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OCR for page 1
INTRODUCTION
Air Force sponsorship of manufacturing technology projects is often
based on the hope that the results will not only benefit the original
contractors but also will be transferred to other Air Force
contractors. Some innovations seem to be readily adopted by other
contractors, but others, though considered likely candidates for
diffusion among contractors, are rejected for a variety of reasons. An
understanding of those reasons and the process by which investment
decisions are made will enable the Air Force to establish policies and
procedures to enhance the likelihood of successful teabnology transfer
to its contractors.
At the request of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), the
Committee on Computer-Aided Manufacturing studied three instances
involving manufacturing research and development (~&D) projects
completed under contract to the Air Force. The AFSC supported the
projects with the understanding that detailed information about them
would be made available without charge to other Air Force contractors.
Each technology was considered by at least two firms other than the
developer. In one case the technology was transferred; in the other
two cases the technology has not been adopted by firms other than the
developer, at least until this report was prepared in the summer of
1981.
The committee has examined all three instances as case studies.
From the evidence provided, the committee developed a model to describe
the decision-making process used by potential adopters of innovations.
Its objectives were to explain why attempted transfers of military-
sponsored manufacturing technology succeed or fail and to propose
changes in contracting procedures to increase the diffusion of such
technology.
In the following sections we describe the research procedures used,
the framework for analysis, case study findings, and recommendations.
Detailed case study reports form the three appendices.
RESEARCH PROCEDURES
A list of projects and the outcomes of attempted transfers was
provided by the AFSC through the Air Force Materials Laboratory
(AFML). Three cases were selected:
OCR for page 2
8
1.
2.
3.
Hot isostatic pressing,
Automatic assembly drilling, and
Advanced composite tape-laying head.
1. General Electric investigated hot isostatic pressing (HIP) as a
method to repair castings made of nickel, titanium, aluminum, and
steel. Several vendors adopted the process. The conon~ttee research
team contacted Howmet and TRW, who are adopters, and also studied
intra-organizational transfer within General Electric.
2. Grumman had a contract to locate, precision drill, and
countersink fastener holes by means of an automated drill-head mounted
on a computer-controlled gantry. Grumman is currently using its
automatic assembly drilling machine at a low rate of production.
Though offered the machine, Fairchild and General Dynamics rejected
it. Northrop discussed buying one but so far has not. The AFML
considers the outcome of this case to be a failure. This judgment is
based on a limited interpretation of transfer. It does not take into
account instances where firms used knowledge of the Grumman work as a
foundation for advancing the technology.
3. General Dynamics was one of several firms under contract to
develop manufacturing methods for composite production integration
equipment. The only advanced tape-laying head model currently in
steady production at General Dynamics is a prototype machine.
Ingersoll-Rand built a more advanced version for General Dynamics, but
General Dynamics claims it has not worked reliably. Grumman rejected
the General Dynamics approach in favor of one designed by LTV.
McDonnell-Douglas might supplement its current broadgoods approach with
a tape layer in the future, but at present no other company has adopted
the General Dynamics concepts. The AFML considers the transfer of the
tape laying head to be a failure.
Each case includes an originating organization and at least two
potential adopters. All told, eight firms have had an active part in
the three cases. Consultants to the committee, Margaret Graham of the
Harvard Business School and Clint Stanovsky of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, interviewed key individuals--developers,
evaluators, and decision makers--at each firm. The parties interviewed
are shown in the table on the following page.
FRAMEWORK AND ITS THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Figure 1 is the decision-making framework developed for analyzing
the empirical information. It shows decisions to be made before
adopting an innovation, considerations that enter into each decision,
and the research questions raised at each decision point. In general
the committee conceives of the process as one or more dec~sion-makers
weighing the perceived risk and perceived leverage of an innovation and
comparing the outcome to other alternatives.
2
OCR for page 3
Case Study Interviews
Firm Interviewees Status*
General Electr ic
Evendale, Ohio
Peter Bailey
Ernest Keraz in ick
Ken Stalker
Or iginator of 1
Howmet Bill Freeman Adopter of 1
Whitehall, Michigan Don Preston
General Electric
Lynn, Massachusetts
Steel Irons
Adopter of 1
TRW
Jack Alexander
{now at Precision
Castparts Corp.)
