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OCR for page 85
The Special Supplemental
Food Program for Women,
infants, and Children
John R. Nelson, Jr
INTRODUCTION
By any measure, the Special Supplemental Food Program for
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) makes an intriguing
study of the policy-making process. Enacted by Congress
in 1972, it was a $20-million pilot program designed to
provide specified food supplements to a few thousand
pregnant women, lactating mothers, infants, and preschool
children determined by health clinics to be nutritionally
"at risk." Plagued over its 7-year history by litigation,
impoundments, a presidential veto, controversial evalua-
tions, and fiscal austerity, WIC nonetheless reached 2.5
million people at an annual cost of $750 million by the
close of fiscal 1980. It is touted by administrators at
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), congressional
supporters, and public advocates as the most successful
health or welfare program in the federal government.
Congress has reenacted it three times with near unanimity.
It represents one of the very few major programs greatly
expanded under the Carter administration.
This chapter traces the evolution of federal policy
toward pregnant women, infants, and children in the areas
of health care and nutrition. It pursues the historical
strands that led to the creation of WIC, from the New Deal
to the Great Society programs of the 1960s. This chapter
then focuses on WIC's direct antecedent, the Commodity
Supplemental Food Program, which was initiated in 1968.
In sequential sections, WIC's origins in Congress, its
difficulties with the USDA and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), its days in federal court, and the
evaluations of its efficacy are examined. Throughout the
case study, particular attention is accorded to the role
of research and evaluation in policy making.
85
OCR for page 86
86
CHILD NUTRITION: THE NEW DEAL TO THE GREAT SOCIETY
Direct federal financial support for feeding children
began with a conversation between Harry Hopkins, admini-
strator for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration,
and Frederick I. Daniels, director of New York's Emergency
Relief Administration. The first 100 days of the Roose
velt administration had just ended. Hopkins had been
made czar of the federal relief and employment programs.
Daniels had asked him if some of the $200 million appro-
priated for relief could subsidize New York's financially
strapped school lunch program. Hopkins agreed to match
every two state dollars with one federal dollar. Concom
itantly, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation agreed to
loan money to support lunch programs in Mississippi. The
Work Projects Administration (WPA) subsequently supported
local lunch programs with their personnel. The crucial
metamorphosis, however, which carried the nascent programs
beyond the demise of these New Deal agencies into the
1960s, came with the linkage of school lunches to the
disposal of farm surpluses.)
Section 32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935
provided a compensatory fund from tariff revenues to
increase farm incomes. The theory was that industrial
tariffs compelled farmers to spend more money on their
equipment than they would have to in a situation of free
international trade. The law instructed the USDA to
spend these revenues to increase the price levels of farm
commodities by encouraging "the domestic consumption of
such commodities." Backed by Section 32 funds, the number
of schools serving lunches grew to over 3,800, serving
342,000 children in 1937.2 The Surplus Marketing
Corporation provided not only lunches but also food for
relief agencies, institutions, and, in 1939, a food stamp
program. Piloted in Rochester, New York, food stamps
spread quickly throughout the country, reaching 4 million
people by 1941. The USDA also began to provide lunch
milk to school children for a penny or free of charge in
mid-1940 and expanded their distribution to 417,000
children in 18 months.3
The great expansion of federally supported school
lunches did not occur until late 1940. In August of that
year, the WPA and the Surplus Marketing Administration of
the USDA issued a directive to all regional, state, and
local personnel involved in federal food programs. It
began rather succinctly: "Recent violent disruptions in
world distribution of American farm products and the
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87
prospects of added losses of markets make imperative the
development of new outlets for American surplus food-
stuffs." The directive specified three areas of expan-
sion: food stamps, direct distribution of commodities,
and school lunch programs. They sought to increase the
coverage of the lunch program n to not less than six
million children during the 1940-41 school term"--fully
half of the school population.4 It was a goal that
they came within 800,000 children of achieving. By fiscal
1943 the USDA was spending over $18 million annually on
school lunches and the commodities that local distribution
centers received. (For funding, participation, and legis-
lative data, see Appendixes B and C.)
