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The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements John R. Nelson,Jr: INTRODUCTION This case study reconstructs the decision-making processes dealing with the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR), past and present. The first section develops the three traditions of nonparental child care in America: the reformer tradition oriented toward the moral and physical well-being of the children of the poor; the employment tradition directed toward child care that allows the mother to work; and the developmental tradi- tion, concerned with the comprehensive psychological development of the child. All three interacted continu- ously throughout the history of nonparental child care and are significant in shaping the requirements. The following section details the creation of the FIDCR and the continual subsequent efforts to revise them. The next section examines the crisis of enforcement in 1975-1976 that followed the passage of the Title XX amend- ment to the Social Security Act. The final two sections of this chapter explore the current debate over the requirements and the most far-reaching scientific examination of their impact, the National Day Care Study carried out by Abt Associates, Inc. Throughout the paper the issue of child-staff ratios is stressed over the other requirements. This emphasis is due to the care giver's overriding importance both to the cost of child care and to its benefits to the child. In particular, the child-staff ratios for preschool children aged three to five were crucial, since this age group constitutes most of the children receiving non- parental care. Child-staff ratios, although not by any means the only significant aspect of child care touched by the FIDCR, are nonetheless the crux of the politics 151

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152 and economics surrounding them. In addition to being an aspect of care easily subject to regulation, the ratios have been considered by decision makers to be of the greatest importance. AMERICAN DAY CARE BEFORE THE FIDCR Day care and its regulation have no unified past. Depend- ing on the history sought as a prologue, the care of other people's children finds antecedents in America in one of three traditions: one directed toward the moral reforma- tion of the child, another toward the employment of the mother or care giver, and a third toward comprehensive development. The earliest day care began in the infant school of early l9th-century Boston. There, social refor- mers sought to remove, if only for the day, poor children from an environment of "want and vice" into a salubrious milieu of cleanliness and its next-of-kin, godliness. Similar efforts to care for preschool children followed the international precedents of Fredrich Froebel's kinder- gartens and Maria Montessori's work with impoverished Italian children. In part, these efforts by social reformers reflected a sincere concern for the well-being of the children of the poor. In part, too, they were deliberate attempts at imposing a particular ethos on poor immigrants who vehemently resented and resisted their paternalism. The initial peak of the reformer movement came in the Progressive era of the 20th century with the professionalization of social work. To uplift the children of the "deserving poor," social workers opened settlement houses that provided education, dental and medical care, and counseling. Day care became part of a broad social welfare philosophy. After World War I, rapid turnover of personnel and clientele brought about a steady decline in these houses.) A countertrend to day care was the long-standing notion of keeping women at home to care for their own children. Labeled the Widows' Pension Movement, this group lobbied successfully for state financial aid to fatherless families--fatherless by death, that is. Now paid to care for their own children, a few "deserving poor" were channeled away from day care centers and full-time work. However, the paucity of the pensions often compelled mothers to continue working, and working women needed some kind of day care for their children. Despite their resentment of the social worker and reformer, these women

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153 found day care preferable to giving up their children to orphanages and other institutions. By the 1930s the vestiges of these day care centers surrendered to the depression. Women were thrown out of work and into their homes. Eleemosynary institutions went bankrupt, and the social workers became government bureaucrats. Child care outside the home revived, however, with the Work Projects Administration's nursery schools. Designed to provide jobs for unemployed teachers and food and care for poor children, these schools did not survive the Work Projects Administration .2 The second tradition of child care, more central to federal programmatic efforts and in that sense more policy-relevant, is employment-oriented day care. Its history begins in New York City in 1854. Wealthy women created nurseries for indigent and pregnant women. In return for the care afforded them during childbirth, the healthiest of these mothers came to work as wet nurses and maids in the homes of their patrons. The system helped the poor and eased the shortage of domestic servants. The federal role in day care followed more in the employment tradition than that of the reformer, although the employment of mothers was consistently combined with moral and physical care. The nurseries of the Work Projects Administration already mentioned sought to employ teachers, if not mothers. And the Farm Security Administration sponsored a small day care program for the children of migrant workers during the depression to allow both parents to work in the fields. By far the most massive federal program prior to the 1960s began during World War II, when the massive entry of women into factories placed day care on the national agenda. Reports of children being locked in cars in factory parking lots reached the Children's Bureau, the Office of Education, and Eleanor Roosevelt. Ironically, the children in the locked cars were at least physically safe, unlike others alone at home or on the streets. At the President's behest, in August 1942 the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare began to fund a few local day care centers. In that same month the Federal Works Agency obtained a more liberal interpretation of the Lanham Act for defense housing and public works to allow funding of day care facilities. Under this program the government spent $52 million over three years to care for 109,000 children across the country. Most of the centers were operated by local schools. Others, under the purview of the Children's Bureau, were encouraged to locate away i

