Effective Manning of the U.S. Merchant Fleet (1984)

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4 MANNING OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND JAPAN ROOTS OF CHANGE In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the maritime nations of Northwest Europe embarked on a transition away from their traditional manning and organizational practices in ship operation. as a result of social and economic factors. The social activators for change were felt first, and were both demographic and cultural in nature. Serious maritime personnel short- ages appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s throughout Northwest Europe and in Japan; firms found it difficult to attract and retain crews, particularly officers. The shortage led to several innovations in manning and operating practices, including automation of engine rooms, reorganization of billets, and integration of trade skills in ratings. Research efforts were undertaken in the United Kingdom, Norway, and other countries to find ways to enhance the quality of life at sea. Measures included such social innovations as permitting families to be on board. More practical was a movement toward permanent, contractual employment of seamen and an ef fort to encourage crew continuity through longer-term vessel assignment. The General Purpose (GP) ratings and semi-integrated (poly~ralent) off icer concepts were instituted in the early 1970s to reduce Inning requirements and the boredom of shipboard duties and, on the part of unions, to increase wages. The personnel shortage was a direct outgrowth of social changes including an increase in the level of education, the elevation of middle-class standards of living, and a further leveling of social classes and distinctions. These trends directed the work force away from the isolated life of the seafarer. They also had liberalizing and democratizing repercussions throughout industry. At sea, social and professional tear tied between officers and ratings began to d issolve. Another set of changes rooted in social trends is a shift toward decentralized or shipboard management. Management responsibilities for ship operations are being decentralized from shore to whip. Often 29

30 shipboard management teams, usually consisting of ship's officers, have substantial authority including budgetary responsibility. A related development is the occasional use of consultative work planning groups onboard ship. In the mid-1970s, a worldwide recession brought about a sharp downturn in shipping, effectively ending an era of manpower shortage and forcing interest in improved operating efficiencies. In this economic climate, ship operating companies have focused more intently on cost-cutting measures. ·Flagging out. and crewing with nationals f ram low wage, developing nations has become a common practice. Companies are interested in reducing their crew complements, and have begun to examine ways to reduce the number of their shoreside person- nel. Aboard ship, automation and other advanced technologies as well as labor-saving innovations in design have been increasingly employed. Companies have supplanted worklife improvement experiments with efforts that will provide more immediate economic relief. Faced with the threat of ·flagging out,. unions in all the countries affected have cooperated we th shipping companies in these billet-cutting actions to preserve some jobs. The comparatively high cost of labor in the developed maritime nations has motivated innovations in operating practices as well as · f lagging out. ~ As in any setting where high wages prevail, an ability to succeed in international competition requires that high hourly wage rates be more than of feet by high labor productivity. Wi th manning costs an important element of total operating costs, companies have been continually and increasingly interested in the cost-cutting potential of manning reduction. Direct labor costs represent a greater percentage of operating costs on smaller, rela- t ively low-cost ships. Shif ting into capital intensive shipping does not offer a general solution to high wages since specialized, capital- intensive ships account for only 20 to 30 percent of world transport activity. Industrial strategies f or counteracting high labor costs involve tradeoffs, for example, in technical features, maintenance, training, fringe benefits,.and accommodations. Less tangible costs attendant to organizational changes include costs of dealing with unions and shore organizations, for example. The mix of manpower numbers and skills, management structure and policies, and technology has to be evaluated in terms of overall costs versus income. This assessment by manage- ment is interactive and continuous and has characterized much of the European experimentation in ship manning.

31 MANNING INNOVATIONS This section will review changes that have been experimented with and adopted in the f lee ts of Nor thwest Europe and Japan in the long-term effort to reduce manning costs. There changes encompass the design, technology, and equipment of vessels, the shoreside supper t organiza- tion, and corporate personnel policies. Changes in Vessel Design, Technology, and Equipment Unattended Engine mom The most basic level of engine-room automation consists of remote control of main propulsion machinery from the br idge, in con junction with remote sensing of operating conditions and alarm capability. These provisions eliminate the need for round-the-clock watchkeeping in engine spaces. With additional automation of engineer ing functions, 24-hour unattended operation is possible, and human intervention is no longer required except for the few remaining inspection and operation tasks. Maintenance and repair then constitute the bulk of engineer ing responsibilities. Automated engine rooms have proven to be quite reliable. A study of 300 ships operating with unattended engine rooms revealed that after an initial breaking-in period, alarms averaged 1 every 5 days and faults averaged 1 every 10 days, thus enabl ~ ng the vessels to operate with true unattended engine rooms. The highest level of eng ire-room automation is found in the Japanese Super-rationalized container ships. MOL'S CANBERRA MARU and the NICHIGU MARU of the NYR-MOL-YS consortium have integrated the engine and cargo control stations on the main deck remote from the engine spaces, while NYR's ARUBA MARU incorporates nearly all engine- room function" in the bridge. Both designs incorporate microprocessors which monitor and log over 300 operating parameters. The status of operations is displayed on printers or screens in a number of loca- tions, i.e., control station, bridge, and chief engineer's office. Malfunctions trigger alarms in var ious locations In the ship. The systems are interactive in that auxiliary equipment, such as generators or pumps, is controlled automatically. Central control of bunker ing has reduced the manpower necessary for that operation. Maintenance Vessel manning requirements have been reduced to a great extent by changes in maintenance. In the deck area, the use of epoxy paints and special coatings, which require less maintenance, has become common. it)

32 Innovative maintenance approaches such as design-for-maintenance and planned-ma intenance systems have had an even mor e f undamental effect on shipboard Inning and organization, especially in the engine area. In the early stages of machinery plant design and equipment selection, considerable attention is given to equipment types and conf figurations which will minimize manpower requirements for main- tenance. Machinery is installed with adequate space for maintenance and parts removal, significantly reducing the time required for maintenance and repair . In selection, maintenance intervals and manpower requirements are considered in addition to life-cycle cost and owner's preference. Other practices calculated to reduce maintenance include: selection of main and auxiliary engines that require the smallest amount of ancillary operating equipment; the use of shaft-driven electric generators to reduce operating hours on diesel generator sets; totally enclosed elects ical equipment; sealed bear ings for all elects ic motors; the use of fresh water rather than salt water; and d diesel eng ines with the smallest number of cyl inder s pass ible . Automatic condition monitoring systems are becoming prevalent as ad juncts to planned maintenance systems . These monitor ing systems of ten permi t extended Tea intenance intervals and prov ide the advantag e that planned repairs may be made before they become cr itically neces- sary. Therefore they may be undertaken ashore or by a maintenance gang, and without delaying the ship. In general, much maintenance that cannot be accompl ished with in the normal wor kday and an accept- able range of overtime is reserved for shore gangs when the vessel is in port ~ in shipyard, or in coastwise transit. Bridge Manning level adjustments due to automation have not been so signif icant in the deck department as those proceeding from technical innovations in the engine room. Microprocessors have been incorporated into position-f inding and collision-avoidance devices, but for the most part these have augmented rather than supplanted traditional navigation practice. Moor ing and Anchor ing Mooring and anchoring manpower requirements remain the most resistant to reduction through technical innovation. Innovations have been pr incipally mechanical in nature, e.g ., self-stowing line baskets , constant tension winches, and smaller and lighter hawsers. Through careful design and placement of multiple, redundant line-handling equipment and communication and control stations, the Japanese have lessened the requirements of brute strength in the handling of lines and the s ize of the moor ing party .

