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Components of the
Policy Formation Process
In each of the three case studies, a number of observable
factors helped influence the policy outcome. From our
analysis we conclude that these components can be grouped
into the following six general categories:
1. Contextual factors, including those social,
economic, demographic, political, and ideological
factors, that shape the overall context of federal
decision making at any given point in time.
2. Constituency activities, including direct and
indirect pressure, exerted by both organized and
unorganized constituencies outside the federal government.
3. Principles and ideas that shape a participant's
vision or policy goal.
4. Actors and institutions, including those that
participate directly in the federal decision-making
process in the legislature, executive, and judicial
branches of government.
5. Media presentations, including television, radio,
and the popular print media such as newspapers and
magazines.
6. Research, including knowledge-building, problem-
exploring, policy-forming, and program-directing studies
that are introduced into the policy process to support or
refute the position of program proponents and or
opponents.
Each case is in effect a narrative that describes how
these components contribute, both individually and inter-
actively, to policy formation. In this chapter we discuss
these components as they are manifest throughout the cases
in order to identify some of the salient forces shaping
federal policy toward children and their families.
38
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39
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Although the cases touch on events dating back to the New
Deal, all three deal principally with events that occurred
between the late 1960s and the late 1970s. During this
period there were several important changes in the social,
economic, demographic, political, and ideological factors
that shaped the overall context of federal decision making
affecting children. Inflation surged and unemployment
increased. The birthrate slowed, and a growing number of
American women, particularly those with children under
the age of 18, entered the labor force. The civil rights
movement and the war on poverty blossomed as liberals
advocated social reform and the broadened participation
of minorities, especially blacks, in the political
process. And the United States engaged in a prolonged
and unpopular war in Southeast Asia.
The influence of these changes can be observed in the
cases, sometimes as direct effects but more often they
are mediated through other components in the process.
Hence, we observe, for example, that the increasing labor
force participation of women and the growth of single-
parent families influenced the liberalization of the
child care tax credit and the growth of child care
programs. Similarly, we note that the rapid economic
expansion of the 1960s directly influenced the growth of
social programs and federal spending. Conversely,
sluggish growth and high inflation in the 1970s had the
opposite effect on the enactment of new programs.
As an indirect influence, the increasing entry of women
into the labor force created a broader constituency with
a stake in policies benefiting working women, particularly
child care assistance. Accordingly, this demographic
change was reflected in political advocacy, media atten-
tion, and the shift in traditional beliefs about a woman's
role. Similarly, declining dairy prices in the 1950s
created pressure on Congress by farm interest groups for
a new domestic program.
In addition to the social, demographic, and economic
contexts, prevalent social values and beliefs also play a
significant role. In all three cases, we observed, and
sought in some instances to measure through public opinion
surveys, the power of values and beliefs in molding
policy. In most situations, these beliefs are manifest
through other components of the policy formation process:
constituency pressure, media events, research, and the
perceptions of key actors. Thus, for example, hunger,
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40
especially among pregnant women and infants, was regarded
as unacceptable in the midst of American affluence. On
the Senate floor, Humphrey's photographic display of the
effects of malnutrition on infants touched a humanitarian
chord and was undoubtedly crucial to the passage of WIC.
Support of WIC was classified more than once as a "Mom
and apple pie" political issue because of its target
population.
Beliefs and values were equally potent in the child
care tax deduction/credit case. Beliefs about a woman's
proper place consistently restrained congressional
liberalization of the child ware tax d~dll~ti~n farina the
1950s and 1960s.
Socioeconomic change (women entering
the work force) slowly altered this belief and ultimately
led to the passage and liberalization of the deduction
itself.
The long-standing debate over the appropriate role of
government in the lives of children was a central element
involved in the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements.
Although the obligation of government to protect children
from exploitive labor practices, fire hazards, physical
abuse, and the like has become an accepted principle,
federal intervention to ensure children's cognitive
development is more controversial. Supporters of the
child development research community and public day care
providers contend that the public obligation to protect
children extends to measures designed to enhance their
healthy growth and education. Critics, particularly
among fiscal conservatives and proprietary day care
providers, argue that such intervention threatens to
undermine the role of parents in childrearing and the
free market in social service delivery.
