by signif leant collateral changes relating to increased economic pressures on low-income urban households and increases in rural proletar ianiza- tion. The multivariate regression analysis in the next chapter permits further examination of hypotheses linking d if ferences in average par ity to these var. tables, as well as a decomposition of changes in average parity from 1970 to 1976 as they relate to changes in population composi- tion and in the impact of the different variables on f ertility.