33 Cargo Operat ions Microprocessors have improved the safety and ef f iciency of cargo operations. These developments extend to loading, ballasting, and heel corrections (i.e., load calculators, hull stress monitors, and heel ing sensors ~ . The manpower necessary for deck operating tasks ~ i . e ., the opening and clos ing of hatches and secur ing of cargo} has been reduced through minimization of the number of hatch covers and their automation, and innovations in mechanical secur ing devices for containers. On tankers, cargo control systems permit central control of valves and pumps and provide tank level and f low rate indications, along with appropr late alarms . Communications Improved shipboard communications, including remote input devices, displays, and alarms, have been integral to a number of the innova- tions that have been descr ibed. Information exchange between crew members has been enhanced by greater use of telephones, public address systems, and paging systems . Crew communications dur ing deck opera- tions, such as moor ing where there are no free hands, have been improved in at least one instance by installing walkie-talkies in safety helmets. Satellite systems have made possible dependable, high quality voice, telex, and computer ship-to-shore communications. There recent communication advances have made mar iners ' direct communication with their families more colon, and has made it easier for senior officers to be involved in the bus iness as well as the technical aspects of ship operation. Satellite communication enables reversal of the trend toward centralized shoreside management of vessels begun 75 years ago with the introduction of marine radio by providing the ship with current budgetary, stores, and scheduling information from the head of f ice, and allowing for the timely transmits ion to the of f ice of s imilar information or iginating from the ship. Superstructure Design Just as technical innovations in working spaces have facilitated crew reductions, so too has the design of living and off ice areas. The overall quality of accommodations (i.e., space, privacy, comfort, entertainment, and diversions) has improved steadily, reflecting industry's presumption that, in spite of fluctuations in the market for seagoing labor, the expectations of seamen will continue to rise in parallel with improving living standards ashore. Perhaps more significant than increased comfort through greater space per crew member at the same building cost is the varied environment

34 that ship designer s have sought to provide in new ships to promote interaction of crew members. The superstructure layout of a vessel designed for operation by a smaller crew provides greater segregation of working, recreation, and private areas--as is the case ashore. Crew cabins are located in the most remote sections of the super- structure, while food service, lounge, and recreation spaces are reserved for the intermediate decks. The ship's office, archives, conference room, and stores are found on or near the main deck. More attention is being paid to the provision of a good social environment. The integration of officers and ratings becomes more desirable with the elimination of billets. Integrated lounges, mess rooms, and recreational facilities offer a much-needed opportunity for social contact. Traff to flow within passageways of the reduced-manning vessel' s superstructure is designed to promote encounters between crew members by reducing the number of ladders and locating recreational and other communal spaces centrally. In at least one case, private cabins have been made only moderately attractive so as to encourage the occupants to join groups as often as possible. The underlying pr inciple of these innovations is that the quality of seafar ing lif e during off-hours can be much mproved by reducing loneliness and boredom, and that this improvement will yield gains in productivity, safety, and morale. Off ices have been placed in a central location, rather than the traditional location adjoining the staterooms of senior officers. All of these advantages encourage communication among of f icers dur ing working hours. At the same time, the segregation of office and living spaces allows the crew to spatially and emotionally separate themselves from their work when off duty. Central meeting rooms also have been provided. In this arrangement, the shipboard management team works together in one office; there is central storage of data; and work planning may be facilitated by central display of tasks to be accomplished and progress made. Changes in the Organization of Crews Intradepar tmental Flexibility Perhaps the simplest manning reductions from an organizational perspective are those which are achieved through elimination of certain billets, accompanied by intradepar~cmental adjustments to the contents of others. Engineering automation has made possible this kind of manning adjustment. Engine room watchstanding billets have been eliminated. Th is instantaneous reduction, so closely related to

35 specif ic technical innovations, also has been made possible by the combination of previously separate and distinct responsibili ties into single job descriptions. Within the engine room, this recombination of tasks has taken the form of engineering officer/electricians and dayworking ratings, sometimes retitled mechanics, who are responsible for operations, maintenance, and repair work previously undertaken by oilers, wipers, greasers, donkeymen, and fitters. In the deck department, the number of dayworking ratings has been reduced as a consequence of less shipboard maintenance work, while watchstanding billets also have been reduced through the occasional combination of watch off icer and lookout duties. For deck off icers, the reduction has taken the form of chief mates returning to watch- standing and, more recently, some watchstanding by masters. This latter arrangement has been the sub ject of exper imentation on smaller vessels in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Salen ~ Sweden ~ is considering a half-time ~ 4-hour ~ watchstanding assignment for the masters of their supertankers. The West German st~ipowners have been asking for permission to sail up to 10,000 grt with a master and two deck officers, and the West German Ministry of Transport has recently drafted a regulation that will move the limit for such operations from 1,000 to 4,000 grt. Deck officer and master unions are uniformly opposed to watchstanding masters, citing as reasons the likelihood of fatigue and the probable reluctance of junior officers to call out a master who recently completed a watch. On the other hand, it has been stated that such an arrangement may reduce accidents by preventing masters from becoming weary during a long passage with little to do. Masters and deck officers have assumed radio communication responsibilities in the absence of a radio officer billet. As with the watchstanding master, this is being tried on smaller vessels and considered for application on larger vessels. Reductions in the catering department have been accomplished as a result of diminished hotel services and the smaller size of the total crew. Additionally, intradepartmental integration of tasks in this department has taken the form of chief stewards who also cook, second cooks who also bake, and steward utilitymen whose responsibilities now include all facets of the department's operation. Although come additional training may be required for the expansion of responsibilities within departments of certain billets, these initial manning reductions have not posed a serious challenge to the traditional organization of crews. Interdepartmental Flexibility Further reductions entail alterations in the traditional structure of shipboard work. The most rudimentary structural change, one that maintains for the most part the segregation of departments, is that of interdepartmental flexibility.

36 On conventional general cargo ships, the departmental structure ~ i.e., deck, engine, and steward departments} functions relatively well. However, general cargo ships are being less and less frequently built; more technologically sophisticated, specialized vessels are taking the, r place. Changes in technology and trading patterns have greatly reduced the need for traditional cargo handling skills. The reduction of time in port brought about by developments in cargo tech- nology has substantially increased the time spent in basic navigational watchkeeping . Simultaneously, the need for end ineer ins sk ills has increased in all aspects of ship operation. Automation has also increased the demand for knowledge and sk ill in instrumentation and control systems. These changes have affected the officer ' s role at the same time as they have led to a reduction in the number of ratings. Task analyses of shipboard work have revealed that the workload intensity of the several departments often is not corresponding, and that r atings of one depar tment might be available and able to ass ist in the work of another . For example, engineer ing and galley personnel may assist in moor ing operation.. Such a system allows for further manning reduction. within the crew as a whole, while still meeting the peak manpower requirements of the individual departments. Unlicensed crew members retain their identity with a single department but are called upon to work occasionally on tasks in other departments. Occasional department crossover is widely accepted in Norway and West Germany, and in the United Kingdom was pioneered by e~erimenta- tion conducted in 1964 by the Br itish Shipping Federation, Cunard Line, and the National Union of Seamen. The Danish Seamen' s Union proscr ibes ~~~ ~ is a provision in the the practice for its members, although there Danish Firemen' s Union for working in alternate departments. Departmental Integration: General Purpose Ratings An even greater departure from the traditional structure of shipboard war k is the introduction of general purpose (GP} crew. In this organi- zation there is no departmental (deck or engined distinction between ratings who share operations, maintenance, and repair responsibilities . GP manning experimentation began in the late 1960s on tankers and bulk carriers. The roles of senior deck and engine ratings have been redef ined in con junction with GE exper Indentation. GE crews frequently are placed under the supervision Of a single Ships foreman" rather than under the traditional departmentalized billets of Bosh or ~storekeeper. ~ Some GP implementations in Europe have not been very successful. Experience has shown that ratings who participate in GE arrangements risk a loss of occupational identity, and, without training , are qualif fed to do only low-skilled tasks in the alternative department.