Potential adopter
of 1
Grumman John Huhner Originator of 2
Bethpage, Long Island Carl Micillo Potential adopter
of 3
General Dynamics James Ashton Potential adopter
Forth Worth, Texas Grant Davis of 2
Wendal1 Eliot Orig inator of 3
McDonnell-Douglas Terry Howick Potential adopter
St. Louis, Missouri Paul Meyer of 2
Potential adopter
of 3
Northrop Don Stansbarger Potential adopter
Los Angeles, California of 2
Potential adopte r
of 3
*1. Hot isostatic pressing
2. Automatic assembly drilling
3. Advanced compos ite tape-laying head
3
OCR for page 4
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The initial decision to consider adopting an innovation arises
from recognition of a need, combined with recognition that a solution
might be technically feasible. The decision to pursue the possibility
or not will be based on perceptions of leverage (payoff relative to
cost) and risk, tempered by perceptions of complexity and
applicability of possible solutions. Research questions for this
portion of the decision-~king process are:
Was awareness of technical possibilities a significant help
in the decision to pursue an innovation? A significant
hindrance ?
Was need a major determinant?
Were alternatives considered? Was the specific innovation
rejected in favor of an alternative?
To what extent did the decision-makers proceed because of low
risk? Because of high leverage? To what extent did the
decision-makers proceed despite high risk? Despite low
leverage?
Was the decision making explicit?
As the dec ision-maker approaches the selection of a particular option:
.
Were leverage and risk re-evaluated? Did these become more
or less important as implementation became imminent?
The final portion of the framework shows the decision to implement
an innovation or not. The success or failure of an implemented
innovation will provide feedback to future decisions about investments
in new technology. Questions to ask at that time are:
Did the attempted innovation succeed or fail. . .
- because of (despite) accurate or inaccurate assessments?
- because of (despite) determined or half-hearted pursuit?
The committee does not address the last set of questions; its analysis
ends with the decision to implement or not. In general this report
seeks to determine the relative importance of each of the following:
Awareness of technical possibilities,
Risk reduction,
Perceived need, and
Leverage (payoff in proportion to cost).
A range of interdisciplinary innovation literature has bearing on
the characterization of the parties and the techniques in question.
The industrial buyer behavior studies, for instance, apply diffusion
research to marketing. Webster and Winds identify five
5
OCR for page 6
organizational roles {deciders, influencers, buyers, users, and
gatekeepers) and four key determinants ~ individual factors,
interpersonal factors , organizational factors, and environmental
f actors) . With these, they correlate several decision stages in the
buying process.
Baker2 offers a less complicated model that weighs the
importance of different factors in the buying decision. His approach
teas the virtue of rank ing the importance of many of the factors
identified by Webster and Wind. While his attempt to weight these
factor s with preci s ion i s somewhat suspect, the notion of crude
rank ing makes sense.
A major factor that distinguishes the Air Force from other users
of industrial innovation is its non-prof it status . Transfer of
medical technology, then, may be analogous. Gordon and Fisher, in The
Diffusion of Medical Technology, 3 sketch an excellent methodology
that is similar to those cited earlier but emphasize the primacy of
per formance (or ef f icacy in the case of drugs ~ for non-prof it
enterprises .
This study differs from most previous research on diffusion in
that it seek s to explain not only the adoption of technology but also
failure to adopt. This approach requires careful definition of the
potential set of adopters. Another unusual aspect of this study is
the attempt to characterize each innovation according to its chief
technical attributes, as well as by the customary set of
characteristics common to all industrial products. 4 White and
Grahams characterize a technology according to the core concept, the
embodiment, the operating characteristics, and the market
characteristics. The concept of a new technology may be distinguished
from its embodiment as a candidate for transfer. Not all successful
transfers require that the embodiment be adopted; in some cases
transfer of the concept is all that is intended or desired.
ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS
Case studies are presented below in terms of the decision-making
process at the originating f irms and at the potential adopters. The
cases are described in greater detail in the appendices.