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154 from factories in order not to make working too convenient for mothers. All federal aid for day care ended with the armistice. A handful of states continued funding for a few years to enable families to avoid welfare dependency; most of these, however, faltered in the early 1950s.3 Although neglected in most day care chronologies, federal participation in some form revived in the 1950s. Congress passed an authorization for day care grants during the Korean War: the Defense Housing and Community Services Act. Though enacted in September 1951, the day care provision was never funded and the authorization lapsed with the armistice. The most significant federal action to subsidize nonparental child care came in the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Act. In it a child care deduction was allowed for low-income working mothers. Working parents with an adjusted gross income under $4,500 could deduct up to $600 in expenses for the care of their children. Widowed, divorced, and separated mothers had no income limit on their eligibility; they merely had to have work-related child care costs. In practice, the measure allowed working parents to deduct over $100 million in child care expenses annually--no mean initia- tive, considering that the entire budget of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was only $1,997 million in 1954. Thus, contrary to general belief, the steady influx of women into the labor force was not unassisted in terms of federal subsidies for child care. The employment tradition of federal aid to day care continued through this deduction, which was justified as a necessary work expense .4 The third tradition, that of comprehensive psychologi- cal development, originated in the nursery schools of the 1920s--a unique nonparental care effort. Unlike all the other child care efforts, these nurseries catered to middle- and upper-class mothers. They did not keep children while their mothers worked; rather, they cared for children whose mothers were home. These nurseries were products of new psychological theories that pro- claimed the dangers to a child of a "smothering" and overprotective mother. The nursery endeavored to enhance the psychological development of the child. Insofar as the child was the object of the nursery, there was a kinship with the goals of the infant schools and other devices of the reformer tradition to uplift children. Nonetheless, there were radical differences in social class, technique, and compulsion between the two. The nursery schools of the 1920s began a tradition that can

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155 be traced through the cooperative nurseries of the 1950s and ultimately into the Head Start program, in which centers for comprehensive development finally reached the children of the poor. In sum, out-of-home child care entered the 1960s with three historical purposes: to encourage employment of the poor, to promote the moral and physical well-being of their children, and to enhance the psychological develop- ment of middle-class children. The latter two traditions possessed greater appeal to social workers and child development specialists, while the former held greater sway over policy makers. Both, however, were ambiguous regarding the child. Day care for the sake of employment accorded priority to the cost of services, not their effects on children. Long-term benefits might accrue to a child if a family's cycle of welfare dependency were broken; meanwhile the child might suffer. The reform tradition was not without its flaws. It was afflicted with the ambivalence of all public charity: at once generous and self-serving, caring and condescending, selfless and arrogant. The developmental tradition had been narrowly focused in terms of class and psychological theory. Its theories of development lacked strong empiri- cal bases and had a voguish hue wedded to a popularized notion of Freudian theory. The legacy of these traditions to the child care programs of the 1960s was, in a word, problematic. Another lineage of out-of-home child care in the 1960s was government regulation. The first attempt at regulat- ing out-of-home child care dealt mainly with orphanages and other 24-hour institutions. Their central purpose was to stem the high infant and child mortality rates in these institutions. At issue were basic health measures, sanitation, nutrition, and disease prevention. As national child advocacy organizations and state licensing agencies became forces at the turn of the century, their overriding concern was the prevention of disease and its transmission among institutionalized children. Similarly, their licensing codes sought to protect children from epidemics, fire, severe neglect, and starvation. At the federal level the Children's Bureau suggested provisions for state codes and offered goals for better child care. Licensing laws were by no means comprehensive. Linked to general fire safety and health codes of cities and counties, they allowed little room for the variations in day care. States were loath to enforce their laws against church-sponsored institutions. Funds were always limited