Finally, political factors incumbent on government
structures also shape the context of federal policy
making toward children. Legislation rests with Congress,
enforcement with the executive branch, and adjudication
with the judicial branch. Specifically in the cases we
examined, the fact that Senate bills, unlike House
measures, are usually open to floor amendments helps
explain why the original WIC measure and several efforts
to liberalize the child care tax credit were initiated in
the Senate. Liberal members were able to circumvent
conservative committees and bring their measures before
the entire Senate. Similar actions were not possible in
the House. The fact that HEW promulgated the 1968 day
care requirements without OMB's approval, while OMB
blocked the less stringent 1972 requirements, was due to
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a change in administrative procedures. In 1968, OMB
(then the Bureau of the Budget) could not review agency
regulations; by 1972 it could. Similarly, the role of
the judiciary is a significant structural factor. During
the late 1960s and 1970s the courts adapted a more
activist posture in mediating disputes within and between
the other branches of government. Court rulings, for
example, were crucial in the expansion of the WIC program.
In another era the judiciary might have been less inclined
to interfere in a conflict between Congress and the
executive branch.
To summarize, we understand these factors to be
contextual by virtue of the fact that they establish the
settings in which other components interact in policy
making. It is to these other components that we now turn.
CONSTITUENCY PRESSURE
Constituency pressure is at once one of the most obvious
and most difficult variables to identify. It often takes
elusive forms, such as letters, informal meetings with
policy makers, and public opinion polls, as well as the
more orchestrated, organized lobbying efforts of interest
and advocacy groups. Most instances of constituency
pressure in the three cases examined here involved
organized groups, such as the Children's Defense Fund,
the AFL-CIO, and FRAC. We also encountered some instances
of unorganized pressure, such as letters from constituents
and public opinion polls. Overall, we observe that the
nature and influence of constituency pressure varies at
different points in policy formation. Even when it is
not an obvious component of policy making, constituency
pressure remains a significant backdrop. As we have
noted, it is often the medium through which changes in
contextual factors, for example, social, economic, or
political events, affect the policy process. In several
respects, constituency pressure has the characteristics
of a contextual factor: it is a constant, diffuse, and
largely uncontrollable force (by policy makers) in policy
formation.
Unorganized constituency pressure appears most
frequently at the point in the policy process at which a
problem is defined: letters to Congress on tax problems,
public outrage at widespread hunger in America, or public
opinion of expanding welfare rolls. We interpret it as a
reflection of the role of public opinion in the identifi
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cation of social conditions as social problems. For
example, until women's employment outside the home was
perceived as appropriate, the problems of dual-earner
families were not recognized as legitimate concerns of
public policy.
Unorganized pressure appears less frequently than
organized pressure when a specific policy is being
formulated. Thus, for example, public opinion supported
aid to hungry children, but the Community Nutrition
ensue suggested the specific programmatic form that
such an initiative might take. ~ ~~
~, . , ~
We interpret this as an
expression ot the need for concrete policy proposals by
legislative and executive branch policy makers at that
stage in the process rather than an abstract sense of a
social problem requiring a government response. In
general, organized constituencies are better able to
marshal! the necessary forces and propose concrete
initiatives than are unorganized constituencies.
When a policy is being debated and enacted, both
organized and unorganized constituency pressures appear
to affect the policy process.
Of pressure have a suecif in initiative focused on a
,
At this stage, both types
_ _, ~
problem that they can support or oppose. Hence, for
example, once designed, WIC drew on diffuse public opinion
favoring such a programmatic approach as well as direct
support by organized groups.
For changes to be successfully promoted while a program
is operating and expanding, reforms must be proposed in
specific terms. Organized constituencies, therefore, tend
to be involved more frequently than unorganized ones. It
was an organized group, FRAC, that brought suit against
the USDA to change their handling of WIC program
operations.
There were several configurations of interests from
the first food assistance programs. In the 1930s, farm
interests pressured Congress to relieve their problem of
surplus commodities. Part of the attempt to resolve this
problem resulted in the food assistance programs. The
existence of the program created in Congress and among
outside interests an alliance between rural representa-
tives and the school constituency: federal aid to farmers
in return for federal food assistance to school children.
Within this alliance the farm interest dominated program-
matic initiatives until the 1960s. In that decade the
Democratic-liberal-activist coalition of the Great Society
seized the initiative from farm interests and educators.
An antihunger, antipoverty coalition emerged that relied
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heavily on public sentiments and media presentations.
Support for WIC itself came from advocacy groups such as
the Children's Foundation and Community Nutrition
Institute as well as local free clinics in the states.
Producer interests became much less pronounced, with the
exception of the infant formula companies. Nonetheless,
it should be noted that WIC's initial passage and early
extension depended on its status as an amendment to the
multibillion-dollar child nutrition bills. These bills
commanded support from powerful education interests
throughout the nation.
