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3 STATUS AND MANNING OF THE U . S . MERCHANT FLEET STATUS In this report, the U.S. merchant fleet is considered to compr ise U . S . -f lag, pr ivately owned, self-propelled oceangoing vessels over 1, 000 gross registered tons. * This def inition includes nearly all U.S.-flag ships in international trade and the major ships in the domestic, coastal, and offshore trades. It excludes inland, service, and fishing craft, as well as the numerically larger fleets of U.S. corporations reg istered in other counts ies. Table 1 descr ibes the U.S. merchant fleet, and compares it to the U.S.-owned foreign-flag f feet . The med. tan age of U. S . merchant vessels is 17 year s; that of the world' s merchant vessels is 13 years. Table 2 documents the long-term decline of the U. S . fleet. From a high at the end of the Second World War, the U.S. merchant fleet had fallen to fourth place in shipping tonnage by 1960, with 1 , 008 ships r epresenting 5 . 8 percent of the wor Id f feet . By 1981, the U. S . mer- chant fleet had dropped to eleventh place, with 578 ships representing 2 . 3 percent of wor Id vessels . In this sane per iod, U. S . trade declined from 50 percent to 30 percent of world trade. The percentage of that trade carried by the U.S. merchant fleet has dropped to 4.6 percent. The fleets of five foreign countries now carry as much or more U.S. cargo as the U. S . f leet. Prospects are dim for any dramatic change in the status of the U. S . merchant f feet . A drop in the number of seagoing billets has accompanied the decline of the U.S. fleet. From a high of 168,000 billets after the Second World War, there were 49,000 billets in the U.S. merchant fleet by 1960 . By July 1982, there were 18,826 billets (see Table 3~. With billets filled primarily on the basis of seniority, the median age of the seafarers has r isen to 54 years , which is substantially higher than the world average. *Much of the data in this section were provided by the Maritime Administration to the U. S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and published {OTA, 19831. 9
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11 TABLE 2 U.S. Merchant Fleet 1970-1983 Cargo Number Tons Capacity dwt (xlO 6) Tanker Number Tons Capac ity dwt (xlO 6) 1970 - 1, 479 15.44 301 7. 83 1975 612 8.17 279 9.43 1980 553 7.87 310 16.10 1983 308 6.64 233 14.22 SOURCE: Employment Report of the United States Flag Merchant Fleet Oceangoing Vessels 1, 000 Gross Tons and Over, annual, U. S . Mar i~cime Adm, nistration. Data for 1983 are froth Table 1. TABS 3 Seagoing Employment 1960-19828 Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1982 Employment (x103) 49.2 39.1t 37.6 20.5 19.6 18.8 a Estimates of billets on O.S.-fleg merchant ships, 1,000 grt and over. occludes vessels on inland waterways, Great ekes, and those owned by or operated for the O.S. Army and Navy. Ratio of billets to seafarers is about 2: 1. b Decrease due to str Ike. SON: O. S . Mar itime Administration, 1982 .