37 The system works most satisfactorily in those crew structures which are designed to provide meaningful content in these jobs, and in those organizations that provide the necessary training . Furthermore, the system of general purpose ratings has been implemented most eff iciently where mar iners have not previously served in one department or another, but are trained initially for general purpose service. In spite of some disappointments with early GP exper iments, the more serious companies and countries are expending much effort and money to modify crew organizations and national training schemes to make GP work as it was intended. Since 1980, only GP ratings have been produced by the nautical training system of the Netherlands, and within 5 years, the only entry rating training available in West Germany will be for GP. The Norwegian training scheme has been turned toward GP, an evolution that has been accelerated as a result of the new 1983 manning scales that formally recognize the necessity of GPs for reduced manning operation. In the United Kingdom, 10 to 15 percent of ratings are sailing in a GP capacity. Department Integration: Semi-Integrated Officers A more recent innovation in crew flexibility is that of the dual-purpose or semi-~ntegrated of f icer . Still in the exper imental stage in several counts ies, the inter ~ ion is to license and employ off icers capable of standing na~riga Lion watches, monitor ing engine controls, - ~ - - ~ - repairs. and undertak ing mechanical, elects ical, and electronic The ob jective of semi-integrated off icer operation, beyond that of further manning reduction, in to redistribute the bridge watch- keeping and technical maintenance and repair functions among more off icers. The French were the first to train dual-purpose off icers . In the Dolabella experiment, the French nautical education system was modif fed to produce off icers equally expert in deck and engine skills . However, reportedly because of union opposition, few changes were made in the organization of shipboard work to make use of dual-purpose officers. The multiple-sk ill concept of reatr ix manning has been developed in Northwest Europe. It differs from the polyvalent or dual-purpose scheme in that the goal is not a homogeneous work force of seafarers holding identical billets. Rather, a mate ix crew is composed of individuals, each with ~ specific specialty and varying levels of competence in a secondary sk ill. These matr ices of sk ills cross departmental bounder ies--hence the flexibility--but still distinguish between areas of principal competence. This semi-integrated officer is one whose predominant training is in one department, with less background in the other. Officers graduate from nautical college with both entry level licenses, but are expected to maintain one at

38 entry-level, while pursuing advancement in the other . In the pr mary specialization, the officer is responsible for all aspects of a part of the ship' s operation; his secondary expertise is relied upon by other specialists to provide assistance as needed. The basic purpose of the matr ix concept, with its provision of greater versatility in individuals, is to enable peak var Cations in workload to be dealt with by fewer officers. The Norweg fans tested the mate ix of f icer concept in the ear ly 1970s (Hoegh Multina) with success, but for political reasons the necessary educational reform to diffuse the innovation did not take place until 1978 . The Dutch turned their attention to semi-integrated officers at about the same time (Shell in 1978 and Nedlloyd in 1981}, and now have a number of experimental ships sailing under this system. (Shell has 65 semi-integrated officers--10 percent of their total. ~ The Dutch nautical colleges are designing a 4-year program for semi- integrated off icers . Both Shell and Nedlloyd hope to convince the colleges to provide only semi- integrated of f icers in the future . Shell has announced that in the f utur e th is will be the only type of off icer they will recruit from the colleges. In addition, the Japanese are exper imentinq with semi-`ntegrated off icers. Related to this concept of semi-integrated officers is another concept which might be labeled ~ semi~off icer . ~ The Japanese are the greatest proponents of this innovation, in which watchstanding certifi- cates are awarded to other than fully licensed officers. More than 500 Japanese ratings have now been awarded watchstanding certif icates after completing a 5-month training course. A similar proposal has been made to the UoR. Department of Transport by the General Council of Br itish Shipping (GCBS) . The GCBS had been advised by the Depart- ment of Transport that the government would prefer that they pursue a fully dual-licensed officer approach. One attraction of the ~semi~officer. approach is that it provides an intermediate billet for individuals moving up from rating to officer status. That transition is becoming more difficult as the educational standards of the nautical colleges are being raised. There is some concern that the educational tear rzer to mobility will work against efforts to break down the traditional tear r lets between off icers and ratings . Decentralization: Shipboard Management Teams A number of ship operators throughout Europe are transferr ing some management responsibilities front the head off ice to the ships to improve the job content of ships officers, to improve the effectiveness of the shipboard organization, and in some cases to permit reductions in the stat f of the shore suppor t organization. The management team consists of the master and department heads and occasionally junior

39. off icers and senior ratings. In general, the shipboard management team has authority over operating expenses and budget, personnel, and maintenance. Although managers ashore may establish performance and profit objectives for the ship, the role of the shore office is rev tented toward supporting rather than directing the ships. For DENS (Denmark), Shipboard managements begins after the company selects a master for a ship under construction. The master assists in the selection of officers. This shipboard management team then plans jointly for the organization and operation of the new ship, including recommending a crew size. The company takes this proposed crew level to the Board of Trade for approval. Hoegh Line (Norway} sends its full shipboard management team and their families to the construction site where they have the responsibility to oversee construction and prepare the whip for operation. In operation, the shipboard management team may elect to undertake ma jor engine overhauls or maintenance tasks using the "hip' s own crew, or to hire shore gangs. Such teams are generally permitted to spend funds to a certain limit without consulting the head office, and to oversee shipyard repairs, rather than to depend on engineers from the home of f ice . Shell Tanker B.V. intends to employ a Ship manager. on every ship who will be assisted by five semi-~ntegrated officers. New constructions include in the accommodation layout an administration room which is a centrally located grouping of offices where the management team conducts its daily work. Shipboard management teams are the maritime expression of decentralizing, a trend throughout Northwest European industry to push management decision making to lower levels of organization. The underlying theory is that the best decisions are made by those individuals closest to the problem. In the case of ship operation, this generally means those on board the ship. Not only should this lead to better, economically sound dec is ions, but it is intended to produce greater job satisfaction on the part of local managers--which translates into improved retention, motivation, and overall per formance . Decentralization is facilitated by vessel ass ignment continuity of at least senior off iced. Many companies have adopted this for a dock-co-dock per iod. The exper fence of a number of companies reveals that shipboard management is eas ier to implement onboard than at the head of f ice . Off icers often are eager to take on added responsibilities while middle managers ashore typically are reluctant to release control. Thus, this change requires top management commitment and attention. If there has been any disappointment in shipboard management from the shipboard aide, it is that the involvement of junior officers and

40 ratings has been less substantial than anticipated, especially wher e senior officers have enjoyed assignment continuity, while junior of f icer s have not . Work Planning . Shipboard management teams, as so far constituted, have consisted almost exclusively of off icers. In those instances in which shipboard decision making has been devolved to the level of the ratings, it has generally taken the form of work planning sessions. These entail peri- odic sheetings of the ratings and supervisory officers for the purpose of jointly reviewing and planning maintenance and repair activities. Communication between ratings and officers may be beneficial at any level of manning, but especially important on reduced manning vessels. The log ic is that reduced crew vessels do not of fer the luxury of dedicated supervision, nor is the caliber of reduced-crew seamen such that they require or desire such supervision. Ideally, the greater sense of professionalism of GP ratings results in their desire to be involved in the work planning process. Work planning by ratings was f irst introduced experimentally 10 years ago in con junction with the elimination of the bos ' n billet. The latter innovation often was not effective. Where implemented today, work planning operates in association with the billet of GP foreman. The ship foreman billet has f illed the need of a single rather than dual system of shop floor supervision. The ship's foreman reports to the chief mate for deck maintenance, and to the chief engineer for mach inery and eng ine space maintenance . With both de}?ar~ent heads striving to maximize their individual use of a unified but now reduced work force, reorganization of the management of GE crews was inevitable. For some companies this has taken the form of placing the GP foreman and the GP crew under the chief engineer, who assumed responsibility for maintenance and repair throughout ache sh ip . The fullest implementation of work planning has been in Norway and the Netherlands. On Shell 8.~. tankers, all junior officers and ratings are invited to contribute to the daily work planning session of the shipboard management team. In BE itain and Denmark, the emphas is has been on involving the officers. DFDS, however, is in the process of reprising its shipboard meeting reporting requirements to press ache off icers to br ing ratings in on the work planning process . Formal work planning structures are not employed on Swedish ships because it is felt that the traditional ease of communication between ratings and officers allows this process to take place informally.