Well before the USDA distributed food for lunches, or
for any other purposes, it had published numerous pamph-
lets on nutrition and diet, e.g., Food for Children
(1931), Milk for the Family (1933), and Meals and Recipes
for Lunches (1936).
.
When it entered the food distribution
business, the stream of booklets became a torrent. The
Bureau of Home Economics (later the Bureau of Human
Nutrition and Home Economics) published over 50 pamphlets
in the 1940s dealing specifically with school lunches.
The USDA also provided nutrition and production data to
the military for diet planning during the World War II.
In 1933 the Programs Planning Division of the USDA began
coordinating crop production with human nutritional
requirements.
The onset of World War II brought the
first serious and extensive application of nutritional
needs to crop production: If crops were planted according
to their nutritional value, then any potential tension
between what was distributed as surplus and what was
nutritious would dissipate .5
World War II stimulated a flurry of nutrition-related
activities. At President Roosevelt's request, the
National Research Council established the Food and
Nutrition Board in May 1941. The board drew together
existing research, previous standards, and USDA data to
develop recommended dietary allowances (RDA) for persons
by age, sex, and level of activity. The original RDA
covered calories, protein, calcium, iron, and some
vitamins; it specified, in a preliminary manner, the
nutritional needs of pregnant women, infants, and
lactating mothers. Subsequent reports described the
"staggering n extent of malnutrition in antebellum America
"It is obvious," one report concluded, "that an appalling
proportion of families were receiving what might with
considerable understatement be called an unsatisfactory
OCR for page 88
88
diet." Guided by these recommendations, the USDA launched
a nationwide campaign to improve the diets of Americans.
To abet this effort, it expanded the Bureau of Home
Economics into the Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home
Economics, and created a Nutrition and Food Conservation
Branch of the Food Distribution Administration to
incorporate all food-related activities in the federal
government. Internationally, USDA officials organized
the United Nation's Interim Commission on Food and
Agriculture, which issued, among other things, worldwide
standards for human nutrition .6
The lunch program in particular, and the feeding of
children in general, did not come under congressional
scrutiny until 1943, when the USDA requested a $50-
million appropriation for the program's continuance. The
war had absorbed the agricultural surplus and rendered
direct commodity distribution impossible.
Only commercial
purchases could maintain the program. Secretary of
Agriculture Claude Wichard proposed legislation to the
White House through the Bureau of the Budget to create a
permanent lunch program. He stressed the necessity of
adequate food distribution to children in the face of
wartime rationing/and working mothers. He suggested the
President convene a national committee on child nutrition.
Other USDA officials contacted the Bureau of the Budget
to support Wichard. War Food Administrator Marvin Jones
explained that the lunch program ensured "proper distribu-
tion of the civilian food supply during the war" and
"expanded markets for agricultural products and .
farm surplus during peacetime." A USDA memorandum
stressed malnutrition as evidenced by the high rates of
draft rejections. In sum, Wichard and the USDA had, by
1943, not only presented all the arguments that would be
offered subsequently to support the program but had also
identified in their choice of a child nutrition committee
all the important elements of what came to be the
political coalition for feeding children.7
The complex preparation for maintaining a lunch program
developed out of a postwar planning commission on agricul-
ture that met in July 1943. The commission anticipated
strong economic growth after the war and made four assump-
tions about agricultural policy: first, that large
postwar incomes could maintain a strong market for farm
products and adequate diets for Americans; second, that
farmers should anticipate expanding their output of
commodities to meet this demand; third, the food stamp
and school lunch programs would compensate for any slack
· ~
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89
in normal market outlets; and fourth, as a result of
these factors, little production restriction would be
necessary. Though by no means the principal instrument
of farm policy, agricultural policy makers considered the
lunch program an integral tool of price stabilization.6
While the administration prepared permanent legisla-
tion, the congressional agriculture committees permitted
a temporary appropriation to continue the program.