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156 and often lowest in times of greatest demand for facili- ties. It was difficult to suspend licenses because the alternative to poor facilities was frequently no facili- ties. Finally, the enforcers were drawn from the ranks of social workers. They lacked experience in administra- tion and found themselves regulating their colleagues. In sum, over the first half of the 20th-century effective regulation suffered from poor administration and the general inadequacy of the regulations themselves. During World War II the Children's Bureau and the Office of Education were empowered to approve local and state day care plans for federal funding. The Office of Education had jurisdiction over school district plans, the Children's Bureau over nonschool plans. Since 95 percent of the facilities were school related, the Office of Education predominated. For the first time the govern- ment issued a set of standards for day care. Under the aegis of the Children's Bureau, the Conference on Day Care of Children of Working Mothers met in July 1941 to confront the problem that war mobilization posed for women and children. A February 1942 report proposed a set of day care standards based on the experience and expertise of the conference participants. These standards preceded approval powers granted in August 1942 and did not have the force of law. Like all the standards of the Chil- dren's Bureau, they were merely recommendations to state and local authorities. The standards assumed that school-age children received adequate education in school and required only supervision and a safe play area until the end of the work day. They recommended that children under age three stay with their mothers and that those women be discouraged from working. Children aged two to five received the most attention. The standards suggested a maximum group size of 30 chil- dren with a minimum ratio of 10 children to 1 adult. They discussed the child's need for "warmth and affection" and opportunities "for music, conversation, poetry, stories, work with materials, group play, etc." The needs of the family were also to be considered. Staff directors were to be trained in a broad range of children's needs, including education, psychology, family relations, health, nutrition, and child development. Ideally, a facility would provide proper nutrition and health training and would conform to safety codes. Intended only as goals, these standards were never enforced as a precondition of federal funding. Federal regulatory authority extended only to state and local plans, not their operation. As

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157 goals, however, they no doubt exerted some pressure for better day care facilities than otherwise would have developed.5 The expiration of direct federal aid to day care did ~ e __ ~:~ ;~ ~ A; ~ =~= not Salt cnllaren-s DUE Beau ~ ~ v ~ ~ ~ In 1953 the bureau, in conjunction with the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor, held a National Confer- ence on Planning Services for Children of Employed Mothers. The conference stressed the growing number of women with children entering the labor force: They noted that 2 million working women had children under 6, and over 5 million had children under 18. In an effort to promote more state and local aid to day care the con- f mr"=c ma; need t~ industry's need for labor and the ='~~~ rim working woman's need for supplemental family income. Forty percent of those working women were the sole supporters of their families. To touch all bases the conferees explained the growth of kindergartens and nursery schools because parents were "eager to profit from the new scientific knowledge of child develop- ment. . . ." Their central plea, however, remained the expansion of day care to abet the entry of women into the work force. No federal programs were enacted, but the year following the conference Congress passed the child care deduction 6 The issue of day care and its regulation persisted throughout the 1950s. The Children's Bureau conducted a major study of day care in 1958. In October 1960 the Child Welfare League published Standards for Day Care Service. "these standards," Director Joseph H. Reid stressed, "are intended to be goals for continuous improvement of services to children." In many respects the standards recapitulated those issued earlier by the Children's Bureau: health supervision, family counseling, educational experiences, and physical and emotional security. They suggested group sizes according to age: for children age 3, 12-15 per group; for children ages 4-6, 15-20 per group; and for children over 6, 20-25 per group. Each group "should have a full-time teacher and assistant." As Children's Bureau standards emphasized earlier, children under 3 were not recommended for day care. The staff ratios recommended were roughly the same, but the recommended group size was one third smaller in the Child Welfare League standards.7 Soon after the publication of these standards the Children's Bureau and Women's Bureau sponsored a day care conference, which noted among other things the continued

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1S8 influx of women into the labor force and their purported demand for day care services. Again the conferees raised the issue of child care in terms of dependency. Day care was touted as a means to escape welfare. President-elect John F. Kennedy wrote approvingly of the conference's recommendations. Once inaugurated, he set his new secretary of HEW, Abraham Ribicoff, to work drafting a welfare reform package for Congress--a package that included a $10-million day care program for welfare clients. In several respects the legislation was similar to a 1958 day care bill Senator Jacob Javits had proposed to Congress. His bill had gone nowhere, but now packaged with the first of a long line of welfare reforms it became law in 1962. The rationale for the reform measures would become a familiar litany throughout the next two decades. Welfare costs were rising; the present system was an administrative nightmare and a failure; only by breaking the cycle of dependency could the welfare burden be lessened; employment and training were necessary means of breaking that cycle and day care was a requisite support service. The tradition of employment oriented day care reached an apotheosis. Enacted as P.L. 87-543, the bill authorized $5 million for fiscal 1963 and $10 million for each ensuing year. Although the House report on the bill recounted the latest figures on the numbers of working women with children in its explanation of the day care provision, the promise of lower welfare costs appears more relevant to its passage. After all, women with children had been entering the labor force in significant numbers for well over a decade--a fact of which the Women's Bureau consistently reminded Congress. Even under the welfare reform rubric, the day care program managed only to extract $800,000 of its $5 million authorization from the conservative appropriations committees in fiscal 1963. From its inception within HEW, the welfare reform legislation contained one specific regulatory provision regarding day care. Federal funding was made conditional on a facility's obtaining a state license. This provision left primary regulatory responsibility to the states, where it had traditionally resided. The promise of fed- eral money encouraged states to modernize their licensing procedures, and 40 percent of that money went in the first years of programs to fund this modernization. The results, however, were less than heartening. Still plagued by the social worker and enforcer, state licensing