41 Although there has occurred on West German vessels a degree of informal work planning, the West German companies remain fairly cen- tralized in their approach; in general, they are not pushing in the area of shipboard management. It should be noted that, even where decentralized work planning is not practiced, there are commonly other consultative structures in place on European ships to deal with issues such as sat ety . Changes in Union/Management Arrangements, Shoreside Support, and Corporate Policies Employment Stability Long-term employment contracts to seafarers are an established practice for some Northwest European ship operators. Such contracts give the seafarer slightly better pay and benefits, a more systematic vacation schedule, and more employment security. Employers generally get a higher quality employee, and one from whom they feel training expenditures will be recovered. With the exception of the Danish Seamen's Union, European seafaring unions have permitted their members to accept such contracts. In addition, in each country, there are also a number of mariners who, while declining to accept contracts, still remain ode facto. in the employ of individual companies. Concomitant with their interest in reduced manning, European ship operators are interested in long-term contracts with seafarers because of the employment stability that they bring. The operators are con- vinced that longer association between seafarer and company, and consequently longer-term association between seafarer and ship, and among crews, results in greater operating efficiency. New crew structures generally require additional training that is company- ;pecific, and companies are reluctant to invest in training for seafarers who are not long-term employees. Also, as the size of essel crews diminishes, the quality of the crew and crew organization lecome more important. In Sweden, national legislation has had the effect of making Swedish seamen permanent employees of their companies. The Shipowners association reports that 10 years of experience teas demonstrated that Legislation intended to provide social benef its ~ employment secur ity ._so has been commercially successful. All Danish officers and approximately 10 percent of the membership of the Firemen's Union are under contract; the Seamen's Union does not allow it . In an attempt to encourage Danish ratings to adept contracts, Lauritzen has extended to them privileges formerly r nerved for officers such as taking wives on trips. DFDS attracts r sings with a two-on/one-off vacation schedule. They feel that they hate achieved substantial continuity on an informal basis and are not cc ~ Kerned about formal contracts which would cost the company a'- ~ i t tonal money .

42 Norway has traditionally relied upon casual labor, although Hoegh and other companies are attempting to achieve employment stability. The Norwegian Shipping Directorate has approved a reduced manning plan for the Jebsens fleet with the proviso that the company employ all crew members of these ships on a permanent basis. This also has been a bargaining ob jective of the Norwegian Seamen ' s union in their agree- ment~ to provide reduced crews. In the United Kingdom, the ship management firm of PoAeL. ~ formerly Pan Ocean Anco) has 75 percent of its of f leers on contracts, and 40 percent of its ratings. Another ship management f irm, Furness Withy , has nearly all of its officers under contract. In the Netherlands, Shell Tanker seafarers are all permanently employed. European ship operators recognize that it is no longer possible to rely on casual wor kers with standard skills to meet the needs of operating environments that have ceased to be standardized and narrowly def ined. They consider permanent employment of mar iners essential to the manning of vessels with smaller, reorganized crews. vessel Ass ignn~ent Continuity As greater management responsibility is assigned to billets it becores more desirable to give crew members a longer period of association with a specific stripe This is most critical with members of shipboard management teams. European observers recommend that the off icers 9 iven the responsibility of development and execution of budgets onboard ship be assigned to one vessel for a per iod long enough to become familiar with the maintenance and repair requirements of that vessel. Observers also note that, to a lesser degree, ratings with work planning responsibilities are likely to be Toore eff icient if they remain for some time on the ship for which they will be doing . work planning . JUSt as European ship operators are now offer ing contracts of permanent employment to their seafarers, so too are they attempting to place the ir seamen on vessels for longer per iods of t ime . A common technique for crew continuity is to rotate three full crews between two vessels. This is the approach taken by Jebsens (United Kingdom), DFDS (Denmark), and Nievelt Goudriaan (Netherlands). Where senior off icers receive leave on a one-for-one basis, it is possible to have two men share a single billet; Nedlloyd does this with their masters and chief engineers. Salen attempts to replace 50 percent of a vessel' s crew at one time, reassigning them to the same ship if possible. Company preference is for two individuals to share a billet and to let these pairs determine their mutual work and aca- tion schedules. Hapag Lloyd is experimenting with the reE,laceme it of entire crews at a time.

43 Another approach to continuity focuses on the length of crew assignment. DFDS assigns its seafarers to individual ships for a minimum of 3 years, although it has tried for greater continuity among senior rather than junior officers. Junior officers, it is felt, benefit from experience with a greater variety of ship types. Shell Tankers B.it. (Netherlands) makes 20 5-year assignments, which include a drydocking, for the 4 senior off icers on 13 of their vessels. Junior officers and ratings still rotate within the fleet as a whole. The relief system also influences crew continuity. DEDS employs a ~yo-yo. system of internal temporary promotion, in which a billet vacated because of a permanent employee's leave is filled by another qualif fed member of the crew. The master is relieved by the chief mate, the chief mate by the second mate, and so on. Under such a system, when new men are brought into the crew it is in the lower pos itions . The traditional reliance of the industry on casual labor would not have been so widespread if it did not serve some useful function. ~ t has in the past been a practical strategy in an industry sub ject to chronic f fluctuations in labor demand . Ass ignment discontinuity is also practical in view of the expense of personnel transportation. The traditional practices of casual labor may also have f unctioned, albeit indirectly, as a ~ safety valves to alleviate ten- sions stemming from the traditional organization of crews. One way of defusing volatile personnel problems is to reduce the chances that individuals will work together frequent, y or for any per iod of time . In the context of monotonous traditional jobs aboard ship, they also offered the opportunity to experience a variety of trades and tech- nologies. Given the traditional structure and operation of merchant crews, permanency of position may not necessar fly be desirable. Only when the organization of work aboard ship is improved so that knowledge of the job and the ship and team performance become important does crew continuity become a positive innovation. Even then there should be some provision for mobility in the event of the inevitable inter- personal problems that occasionally accompany isolation. Social Integration of Crews Manning innovations have been accompanied throughout Europe by Reemphasizing the traditional status difference between officers and ratings. Social integration is reflected in design changes in accommodation spaces . The Brostroms 16-man Roe= ' s, for example, have only one class of cabin. Other indications of this change include in var ious fleets, ratings on salary rather than hourly pay, extension to r stings of the pr ivilege of tak ing spouses on tr ips, and the var ious consultative structures in which ratings play a management or planning sole. All of these are reflections of new organiza~cions of shipboard work in which supervisory, technical, and menial tasks are not so r igidly prescribed on the basis of the officer or rating distinction.

44 Cultural values and traditions play a role in the degree or ease of acceptance of this diminishment of shipboard status differences. The Scandinavians seem to be having the least cliff iculty ~ n adapting, followed by the Dutch, and at a greater distance the West Germans and British. The Norwegians in particular are enjoying success in this change; this is partly a reflection of the recruitment and nautical educational system in that country, in which all the off icers come up a through the hawsepipe. ~ But Hoegh reports that even in Norway, there was some discussion and complaint at first. Swedish officers are also recruited exclusively from the ranks of ratings, but this is no guaran- tee of social hor~geny of crews. The person recruited to officer status is not necessarily of the same social background as the person who is content to remain a rating. Another factor influencing this trend may be the changing social values generally at work In the industr ies of the Scandinavian counts ies . In some Scandinavian and Dutch companies, it is common practice to have a single bar and mess room for both off icers and ratings. While this innovation was initially resisted, it is now accepted. All new ships built by Hoegh and Shell Tankers B. V. are f itted with common recreational and dining facilities. The lessening of importance of traditional shipboard status d distinctions must also be understood as the consequence of the higher level of technical and manager ial tasks be ing assumed by ratings on reduced manning vessels. The logic is that high cost countries can compete only if they run their vessels with very small numbers of well trained, highly competent seafarers. Such competent ratings will not serve long, however, if they are treated as a class below and separate f rom the off dicers, as has been the traditional practice. It is prec isely th is cha in of log ic that has led Brostroms (Sweden ~ to sue - cessfully introduce social integration on its 16-man Ro-Ro' s. Another related reason given for social integration is that smaller crews are challenged more than conventional crews and require a team ef fort and sense of Esprit de corps. ~ Integrated, rather than divided, status for crew members is felt to contr ibute to the achievement of this team effort. Ther e is concern that the technical content of the r stings jobs may be diminishing on the more technically advanced ships, especially those on which officers, now freed from watchstanding, have encroached upon maintenance and repair work traditionally handled by the ratings. These pressures may cause the status of ratings to slip rather than to be elevated. Such billets would not attract ache quality of rating that is envisioned, nor would they offer ratings the opportunity to earn the respect of off icers. To counteract this, technical training programs have been initiated and organizational changes onboard have been made to increase the technical content of the jobs of ratings.