Congress approved of the appropriation as a wartime
exigency to ensure food distribution to children.
Congressional concerns about funding the program beyond
the end of the war resulted in the House rejection of an
appropriation to extend it pending hearings on formal
legislation. A peacetime program awaited the full
legislative process and consideration of the whole issue
of agricultural stabilization and the feeding of
children.9
Within the administration a disagreement erupted
between the War Food Administration (representing the
USDA) and the Federal Security Agency (representing the
Office of Education) over administrative jurisdiction of
the proposed School Lunch Program (SLP). The Federal
Security Agency argued that as a program functioning
within the school system for an educational purpose, the
SLP should come under the Office of Education. War Food
Administrator Marvin Jones disagreed. "I cannot too
strongly emphasize," he wrote, "that, although the
educational aspects of this are very significant, the
operational meaning of the program is that it is providing
food. It is a food program in wartime providing proper
distribution of food, and in peacetime expanding markets
for agricultural products and providing orderly removal
of farm surplus."~°
That the USDA prevailed indicates
to some degree that the administration assigned a higher
priority to the farm disposal aspect of the program than
to the educational aspect.
With regard to nutrition-
related activities, however, the USDA was the logical
choice: It was by far the preeminent federal agency
involved in nutritional research and information
dissemination. Inertia and the relative clout of the
executive and congressional entities involved in the SLP
also contributed to the USDA's victory.
With the onset of congressional hearings in late 1944
through 1945, a nascent children's feeding coalition
became evident. Various farm organizations and their
representatives served as the bulwark of continued federal
funds for lunches. School lunches, the National Farmers
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Do
Union argued, were "a big market farmers cannot afford to
lose. . . ." USDA officials also stressed the need to
maintain outlets for surplus farm products, which were
again becoming a problem in May 1945. Indeed, the
program, as Senator Richard Russell noted, "grew up out
of the disposition of surplus agricultural commodities,
and no one had ever seriously discussed any bill providing
for a federal school-lunch program prior to that time."
In a brief House Agriculture Committee exchange the "main
objective" of the program could not be clarified. Repre-
sentative Harold Cooley believed that the primary objective
was the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities and
feeding school children was "just collateral." The
majority, however, stressed it as a "two point" program:
surplus disposal and children's feeding. 2 The dual
stress enabled program promoters to draw a broad range of
support outside agriculture.
The children's feeding coalition encompassed nonfarm
groups that included school administrators, who had a
direct financial stake in continued federal funding,
organized labor, PTAs, social organizations, professional
nutritionists, and medical experts.
-
. . ..
In their testimony
before the House Agriculture Committee, many nutritionists
pleaded for a flat national commitment to children's
nutrition regardless of agricultural surpluses. The
surgeon general made an extraordinary plea, in terms of
need, for a national policy to combat malnutrition when he
described Americans as "poorly fed." Another official of
the U.S. Public Health Service noted that pregnant women
and infants would be an excellent target population for
.
· .
nutritional aid. The committee ignored his comment ana
all other suggestions to modify or expand federal aid
based on nutritional need beyond the lunch program. Such
innovations from the depression era as food stamps and the
school milk program were not revitalized. The ideologi-
cally conservative Congress of 1946 authorized only a
limited federal role in nutritional welfare." 3
Support for the program, particularly among southern
members of Congress, stemmed from several factors other
than farm incomes. The primary basis was the enormous
popularity of the lunch Program among constituents
throughout the nation. ~
was an inherently appealing activity. Even those few
members of Congress opposed to federal support praised
school lunches as an eminent state or local endeavor. In
addition, there was the problem, conceived in terms of
national security rather than social welfare, of
Second. feeding school children
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91
malnutrition in America, demonstrated by selective service
rejection. General Lewis Hershey, the Selective Service
director, testified that 40 to 60 percent of those rejected
for military service had defects related to nutritional
deficiencies. Overall, this meant that roughly 1 of every
10 draft-age males was sufficiently malnourished to
preclude induction. Nutrition-related rejections were
concentrated in poor southern states and were much higher
among blacks, though this revelation evoked little congres-
sional comment. The South, too, faced the problem of
newly consolidated rural schools that required busing
children, making it impossible for them to return home for
lunch. Regardless of the school's distance from home, the
absence from home of working mothers during the war made a
home lunch difficult in all parts of the nation.) 4
The School Lunch Act of 1946 set the basic terms under
which the lunch program operated into the early 1960s.