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159 authorities also suffered from a lack of technical know- ledge and funds. confronted by the choice of closing substandard centers with no prospect of a replacement or allowing them to continue, the regulators chose the latter. To compensate for this bending of the code they intensified their scrutiny of new applications. Thus expansion of day care facilities was curtailed, while older, less satisfactory centers continued to operate. This problem was compounded by the succession of new antipoverty programs, which provided funds for day care to allow mothers on welfare to receive vocational educa- tion or other job training. The proliferation of federal programs operated by various agencies and departments precluded any easy centralization of day care regulation, had one been attempted. _ By default, the states retained regulatory power over the expanding day care industry. The developmental tradition of child care also had its heyday. In 1964, Congress passed the mainstay of the war on poverty, the Economic Opportunity Act. Head Start, touching on practically every aspect of poverty, became the showpiece of the act and of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Following in the tradition of middle- class nursery schools, Head Start was designed to enhance the psychological development of poor children. The research of psychologists J. McVicker Hunt and Benjamin Bloom and various local preschool education projects in universities had indicated the positive impact of instruc- tion and a salutary environment on a child's cognitive development. Head Start was more firmly rooted in empiri- cal psychology than its antecedent nursery schools. Although its stated purpose--social uplift--was very similar to the moral uplift sought by the reformers of the early 20th century, there was a significant differ- ence. The poor welcomed Head Start; it was not the kind of hegemonic imposition that the infant schools were. It was also more of an effort to reach the rural than the urban poor. Yet, there was a motif of getting the ghetto out of the child. The prospect of derailing multigenera- tional poverty had great political appeal. Sargent Shriver, director of OEO, wisely chose to capitalize on it. Planned as a pilot project involving 100,000 children, Shriver allowed over half a million to enroll. OEO found Congress very willing to increase its budget to fund such a potentially revolutionary approach to poverty. Since employment and the cost of care were less relevant to Head Start's purpose, the issues of smaller groups, more

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160 attention to education, health care, and nutrition became paramount. Head Start's stress on direct community par- ticipation circumvented the traditional federal-state- local funding chain and escaped the extant licensing morass. Its priorities were different from employment- oriented day care, and this difference in priorities was no better reflected than in their child-staff ratios of 4 and 5 to 1 for preschool children. Based on their own experience with preschool education and consultations with outside experts, Head Start's organizers reduced the traditional day care ratios by one half to two thirds. Costs, of course, were tripled. As the federal government expanded its day care fund- ing, a schism in purpose surfaced and slowly widened. In the developmental area, comprehensive child care grew with OEO's increase of Head Start. In the employment area, every new program proposed to replace welfare with "work- fare" carried a day care provision. Such provisions became more integral as the welfare explosion was recog- nized among unmarried mothers. Work would take them off the dole and occupy their time with pursuits other than procreation. Meanwhile the children required care so that their mothers could find jobs. Ultimately, both kinds of day care shared the commmon purpose of reducing poverty and welfare dependency. Nonetheless, their means were in most respects antithetical. Where minimum costs were essential to making employment practical, comprehen- sive services and education were integral to breaking the poverty cycle. There would obviously be a crisis if the two were ever compelled to integrate their programs; in 1967 that integration was mandated by law. The year 1967 was a watershed year for day care. OEO was coming under heavy criticism from conservatives. Accused of waste and mismanagement, its programs ran into the backlash against the urban riots and the economic pressures of the war in Vietnam. Essentially a creation of the Johnson administration, few in Congress felt responsible to defend it. The task fell to Shriver. To defuse his critics, Shriver formulated a revision to the Equal Opportunity Act, which promised tighter administra- tive procedures, expanded OEO's support services for welfare recipients seeking work, and proposed employing welfare mothers in child care centers. His revisions first encountered opposition within the administration. The Bureau of the Budget feared the administrative provisions were too constraining and probably unworkable. Their very complexity ensured that they would not be