45 The U. R. Merchant Nary and Airline Off icer Association (MNAOA) f eels that its membership would accept social integration if the quality and training of the ratings would improve. P.~. L. reports that their officers initially had difficulty with management's initiatives toward social integration, but that this is no longer a problem because the ratings are much better trained and motivated. Perhaps 75 percent of those officers who were suspicious or hostile at f irst are now in favor of integration because it has simplified their jobs . Running a ship as a one-class entity, rather than two-class, eliminates the them v. us. problems. In some cases, ratings object to integrated messing because they feel it allows the officers to supervise them more closely and continuously. Alteration of the physical layout of certain accommodation spaces may aid, but will not guarantee, integration. While physical altera- tions to promote one-class operations may offer savings for owners in construction and operation costs, this approach has not been accepted in every instance. It is also probable that, regardless of nationality, rigid status distinctions are more acceptable when the pr ivileged are few, and become less acceptable as that ratio increases to the point at which the officers begin to outnumber the ratings. One effect of manning innovations has been a steady increase in the of f leer/rating ratio. The ratio for all vessels of the O. E e C ~ D . member counts ies was 1 officer to 2.35 ratings in 1965, and changed to 1:2.04 in 1970. A ratio of 1:1 has been achieved in many instances. Ratings, and their unions, in general, have been enthusiastic proponents of innovations that will lead to integration. Denmark may be an exception, especially the Seamen' s Union. The officers and their representatives, on the other hand, have more difficulty with integration. In a practical sense, it means comparatively fewer perks and privileges, but more basically it means a relative loss of status and calls for a substantial adjustment of self-image. There is also concern that social integration cannot succeed in the absence of career mobility across the off~cer/rating boundary. In fact, it appears that the national educational systems of some of the European countries are developing in such a way that it is becoming more--not less--difficult for ratings to make the transition to officer s tatus . Shoreside Reorganization Although the initial focus of manning exper imentation has been on shipboard organizational change, exper fence has taught that modif i- cations to shore-ba~ed organizations are necessary to the realization of the overall objective of effective manning. This is particularly true of the shipping companies ' head off ices, but it applies as well to the union organization.

46 Office Reorganization Since the advent of radio, European ship operating companies have maintained central control over their f leets . The traditional management structure is based on broad functions, e . g ., per sonnet , account ing , eng ineer ing , insur ance , mar ket ding , and purchasing. Each department controls the corresponding function on all ships. Shipboard management teams, and other manning innovations, alter the traditional departmental division of responsibility. To take advantage of an integrated management approach on the ship, companies have found it necessary to make corresponding changes in headquarters organization. Manning innovations also have involved the delegation of author ity from shore to ship. However, the traditional fleet management structure is set up to direct, rather than support operations afloat; thus, changes have been necessary in this respect as well. A character istic change is the institution of the Ship manager. position. The ship manager is responsible for coordinating shoreside support of a small number of vessels; usually such ships are alike in terms of trading conditions or technology. The ship manager is con- sidered to be an element of the shipboard management team, the member best situated to see that the needs of their ships are being met by the several divisions of the office staff. The ship manager provides a single, rather than multiple, line of accountability between ship and shor e . Reorganization of the off ice most directly affects the managers who are the architects of change, and it generally involves the sur- r ender of management controls that are not r eplaced by other control tasks passed down from higher levels. A change that has facilitated and been made necessary by reduced manning has been the reduction of maintenance work required by the crew. Alternative arrangements for maintenance include more extensive shipyard work lists, and the com- pletion of maintenance and repair work in port or by a mobile team of contractors or temporary employees. The latter arrangement provides for occas tonal shoreside employment of a f irm' s seagoing stat f . Norway ' s most recent innova- tion in the area of reduced manning maintenance is the ~ f lex~ble manning scale, ~ as used by Rlaveness. On the basis that ache prescribed manning scale is larger than that actually required for vessel maintenance, ship management teams are given the authority and flexibility to increase or decrease the size of the crew to match immediate maintenance requirements, and weather conditions or other opportunities . Union Reorganization Exper imentation with manning has led to union involvement in a variety of consultative structures such as tr spar ante (i.e., government, industry, and union) manning committees and research oversight groups. Unions also participate on company-level

47 or clipboard safety' work planning, co-determination, and project guidance committees. One union, the National Union of Seamen (NUS), has found it advantageous to tailor its structure to participate more effectively in manning innovations. Just as companies are decentral- izing, unions are creating Shipboard branches and placing greater reliance on company, as opposed to industry, level agreements. , . such contracts are negotiated by the same national officers that negot;a-e the national agreement. Furthermore, unions are recognizing that each company has specialized needs and particular requirements, and th; a~ the membership should play a more di rect role in the negotia- tion of the company contracts. NUS in the United Kingdom has insti- tuted a structure in which company-level agreements are negotiated by the local leaders of the membership working for their companies. The nations 1 off icers are available at such negotiations for counsel and assistance, but the principal responsibility lies with the local leaders. The concept of a shipboard branch is not merely an elaboration of the tra ~ tional shipboard union committee. Delegates from these branche report directly to the union executive council and the con- gress. In NUS, the shipboard branch is becoming the fundamental organizational unit. PROCESS OF CHANGE Nature of Organizational Change The pr ocean of change has been as important to manning innovation in Europe as :he innovations themselves. The process of change has been led by individual, innovating companies. Institutions--government agencies, shipping associations, trade unions, and research institutes --have alar, played roles, but have been more involved and most suc- cessful in collaboration with innovating companies. The cringe process is long term; some consider it continuous. Some years ago Shell B.~. initiated an experimental ship project which it named project with a Long Breath,. because they were sure that it would take Many years to accomplish the degree of change envisioned at the start. The sort of innovations being worked on in the pro ject today were not even envisioned then. Ideas fir organizational change may be derived from theory and research; they may be adapted from studies, experiments, or practices in ship operation in other countries, or in other industries in the same country, or, they may spring from operating experience. The top management a: the innovating company may be enthusiastic, skeptical, or uninformed about the need for change. Other parties, such as unions or governments, may be many or few, and more or less influential. In

48 the ear ly stages of organizational change in an industry, one or a few companies may be in the vanguard in exper iments or pro jects. The results of the exper iments or pro jects will be assessed by the parties involved and the innovations will be embraced or abandoned, or modif fed and exper imented with in an interactive process. AS innovations prove themselves successful and produce conf idence, they will become more widely known, accepted (as reflected in changes in supporting institu- tional policies), and adopted elsewhere in the innovating company and industry. Dif fusiora of organizational innovations involves information exchange, education, and attitude change. The focus of change evolves as attention shifts from the pioneer companies, to the over early changers, and f inally, to the companies that are more reluctant to change. Innovation in the manning of merchant vessels has inc' uded equipment-based crew reductions , limited crew organizationc.l change, and comprehend ive organizational change . The s Amplest changes have focused exclusively on reduction in numbers and not on changes in other manning policies or practices. The reductions are ;de possible by labor-saving equipment and approved by governmentally c 2ecif fed procedures. The objective is cost savings. A variation of this Yodel is one where functions, such as maintenance, are removed from the shipboard crew ' s r espons ib ilities with cor r esponding mann ing reduce ions. The next level of change focuses on two type; of policy modifications: a) interdepartmental flexibility of multiple-skilled ratings; and b) greater continuity of employment. It may be based upon, or merely reinforced by, an assumption of decreases in crew size. The objective is to go beyond labor savings from technical change and to become more eff icient in the use of human resources. Provision must be made for the cross-training of existing ratings or the multi-purpose training of new GPs. It may be necessary to provide additional pay for multi-sk illed ratings and to provide some inducements for ratings to accept company contracts. The management responsibilities of off leers also may be broadened . This limited level of organizational change typically is responsive to the need to Uprose operating costs. The most complete change incorporates participative work planning, off icer role flexibility, vertical role flexibility between off icers and ratings, and stability of crew assignments. A number of other supporting changes are often made, including leave time and common f abilities. This degree of change assumes and encourages increased social integration. It is supported and made possible by a better correspondence between management and union objective=.