The conflict over the Federal Interagency Day Care
Requirements displayed no consistent alignment of
interests in opposition. In support of the requirements
were the various children's advocacy groups. The opposi-
tion tended to come chiefly from the executive agencies.
Only when there was the threat of enforcement in 1976
under Title XX did interest groups express strong opposi-
tion to the regulations. The requirements have been
employed by interest groups as vehicles to other ends:
more employment opportunities in day care, revising
welfare policy, increasing government spending on day
care, and reducing categorical programs. Constituency
pressures were often expressions of other conflicts that
happened to touch on the requirements in a particular
context.
We observe this symbolic use of the Federal Interagency
Day Care Requirements more than once in our case study.
They were originally mandated by members of Congress
opposed to the WIN program. Unenforced, they lay quietly
until the day care proposal of FAP led to a demand for
more realistic requirements. In 1972, Edward Zigler,
director of the Office of Child Development, responded
with a revised version. Zigler's revision was buried
amidst the advocacy groups' opposition to all Nixon
administration initiatives and their emotional attachment
to the 1968 version of federal day care standards.
Revived once more in negotiations over Title XX, the
requirements again became hostage to several strategies,
including the promotion of workfare, the increase of day
care funds, the decrease of Title XX funds, and enforce-
ment of the day care requirements. The backlash created
by organized interests was sufficient to destroy the
requirements. Thus, constituency pressures focused on
the shape of the day care requirements as a manifestation
of the larger issue of federal responsibility for the
well-being of children.
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In the case of the child care tax deduction/credit,
constituency pressure demonstrated steady support for the
provision. Since it was first proposed in Congress,
organized interests uniformly supported it. This support
came from both employee and employer organizations,
although it was not a major goal of either. Not until
the late 1960s did any organized groups, such as the
National Organization for Women, make the tax deduction/
credit a major goal. In the 1960s, organizations promul-
gating the rights of women included the tax system in
their overall effort to end discrimination against women.
Still, congressional liberalization of the tax credit for
child care resulted from more than the growth of the
women's movement. By the time the movement became signif
icant politically, the rapid increase in the labor force
participation of women had discouraged prevalent biases
against working mothers. Accordingly, the opposing forces
shifted after the 1963 revision. The issue of liberaliza
tion became less of a contest over a woman's proper place
and more an issue of tax equity versus tax structure-
political logrolling versus revenue loss. As with the
contextual factors, it is difficult to separate constitu
ency pressure from the other components at work in the
process. They continually interact.
PRINCIPLES AND IDEAS
One component that appears significant in all three cases
is what we have called "vision"--a unique combination of
idea and principle that serves as a participant's policy
goal. We were consistently impressed by the powerful role
of vision in policy making. The principal architects of
WIC envisioned a food assistance program for pregnant
women and infants. They convinced Senator Hubert Humphrey
of the idea's merit. Losing in committee, Humphrey played
eloquently to the Senate with images of suffering children
and the simple act by which Congress could relieve them.
Victorious in Congress, WIC's architects had anticipated
administration opposition and the subsequent litigation.
The law was therefore written to maximize the probability
of success. Aided by FRAC, which also envisioned the
program as a major federal food assistance effort, WIC's
supporters managed to obtain court decisions ensuring its
rapid expansion. Supporters even anticipated USDA and
OMB behavior and won a court order that turned agency
ploys to the program's advantage. They succeeded in
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expanding a $20-million pilot into a $750-million entitle-
ment program in 5 years.
In the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements we
observe conflicting vision in policy formation. For
proponents the regulations had an emotional, symbolic
character, reflecting a long tradition in social work.
The requirements represented an optimal goal that, with
time and struggle, would one day be realized for all needy
children. Opponents approached the requirements in more
pragmatic ways:
Were they enforceable, affordable,
necessary' More interest-laden issues such as social
services costs, welfare rolls, employment, and revenue
allocation often established the context in which the
debate resurfaced. Resolution of these issues, however,
rarely depended on settling questions concerning the
requirements themselves. Indeed, on more than one
occasion, decisions concerning the proposal for FAP, the
WIN program, and Title XX services brought about a de
facto settlement of the controversy by postponing or
resubmerging it in bureaucratic procedures.
Two general observations can be made concerning the
role of vision in the case of the day care requirements.
First, the attempt to embody the ideas of the child
development research community in the regulations could
not overcome or undo policies determined by substantive
interests, primarily those of the states and proprietary
providers. Vision, unsupported by interests, was unable
to overcome these obstructions.