HIP Casting Consolidation Technology
Originators
Both General Electric Evendale, which was the AFML contractor, and
Howmet Turbine Components Corporation were originators of the hot
isostatic pressing (HIP) casting process. Their decisions to pursue
the technology were based on different planned applications. General
6
OCR for page 7
Electric, as an engine builder for military aircraft, specified in its
designs castings that used HIP and also used the process to salvage
unacceptable castings that bad been received from vendors. Bowmet and
other parts suppliers used the HIP casting technique to produce
products and to cut down on the number of castings rejected because of
unacceptable poros ity .
The HIP casting concept involves the application of high
temperature and pressure to metal parts that have already been cast.
The embodiment involves use of an autoclave to accomplish this
application. The contract that General Electric performed for the
AFRO provided for the use of HIP casting on metals used in airplane
engine construction. The basic concept had already been demonstrated
for aluminum castings by Alcoa when General Electric first
experimented with HIP for casting other metals. Battelle's publicity
for the techn igue prompted both General Electric and Howmet to
consider further development programs. For both companies the
original benefit of HIP appeared to be casting repair (scrap reduction
for Howmet and salvage reduction for General Electr ic ~ rather than
product enhancement.
Dec i s ion to Pur sue
General Electric's Evendale operation was responsible for
investigating all relevant forms of manufacturing technology, and i t
was Evendale that decided to pursue HIP casting. For General
Electr ic, low r isk appear s to have been the important motivating
f actor in the decision in two respects . First, General Electr ic was
able to do its first experiments using an autoclave that was already
available for its nuclear work . Second, and critically important, the
AFML was willing to fund the project as soon as General Electric had
brought the potential benefits and generic appeal of HIP casting to
the attention of Air Force off icials.
For Howmet low risk also played some part in the decision to
pursue the technology, because Howmet was able to send early castings
to Battelle to be processed in its autoclave. But perceived payoff
seemed to be a stronger motivator for Howmet from the outset. The
payoff was anticipated not only in terms of the tangible benefits that
Howmet could realize if HIP casting reduced the scrap rate, but also
in terms of the enhancement of Howmet's image as an innovator in its
industry. Accordingly, Howmet investigated the HIP casting process at
its own expense, avoiding the requirements that accompany government
support for development.
The first stage of investigation quickly revealed to both
companies that HIP casting offered larger benefits than they had
perceived at first. The process not only repaired bad castings but
improved good ones as well. For Howmet this meant a potential
competitive advantage in its market; for General Electric it meant the
7
OCR for page 8
possibility of improved performance in its engines. The new
information made the adoption decision less complicated for Bowmet and
more so for General Electric. While the findings increased the
leverage of HIP casting for Howmet, it meant that General Electric
Evendale had to convince the eng ine designers and General Electric
Lynn, which produced its engines , to specify HIP-cast components in
new engine designs.
Dec i s ion to Adopt
The decision to adopt HIP casting was a gradual one for both
companies . With old equipment that could be modif led, Howmet was able
to test its commitment to the process before investing heavily in new
autoclaves specifically adapted for the new purpose. General Electric
could also adopt gradually, by testing HIP-cast parts as replacements
and in prototypes before actually using them in new development
engines.
As of 1980, Howmet can be said to have adopted HIP casting fully,
General Electric provisionally. In view of the enhanced leverage
revealed in the early stages of investigation, Howmet committed
substantial sums to purchase an autoclave for HIP in 1975. By
investing at this time, Howmet anticipated demand and planned to
develop a market. General Electric Lynn is still evaluating the test
data relating to the use of HIP castings as replacements, but there
are strong indications that it may soon specify HIP castings for the
next major group of development engines.
Other Adopters
Other parts suppliers have adopted HIP castings without committing
themselves to major investment. The existence of companies that will
use the HIP technique for them has made this possible. TOW, for
example, will continue to send out its HIP casting work until the
volume of demand seems to warrant buying autoclaves for internal use.
Here, leverage clearly outweighs risk as a motivating factor.
Findings from the HIP Casting Case
1. The AFML has termed the hot isostatic pressing contract with
General Electric a case of successful transfer. Clearly AFML
announcements and conferences, as well as conferences and reports
generated by private research, bave been important in diffusing the
conceded. General Electric's contract seems to bave had little to do
with diffusing the embodiment of the technique. If General Electric
does decide to specify HIP castings in its next major engine design,
it will be instrumental in transferring the embodied technique as well.