49 Key Ingredients in the Change Process Regardless of the degree of innovation attemp~ced, success depends on the change process. The following review highlights those elements of change processes followed in European and Japanese manning innovations, which, in the committee' s view, have differentiated effective change efforts from those which have been less effective. 1 Leader ship Top management commitment was cited as an important ingredient in the success of many pro jects, for example those of Bough, DFOS, Hapag- Lloyd, P.A. I`., Jebsens , and Shell Tankers B.V. This factor was missing in other cases, where projects were directed principally by the researchers. One of the lessons learned by the sponsors of the Sealife Progranune in the United Kingdom is the importance of clarity of purpose . It is not enough to have a strong bus iness or human rationale; it must be communicated to all participants. Symbols are sometimes important. In Hoegh, beginning in 1975, management shifted from annual conferences of top officers of project ships to ~grass- roots. conferences which included ratings, thereby signaling management' s intentions regarding participation. Change is often championed by one or a few individuals within a company, the industry, or both. The champion could be a top executive of an exper imenting company but need not be. Successes in the change efforts of Bough, Nedlloyd, DFDS, and P.A.L. were attributed to the championing of individuals who were strong, persistent, strategically placed, and influential advocates for change. The more similar the innovating company and exper imental ship to others that follow, the better the prospects for diffusion, the com- mittee learned. Firms that are seen as leaders generally within the industry will be more effective in pioneering industry-wide organiza- tional change. Bough and Mapag-Lloyd appear to score high on these criteria and have been effective pioneers as a result. Brostroms, because of its unusually large shore-based exper fence and facilities, may have been less effective as a general model. A very early pioneer, Shell Tankers B.~., may have been less persuasive to the other Dutch shipping companies because of perceived dif ferences between a division of a large oil company and independent ship operators. DENS was small, peripheral, and differentiated from much of the Danish fleet, which may help explain the negligible diffusion of its internally effective shipboard management innovations.

so Involvement of Institutions The involvement of union, management, and government par ties has a bear ing on whether an exper iment may go forward and, if it does, whether its results will. influence policy. Three cases illustrate a broad spectrum from a minimum to a maximum amount of institutional involvement: o In Denmark, the Holler company presented the author ities with a proposed experiment utilizing GP crew. The Sea~n' s Union insisted upon being involved in deciding the conditions and in monitor ins the results. The company refused. With such a poor rapport between the parties, no change has occurred. O Shell Tankers B.~. negotiated with its unions, both off leers ' and ratings ', the early GP tr ials and subsequent policy change. The result was a relatively rapid diffusion throughout Shell ' s fleet. It was not necessary to have this agreement approved at the industry level, however, and no dif fus ion beyond Shell to the Netherlands shipping industry occurred for almost a decade. When the rest of the Netherlands shipping industry exper unented with manning innovations, they operated their own pro ject ships rather than base their decis ions on Shell ' s decade of exper fence . O In Norway, the Hosqh exper iments with GP and other concepts wer e discussed, debated, approved, monitored, and evaluated by an industry-level "contact group. composed of union, government, and shipowner representatives and researchers. Not only did Hoegh change on the basis of these experiments, but industry-level learning occurred. Other Norwegian shipping companies, notably Je3:>sens and Klaveness, initiated manning innovations on the basis of the Hoegh experience. The Hoogh-Shell comparison is particularly instructive. Both were leading edge companies in their countries. The choice to make Hoegh's experiments industry property, approved and monitored by the industry-level contact group, resulted in slower diffusion of the new manning model within Bough, but it spread Moegh ' s influence throughout the Norwegian ship operating industry. The tr ipartite contact group in Norway was copied later in Netherlands. There have been no comparable mechanisms in Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom capable of creating industry-wide sponsorship of experiments. In several countries, inter-institutional mechanisms played a role in creating industry-level ownership of experiments, in promoting industry-wide learning from them, and in br inging about required changes in industry education, certif ication requirements, and manning

51 rules. Inter-institutional mechanisms sometimes offered a way for each institutional representative to develop a deeper appreciation of the others' concerns and to gain an understanding of the ingredients of effective change. Whether the existence of an inter-institutional mechanism actually had the effects just described depended on a number of factors: the quality of pre-existing rapport among the parties, the amount of time the parties committed to the process, and the par- ticipation of individuals who were effective in promoting discussion and learning. In Norway, the contact group was launched at a time when management, union, and government officials were all concerned about attracting more qualified mariners and enjoyed reasonable, positive rapport. The parties met more than 30 Times over several years; the Norwegian researchers were accepted as legitimate partners in the process and evidently were skillful catalysts. The contact group started in the late 1960s and continues today. In the European experience, the quality of relationships among labor unions, ship operators, and government was a very important ingredient determining how much effective change occurred. When a country's industry was characterized by frequent discussion, mutual respect, and trust among these institutions, it was better able to innovate new manning policies and diffuse them. Several factors complicated the development of cooperative relationships among institutions. The most important factor was the complexity and diversity of the constituent elements of each inst i tution . Consider the trade union structure. At one extreme, the Netherlands has a federation of unions. At the other extreme, Denmark has seven different unions representing seagoing personnel, including different unions for engine-room ratings and deck ratings. It is not difficult to see that the Netherlands' union structure played an important role in enabling the unions to accept interdepartmental role flexibility. In Norway, Boegh's Mulling ship project, started in 1971, convinced many in the industry of the desirability of role flexibility between navigation and engineering officers; but because of separate engineering and mates' unions, a decade later there still have been only modest steps in that direction. The mates, especially, suspect they would not fare as well as the engineering officers in qualifying for integrated officer positions. The effect of union structure is also illustrated by the fact that in Sweden, radio officers are represented by the mates' union; Sweden has made the most progress toward eliminating the radio officer position, and communication functions have been assigned in some cases to other officers. Diversity and complexity among shipowners must also be addressed. In West Germany, two of the largest and most influential shipping companies, Hapag-Lloyd and Hamburg Sud, had opposing preferences about the manning models they wished to employ and

52 therefore about what practices should be promoted or required by industry-level action. The industry in the United Kingdom is com- pr ised of a large number of small- to moderate-s ized f irms with no large, dominating companies. As a result, the U. K. shipowners association has evidenced less leadership in manning innovations than i ts counterpar ts in other European counts ies . Complexity and diversity within the government is also a factor. Sweden has recently consolidated government responsibility for shipping matters in one agency. West Germany is moving in the same direction. Involvement of Participants Another major factor influencing the success of experiments as well as subsequent diffusion in the Northwest European ship manning exper i- ments was the degree to which direct participants, including the crew, were given an opportunity to discuss, review, and shape proposed or p ilot innovations . Norway' s Hoegh f irst learned the lesson when they omitted this seep in their initial efforts to transfer elements of an experiment to two other ships. They found that the crews on The nest ships did not have the commitment required to make the innovation world effectively. Hoegh concluded that participative planning is art essential step in organizational change. A further implication of this decision for Hoogh is that innovations need to be tailored to the conditions on each sh ip . A related lesson was learned by Sweden' s Salen. In the mid-1970s, top management approved a trial in which increased shipboard manage- ment was delegated to off icers on four ships. When the results proved encouraging, management made the change a policy and attempted to implement it throughout the company's fleet of several dozen ships. They encountered difficulties. The officers for the experimental ships had been carefully selected and the personnel onshore who served as liaisons for the exper imental ships had been carefully br iefed and involved in the planning. However, the company' s program for imple- meeting the change company-wide overlooked the importance of these two aspects of the experiment. The company found that many officers in the additional ships targeted for change were either reluctant or unprepared to take on the additional responsibility, and many of the shore personnel were unwilling to transfer authority because to do so would threaten their current role. From this failure in dif fusion, Salen management learned that careful preparation is required to lay the groundwork for diffusion of organizational innovation. They concluded that preparation must encompass participative planning by all affected groups to achieve acceptance, education and training for the new roles, and compliance mechanisms to ensure that individuals carry out their new responsibil- ities.