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161 followed and would merely invite more congressional criticism. HEW resented the further erosion of its policy purview. In particular, they fought OEO' s proposal to administer the day care program. At HEW's behest, the language was broadened to include HEW. The change was portentous, since Congress expanded the day care subsection to include the mandate for the FIDCR. The legislation encountered more problems in the 90th Congress. Republicans worked to divest OEO of its more established programs, such as Head Start, and to restore more program control to traditional departments. Budget authorizations were cut and appropriations were reduced. Finally, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee sought to bring some administrative order to the plethora of social welfare initiatives by mandating a set of inter- agency regulations to govern the numerous federal day care programs. From the perspective of OEO, HEW, and the Bureau of the Budget, however, day care regulations were not the issue. They worried about the potential cost of the day care programs that were greatly expanded in the OEO legislation and in the new Work Incentives Program. Over $1 billion would be needed to care for all children under six of the working poor affected by these programs. The new employment thrust of OEO's legislation did not reduce funds for Head Start nor did it eliminate the smaller Follow Through Program designed to preserve the child's early gains. But OEO's suggestion for employment of welfare mothers echoed loudly in the House Ways and Means Committee. Confronted by an unanticipated and politically frightening expansion in the nation's welfare rolls, the committee and the Congress enacted the AFDC- Work Incentives Program. The incentive for working was simplified: get a job or lose all benefits. For the first time, Congress imposed this requirement on women with young children. - Day care became a necessary support service and was included in the program. This legislation as well as the OEO revision complicated the day care programs further; they required the use of welfare recipi- ents to staff centers. Obviously, employment-oriented ~ ~ A; A_ ~ 1 care was overwhelming aevelopmencax care `~ ~v~y`~.v..~^ enactments. The only catch was that those who would write the regulations governing these day care programs were from the developmentalist tradition.

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195 hierarchy and, presumably, OMB also wanted to avoid raising the costs of child care or penalizing the states' Title XX funds. More than once the states and day care centers had demonstrated their political muscle in inducing congressional suspensions of child-staff ratios that they could not attain. Although the 1976 offer of additional Title XX funds for compliance did dampen state opposition, a fiscally austere Congress was unlikely to sweeten compliance with more money. Since the alternative to funding additional staff was more "sensible" require- ments, most members of Congress were not inclined to oppose HEW's relaxation of staff ratios. Moreover, the Abt study provided all parties interested in less strict child-staff ratios with a scientific justification. After preliminary publication, HEW sponsored a series of meetings across the country on the requirements. Participants generally approved the requirements, though there was some dissent over the exact child-staff ratios. While these meetings progressed, decision makers within HEW were replaced by new people. While Patricia Harris, who replaced Califano, and Jody Bernstein, who replaced Libassi, learned anew about the issues, the FIDCR revision process came virtually to a halt in fall 1979. In the face of this hiatus the advocacy groups split In one came were the proprietary day into three camps. care centers. They believed that the changes in HEW accorded them an excellent opportunity to delay the FIDCR's promulgation and relax the staffing ratios. To this end they distributed anti-FIDCR postcards to parents who used their child care facilities, newspapers, members of Congress, and HEW. The message was simple: the new FIDCR will close the day care centers or raise costs or both and we oppose them. At the other extreme was William Pierce and the Child Welfare League. Pierce refused to accept the staff ratios that the Abt study had recommended. He, too, wanted the new FIDCR blocked and replaced by the 1968 requirements. Pierce, however, was respectfully ignored. Somewhere in the middle was a colon or advocacy groups led by the Children's Defense Fund. They had accepted Abt'S recommendations and strove to have the new FIDCR promulgated with the strictest staff ratios within those recommendations. To this end they organized their own campaign to compel HEW Secretary Harris to promulgate the new FIDCR. In response to this coalition and the personal lobbying effort of the Children's Defense Fund's leader Marion

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196 Wright Edelman, Harris agreed to a March 1980 deadline for the new FIDCR. Although the deadline was a small victory for the Children's Defense Fund, the exact staff ratios remained unresolved. Here the proprietary centers made some headway. Joan Bernstein, HEW's general counsel, had a reputation for being somewhat antiregulatory from a previous stint at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Bernstein and her staff produced a memorandum on the new FIDCR for Harris that essentially argued for less stringent staffing ratios. In conjunction with the proprietary centers' campaign, Bernstein's memo began to sway Harris toward less strict requirements--particularly staffing ratios. Bernstein's memo, however, was leaked to the Children' Defense Fund and to their allies within HEW--specifically ACYF. Proponents of the stricter FIDCR realized that only a strong response could salvage their course. In desperation they turned to White House domestic adviser Stuart Eizenstat. Access to Eizenstat depended on the personal relationship of one of the proponents with Eizenstat's wife. They presented their case for the stricter FIDCR to Eizenstat at his home one night and convinced him to send a memo--drafted by the Children's Defense Fund--to Harris expressing strong White House support for the stricter FIDCR. Armed now with White House support, proponents of the stricter FIDCR managed to overcome their opponents' objections based on costs and promote staff ratios as strict as (or stricter than) those recommended in Abt's Policy A option. The final regulations were issued in March 1980. Although the staff ratios for the key preschool age cohort--3-5-year olds--were in the range of Abt's Policy A option, they were still less stringent than those in the other revisions of the FIDCR. The new requirements are ~enforced" because 80 percent of the day care centers are already in compliance with all or most of the new requirements. Moreover, the requirements allow, upon application to HEW, a two-year phase-in period. Thus enforcement means affirmation of continuity in existing conditions, not disruption and proscription. Indeed, one of the general survey findings of the Abt study was that centers, regardless of regulations, tend to gravitate to certain staff and group patterns that quite simply work better than others. In the final analysis, effective regulation may be no more (and no less) than an authorita- tive imprimatur on situations ordered by forces more profound than any policy maker's decision. s