8
OCR for page 9
2. In the case of HIP casting, the form of the technological
embodiment was a factor that promoted diffusion. Although autoclaves
,
require significant capital investment, they are separable, stand-alone
pieces of equipment that can be used with minor modif ications for a
variety of tasks. The existence of autoclaves made it possible for
HIP casting users to try different applications without interesting
heavily ahead of time; and once a commitment to adopt was made it was
possible to invest gradually.
3 . An important aspect of the HIP casting process, which may
account for its successful diffusion, is its benef its when included in
designs. This aspect of HIP casting secured the support of influential
design engineers and increased the size of the potential market, while
a llowing a premium to be charged for the product f abr icated as a
result of the technique.
4. Because of the design implications, the relationship of the
ANAL contractor, General Electr ic , to the potential adopters is
important in the diffusion process. All suppliers can be expected to
adopt the process in some way if General Electric specifies the use of
HIP for cast components for its new engine designs. The timing of
this diffusion will be closely linked with major new engine
contracts. For all but conscious pioneers like Howmet, major new
contracts are likely to trigger the adoption of the new technique.
Automated Assembly Fixture Or illing
The motivation for automated assembly f ixture drilling was a
desire to automate labor-intensive and monotonous tasks in airframe
assembly. This need had been defined and promoted in several Air
Force conferences in the early 1970s. Automation in assembly would
not only reduce cost and improve consistency, but it would reduce
dependence on trained manual personnel. With the recent appearance of
minicomputers capable of being operated on the shop floor, the
enabling technology was at hand. Both Grumman and General Dynamics
chose to pursue concepts related to automated drilling.
The Air Force Materials Laboratory chose Grumman as its contractor
to develop and demonstrate automated drilling in preference to General
Dynamics, which was also competing for the contract. The Grumman
approach was preferred because it added a scanning mechanism as a
locating device in addition to the computer control cuff the dr illhead .
Or is inator
The factor that f irst motivated Grumman to pursue the automated
drilling technology was its perceived leverage. While Grumman lacked
a high volume airframe contract to which the technique could be
applied in the near term, Grununan's Advanced Materials and Development
9
OCR for page 10
Group had a standing mandate to explore all potential manufacturing
cost-reduction opportunities. Grumman saw in the technique a variety
of potential short-term payoffs dumb as chances for quid-pro~uo
subcontracting, royalties, and demonstration funding from the Air
Force for technology that had generic appeal to the industry at large.
Demonstration of the automated drilling technique entailed
relatively little risk for Grumman. It was able to show feasibility
for the equipment by drilling production panels in Plant Twelve where
the equipment bad originally been developed e Later it was able to
move the same prototype equipment to the A-6 assembly line. Volumes
on the A-6 program were low enough that the prototype automated
assembly fixture was adequate for the task without modification. The
same piece of equipment could be used to perform the Air Force
contracts, enabling Grumman to evaluate the economics for both the A-6
and the A-10 parts.
Adopters
Since all airframe manufacture requires drilling numerous holes,
the Grumman device was viewed by Grumman and the AFML as highly
generic and potentially transferable to all airframe manufacturers.
Immediate potential adopters were those companies tooling up for new
contracts in 1974, Fairchild and General Dynamics. The AFML suggested
that Grumman demonstrate the technique on an F-16 par t produced by
General Dynamics. In the view of the AFML, then, General Dynamics was
the designated adopter. Other airframe manufacturers monitored the
development of new techniques but were unlikely to adopt new tooling
in the middle of a program. Despite the assessment of its general
quality, the Grumman device has not transferred to any other company
as of 1980, though several companies have given it favorable
evaluations that may result in transfer in the future.
General Dynamics was one of the first companies to be given a
demonstration of the automated assembly fixture drilling, even before
Grumman received AFML funding to demonstrate it. General Dynamics had
also been pursuing automated drilling, using its own research money.