Second, apart from the requirements themselves, the
case study offers evidence that policy making is more
than a series of incremental responses to interest group
demands--that vision is indeed relevant. The creation of
Title XX is an excellent example of policy makers con-
fronting a serious problem--the social service stalemate--
with an imaginative solution. Building vision on inter-
ests, the assistant secretary for planning and evaluation
in HEW was able to break the deadlock and broach a new
approach to social service funding. Though unsuccessful,
the proposal for FAP represents a similar blend of imagin-
ation and interests in its approach to a guaranteed
income. A vision that comprehends interests is a potent
factor in the formation of policy. It appears most
effective when the ordinary mechanisms of incremental
change through political brokering prove incapable of
resolving conflicts among various interests.
In the child care tax deduction/credit case we also
observe vision presented in the form of a principle in
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.
conflict: tax equity versus the integrity of the revenue
system. Regardless of its legal definition, in the policy
formation process, tax equity is a principle accorded
substance by the alignment of political forces. Decisions
concerning the distribution of the tax burden reflect the
political pressures that various constituencies can bring
to bear on Congress. Operationally, maintaining the
integrity of the tax structure is the ideological safe-
guard against tax provisions that threaten to seriously
deplete revenue collections. Policy determination is
thus a function of the interplay between the political
benefits of appeasing constituent demands for lower taxes
and the responsibility of lawmakers to ensure adequate
revenues to operate the government.
The liberalization of the child care tax deduction/
credit in the 1970s reflected the increasing political
pressure to reduce taxes and to make the tax code more
equitable. This liberalization was aided by the departure
of Representative Wilbur Mills--the unequaled congres-
sional guardian of the tax structure. Once Mills
departed, the more equity-prone decision-making process
in the Senate approved an increase in the benefits of the
child care tax deduction/credit. The check of the House
Ways and Means Committee became less effective as its own
decision-making process became more open following Mills's
departure. In the executive branch, responsibility for
maintaining the structural integrity of the tax system
resides in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Alone,
however, Treasury was incapable of sustaining opposition
to proponents of liberalization. The result was a steady
growth in the size of the tax benefits and number of
beneficiaries from the child care tax deduction/credit.
We observe that both vision and interest are signifi-
cant in policy formation. Principle without interest
seems impotent; interest without principle appears self-
serving and manipulative. Although we hesitate to assign
a primary role to either, we do note that vision has
appeared dominant in the cases we examined. In the case
of the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements, vision
that failed to account for prevailing interests proved
incapable of realization. Successful vision, like that
underlying the WIC program, is linked in some significant
way to interests, and its power is enhanced by that
linkage. Indeed, the most effective vision appears to be
that which imagines the possible without forgetting the
necessary.
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ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS
Key government participants appear at each stage in the
policy formation process. Individuals and groups, who
hold beliefs, seek changes, respond to others, and make
decisions, shape policy. In each case study we discovered
one or more key participants striving to realize a
vision--some more successfully than others. Hubert
Humphrey and his staff were able to bring the WIC program
into being. Senate passage was in large measure a result
of Humphrey's elan on the floor after defeat in committee.
WIC's growth was fueled by advocates who used the courts,
constituencies, and visceral appeals to create an effec-
tive lever against the USDA and the OMB.
In the case of the Federal Interagency Day Care
Requirements, the cast changed several times as the policy
debate moved in and out of the agencies and Congress.
Many of the principal government participants in 1968
were replaced by new personalities in subsequent debates
over revisions. Jule Sugarman, a principal in the 1968
requirements, did not participate in the 1972 revision or
the 1975 Title XX controversy. In contrast, Edward
Zigler, a principal in 1972, continued as a private
a~v~rnm~nt-service
advocate after he left government. Indeed, we find that
some actors shift their roles over time but remain, in
some capacity, participants in the policy process.
This observation is more complicated than the
revolving-door notion of government-to-private-sector-to
~ . We see in these role changes the
opportunity of advocates to promote continuity in policy
making that is typically attributed only to career civil
servants. For example, in the case of the WIC program,
Rodney Leonard's efforts to promote food assistance to
special target groups did not cease when he left the
USDA. He persisted in promoting such programs and with
the help of others succeeded in establishing WIC.
Participants are themselves frequently the agents of
continuity in policy formation.
Institutions, too, represent actors of a sort. They
exhibit certain general characteristics and behavioral
patterns. Perhaps the most vivid display of institutional
behavior patterns is the USDA and OMB response to the WIC
program. Both executive agencies opposed the program
during its early years of existence. The USDA believed
target feeding to be ineffective and disliked the medical
requirements of the program. The OMB believed WIC to be
too costly, too rapidly expanding, and basically "bad"
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public policy. Both agencies sought to persuade Congress
of their positions and, failing in that, both used their
institutional resources to create delays and impoundments
to restrain program growth.