12 About 70 companies operate the 541 U. S . merchant ships . Nearly half of these own 5 or fewer vessels; 12 companies operate just 1 ship, and another 12 own 2 apiece. Such f igures, taken with the world trade picture, describe a very competitive operating environment both in obtaining cargoes and in keeping operating costs down, and one in which the U. S . -f lag operating industry is in a relatively weak pos ition . Compounding the competition of companies is the multiplicity of unions. There are many maritime unions. Eleven national unions represent 89 percent, or 16,259, of the existing billets. Several unions represent each seagoing discipline. Typically, several unions are represented on each ship. The atmosphere of industrial decline has placed the unions in competition with each other to def end or increase their representation. A germane problem facing the labor unions and ship operators as a result of the decline in billets and the aging of the work force is the obligations of employer-funded pension plans. Several long-run observable trends are likely to have a measurable effect on the pension plans of the industry. These trends include a gradual decline in the number of deep-sea vessels, the number of vessel operating companies, and average crew sizee Obviously, if the above-noted long-run trends continue, they will result in a smaller active seafaring labor force. At the same time, the total number of retired mariners to whom pension benef its are owed will increase substantially; concurrently, the amount of contr ibutions to pension plans will decrease. AS a result, pension plans may face severe f financial strains; payouts to elig ible retirees may significantly exceed receipts from employer contributions and fund earnings. U . S. . Gener al Cargo Fleet Great changes have taken place in the U. S. -f lag general cargo f feet . In the last 15 years, the fleet has changed from mostly small multi- purpose general cargo car r iers to large container ships. The U.S.-flag general cargo industry comprises 8 major ship-operating f irms with fleets ranging from 3 to 46 vessels IOTA, 1983} . The three largest f irms own and operate over half of the total tonnage . Seven of the ma jor f irms operate under the U . S . Mar itime Administration' ~ (MarAd} Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) program, which uses direct subsidies to corer the cost differential of foreign- f lag ships operating on the same trade route . One of the largest f irms, Sea-Land, does not receive direct subsidies. The percentage of U.S. trade carried aboard U.S. general cargo ships has increased 30 percent over the past decade, while the U . S. -f lag industry has remained rather constant in tonnage capacity . However, the fleet has changed in character, improved its productivity, and moved toward of fer ing intermodal services.
13 Through productivity improvements, subsidy, cargo preference, and marketing practices, the U.S.-flag general cargo fleet has maintained a healthy share of U.S. foreign trade despite effective foreign-flag competition. The U.S.-flag share was 27 percent in 1981, up from 22 percent ir1 1967. It peaked in 1974-1975 at approximately 30 percent. Most of the productivity improvement has been the result of techno- logical innovation, especially vessel specialization and the appl ication of intermodal concepts . The crew size of the U.S.-flag general cargo ships has been declining, in part because of technological innovations and labor- management agreement. Net cost savings, however, are offset by expenses associated with the automated equipment and increases in shoreside contracts for maintenance and repair formerly performed by shipboard personnel. Discussions with maritime unions to decrease personnel requirements are likely to continue s ince the technology exists for further reductions in crew size. The fact remains that the cost of operating U.S.-flag general cargo ships is higher than foreign- flag costs, and that crew costs are a signif icant factor in this (Ackerman, 1982) . Expenses for subsistence, stores, and supplies are usually proportional to crew size. The costs to U.S. operators of maintenance and repair also are higher. U.S. insurance costs reflect the higher capital costs of ships built in the United States and the fact that settlements made to, and court judgments in favor of, injured O.S. seamen are considerably higher on the average than comparable foreign settlements. Another significant reason for high U.S. operating costs is fuel. Most of the U. S . -flag general cargo f feet is still powered by steam turbine engines which are much less eff icient than modern slow-speed diesel engines which predominate in foreign-flag whips. That portion of the dif ferential, however, should lessen as new U. S. ships come into the fleet. The newer vessels, in general, have greater cargo capacity. Given higher operating costs, special assistance has been used by the O.S. general cargo operators to compete in world trade. Construc- tion and operating subsidies have helped, as have U.S. preference cargoes . Strong mar keting ef for ts have contr ibuted . The advances noted in ship and cargo-handling productivity also have played a role. It should be noted, however, that no new operating subsidies have been awarded recently, nor are they planned. The last "hip to receive a construction subsidy was delivered in 1983, and the policy of reserving cargoes for U. S . ships is being debated in the adminis- tration and Congress. Productivity improvements have helped soften operating cost disadvantages. While the general cargo fleet declined from 403 ships in 1971 to 303 ships in 1976, ton-miles of cargo carried increased 11 percent (National Research Council, 1976) . In the future, U. S . general cargo ships should become more cost competitive as older ships are replaced or upgraded with modern, automated, diesel-propelled vessels.