53 Adequate Information and Evaluation There has been a general tendency in the diffusion of organizational innovations for followers to oversimplify. The methods by which new manning innovations were developed, approved, and monitored influenced the type of changes that were copied, if they were copied at all. This can be illustrated by reviewing the Brostrom case. The Brostro~ manning innovations, which have been extended to seven Ro-Ro ships over the past several years, have the following well-publicized aspects: a 16-man crew, 6 general purpose crew members, and an operational strategy which transfers almost all maintenance to shc~re-based facilities. It is regarded as successful, safe, cost effective, and satisfactory to crew members. When other Swedish managers and government and union officials consider the gener ~ applicability of the approach, they especially focus on whether in is practical for other shipping companies to transfer maintenance functions to shore-based crews. These officials, however, may be missing important lessons from Brostroms' experience. When examining less `'ublicized aspects of the Brostroms model and when one listening close ~ to what Brostroms' management itself considers to be the basis for i ~ s success, a more complex picture can be sketched. The company negotiated the manning innovation initially with their unions and madly them partners in the monitoring and evaluation of their early experiences. Crew members, who were required to be experienced, were recruited from among volunteers. There was a con- scientious commitment -a give more voice to crew members and to be more responsive to the. r stated needs. There was greater provision made for role flexibi;: ty between ratings and officers and for includ- ing ran ings in the wor k planning. The manager with line responsibility for these ships emphasized that a major factor in the success of the innovation was motivate-], spirited crew. This aspect of the success of the innovation is n i well appreciated by observers, nor is there an information diffusion mechanism in Sweden which could help other ship operators understand the many ingredients for success that were built into the Brostrom' s approach. There are other il' ustrations of this tendency to fix on an aspect of an innovation, usually its most controversial aspect, while ne- glecting the key ingred ents of its success. When in the late 1970s the Sealife Programme in the United Kingdom attempted to duplicate the Norwegian manning experiments, the intention was to test several concepts: general purpose crew, continuity of assignment, and crew participation. As it happened, the U.K. officers, ratings, their unions, and many managers were hindered by the question of social integration. A better g: asp of the Norwegian experience might have

54 enabled the participants to see that it is more ap ~ropriate to treat social integration as a by-product of work role in egration, rather than as a precondition for other changes or as the central element of the planned change. Technology Transfer Each industry has, as a rule, insisted upon conducting its own research and trials rather than directly applying the experiences of other countries. For example, the Sealife Programme in the United Kingdom explicitly set out to reproduce the Norwegian experiments ·on O.K. ships with U.K. personnel.. Even within the Netherlands, Shell experiments were not regarded by the rest of the industry as a basis f or evaluating the GP concept or the semi-integrated officer. This repetition served several purposes. :t provided a common experience which all of the affected parties could evaluate. It provided a concrete basis f or all of the parties to learn about the detailed requirements of the change process. The planning and evalu- ation discussions among parties provided an opportunity for them to develop a more systematic understanding of the innovations, including their key ingredients and subtle effects. The_e discussions, like other instances of participative planning, developed ownership and commitment. Much of the reporting on effective manning developments has been descriptive. There has been little assessment of the innovations, their strengths and weaknesses, and advantages or disadvantages. Once several different companies were experimenting in Europe, the possibility existed for them to interact and influence one another. The rate of diffusion of change and the quality of the specific models which evolved were enhanced as networks were created in which partici- pants in these innovations could meet and exchange their experiences. Some networks have been formalized, such as the companies participating in the Sealife Programme Ignited Kingdom), ;.ae Ship of the Fu~cure Program ~ West Germany ), the Committee on Modernization of the Japanese Seafaring System, Provo ~ Netherlands), and the Ship Operation of the Future Pr ogram ~ Norway ~ . Others consist of inf ormal exchange among those companies that have an interest in the subject. Examples of informal networks include the 1980s Group (alumni of the Sealife Programmed, the proposed Advanced Manning Croup of the General Council of British Shipping, and similar but nameless networks in other European shipowner associations. Compared to other industries worldwide, ship operators in Northwest Europe and Japan have devoted a remarkably large amount of effort to learning about organizational Innovation. Also impressive is the very high quality of both the research and policy implications

~5 drawn from the research efforts. Most of this social science research has focused heavily, but not exclusively, on the Norwegian and BE itish exper fences--but it has had broad relevance to all of the counts ies studied. Moreover, the conferences explor ing organizational innova- tions in ship operation often have been broadly international in their content and in their participant roster. The many trade journals and magazines which track developments in the international ship operating industry have- reported frequently, and sometimes in depth, on the status of and trends in manning policies and practices. Importance of Training Training has played an important role in the process of change. Most innovations have entailed training of participants in technical sk ills related to expanded responsibilities and also in participative organi- zational change. A number of countries have revised rating and officer training schemes to support manning innovations in the national fleets. Norway has expanded its Ship ' s mechanic. training program to f ill the demand for such ratings. West Germany has modified its national train- ing program for ratings to the extent that the only entry training available is for GPs. Japan has revised its national training and certification scheme for officers to bring it into accord with the International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, and also to support the trend toward semi-integrated officers and certified nonofficer bridge watchstanders. The most substantial changes in training have been those for ratings because manning innovations affe<:`c ratings more than officers; a reduc- tion in the number of crew members leads to an increase in required skills and qualifications. In addition to changes in national training programs and requirements, companies have initiated programs to meet specialized needs. This company training is provided to recruits emerging from the training schools as well as to upgrade employees for innovative service. The scope of company training depends on the scope of the company' s manning innovations. Nedlloyd in Holland started an experimental program with two project ships in 1978 using the Multi-purpose Crew concept. They provided 5 days of special training in f iref ighting, safety, f irnt aid, and lifeboat certif ication; 3 weeks of shoreside training; and 2 months of on-the-job shipside training in the opposite department. Other examples of companies engaging in similar exper imentation and training efforts are Mapag-Lloyd in West Germany (3 weeks of shore~ide and 3 weeks of ship~ide training); Hamburg Sud in conjunction with other Went German companies; P.A.L. in the United Kingdom with shoreside schools to improve ratings' skills; and Leif Bough in Norway with structured training programs for GPs onboard the ship. Dual competency has brought about major changes in officer training schemes. Dual competency is now a hir ing requirement in Shell Tankers Big., with pressure being brought on the Dutch govern- ment to make such training mandatory in the nautical college. The

56 system offers the ~minor. competence through an additional 6 months of college and 6 months at sea in the opposite department. The goal is to design a dual-purpose off icer education program of 4 years. For the future, a fully integrated officer training system is envisioned. In West Germany, the new system of officer training consists of 13 years of compulsory schooling, 18 months on ship, then 3 years of theoretical work at a polytechnic school. Attempts on the part of West German shipowners to have a semi-integrated educational program implemented have not gained approval by the government, but there is mounting pressure to include special provisions for such manning in manning regulations under consideration. Semi-integrated officer experimentation undertaken by Leif Hoegh in Norway several years ago was allegedly highly successful, but failure to gain support in the educational system made it impossible for the company to sustain the arrangement. Given the importance of leadership to successf ul innovation, some training has been directed to the development of leadership skills, and understanding of participative organizations, among those involved. Off icers have received training in management and meeting techniques, so as to be more competent in handling situations resulting f ram the implementation of shipboard management/matr ix organizations . Shoreside of f ice staff members have been given training in communica- tion appropriate to their roles as teachers of skills to be transferred f rom shore to ship. While these additional training components may not seem very significant in and of themselves, they signal a new emphasis on cooperation and a move towards decentralization and a self-contained ship. Government and Union Rules and the Process of Change Some manning innovations in Northwest Europe have contravened laws or regulations. Some experiments and trials have required variances from requ i remeet s . Where exper iments have been successf ul, laws or regula- tions have had to be modified to enable the innovation's diffusion in the industry. The two types of laws or regulat ions that bear most directly on manning innovations are manning scales that specify numbers and qualif ications of seafarers for specif ic tonnage and power vessels, and work environment laws which specify maximum numbers of hour s of allowable war k. The pattern throughout Europe and Japan has been to move away f ram legislated manning scaler in ache direction of regulations which can more easily be modif fed and interpreted for special circumstances. In some cases, industry advisory bodies have ass isted government agencies in consider ing requests f ram operator s to crew at levels less than that prescribed by law. Japan has gone so far as to remove manning from the realm of legislation and now relies upon regulation for guidance, which provides the legal elasticity to exper iment .