It would be a gross understatement to suggest that
their tactics were ineffective; rather, they served to
expand WIC at many times the rate its congressional and
private proponents had dared to hope. Because court
decisions changed the character of the policy debate,
these institutions, particularly OMB, were unable to
respond effectively. As a practical matter, rapid
expenditure of all program funds was the most effective
means of restraining program growth. In WIC's case, the
usual executive weapons against program growth, impound-
ment and delay, produced results that were antithetical
to the institutional goals of restraint in spending.
In addition to general behavior patterns, institutions
establish a context in which policy making takes place.
As noted above, the role of an institution determines to
a large extent where, how, and in what capacity an actor
can participate in the policy formation process. The
functional division among the three branches of government
limits the power of any single participant to formulate,
legislate, and execute policy changes. Less obvious is
the administrator who uses his or her power to write
regulations in order to control a program's development.
Such an individual may hold a relatively subordinate
decision-making role but through the form and content of
regulations can exert an influence on a program greater
than that of Congress or the President. An OMB budget
examiner's power to change a program's direction may be
limited to impounding funds, even if spending is not what
the examiner wants to see changed. The President may not
be able to effect a policy initiative without convincing
Congress and the bureaucracy of its worth.
The "iron triangle" is a metaphor for the power of
institutions and institutional actors in policy making:
congressional committees, executive branch agency heads,
and interest groups. Our cases reveal that these insti-
tutions are not monolithic, nor do they function in the
same way from case to case. The committee structure
results in a wide distribution of policy-making power in
Congress: authorizing committees, appropriations commit-
tees, and revenue committees. Each must endorse a social
service program in order for it to be established. An
executive branch agency must take responsibility for its
implementation. Other policies, such as tax cuts, can be
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accomplished in one committee of each house of Congress.
Within an executive department the administering agency
must clear its regulations with the general counsel and
the assistant secretary to have them promulgated. Where
one stands may indeed be determined by where one sits
and, as the cases reveal, there are quite a few seats in
each institutional setting.
MEDIA PRESENTATIONS
We identified in the case studies several examples of
media presentations that influenced the policy formation
process, including television, newspapers, and popular
magazines and journals. (We do not include scientific
research journals in this category.) Media presentations
can affect the conception, debate, and expansion of a
policy. Moreover, their influence on policy formation
frequently felt at later stages in the policy process as
well as when a policy initiative is introduced. A CBS
documentary on hunger, for example, helped define mal-
nutrition as a serious problem. It also galvanized
public opinion and facilitated the expansion of food
assistance programs in the 1970s.
The response elicited by a media presentation appears
crucial to its influence on policy formation. Respondents
the public and policy
makers. Policy makers are, of course, the key respond-
ents, since they in fact initiate policy proposals.
Their response, however, can be direct--evoked by the
presentation itself--or indirect--evoked by Public
reactions to the presentation.
fall into one of two audiences:
-
,
A New Republic article
crze~c~z~ng wit, tor example, reached the President's
desk in summary form; Carter responded to it directly.
On the other hand, the Red boo k article on WIC elicited
200 letters from citizens to the USDA. In this instance
the media presentation was indirectly influential.
In our three case studies, media presentations served
to define social conditions as social problems. They
helped to frame issues for the political agenda. Pre-
sented in graphic form to millions of viewers, hunger
became an emotional national issue. A working woman
complaining of tax inequalities became symbolic of social
changes when she aired her grievances on a television news
program or in a newpaper's editorial pages. Furthermore,
at times, media presentations can be very specific in
affirming (or condemning) a program or policy initiative.
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.
The Redbook article on WIC, for example, urged readers to
write to the USDA and demand that the agency implement
the supplemental food program. Similarly, a newspaper
column complained of the exclusion of payments to rela-
tives as tax deductible child care expenses. Both
articles influenced policy formation.
Despite their influence in framing problems and issues,
however, we observed no instances of a specific policy or
program initiative's being conceived by the media. Vision
and constituency pressure seem to intervene in the policy
process even if the principal instigation is a media
presentation. Hunger was a media issue, but the food
stamp, supplemental food, and WIC programs were designed
by policy makers. Again, there is a constant interaction
between media and other components of policy formation.
RESEARCH
We observed in the three cases numerous instances of
research and analysis playing a role in decision making.