14 U.S. Oceangoing Bulk Fleet Worldwide, there is an oversupply of tonnage in the bulk trades, both dry bu1 k (e.g., iron ore' coal, and grain) and liquid bulk, especially petroleum and petroleum products. The U.S.-flag dry-bulk fleet operating internationally comprises 23 vessels. Ten of these vessels are 10 years old or less; 9 are 20 or more years old. The fleet operation costs are much greater than that of competing foreign fleets. Crew costs account for the major difference. Expenses for crew and fuel account for a higher propor- tion of operating costs for bulk ships than for general cargo ships, limiting the opportunities to reduce the cost differential through eff iciemy improvements in other operating cost components. As a result of this situate ion, the U. S. dry bulk f feet operates primarily to carry the protected trade of government preference cargoes. The U. S. -flag foreign trade tanker f feet is similarly burdened by higher operating costs than the world f leet. This f lee t is small and attracts little business in the higher volume international markets. The U.S . ~owned, foreign-flag tanker and dry-bulk fleet is cost competitive worldwide. This f feet serves a large portion of U. S. international trade and foreign-to-foreign trade routes. Available cost and technology advantages generally have been adopted by this f leet. The Coastwi se and Noncont iguous Domest ic Fleet The coastwise and noncontiguous domestic waterborne trade of the United States is reserved for U. S. . -built, U. S. -f ~ ag vessels by the Jones Act. Table 4 describes the U.S. coastwise and noncontiguous domest ic f lent. The table shows that tankers account f or 93 pe rcent of the U. S. coastwise and noncontiguous fleet. Most dry-bulk coastwise and noncontiguous domestic cargo is carried on barges. Table 4 excludes barge operations, which are ixreasir~ly important because of their lower capital and operating costs. The coastwi se and noncom iguous domest ic general cargo trades have been stable for some time. Their growth has paralleled U. S. economic growth, which is presently modest--3 percent per year. MANNING OF 1'HE U. S . MERCHANT FLEET Different operating environments-~differences in ship types, services, subsidy, and crew and company organizations--make it cliff icult to interpret comparisons of manning levels. The data in this section should be treated as indicative and not conclusive.
15 TABLE 4 Active U. S . Coastwise and Noncontiguous Domestic Fleet as of May 1, 1983 Number of Vessels Capac ity (dwt) General Cargo 3 4 484, 000 Bulk cargo 7 202, 000 Tankers ~ 75 9, l3 9, 500 TOTAL 216 9, 825, 500 SOURCE: U. S. Maritime Administration, 1 983. A 1982 analysis of the manning of the U.S. merchant fleet is summer i zed in Table 5. The table does not take into account a number of relatively new U.S. vessels, which are manned with crews of less than 24. Most of these vessels are in the domestic {Jones Act) trade, employ diesel power p, ants, and have automated engine rooms. Table 6 compares the manner of newer and older U. S. ships of comparable size and serve ce. Representat ive European vessels with a number of manning innovations are also shown for comparison. Again, Table 6 is not truly representative of a number of new U.S.-flag vessels, which are manned with crews of less than 24. Table 7 provides a crew size dish ribution for the U. S . f feet . The cost of manning is even more difficult to quantify than manning levels, because of differences in wages, fringes, benefits, pensions, overtime policies, and crowing f ram vessel to vessel, company to company, and union to union. International comparisons are even more complex because of different national policies. Seafarers may receive benefits such as health care, preferential tax treatment, and retirement f tom national plans and not f ram their employers. Tab, e 8 provides vessel characteristics and operating expense data for three classes of U.S.-flag ships: general cargo (Mariner class), modern large container ship, and modern large tanker. In the examples in Table 8, manning costs range from 15 to 30 percent of the vessel operating cost. Manning costs tend to be relatively lower on more modern, specialized ships. Whatever the exact percentage, manning is a major operating cost, along with fuel and the capital {debt service) costs. As or more important to the operator than costs is cash flow. A C8 container ship carrying a full load of containers between the United States and Europe will generate between S3 million to $4 mill ion in operating revenue. During the voyage, including loading and unloading time, operating expenses as defined in Table 8 might amount to $300. 000 to