Its loss of the development contract to Grumman naturally affected its
evaluation of Grumman's approach, but the ultimate decision not to
adopt the Grumman device was motivated first by high perceived risk
and secondarily by questionable leverage. The perceived risk in the
Grumman device der ived f ram two sources- - oubtful appl inability and
poor relations between the two companies. Leverage appeared low, not
only because Grumman proposed to charge substantial royalties, but
a lso because the egu ipment would be costly to repl icate at General
Dynamics in view of the poor communications between the two
companies. Grumman had tried unsuccessfully to interest Cincinnati
Milacron in building the machine, and General Dynamics was unwilling
to rely on Grumman drawings as the basis for the transfer. In the end
General Dynamics chose to reject both the Grumman device and its own
10
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earlier approach to automated drilling in favor of a robotic wing
driller . This device reflected General Dynamics's preference for
lower cost, less deaf icated equipment .
McDonnell was not tooling up when Grumman first demonstrated its
automated assembly fixture drilling system, though its engineers
thought the concept had high potential leverage. After watching
Grumman ' s demonstration, McDonnell seriously considered investing in
the technology. Evaluation of the Grumman approach ultimately
revealed poor applicability without extensive modif ication . There was
high perceived risk in replicating equipment that was not built by a
machine tool maker. In the end McDonnell also chose to develop its
own equipment, but, unlike General Dynamics, it chose to adopt certain
Grunt an concepts--in particular, scanning for accuracy of hole
locat ion .
Fairchild came closest to actual adoption of the Grumman
equipment, signing a lease agreement in 1976. In the end insufficient
leverage prevented the transfer there too, but in Fairchild's case the
problem was one of timing. Had the Grumman demonstration occurred
when Fairchild was tooling up for the A-10 instead of a year later,
Fairchild would probably have adopted the technology.
In 1977-78 Northrop considered buying a wing drilling system, with
the understanding that it would cost S250, 000. Northrop' s
manufactur ing processes group conducted a feasibility study that
showed a marginally acceptable payback. But when Grumman raised the
price to S1.2 million, Northrop could no longer anticipate suff icient
leverage in adopting the system and rejected it on economic grounds.
Findings from the Automated Fixture Drilling Case
1. The AFML has labeled the Grumman device a case of failed
transfer, yet it may still attract adopters. The Grumman concepts for
automating drilling, especially the use of a scanning device for hole
location, have already been transferred, even though the complete
embodiment has not. The demonstration of the Grumman device clearly
stimulated at least one company, McDonnell, to look at automated
drilling in assembly for the first time.
2. Transferring technology into an interrelated system such as
an assembly operation is bound to require some adaptation. me amount
of adaptation depends on two factors: the similarity of the products
being assembled and the similarity of organizational design and
manuf actur ing ph i losoph ies . Both McDonnell and General Dynamics found
that the Grumman device needed significant adaptation for their needs,
in part because of their h igher volumes of production and in part
because of the different types of drilling required. Fairchild and
Northrop have production volumes more comparable to Grumman's, and
their manufacturing philosophies are similar.
OCR for page 12
3. Relations between the companies involved in a transfer have a
profound influence on the success or failure of adoption. If past
dealings beve been good or if the companies are currently involved in
joint work, such as a subcontracting arrangement, then the process of
transfer is aided. By contrast, if there is a history of previous
conflict among the parties to a potential transfer, the perceived risk
of transferring and adapting a technology becomes high. Even very
thorough reports and demonstrations contain only a fraction of the
information and know-how required to transfer a complex embodiment.
4. The Grumman device would have been much more likely to spread
in its embodied form if a machine tool builder had replicated the
device. In cases such as General Dynamics and McDonnell, where
adoption involves significant adaptation of the original embodiment,
the costs of transfer may well exceed the cost of building equipment
from scratch. If a machine tool company, with its know-how and
warranties, were to produce the equipment, adopters might be willing
to forgo some adaptations.
The Advanced Composite Tape-Laying Head
The advanced composite tape-laying head is designed to automate
the process of fabricating laminated parts from advanced fiber
composite tape. Composite materials (boron or graphite fibers in a
resin base) are available in either tape or broadgoods form.
Uncertainty concerning the format and cost of the materials has kept
production technology f lu id over the past 20 years . There are
numerous materials suppliers, and although there has been some
standardization of widths, there are still many different combinations
of material and adhesive systems, each with slightly different
handling properties. With the additional problems of storage and poor
shelf-life, the difficulties of settling on a stable production system
become enormous. Whether in tape form or in broadgoods the material
has to be dispensed, laid up carefully ply on ply, and cut accurately
in any of several ways, not necessarily in that order. The concept of
the tape-laying head is the automation of this process for the tape
format, heretofore an intensely manual process. The tape is
dispensed, its deposition controlled so there are no gaps or overlaps,
and then it is sheared evenly and accurately.