Research can be categorized as knowledge-building (con-
tributing to fundamental understanding of social and
behavioral processes), problem-exploring (contributing to
the definition of social problems), policy-forming (con-
tributing to the formulation of policies to address
specific social problems), and program-directing (contrib-
uting to the design and improvement of established
programs).* Each can have a different kind of influence
on policy making. Knowledge-building and problem-
exploring research, for example, is most often influential
in defining a problem or providing supporting justifica-
tion for the initiation of a policy proposal. Policy-
forming research is similarly influential at the stage at
which a social problem is recognized and alternative
policy proposals are under consideration or when a
particular policy initiative is being conceived. Program-
directing research usually has its greatest impact when
specific programs are being designed or refined. In the
case studies we confined our collection of data and
analysis of the impact of research to that which was
relevant to the policy formation process in each case.
We did not examine or cite studies that were not part of
*This typology is drawn from the National Research
Council's Study Project on Social Research and
Development (1978).
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the documented history of the particular policy formation
process. Although we observed several instances in which
the results of research did not accord with the thrust of
a policy initiative, all of the studies cited in our
cases played some role in the decision-making process.
Our first observation on the role of research is that
no single type of research appears to be inevitably
influential on policy. We have an example of knowledge-
building research on brain development and nutrition that
was extremely influential in the WIC oroqram's initiation,
debate, and expansion.
_
There appear to be mediating
events in this instance, however. The Johns Hopkins and
St. Jude's nutrition projects for pregnant women demon-
strated to policy makers how research on neurophysio-
loqical development could be employed to deal with a
social problem.
After WIC's conception, this body of
basic research remained a significant justification for
the enactment and eventual expansion of the program.
Two examples of program-directing research, the Call
study of the pilot voucher program and the USDA'S study
of the WIC program's delivery costs, had an influence on
decision making. For a period of time they successfully
supported opponents of the program's expansion. Research
can thus affirm or deny the policy initiative and still
have significant impact on the policy formation process.
On the relation of timing to influence, we note several
examples of research having an impact at different points
during the policy formation process. The more exploratory
the research is, the more far-reaching its potential
influence on the policy process. ~
. . .
Conversely, the more
directed toward specific programs the research is, the
less applicable it is to contexts other than the operation
and expansion of the particular program or immediate
decision. Thus, even if program-directing research is
more likely to directly influence policy operation and
expansion, it seems less likely to influence decision
making related to the formation of any other policy.
Similarly, the more directly focused a piece of research
or analysis is on the operation of a particular program
or decision, the more crucial its timing becomes. Hence,
the Urban Institute Is evaluation of the WIC delivery
system had relatively little impact because it was intro-
duced in the policy process after crucial decisions
concerning the program's expansion had already been made.
The conflict between research studies related to WIC's
program operation and those related to its medical ~usti-
fication illustrates the interaction of research with
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52
other components in policy formation. Generally speaking,
opponents of target-specific food assistance resided
principally in the USDA and the OMB. Although they did
not deny the medical evidence linking proper nutrition to
healthy infant development, they pointed to the two
evaluations of target-specific delivery systems (by Call
and the Urban Institute) as evidence of programmatic
ineffectiveness. Whatever its theoretical merits, they
argued that food assistance could not effectively be made
target-specific. In large measure the UDSA's determina-
tion stemmed from the overall administration policy of
replacing all direct food distribution programs with food
stamps and, ultimately, a unified, income-based welfare
system. Moreover, the administration sought to extricate
the USDA from programs with expensive delivery systems.
Within the department there was a general resistance to
taking on any new food assistance programs since those
already under way were dramatically shifting USDA's
traditional role of aiding farmers through vice supports
and marketing.
_ , .
What research the USDA considered relevant
or influential depended on the larger policy imperatives
that were operative.
Proponents of target-specific food programs were
equally selective in their use of the research findings.
They discounted results that contradicted their assertions
about WIC's efficacy. They ignored methodological criti-
cisms and other reservations concerning evaluations of
the program's impact on participants. Nevertheless, in
the debate over WIC's effectiveness, proponents of the
program were victorious. They had two factors in their
favor: one scientific and the other ideological. First,
research supporting the notion that proper nutrition is
esssential for optimal human development was unquestioned.
Second, feeding hungry infants was an activity that exist-
ing social values and sentiments reinforced. Congres-
sional decision makers had an intuitive sense that a
programmatic effort of this type was good policy--
politically and morally.
During the development of the program, research and
evaluation generated ambiguous results concerning the
Supplemental Food Program and WIC. Scientific findings
introduced as evidence in the policy debate consistently
affirmed the strong link between proper nutrition and
healthy fetal and infant development.