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19 TABLE 8 Vessel Characteristics and Expense Data Vessel Characteristics Mariner Class (C4 breakbulk) 13,000 cwt. built 1965 crew 40 steam turbine (automated engine room) fuel consumption/day 590 bbls. (at sea) Domestic Market Value S2.7 million Modern Large Container ship (C8) 27,500 cwt. built 1972 crew 39 steam turbine (automated engine room) fuel consumption/day 960 bbls. (at sea) Domestic Market Value S23.5 million Modern Large Container Ship (Diesel) 42,000 cwt. built 1980 crew 34 diesel (automated engine room} fuel consumption/day 1,050 bbls. (at sea) Domestic Market Value SllO million Tanker (such as in Alaska trade) 120,000 cwt. built 1975 crew 27 steam turbine {automated engine room) fuel consumption/day 800 bbls. (at sea) Domestic Market Value S42 million a Fuel calculated at S30/bbl.; debt service of market value. SOURCE: U.S. Maritime Administration, 1982. Estimated Daily Vessel Expensed Wages & f r inge benef its Subsistence Stores, supplies, equipment Maintenance & repair Insurance Fuel Debt Service Other TOTAL Wages & fringe benefits Subs istence Stores, supplies, equipment Maintenance & repair Insuranc e Fuel Debt Service Other TOTAL Wages ~ fringe benefits S ubs istence Stores, supplies, equipment Maintenance & repair Insurance Fuel Debt Servic e Other TOPAL Wages & fringe benefits Subs istence Stores, supplies, equipment Maintenance & repair Insurance Fuel Debt Service Othe r TOTAL $ 9,765 340 543 1,551 1,004 17,700 1,109 110 $32~122 S10,730 332 724 2~069 1~750 28~800 9,657 140 $54J 2~)2 S10~535 357 616 2~740 2,504 31~500 45 t 205 205 $93,722 S 8,300 230 830 2,765 2,092 24,000 17,260 145 SS~ t 622 calculated at 15 percent per annum
20 $400,000, or 10 percent of operating revenue at full capacity. Thus, it is most important for the vessel operator to concentrate on genera- ting revenue by carrying full loads through strong marketing, reducing port time through intermodal and other technical innovations, and making swift, efficient passages. The operator 's first cost concern is buying fuel cheaply and power ing the vessel eff iciently. In today' s operating environment, attention to manning costs comes behind these other items in priority. Despite the age of the UOSO fleet, much has been done within existing constraints to reduce the manning levels of U. S . ships . Through a chain of vessel automation, vessel resale, and renegotiation of union contracts and Maritime Ad~ninistration-approved manning levels ~ subsidized ships), the crews of older ships have been reduced. Some Mar iner~class vessels, for example, which were or iginally crewed with more than 50, are now operated with crews of 3 5 to 40 . As shown in Table 6, some of the newest U.S. vessels have crews in the low 20s. At this level, manning is at or near the minimum permitted under current interpretations of laws. RULES AND PRACTICES GOVERNING THE MANNING OF U . S . VESSELS The U. S. . -f lag merchant f feet is manned and operated along the traditional lines of deck, engineering, and steward departments. The manning of vessels is governed by international and national rules and their interpretations, and union-management agreements. AS a general rule, the manning level of each ship is a function of company and union practices and agreement, class and technology of ship, and type of service. The manning level of a particular ship may change if any of these var tables change. The governing documents concerning a vessel' s manning are: Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection, which specifies a minimum level; Mari- t ime Administration approval of a manning level, if the vessel operates under subsidy or has been built with the aid of government funding guarantees; and union-management agreements. This section reviews government, industry, and labor rules and practices concerning manning. Government Laws, Rules, Practices, and Interpretations A review of government rules* concerning merchant vessel manning is provided in Appendix C of which this section is a sublunary. Government *The Mar itime laws of the United States have been updated recently (P. L. 98-39, August 26, 1983} . This recodif ication was made to update the language of the var. ious laws and to put them into a log ical sequence. While some of the laws that were outdated were repealed, the recodif ication was not intended to make any controversial substantive changes in the laws replaced. References herein to the new law in this section are followed by corresponding section numbers of the former law in parentheses, e.g., 46 USC 8104 (673~.