Funding for the first decade remained around $80 million
per year. In light of the explosion of the school popula-
tion and inflation, this constant funding level represented
a continuous decline in federal participation. Federal
funds were paid as matching grants in a ration declining
from 1:1 to 1:4 over a 5-year period. This ratio was
adjusted according to the extent to which a state's per
capita income varied from the national average--an advan-
tage to the South. Finally, the legislation provided for
nutritional standards, nondiscriminating discounts or free
meals to poor children, nonprofit programs, and priority
Purchases of commodities in surplus.
The preamble of the
act "declared [it] to be the policy of Congress, as a
measure of national security, to safeguard the health and
well-being of the nation's children and to encourage the
domestic consumption of nutritious agricultural commod-
ities. . . ." The policy statement struck a balance
between the two major interests of the children's feeding
coalition.~5
In 1946 the USDA issued detailed nutritional require-
ments for school lunches. They divided the lunches into
three types and provided a declining scale of reimburse-
ment dependent on the lunch's nutritional adequacy. Type
A supplied one third to one half of the daily nutrient
needs of a child.
Type B supplied roughly one third of a
child's daily needs. Type C was one half a pint of milk.
A more complete lunch yielded a higher federal subsidy.
The local school or district chose the exact composition
of the meal with an eye to what commodities were in
surplus. Although this practice often precipitated a
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92
.
jejune diet, the nutritional regulations did limit abuse
of the mandate that required the use of commodities in
surplus. 6
Prior to the 1960s, Congress enacted only one other
federal program related to feeding children: the Special
Milk Program (SMP). As the Korean War ended, the USDA's
Commodity Credit Corporation found itself accumulating
milk at an increasing rate. In 1954 its price support
operations absorbed 10 percent of the total milk supply--
more than triple its acquisitions of the year before.
Milk prices declined, and national farm incomes suffered
from this weakness of its largest single component. Not
only production increases wrought from mechanization, but
also a decade-long decline in per capita milk consumption
had created a crisis for the dairy industry. Their organi-
zations turned to Congress and the USDA. The result was a
revival of the depression era school milk program, renamed
the Special Milk Program, a $50-million "domestic disposal
program" to ease dairy surplus by providing subsidized milk
to school children in addition to lunch milk.
When the SMP came up for a supplementary appropriation
and renewal in January 1956, the USDA proposed a 20 percent
increase in the appropriation and an expansion of the
program into nonschool areas devoted to children. As in
the initial legislation, the burden of congressional
testimony came from USDA officials and dairy organizations.
The passage of the new law increased SMP funding by 20
percent in fiscal 1956 and by 25 percent more in fiscal
1957. More significantly, the new law extended the SMP to
nursery schools, day care centers, summer camps, settlement
houses, and "similar non-profit institutions devoted to
the care and training of under-privileged children on a
public welfare or charitable basis." 7 By 1959, gross
federal spending exceeded $210 million on the lunch and
milk programs operating in a wide variety of settings.