Originator
When General Dynamics chose to pursue the automation of tape
laying in the mid-1960s it seemed to all that the pr ice of composite
materials would decrease and more composites would be used as a
consequence. The company' s first prototype machine gained support
f ram the AEON to develop an improved version built by Conrac. The
series of AFML contracts that followed reduced the risk for General
Dynamics; to interest in tape-laying automation but the real motivation
OCR for page 13
was perceived leverage. In the late 1960s General Dynamics planned to
design a high-volume, low-cost f ighter aircraft , using some composite
parts, and manual production costs were considered to be prohibitive.
The firm projected a need for 15 tape-laying machines in the mid-1970s.
Since all military aircraft were expected to incorporate composite
materials in a few years, the AFML saw the automated tape-layer as
highly generic.
General Dynamics experimented further with the Conrac and other
improved prototype heads. It adopted and modified its concept in a
machine built by Ingersoll-Rand for production of the F-16 in 1976.
In 1977 it began a further AFML contract to improve the tracking
capability of the head, as well as to introduce flexibility as to
length of strips laid down and versatility in cutting. Its latest
AFML contract was designed to perfect the concepts for use in an
integrated, fully automated composite production system.
General Dynamics chose to stay with the tape approach, even after
broadgoods became available, not only because it had already invested
extensively in tape technology but because it saw tape as the lower
cost approach (less waste, more versatility, fewer materials control
problems). The company placed such importance on low-cost
manufacturing that it was willing to limit the freedom of its
designers if that were necessary.
Since the time material suppliers made broadgoods available, a
number of equipment makers that had previously focused on the garment
industry have entered the aerospace market. Because of the large
number of competitors in the field, the equipment builders have tended
to custom design equipment--and charge custom prices. General
Dynamics has not yet found an equipment maker to produce its most
recent version of the tape-laying head at an acceptable price.
Adopters
The tape concepts that had seemed generic in the late 1960s when
the AFML funded the early General Dynamics contracts were called into
question when broadgoods became available. The broadgoods philosophy
won enough converts to narrow the field of potential adopters
considerably. Three different groups emerged: companies such as
General Dynamics that stayed with tape, companies such as Grumman that
adopted a hybrid philosophy, and companies such as Northrop that moved
entirely into broadgoods.
Grumman closely followed General Dynamics into the area of
composites automation. It began investigating the automated tape-
laying concept when General Dynamics demonstrated the Conrac. In 1969
Grumman projected a need for perhaps one-third of the volume projected
by General Dynamics . Grumman evaluated the Conrac for its own use but
rejected the General Dynamics embodiment in favor of its own mechanized
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tape dispenser. The objections to the General Dynamics approach might
be regarded as technicalities, but they reflected enduring differences
in priorities. General Dynamics emphasized cost and volume; its
primary concern was economic. Grumman insisted on various performance
characteristics such as individual ply inspection and accurate cutting
before it turned to cost considerations. As a result, Grumman chose
to pursue other available options, including its own. It learned from
General Dynamics's concepts but did not adopt them.
Grumman moved closer to adopting a particular tape layer in
1974-75 when it foresaw a need to automate its composite production in
order to manage the huge B-1 bomber stabilizer. Its need was again
defined not so much in terms of cost as in terms of performance.
Having evaluated the three leading tape layers, it chose LTV' s because
it would lay up smaller individual pieces of tape than the one for
General Dynamics. Grumman then pushed for defining an entire
integrated composite production system and reducing cost on a
system-wide basis . In 1975-76 the AFML funded Grumman ' s integrated
laminating center, thus leading the firm permanently away from the
advanced tape head concepts.
When broadgoods appeared in the early 1970s, other companies
reassessed their entire composite production systems. McDonnell had
been track ing and evaluating the automated tape-laying concepts at
each stage and had built its own more rudimentary equipment.