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197 NOTES 1 Sara Pope Cooper, A History of the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements" (HEW, 1976); Sheila Rothman, "Other People's Children: The Day Care Experience in America," Public Interest, #30 (Winter 1973), 15-19; and Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Harvard University Press, 1960), passim. 2 Rothman, "Other People's Children," 18-19; Planning Services for Children of Employed Mothers Department of Labor Publication, 1953), 7-11, 14-15. 3 Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Children's Cause (Washington, D.C.: 1976), 16-18; Planning Services, 7-10, 14-15; Rothman, "Other People's Children," 20-21. 4 Planning Services, 10; Bureau of the Budget, Legislative Reference File: G-1-2154.1, [hereafter cited as BOB-LRF:] (1954), Record Group 51, National Archives [hereafter cited as NA]. 5 Standards for the Day Care of Children of Working Mothers (Children's Bureau Publication No. 284, 1942), - passim. 6 Planning Services, passim. 7Child Welfare League, Standards for Day Care Service (New York, 1960), passim. 8BOB:LRF:R1-4/67.4 (1967), KG 51, NA; Congressional Quarterly Almanac: 1967 (Washington, D.C.: 1968), 1058-1086 [cited henceforth as CQA:]. 9 Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (HEW Publication #(OHDS)78-31081, 1978 [1968]), passim. Scooper, "History of FIDCR," 19. Gwen Morgan, "Legal Aspects of Federal Day Care Standards" (HEW, 1976), 39. \2 Rothman, "Other People's Children," 22. ~3 Edward Zigler and David Cohen, "Federal Day Care Standards: Rationale and Recommendations" (HEW, 1976), 6-8. id Zigler to R. P. Nathan, April 18, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW: Office of the Secretary [cited henceforth as OS]. ~5OMB:LRF R1-4/71.2 (1971), RG 51, Federal Records Center [cited hereafter as FRC]. In The Children's Cause Steiner apparently overstates the conservative appeasement motivation for the veto. ~ 6 Richardson to Quie, August 31, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. i70MB:LRF R1-4/7112 (1971), RG 51, FRC.

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198 t8 Note for Mr. O'Neill, June 21, 1972, OMB File A7, RG 51. New Executive Office Building [cited hereafter as NEOB]. 19Ibid. 2 Veneman to Richardson, July 10, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 2\ Zigler, "Federal Day Care Standards," 8-11; Morgan, "Legal Aspects," 39. 220MB:LRF R1-4/74.6 (1974), RG 51, FRC. 2 3 Ibid. 24 House Report 93-1490. 2 5 Senate Report 93-1356; House Report 93-1543; CQA: 1974, 505-508. 260MB:LRF R1-4/74.6 (1974), RG 51, FRC. 2 7Memorandum to the Secretary, September 16, 1975, File FIDCR-Title XX,~HEW:ACYF. 2 ~ Memoranda to the Secretary, August 27 and September 16, 1975, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS; Weinberger to Mondale, June 12, 1975, CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 29 See the letters in File CY-1-3 (1975), HEW:OS. 3 These responses are attached to the Social and Rehabilitation Service's draft memorandum, September, 1975, ibid. 3 Matthews to Carl Albert, October 1, 1975, ibid. 3 2 See CQA: 1975, 691-692, and CQA: 1976, 620-625, for the details of these legislative actions. 3 3 CQA: 1976, 621-625. 34Matthews to Lynn, October 16, 1975, OMB:LRF 73-1(G)/75.2 (1976), RG 51, NEOB. 3sCQA, 1976, 625-628. 36Morrill to Secretary, May 6, 1976, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 370MB:LRF R3-1/76.4 (1976), RG 51, NEOB. 38 These statistics are drawn from UNCO's, National Child Care Consumer Study: 1975 (HE W-OCD, 1975) and ASPE documents. 39Abt Associates, Inc., National Day Care Study: Preliminary Findings. . . (MEW: OCDS, 1978), passim. 4 Ibid., 23-25; Abt Associates, Inc., Day Care Centers in the U.S.: A National Profile, 1976-1977 (Cambridge, 1978), 63; Abt Associates, Inc., Children at the Center: Summary Findings and Their Implications (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979), 194-195. 4~This information is derived from statements and handouts by participants in the Day Care and Child Development Reports' Conference, Washington, D.C., March 2, 1979.