Although both programs were administration initiatives,
their maintenance and expansion became the hobbyhorse of
Congress. In the final two years of the Eisenhower admini-
stration, the huge surplus of the Commodity Credit
Corporation, which had directly stimulated the SMP, began
to ease. Coupled with a general fiscal conservatism,
these circumstances led the administration, through the
USDA, to oppose any increases in the SLP and seek a
retrenchment of the SMP. The issue involved more than a
change in farm surplus or fiscal policy. An important
reason for the stagnation of nutrition programs for
children in the 1950s was the decision to use that surplus
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93
abroad as an instrument of foreign policy (P.L. 480 and
the Food for Peace Program). This decision reflected the
exigencies of international relations and the impact
domestic disposal was purported to have on prices. "The
commodities contemplated to be set aside," Agriculture
Secretary Benson explained, "are so large that it is not
anticipated any substantial portion can be disposed of
through domestic channels without disrupting markets and
our future price support programs. The only solution to
the problem," he concluded, "lies in recourse to distri-
bution abroad." The nature of the agricultural market and
foreign policy combined to prevent the expansion of the
programs. Indeed, had it not been for Congress, the
programs would have been curtailed.
Against the administration's proposed cuts assembled
the now familiar agricultural lobbies, school admini
strators, PTAs, and newly formed food service organ~za-
tions. At their prompting, citizens inundated Congress
with protest letters over the cuts.
Farmers did not want
subsidized markets reduced nor did parents, educators, or
service workers want reduced federal aid or increased
costs. The SMP alone accounted for 2 percent of the
aggregate fluid milk consumption and probably much more in
terms of establishing the habit of drinking milk among
children. One of every two school children drank SUP milk.
The lunch program purchased $750 million in agricultural
products. One of every three school children ate SLP
lunches. Overall, approximately one third of the lunch
costs were born by the federal government. When the
administration attempted to retrench and restrain appro-
priations for these programs on the grounds of the improved
farm situation, it was overwhelmingly defeated in Congress.
There was simply no support for the cuts and a phalanx
opposed to them.~9
The administration's challenge did lead supporters of
these programs to begin to rethink their heavy reliance on
the farm surplus situation for justification. The surplus
tended to have an amorphous quality, given form only in
terms of the relationship of price to parity. The separa-
tion of children's feeding programs from the "surplus"
could well mean even higher prices for farmers without the
usual criticisms of price support programs. To the various
agricultural interests and their representatives, stressing
nutritional need in these programs or allowing more input
to educators and health specialists would not hamper the
programs in their role as a market. Indeed, if need and
nutrition were given sway, perhaps the programs might
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94
.
expand beyond the constraints of surplus and parity. No
farmer would turn down a price higher than parity. More-
over, the support of members of Congress from nonfarm
states would come more easily for food assistance than for
price support. As long as it was not used to curtail any
price support programs, nutritional need was a method of
disposing of surplus agricultural products that was accept-
able to the agricultural interests.
The reorientation of federal feeding from surplus
disposal toward nutritional need occurred slowly during
the 1960s. The farm interests receded in preeminence and
the educators, nutritionists, physicians, social workers,
and service organizations moved into the forefront of
federal policy for feeding children. Although federal
policy leaned more toward nutrition than agriculture, the
programs still drew political strength from their impact
as a subsidy to American agriculture. For this reason
they received a great deal of congressional support that
would otherwise have been hostile to social welfare
measures. On the other hand, a great deal of support that
otherwise would have opposed farm subsidies found no objec-
tion to feeding needy children and adults. In public
opinion polls, food stamp programs (and by inference other
feeding programs) enjoyed much greater popular approbation
than either cash subsidies for the poor or price supports
for farmers (see Appendix A).
The Eisenhower administration was the last to argue for
alterations in children's feeding programs based exclu-
sively on changes in farm prices. When Kennedy assumed
office, the USDA ceased its opposition to extension of the
SMP and expansion of the SLP. Instead, the USDA became an
advocate of reform and larger appropriations. Expansionist
fiscal policies and an effort to restructure program
allocations to reflect better participation rates and
nutritional needs led the administration to propose
increasing the funding of the SLP and changing the 1946
allocation formula. The old formula used per capita
income and the school-age population as the bases for
apportionment of federal funds, regardless of the actual
participation rate. States therefore found it more
financially advantageous to keep participation rates down.
Congress revised this formula to reflect participation
rates and followed an administration initiative to include
a specific appropriation for needy children and schools.