21 rules on merchant vessel manning are found in acts of Congress, f ederal regulations, and judicial rulings which either interpret these pro- nouncements or apply concepts of liability in admiralty. Another form of government rule is the direct prescription of required crew for an individual vessel under 46 USC 8101 ( 222 ) . Throughout administrative interpretations and judicial rulings, confusions in terminology are comIT on. Some important terms such as ~ sailor ~ are undef ined in the law. There are no international requirements in force concerning the manning of U. S. vessels, other than that in the Safety of Life at Sea Convention of 1974 for a radio officer. In U.S. law, 46 USC 8301(a) ~ 223) requires that inspected machine-propelled vessels have a licensed master and three licensed mates. 46 USC 8301(a) (5) (404), requires that these vessels have a licensed engineer . The f irst provision of 46 LISC 8104(d) (673), requires that the licensed individuals, sailors, coal passers, firemen, oilers, and water tenders shall be divided when at sea into at least three watches, and shall be kept on duty succes- sively to perform ordinary work incident to the operation and management of the vessel. The classifications of unlicensed mariners are set by statute which merely recognizes preexisting customary capacities, established by Coast Guard regulations' and based on tradition or felt need. The statutes refer to cable seaman,. Coal passer,. ·wiper,. and Qualified member of the engine departments (QMED)~46 USC 7314 (672~. This last is left to the Coast Guard to specify, and includes any member of the engineering department below licensed officer and above ·coal passer. or ~wiper.. The three watch law (46 USC 810A (673~) also recognizes soiler,. ·fireman,. and Water tender.. These last are among the 10 QMED ratings established by 46 CFR 12-21. Still other ratings are specified at 46 CPR 12; for example, ~cadet. and Apprentice mate.. Many other ratings have been specified on Certificates of Service, such as ~librarian,. ~cattleman,. and ~musician,. although they are not mentioned in any law or regulation. The familiar ·boatswain. and Deck maintenance man. are in this category. Other Coast Guard laws affect manning. A provision of 46 USC 8702(d) (672(a), declares that none below cable seaman. may be at the wheel in certain conditions. Of one, then three.... ~ would follow from the rigid application of the three watch law, but there is nothing to prevent a mate f ram taking the wheel when necessary, and a person hired as Maintenance man. may, if holding AB credentials, do the job occasionally. Another law is the lookout rule of 33 USC 221, as well as other precaut ionary sections in the var ious Rules of the Road, which requi res that a lookout be maintained at all times while underway by a seafarer who shall have no other duties while maintaining the lookout. ·Lookout, ~ however, is not a ·capacity. in which a seaman is employed, nor is it a rating . While an AB may be prima facie qualif fed as a lookout, any person in fact may qualify and may be so used .