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199 42 Ibid. 4 3 Quoted in Barry Bruce-Briggs, Child Care: The Fiscal Time Bomb," Public Interest (Fall 1977), 100. 44 Ibid. 4 SS. R. Rosoff, OCD, to Margaret Watson, HDS, March 22, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF. 4 6 Aaron Memorandum on his meeting with Califano, April 13, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF; CQA: 95-59 and P.L. 95-171. 47 Memorandum for the Record, September 28, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF; Cotton to the Secretary, September 15, 1977, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 48 Note for the Secretary (Bohen), June 21, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS; Note to the Secretary (Schtick), March 13, 1978, ibid. The latter note contains handwritten comments on the report and ASPE by a staff member of the executive secretariat. 49 From an unedited transcript of Moynihan's comment before the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare Reform in July, 1978. 50Note for the Secretary (Bohen), June 21, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. Tithe Appropriateness of The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR): Report of Findings and . Recommendations (HEW:ASPE, 1978), XXXV. 5 2 Califano to Libassi, October 2, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 5 3 Abt Associates, Inc., National Day Care Study: HEW Briefing (Cambridge, Mass.: January 19, 1979), 1-4. 5 4 Ibid., 4-15, 21. 5sIbid., 22-25. 5 6 Ibid-, 25-30. 57Abt Associates, Inc., Final Report of the National Day Care Study: Children at the Center (5 vole., Cambridge, Mass.: 1979), I, 159. restatement by F. Peter Libassi, General Counsel, HEW (March 2, 1979).

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Appendix A Proposed Child-Staff Ratios, 1942-1978 Source Year 0-6 Weeks 7 weeks- 19 mot 25 mot 3 yr. 18 mot 24 mot 36 mot old 4 5 Children's Bureau 1942 NR NR 10 10 10 10 Child Welfare League 1960 NR NR NR 6-7 .5 7. 5-10 7. 5-10 10-12 .5 Head Start 1965 -- -- ~~ 4 5 5 ~~ FIDCR 1968 NR NR NR NR 5 7 7 Child Welfare League 1969 NR NR NR NR 6 - 7 .5 7. 5 - 10 7. 5-10 Amer ican Academy of Pediatrics 1971 4 4 4 4 -- -- - FI DCR ( Zigler 's Revision) 1972 3 3 4 4 4 10* 10 HEW guides f or s tate 1 icenses 1973 4 4 4 5 10 10 12 Title XX legislation 1975 X x X X 5 7 7 Title XX FIDCR 1975 1 4 4 4 5 7 7 State licens ing average 1977 -- 6 8 10* 11.4 13.7 16.5 Abt study r ecommenda t ions 1978 1 5 5 5 8-10 8-10 8-10 NOTE: Figures given in table are numbers of children per staff member. NR: Center-based care not recommended for this age group. (-): No ratios specified/not applicable X-: To be set by the Secretary of HEW. S.: ~ standards G: "goals. R: Requirements n *over 54 months **over 30 months 200

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6 7-8 9 10 11 12 13-14 Objective 10-12.15 10-12 .5 10-12 .5 10-12.5 10-12 .5 10-12 .5 10 10 10 10 10-12.15 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 __ __ __ 12 13 __ G __ R 10 10 R __ G S 13 16 16 20 20 R 12 16 16 16 16 20 20 S 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 R 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 R 18.8 18.8 18. 8 18.8 19.6 19.6 8-10 17 17 17 23 23 23 R 201