Equally consistent
were the evaluations of target-specific food delivery
systems: They did not work well. In sum, although
nutritional assistance to this group was certainly
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warranted, the programs' delivery systems failed to
effectively meet their needs. There were further
complicating factors. Two studies had yielded results
indicating that a carefully administered local program
could produce measurable effects on fetal and infant
development. Yet one of these studies (by Endozien)
encountered severe methodological criticisms, and the
other (by the Center for Disease Control) qualified its
conclusions to the point of precluding any programwide
extrapolations. Research and evaluation thus became
relevant to the policy formation process only insofar as
selected results were useful to proponents or opponents
in advancing their causes.
We observe this use of research for advocacy purposes
again in the formulation of the Federal InteracencY Day
Care Requirements.
The principal research study in this
case, Abt Associates' National Day Care Study, was
appealing to both supporters and opponents of strict
regulations. Its results provided some comfort to all
sides in the policy debate. For advocates concerned with
cognitive development, it affirmed the link between
regulations and related outcomes. For those concerned
with costs, it eased the recommended child-staff ratios
and instead stressed group size
Moreover, the Abt study
endorsed regulations that most day care providers could
meet at little or no additional expense. Its scientific
methodology was at least credible to most social
scientists. Thus, the influence of the National Day Care
Study on policy stemmed not only from its scientific
validity but also from its accord with the dominant,
opposing political positions. The Abt study in a sense
provided the catalyst for a compromise that met the
demands of both child development interests and proprie-
tary day care providers.
As with other components of the
policy process, it was more than the inherent scientific
worth of the research that determined its influence in
the policy process. Its interactions with other
components--constituency pressure, prevailing values, and
so forth--altered its influence, in this instance
enhancing it.
By and large the only type of research that was
consistently influential on tax policy were studies of
the revenue loss and the distributional effects of
specific tax initiatives. Since the basic conflict in
tax policy making is between the integrity of the tax
structure and the equitable distribution of the tax
burden--i.e., costs in revenue and costs to constituents-
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.
relevant research usually focuses on the costs of a
proposed tax policy provision. Analyses of revenue loss,
however, even when the tax burden is distributed across
income classes, may not adequately measure the benefits
of an initiative. In the case of the job development
deduction, for example, the research, both prospective
and retrospective, did not assess the impact of the
provision on domestic employment or on employment incen-
tives in general. It examined only potential and actual
revenue losses. In this respect it seems that tax initia-
tives are seldom evaluated in terms of their efficacy in
achieving their stated goals. We did not encounter
analyses at any stage in the formation of the child care
tax deduction/credit that examined the impact of various
child care tax benefits on work incentives, types of care
selected, employment, or similar variables. Decision
makers made consideration of the broader impact of
particular individual income tax provisions less relevent
to their deliberations than potential revenue loss.
In sum, we note that research of all types--knowledge-
building, problem-exploring, policy-forming, and program-
directing--can influence federal decision making. The
more specifically focused a study is on a particular
program or decision, the more crucial its timing becomes.
Often the same study can be used by opponents in a policy
debate; just as often opposing research results can be
equally influential. Moreover, as with other components
of the federal policy-making process, the interaction of
research with other factors and forces significantly
affects its impact.
INTERACTIONS AMONG COMPONENTS
IN FEDERAL POLICY FORMATION
Interactions among components are the most complex and
therefore the most difficult aspect of the policy forma-
tion process to analyze systematically. These inter
actions or relationships among components, rather than
the isolated roles of individual actors, media presenta
tions, research studies, or instances of constituency
pressure, explain policy outcomes, although each of these
appears to have an identifiable impact.
To some extent the narrative of the case studies is an
account of relevant interactions that are, in effect, the
story line of each case. In the 1968 origins of WIC, for
example, prevailing social values and beliefs held that
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pregnant women and infants are a target population
deserving special benefits. Popular media dissemination
of information concerning the special needs of this group
focused attention on their condition. Because the
sentiment of media presentations agreed with the dominant
social values, it helped define malnutrition among this
group as a serious problem requiring federal government
action. Popular expositions of hunger in America and the
salutary effects of proper nutrition and feeding habits
on fetal and infant development focused public attention
on undernourished pregnant women and young children and
placed them on the political agenda. Consonantly, the
high visibility of this group made it an attractive target
for the Nixon administration's response to criticisms of
its existing food assistance programs, particularly WIC.
This process illustrates the interaction of constituency
pressure (the Poor People's March), media attention
(CBS's "Hunger in America"), and social values (feed
hungry babies). Moreover, ongoing research on nutrition
and infant development reinforced the inclination of
proponents to provide food assistance to this target
group.