McDonnell 's leadership in composites was based on sophisticated
design, not manufacturing technology. Broadgoods seemed to offer more
flexibility to designers. McDonnell opted for laser cutting as its
ma jor production investment. In the end, therefore, compatibility
with manufacturing philosophy became the key factor in McDonnell's
non-adoption of the tape-laying device, and awareness was the trigger
for adoption of the alternative system. This decision may be changed
eventually. McDonnell could still adopt tape-laying equipment when it
does such a high volume of composite parts and structures that a
subsidiary tape capability becomes desirable to enhance flexibility.
Northrop waited to pursue automation in composites until
broadgoods were available. Its volume of composites was so low that
risk reduction and awareness of technologies consistent with its
philosophy were the decisive factors. Manufacturing flexibility is
the main consideration for Northrop. Since broadgoods satisfy that
requirement more than tape, the company does not consider itself a
member of the class of potential adopters for a tape-laying head in
the foreseeable future.
Findings from the Advanced Composite Tape-Laying Case
1. The AFML has judged the advanced composite tape layer to be a
failure not only because no other company has adopted the concepts but
because General Dynamics has yet to put its most recent improved
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version of the head into production. The problem is the difficulty of
getting an equipment builder to produce the head at an acceptable
price.
2. In a technology as fluid as composites technology,
embodiments are extremely unlikely to transfer. Each attempt to
-
embody concepts raises new problems and the whole system is so
unstable that embodiment in other than prototype form is prohibitively
risky. Even concepts in this environment are more likely to stimulate
further development than to transfer intact.
3. An added barrier to transfer is the reluctance of machine
tool builders to become involved in an unstable technology without
charging custom prices.
4. Individual manufacturing philosophies, consistent over time,
play an important role in aiding or obstructing transfer. Even though
General Dynamics and Grumman have very similar composite concepts, the
differences in their manufacturing philosophies inhibit transfer.
OBSERVATIONS AND CATIONS
Aspects of Technology
Whenever technology transfer is discussed, too little attention is
generally directed towards the characteristics of the technologies. A
f ew distinctions need to be borne in mind.
First, it is important to distinguish between concepts and thei r
embodiments. It is possible for concepts to transfer while particular
embodiments--physical configurations of those concepts--do not. The
reverse is also true. For each individual technology, therefore, it
is important to decide whether the real value is in the technology
concept or in its embodiment. A transfer should be j udged successful
if the valuable part has transferred.
Another aspect of the concept versus embodiment question is
related to the category labeled generic. A striking feature of the
cases treated here is that although the concepts judged to be generic
frequently proved to be so, the particular embodiments often impeded
their transfer. Some embodiments, such as that of hot isostatic
pressing, are more permissive In this sense than others. While there
has been concern about the amount of capital investment involved,
perceived risk is related as much to flexibility, reusability, and
adaptability as it is to actual risk.
Yet a third aspect of a technology that must be noted is the
uncertainty associated with a high rate of change. If a whole process
area is changing as rapidly as composite production is changing, for
instance, then to look for transfer of whole concepts, let alone of
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whole embodiments, is to look for premature standardization. In a
rapidly changing field, stimulation of new concepts may be the
greatest contribution that an Air Force-sponsored project can make
Aspects of Transferring Organizations
The Committee on Computer-Aided Manufacturing, in it'; 1979 annual
report, addressed technology transfer and the characteristics of
participating organizations. That report distinguished between
transfer to large sophisticated firms and to smaller and less
sophisticated organizations, between transfer within the aerospace
enterprise and to or from non-aerospace firms. The committee
recommended in 1979 that the ICAM program take advantage of the
potential role of hardware and software vendors and machine tool
builders, that it stress communication between transferring and
adopting organizations, and recognize that standards for systems
design will be adopted more readily than computer code. 6 The case
studies just completed tend to confirm those observations.
Compatibility between the existing systems and Phil osophies of the
parties to a potential transfer are a necessary but insufficient
condition for adoption. Minor differences can be modif led, but the
costs of modif ication and communication soon exceed the cost of
in-house development for most system embodiments. This factor is one
of the main reasons that machine tool builders often play an important
role; the value they add as a neutral party reduces the urge to redo
the embodiment.
Rapport between originators and adopters significantly reduces the
perceived risk in adoption as well as the costs associated with
transfer .