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u] ~5 u] o - ~4 a) Q4 ~o z x ~: ~l ,1 c) o ~: o .-l :s Q _t S~ U) .,' X E~ C) .,. s s O - 54 s n, oP C) ~ X U) a~ Q~ ~ e-- ~ ~ E~ E~ s: ~ a' :~ ~ ~ ._, E~ 1 p. C 0 s ~ ~ 3 - y a' 3 ~n 3: O ,, O dP ~ o U. ~ ~ a, O ~ a, I c: O :D d~ ~ ~ o ~ U] Y s ~ ~ E~ ~ a, o 3 a~ =: o o ~ P4 ~r r~ ~D ~O O o ~D ~O ~r ~oP opoo U ~o~ dP o ~o o C ~o 0 ~ a ~kD oo . . . . a) ( ~ ~0 0 0 0 C ~O ~D ~er ~,- U~ ~U~ o | ~4 O CO ~(D ~ a, ~a a~ tD Q 4 o a, s C) C ~ 4 ~ 4,, 0, ~ 4 Q, V _1 0 ~ =-t ~ P4-V 4 ~ : ~> ~ /t' 4 4 >' ~ V 05 t ~.,~ _~ ~ ~G~ ~ 4 U) 4J ~ a' 0 ~ a, O c) c' a' ~ 0 1t 4 ~10 4 ~U) 04 ~ 4J -l c n 4 ~ 4 0 (U 0 ~-I 0) 0 ~ 0' ~ ~ 0 aJ ~4 o: Z u' .^ ~r: z co ~a z ~ 3: v, s ~C) O E~ 203 s c o .,, IJ z s E" U] n E~ U? m U~ JJ U] 4 4 ~4 ~S 4 U ~O , ~_ ~Z S ~ ~ E~ o _ 4 -~ C ~- U] a,, ~q C) ~ C o U) a, ~: U' q~ O ~ U) ' 4 U] >~~ 4 U' 4 C ^ o C U) ~q~ 4 ' O - S 4 . ua a, ~ ~ - C ~-^ O ~n ~^ O - S a) U) U, O ~ S C a' O S C Q. ~ /~ 4 _1 4 aJ ~ 4 O C~ s- - ~ s cq ~ ~n Q, . - 4 ,4 o ~n X 4 ,' a) S 4~ ~ C C ._. ~ ~ C ._. 4 ~ a, nO o 4 0 a, C ~ -0 ,[' JJ C O C C, (U 4 - w 3 ._' U) 41 3 4 0) .,' ~n ~ 4 a, V C C O - U) ~a o U~ S o W4 4 JJ ~0 a' w O O tO tD ' n ~ c o .~. U) W .~t 0 - -- ~ 0 0 U) 4~ t)

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Append ix D Care Modes: A Consumer Survey Age and Numbers of Children _ 0-2 3-6 Care 10-29 Hours 30+ Hours 10-29 Hours 30+ Hours Mode per Week per Week per Week per Week Center (group) No. 106,000 180,000 494,000 708,000 Care % 8 15 26 40 Family Day Care No. 402,500 287,300 471,300 346,700 (Relative) % 32 24 25 20 Family Day Care No. 286,000 364,600 302,800 394,100 (Nonrelative) % 22 30 15 22 In-Home Care (Relative and No. 485,000 371,000 642,000 328,000 Nonrelative) % 38 31 34 18 TOTAL No. 1,279,500 1,202,900 1,910,100 1,776,800 IN CARE % 100 100 100 100 Number and Percentages of Children in Care Typo of Care 0-2 3-6 % No. % No. In Own Home by Relative 10-29 hours per week3 245,900 30+ hours per week3 239,900 In Own Home by Nonrelative 20-29 hours per week3 30+ hours per week Relative's Home 10-29 hours per week4 30+ hours per week3 Nonrelative's Home (Family Day Care) 10-29 hours per week3 30+ hours per week4 Nursery and Day Care Center 10-29 hours per week<2 106,300 30+ hours per week2 179,700 2 204 3 2 238,500 1 130,500 402,500 287,300 13 34 286,000 3 364,600 302,100 178,200 340,400 138,600 471,300 346,700 302,800 4 394,100 5 493,800 6 708,700

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Appendix E Households Using Various Types of Care, Classified by Youngest Child's Age Main Method Over 30 Hours Youngest Youngest Youngest Youngest Service Child Child Child Child Used 0-2 3-5 0-2 3-5 - Relat ive (In Child's Own Home) 20.3 11.1 5.0 2.7 Nonr e let ive (In Child's Own Home) 16.8 17.0 3.1 3.2 In Relative' s Home 22.1 17.0 5.3 6.5 Nonrelat ive Home (Family Day Care) 10.7 10.8 6.2 5.6 Nursery School 4.4 8.2 2.1 4 .3 Day Care Center 1. 5 5.0 1.2 4 .2 Cooperative Center 1. 2 0.7 0.3 0.2 Before and After School Program 0.4 0.6 -- 0.3 Head Start 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 No Extramural Care 22.4 28.7 22 .4 28.7 Source: Sheila B. Kamerman and Alf red J. Kahn, Child Care, Family Benef its and Working Parents (1980). l 205