Complex interactions of this type are evident in an
examination of any one of the contributing decisions
presented in the case studies. Yet, as we suggested
earlier, policies of the sort represented in the case
studies are not the result of individual decisions such
as the passage of the 1968 Supplemental Food Program.
They are instead the product of numerous decisions made
over a prolonged period of time, involving a large number
of participants with different agendas and intentions.
Policy represents a cumulative product. Understanding
the dynamics of policy making involves understanding not
only the process leading to individual decisions but also
how such decisions create patterns affecting future
events in the process and, ultimately, determine policy
formation.
The creation of the WIC program, for example, resulted
from a confluence of several decisions from two relatively
independent levels in the policy-making process. At one
level were decisions contributing to the expansion of the
child nutrition complex--a multibillion-dollar collection
of politically invulnerable programs. Inclusion in this
legislative phalanx protected a fledgling WIC program
from a veto. The relatively small group of WIC advocates
was strengthened by the broad array of interests that had
long supported the School Lunch Program and related
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programs. It was not until 1978 that WIC faced congres-
sional and executive scrutiny as a separate legislative
act. By then there was an administration more favorable
to it, an annualized budget of $440 million, and a million
participants in the program.
WIC's early linkage to the child nutrition complex
ensured its passage before the full Congress. The key
legislative action was its inclusion as a provision of
this bill. Very few legislators, mostly senators, needed
to be convinced of its worth to effect this addition.
One Senate staff member and one advocate convinced a
single senator (admittedly of great stature) of the
program's value. Although narrowly defeated in the
conservative Senate Committee on Agriculture, Herbert
Humphrey successfully waged a floor fight. The powerful
sympathy for feeding infants and pregnant women combined
with the relatively small size of the initiative to
produce a lopsided vote favoring WIC's inclusion. On the
House side, the approval of a single committee's chair
ensured WIC's acceptance in the conference report on the
child nutrition bill. Proponents needed to convince very
few decision makers to effect passage. Its association
with the complex of child nutrition programs made it
veto-proof.
Once enacted, the locus of policy making shifted to
another level. The conflict then involved a recalcitrant
USDA and a public interest law firm. The arena of
decision making shifted from the Congress to the courts.
A court ruling favoring the implementation of the program
changed both the size and purpose of WIC. The court
essentially transformed any decision about WIC's future
from one based on scientific evaluation to one based on
specific legal issues. Program expansion became a
function of judicial interpretation of congressional
intent and not a function of its efficacy as adjudged by
science.
WIC's rapid expansion can be attributed to the inter-
play of organizational behavior patterns with the court
decisions, the power of the appeal of feeding hungry
infants, the interest groups supporting the overall child
nutrition bills, and evaluations that could be interpreted
as favorable. The nexus for all these components was the
deliberate efforts of a handful of proponents. Although
one would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that vision
created and sustained the overall food assistance
programs, WIC appears to be chiefly a product of the
ideas and efforts of few actors. It is distinctive for
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its sensitivity to both interests and ethos. Circum-
stances created a window for change; human ingenuity
opened it.
Without going into similar detail, we observe that the
case of the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements
also reflects this movement over time and in and out of
different levels of policy making. The requirements
themselves were largely a product of intradepartmental
debates. Although constituency pressure was evident in
these debates, it did not reach a broad, intensive level
until enforcement appeared imminent. Yet when considera-
tion of the requirements became integral to the larger
policy issues surrounding the FAP and Title XX, the terms
of the debate and the key actors changed. Children's
advocacy groups and federal agency heads found themselves
facing large labor unions, major state lobbies, leaders
of Congress, and the President.
The role of individual components of policy formation
shifted as the level of the policy debate changed. What
had been determined by a few bureaucrats and advocates
abruptly became a struggle among leaders in Congress and
the executive branch. Indeed, presidential primary
politics became relevant at one point. Once these larger
issues were resolved, the debate again became an intra-
departmental matter involving a few advocacy groups.
These shifts over time in the character and stakes of
decision making, which are evident both in the WIC and
the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements case
studies, are of crucial significance in understanding the
policy formation process. In the case of the child care
tax deduction/credit we note that the policy debate never
quite rose to the level of the child nutrition program
complex, FAP, or Title XX, nor did it sink to the intra-
departmental level at which much of the day care require-
ments were played out.
From our analysis of the interactions among components
of policy making, we conclude that they create identifi-
able patterns suggesting a framework for understanding
the process of policy formation. We detail this approach
in the next chapter.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
day care