Companies such as Grumman, Northrop, and General Dynamics, which
possess it&D-dedicated groups that routinely track process technologies
are likely to pursue concepts as opportunities, without a high
perceived leverage. However, clearly defined need and high leverage
are critical to outright adoption by all companies.
For Air Force contractors, outright adoption hinges almost always
on a major new program, because that is when capital investments are
made. Awareness of demonstrated capability in a particular new
setting may help to reduce the perceived risk, but it is not enough
alone to stimulate any activity other than consideration.
Availability on the open market, however, may well lead to adoption
because the machine tool builder offers ways of reducing the risk and
buffering the uncertainty. The phrase awe are not machine tool
builders,. beard so frequently among contractors, indicates what an
important, if indirect, role machine tool suppliers have played in
initiating or inhibiting the transfers that the Air Force has wished
to encourage in the past.
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Recommendations for Air Force Action
The observations stated above have implications for Air Force
practices that can or do influence technology transfer.
Recommendations to enhance technology transfer among Air Force
contractors follow.
First, it would be useful for the Air Force, when considering
awarding contracts designed to encourage transfer, to address the
distinction between concept and embodiment in light of objectives. In
many instances ache real objectives, carefully defined, can best be met
by proof and demonstration of a concept. The Air Force should broaden
its interpretation of successful transfer to recognize the benefits of
transferring the concept. If a generic embodiment transfer is really
required, the embodiment might be developed cooperatively or in
cooperation with a machine tool builder at the start. If a technology
has significant and apparent benefits when included in designs, there
may be no need to fund development or demonstration as it is likely to
be adopted rapidly in the natural course of events.
Second, the Air Force should take into account the often decisive
role of machine tool builders in transferring technologies. To gain
their cooperation the Air Force might offer incentives that are not
administered through the contractor.
Third, guidelines for dealing with potential users ought to take
into account their problems in adaptation. Better contracting
procedures might help to establish the responsibilities of originators
and adopters as a formal condition for funding. Efforts should be
made to identify receptive users and to consider their needs early in
a development program. Gaining adopters at an early stage,
particularly receptive adopters with a stake in the technology to be
transferred, could greatly increase the acceptance and use of the new
technology.
Recommendations for Additional Study
The three cases are examples of hardware manufacturing
technology. However, the framework for this study also applies when
the embodiment of computer-aided manufacturing technology is software.
As suggested from the case studies, it Is important to distinguish
between concept and embodiment; in the case of software the embodiment
would be represented by the code--either source code or machine code.
The case studies suggest that computer-aided manufacturing
technologies may transfer easily in concept, whereas the embodiment
(code) may prove not to be generic or transferable at all.
In these three cases it appears that a machine tool builder's
active involvement will usually improve transferability. Analogously,
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a software house or even a computer hardware house might be important
to the transferability of computer-aided manufacturing technologies.
This discussion suggests significant applicability of the present
studies to issues concerning the transfer of computer-aided
manufacturing technology. To test these inferences we recommend the
study of one or more additional cases involving the transfer or
potential transfer of a computer-aided manufacturing technology where
embodiment is a computer code.
As manufacturing systems become more complex and more integrated,
transfers of hardware/software combinations will be increasingly
common. We further recommend one or more case studies of the transfer
of systems that, of necessity, involve such combinations.
NOTES
Frederick E. Webster and Yoram Wind, Organizational Buying
Behavior (Englewood Clif fs , N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) .
2Michael J. Baker, "Industrial Buying Behavior and Adoption, n in
Michael J. Baker, ea., Industrial Innovation : Technology, Policy,
Di f fus ion (McMillan: London, 19 79 ~ .
.
3Gerald Gordon and Lawrence Fisher, eds. The Diffusion of
Medical Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975~.
4George Hayward, in Baker 1979, compares the attributes of a
technology as perceived by different parties to a transfer transaction.
5George R. White and Margaret B.W. Graham, Chow to Spot a
Technological Winner, n Harvard Business Review, v. 56, no. 2, Mar-Apr,
1978.
6Co=,littee on Computer-Aided Manufacturing, The Committee on
Computer-Aided Manufacturing in 1979, Annual Report (National Academy
of Sciences: Washington, D.C., 1980) pp. 20-21.
18
Representative terms from entire chapter:
machine tool