22 The International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certif ication, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers of 1978 (effective Apt il 28, 1984 ~ postulates a br idge watch and recognizes that a lookout should have no other duties which might interfere with his primary object. Under good conditions of weather and ship' s equip- ment, however, the convention permits a mate on watch to be the required lookout. This same document permits an unattended eng ine roome' Planning reductions have been achieved in the United States under this framework of rules and interpretations. Certif icates of Inspec- tion have been issued with no requirements for unlicensed engineering personnel, and for unattended (i.e., no watch) engine rooms. This leaves a contemporary minimum manning of one master, three mates, one radio officer, six sailors, and about three licensed engineers (the proceeding does not include a variable number of probably required unlicensed engine room personnel, and makes no provision for steward department personnel). If no engine-room watch is necessary, it appears that the number of licensed eng ineer s could be legally reduced to one . Legally the ~ sailors. could be reduced to three, with ~maintenance. personnel, properly identified, required for safety purposes. The introduction of General purpose" licensed off icers, contemplated by some interests, currently contravenes the statutory division of deck and engine licenses, plus the Crossovers prohibition in 46 USC 8104 ~ 673), which stipulates that the mar iner may serve In one department only. The use of general purpose maintenance personnel in a department other than deck or eng ine is possible. A recent Coast Guard circular, NVC 3-83, recommends certain minimal training for ordinary seamen and other entry ratings before they go to sea. The Coast Guard will allow some of the billets normally f filled by able bodied seamen to be replaced by these specially trained ordinary seamen. It has been noted that with increasing numbers of vessels having reduced deck crews, fewer billets are available for entry-level ratings. The use of those specially trained personnel will provide a means for introducing new seamen into the system and provide a supply of trained personnel as more exper fenced seamen leave the sea. While the Coast Guard has, in its Certif icates of Inspection, supported and approved reductions in manning proposed by ship operators, it has done so conservatively. For example, there have been instances of the Coast Guard' s requiring a watch in an automated, designed-to-be-unattended, eng ine room for extended per iods ~ i . e ., a year or more) until the development and its manning have been ~proof- tested. ~ On automated vessels where it is deemed necessary for the purpose of maintaining the vessel, its equipment, or for emergencies, maintenance personnel are being required by the Coast Guard. The
23 panoply of rules and interpretations, and the fact that Certif icates of Inspection are issued f rom r eg tonal of f iC8S, have, on occas ~on, led to similar vessels in similar trades being issued Certif icates of Inspection that set different manning levels. However, regional variances in Coast Guard approvals of manning provisions of Certifi- cates of Inspection are now minimized, since Coast Guard headquarters acts as a central clear inghouse for requests that involve reduced manning. The other government agency concerned with vessel manning is the Mar itime Administration. The Mar itime Administration approves the subsidizable manning level of every vessel receiving an operating differential subsidy (ODS) . Whenever a change in vessel ownership, character, or service affects the calculation of the ODS, the Mar itime Administration reapproves the subsidizable manning level. Industr ial Practices While U.S. shipping company managers are aware of technical innovations and are employing them to some extent on newer ships, they are gene~- ally not eager to undertake expensive retrof its to reduce crew costs . * Most who have done so are uncertain that they are getting an adequate return on their investment. The age of the U. S . fleet, an average 17 years is a particular obstacle to investment--the short life expec- tancy of older ships often exceeds the payback per iod of ma jor capital investments, while operators of newer vessels are able to acquire designed-in technologies that require less manning. Within existing technology and crew structures, ship operators are, in general, interested in reducing billets and compensating with increased overtime because of the cost advantage". The only licit to this approach, besides government rules, is the number of hours a crew member can or is willing to work before performance, including safety performance, is af fected. Another innovation pertains to the radio officer who is required by law, but who, as a watchstander, is becoming superfluous with advances in communications technology. With union concurrence, more and more radio officers are serving as electronics officers with responsibility for maintaining certain shipboard electronic equipment. There in interest in the United States in employment continuity because of the improvement in productivity that results from the longer-term association. Employment continuity of senior officers, by company and vessel, is most advanced. Many junior off icers and unli- censed seamen still are placed aboard ship through the union hir ing *The reporting of industry views in this section is based in part on the discussions of the committee with inherited industry and union off icials, held at MITAGS, October 31-November 1, 1983.