57 For years, Norway had a means of providing for regulatory variance f or exper imental vessels · In 19 83, a new manning scale law was passed that permits considerably smaller crews. The size of the crew is determined by the technological standard of the ship and the type of organizational innovations implemented. Just as variances from government rules have been needed for manning innovation, variances from union rules have also been needed prior to manning experimentation. In the United Kingdom, there has been a trend in the direction of individual companies negotiating separate contracts with the unions whenever they want provisions unlike those specified in the national agreement. The West German 18-man Containership Experiment operated under the provisions of an agreement signed by both the German Shipowners' Association and the two unions. A number of companies and most unions were signatories to similar agreements in Norway. Two of the more difficult issues attendant to manning innovation are watchstanding of captains and the requirements for a radio officer. The radio officer requirement is increasingly being viewed as obsolete because of substant ial advances in communications and navigation; although it is provided for in international law. In the countries reviewed, resolution of these issues has or will involve statutory changes. Compensating Workers for Their Participation Compensation has been provided throughout Europe and Japan because some manning changes can have negative consequences for mariners and their unions. In Norway, an industry-labor agreement provided for permanent employment, fixed annual salaries, and more vacation time. In West Germany, the 18-Han Containership Experiment also provided for continuous employment, additional holidays, guaranteed overtime, and other fringe benefits. Throughout Europe it is understood that one compensation to the ratings for shouldering the brunt of billet reductions is improvement in the status of those that remain. Unions representing the ratings have attempted to incorporate within manning experiments provisions for better training, facilities, and social status for their members. The All Japanese Seamen's Union, which has cooperated in the national program to restructure merchant crews, has revised its views on wage policy as a result of the increasing unemployment and radical changes envisaged for the seafaring career. The union is now attempt- ing to obtain a new pay and benefits structure that would provide lifetime security to the seafarer and his dependents. The union is also pushing for a selective retirement formula to promote the early retirement of an aging work force. With a usual retirement age of S5,

58 the Japanese seafaring work force has a high proportion of individuals in the 40 to 54 age bracket. As in the United States, the ratio of reserve to active seamen In Japan has risen dramatically. The number of reserve seamen decreases at a far slower rate than the number of billets eliminated through crew reductions. Thus, savings through elimination of active shipboard positions is insuf f icient. Early retirements may alleviate the unemployment problem. Another means of alleviating unemployment among seafarers has been retraining for other than seagoing careers. The Japanese have been most active in this regard, both through the efforts of in.di~ridual companies and the government. NYK runs a job development program which assists in f inding NYK seafarers jobs ashore with aff iliate companies (e.g., steel and shipbuilding). K Line and Mitsui have similar schemes, and on a broad basis the Japanese Ministry of Transport established in 19 7 8 a Seamen ' s Employment Promotion Centre. These voluntary programs are assisted by the fact that these shipping companies are a part of larger industrial groupings. RESULTS OF MANNING INNOVATIONS Reflecting those historical conditions of the industry which led to effective manning programs, evaluation of innovations has focused primarily on the economy of vessel operation and the degree to which changes have improved the quality of working life. The effect of manning reductions and modif ication of traditional work practices on sat ety and health also has been an area of concern. Economy of Vessel Operation While earliest change efforts were concerned with providing a remedy to the manpower shortage problem, and were directed toward improving the quality of work life an sea, economy of operation always has been a measure of the success of effective manning projects. Cost reduction has become increasingly important in recent years due to overtonnaging and severe competition. Savings in direct payroll costs as the result of billet reductions has been the primary ob jective of a number of European and Japanese ship operators. These operators have introduced organizational or working practice changes only for the purpose of supporting the primary objective of manning reduction. Problematic in these cases is the degree to which direct payroll savings are offset by other costs associated with manning reductions (e.g., additional overtime for remaining crew members, additional training for remaining crew members, expanded shoreside maintenance, and declining resale value of the vessel, especially if it has not been maintained as before).

59 The degree to which individual companies have monitored the costs and benefits of effective tanning projects has varied. There are no figures available for the industry as a whole, or for any national fleet. The Norwegian Ship)wners' Association, in a review of that country's experience with ffective manning experiments, flatly states: nit is not possibl' :o estimate the cost that has been incurred in the new equipment, additional training, or savings made.. A number of companies, including DFDS, Bough, and Shell Tankers Bail., have made comparisons of developments over time. Whereas costs on conventionally manned ships rose steadily over a couple of years, the costs on project ships rose much less sharply. The results were encouraging both in terms of operational performance and maintenance costs. Operators engaged in effective manning programs claim that reduced and reorganized crews operate project vessels not only without increasing operational costs ~ n areas other than payroll, but in a fashion that has reduced these costs as well. In other words, effectively manned vessels are not only earring payroll costs, but are providing savings in such area" as fuel economy, economy of equipment and stores, less days of f-hire, and less illness and accident claims. Quality of Working Life and Job Satisfaction During the era of manpower shortage, the companies were insistent that changes in operating practices should result in the seafarers being more satisfied with their employment and consequently remain at sea. With the shift of emphasis to economy of operation, the social goals or quality of work-life goals have not been lost. Operators still voice the concern that the quality of work life resulting from effective manning changes be a positive improvement rather than simply knot degrading. as manning level-, are reduced and economic working practices introduced. The most effective innovations are felt to be those that simultaneously increase productivity and improve working conditions {e.g., decentralized collision making, participative work planning, assignment continuity, higher levels of training, competetence, and responsibility}. It is widely reported that seafarers employed under effective manning arrangements en joy a subst antially improved quality of work life, and are not inclined to reve: t to traditional employment and working practices.

60 Bibby Bros . reports of their pro je At ships that: Management inspections of the sh ips reveal h igher levels of achievement in the: ~.ntenance and appearance of the ships and also indicate improved management and morale on board. . . In short, bc th the teams themselves, and company management, think that they have a much better Or ip on affairs and greater satisfaction in their work. In essence, we would see the main benef it from these developments as be ing a much unproved trust and collaboration between shore and ship management. There has been a marked departure from traditional attitudes and a lessening of unproductive conflict. Issues are still confronted, but in a more constructive and less status-conscious manner. Tte organization as a whole is displaying a greater continuity and coherence of purpose and effort.. (Smith, Gosden, and Elkington, nd.) The Norwegian Shipowners' Association reports that ship~to-shore relationships have been remarkably improved, and that barriers between officers and: stings and between departments have been broken down, And are in some ships almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the crew works as a much closer team than before. Safety and Health Concern about safety and health in manning projects has generally taken the form of precautions that they not deteriorate. Dif ferent parties have had dif ferent safety and health concerns in overseas manning exper iments. The ministr ies of transport and their industry advisory committees have, in reviewing requests from operators for permission to sail with smaller crews than provided for by law, considered the possible vessel safety implications of proposed changes. In same cases, these agencies and advisory groups have played a further role in monitoring the performance of vessels granted such variance and operating with reduced crews. In countries with work environment laws {e.g., Norway and West Germany), agencies with this respon- sibility have monitored the hourly work records of experimental ships. Operators and shipowner associations generally claim that effective manning vessels are not only as safe as traditionally manned ships, but have resulted in better safety records because the smaller, higher trained ~ be ~ ter motivated crew is more aler t and attentive to duties. Some of these operators claim to have quantif fed these safety gains.

61 Those union leaders that are cautious with regard to the new crew structures argue that quantity, in terms of numbers of crew, is important in addition to quality, and that expanding the responsibilities of ratings and officers beyond traditional duties is resulting in seamen less qualified in their principal departments. Although they have no data to support their claim that these ships may be less safe than those traditionally . manned, one union observed that it is the most modern well- equipped vessels that are being crewed in the new fashion. Arguing that such high-~echnology vessels should be safer than older ships simply from a technical point of view, this union maintains that effective manning vessels should therefore be required to show safety gains, and not just the absence of safety slippage. Additional Comments on Measurements of Results Characteristic of company-level efforts in organizational change in any industry, the results of such projects in shipping are not well documented. If projects are reported at all, and many are not, the reports frequently take the form of descriptive case studies. Few change programs are conducted in a scientific fashion. There are several reasons for this. Companies are interested in results, not scientific documentation. They are not motivated to increase the cost of the project. Another reason is that formalization or manning projects in a scientific mode can reduce the enthusiasm of participants, and therefore the likelihood of successful changes. Finally, the active participa- tion of evaluators--managers, union representatives, and seafarers --in experimental manning projects has provided experiential proof of results which has been sufficient for corporate purposes.