24 hall where mainly senior ity hir ing rules prevail. While the practice of h ir ing through the union hall has advantages for unions in meraber- ship cohesion and work dist: ibution, it helps perpetuate the casual labor system that the European mar itime industry is n~ov ing away f ram. It also reduces the opportunity for vessel assignment continuity and for company-specific training. In the United States, company-specific training is not so important because of the general use of multi- employer°funded, jointly administered, industry training schools. Long-term contractual employment, on the other hand, facilitates vessel assignment continuity. Union Practices With the exception of major oil company fleets, deck and engineering officers are represented by two national trade unions, radio officers by three unions, and unlicensed personnel by four unions. Table 9 descr ibes the membership and scope of activity of the national seafaring unions. The data in the table show that four unions , two officers' and two unlicensed, have nearly 85 percent of the total seafaring membership. Union contracts are negotiated through four collective bargaining associations of management and with independent ship operating co~r.?anies. Contracts specify work rules which can be negotiated on an individual basis and can vary depending on type of ship and service. The union representation s ituation is competitive O Labor unions are willing to discuss manning innovations on new ventures; they are much less willing to do so on existing operations unless it is under conditions of expanding opportunity. The unions ' top pr for Sties are to protect existing jobs and compete for new ones. Even so, it is possible that some interest in manning innovation can be stimulated in existing billets, especially when ad justaments, such as overtime for billets, can be made to protect existing jobs. TRAINING Mar itime training in the United States is accomplished at mar itisne academies and industry training schools. Generally, licensed officers come from maritime academies through the ranks after receiving company- or union-sponsored training at a training school. Unlicensed mar iner s enter the industry through the Made unions and are trained at training schools . All the mar itime academies, with the exception of Great Lakes Mar Chime Academy, are four-year institutions that provide baccalaureate programs, training for operating licenses, and job-entry qualif ica- tions. The training schools are jointly sponsored by unions and ship
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26 operators and endowed by contractual commitment of shipping companies. The training schools serve both licensed of f icer s who des ire to broaden or advance their skills and unlicensed mar iners who endeavor to qualify for Coast Guard ratings. The upgrading and retraining of personnel in new technologies are major functions of the training schools. The training schools add to The number of qualif fed third assistant engineers and third mates in direct competition with the mar Time academies. The licensed unions have given pr for ity to the graduates of their own schools, to the disadvantage of the mar ine academy g raduates . The technology of mar itime training in the United States is state of the art. Videotapes, film, and microfiche are employed. Calcula- tors and microcomputers are used in problem solving. Electronic simulators, each a ma jor investment, have become a cornerstone of the retraining process, providing hands-on exper fence. While mar iners are prohibited by law from serving simultaneously in both deck and engine departments in a single voyage ~ some progress has been made in multiskill training. The U. S. Merchant Mar ine Academy offers a dual license curriculum and graduates some officers with both deck and engine licenses. Similarly some unlicensed mariners hold Coast Guard ratings in both deck and engine departments. It is indicative of the general state of the mar itime industry in the United States that only 14 to 50 percent of the 1983 graduating classes of the mar itime academies sailed as of f icer s in the merchant mar ine upon graduation. EXTENT OF MANNING INNOVATION IN THE: U . S . F!:F~T Wh ile the state of the at t of technology in the deck and eng ine departments in the U.S.-flag fleet has been advancing, little experi- menting with manning innovations has taken place. AS a consequence, U.S. operators have not been able to take full advantage of their technology advances. Only a handful of U. S . ships have broken below the 25-man crew structure that was prevalent in Europe in the mid- 1970s. These successes have been more the result of automation technologies than crew or shoreside reorganization. An area of some interest in the United States is modification of the seaman-per-billet ratio which typically is 2: 1, with each crew member on board ship 6 months per year . Discussion of a 3 :2 ratio is tak ing place between companies and some unions . There is some evidence that competition is having a favorable effect on the introduction of effective manning practices into the U.S.-flag fleet. For example, recent opportunities to obtain additional contracts for government cargoes from the Military Sealift Command have caused unions and ship operators to reach agreement
27 concerning the manning of existing ships with crews of 24 or less. One would expect that continued competitive pressure will cause these manning levels, and the technolog ies and ef festive manning practices which make them possible, to spread in the industry over time. {Jndoubtedly, there are other developments concerning the introduction of effective manning practices into the U.S.-flag fleet as the result of competition and especially competitive opportunities, but there is not much hard evidence in the public domain, except in cases where new ships have been constructed. s