By 1962 the SLP and the SMP had been expanded to over $260
million and directed more toward need. This subtle shift
in emphasis alienated no one, for funding was adjusted
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95
upward based on need. No middle-class children were
dropped. Aggregate program expenditures on farm products
rose. An expanding economic pie would bring the "other
America" into the affluent society. 2 o
Under the auspices of the Johnson administration,
political recognition of America's poor people reached a
level unattained since the prewar depression. The new
administration's stress on need coupled with the burgeoning
financial drain of the war in Vietnam spawned a White House
drive to reorder the priorities in children's feeding
programs and cut back the SMP by 80 percent in fiscal
1967. The drive commenced with Bureau of the Budget's
directives to the USDA to withhold $3 million of the SMP
appropriation for fiscal 1966. The reaction from the
dairy and education interests was swift and predictable.
Bureau of the Budget Director Charles Schultze wrote to
outraged representatives and senators of "the increased
Vietnam defense requirements" and the subsequent decision
to hold SMP expenditures down to $100 million in fiscal
1966. Schultze felt compelled to inform the President of
the vehement opposition to this S1' get cut and the ~nev~-
able outcry against the $79 million cut proposed for fiscal
1967. In defense of this cut he added, "Why subsidize
milk for wealthy Montgomery County school children"' He
sought to restrict the SMP to needy children and schools
without any lunch program. Aside from the losses to the
dairy industry, the only problem the Bureau of the Budget
foresaw was that schools with few needy children might
drop the SMP if federal reimbursement were available only
for the needy. The net savings of $65 million and the war
demands on the budget outweighed these concerns. Whatever
the merits of the arguments, Congress was not impressed.
The thrust of the argument before Congress was that
"the dairy situation is greatly improved now from what it
was in 1954 . . . [and] the diversion of milk to avoid
adding to surplus inventories is no longer a compelling
oD~ecc~ve.-- The only remaining justification for a milk
subsidy was financial need. The remaining $21 million
provided adequately for needy children in the program. 2 2
Congress parried with the argument that need, though
significant, could not be used to curtail a subsidy
program. "This is," Representative Sisk told Agriculture
Secretary Freeman, "no way to cure the ills of our dairy
industry. . . ." SMP defenders added that middle-class
children could be malnourished as well as poor ones.
Finally, to the administration's exigencies-of-war plea,
~a
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140
8/61 Increase community voice in relief
regulations: 55%
Continue federal control as is: 29%
No opinion: 16%
8/61 Physically able must work somewhere in
public park, etc. for relief.
Favor
oppose
No opinion
85%
9%
6%
August 1961 November 1964
82%
12%
6%
1/69 Equalize welfare payments across the nation.
Good idea: 77%
Poor idea: 15%
No opinion: 8%
6/71 Compel large firms to hire welfare
recipients and pay three fourths of the
salary with federal funds.
YES NO NO OPINION
67% 27% 6%
OCR for page 141
141
II. Food Stamps/Child Health
Month/Year
8/37 Should federal government help state/local
governments aid mother at childbirth with
medical care?
YES
81%
NO
19%
10/39 Food stamps for relievers.
Approve: 62%
Disapprove: 26%
No opinion: 12%
Food stamps for families earning $20 per
week or less?
Approve: 57%
Disapprove: 43%
3/69 Food stamps free to families making les
than $20 per week?
Favor: 68%
Oppose: 25%
No opinion: 7%
s
3/69 Food stamps for families earning $20-60 per
week at reduced cost.
Favor: 60%
Oppose: 31%
No opinion: 9%
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142
III. Farm Aid
Month/Year
9/49 Federal purchase of eggs/potatoes to support
prices.
Eggs
Approve
Disapprove
Neutral
25%
61%
4%
No opinion 10%
Potatoes
30%
58%
4%
8%
Federal guarantee of price for farmers
Approve: 49%
Disapprove: 45%
No opinion: 6%
7/53
7/53
Federal government should continue to buy and
store farm products to keep farm income up?
Should: 72%
Should not: 20%
No opinion: 8%
Should the President be allowed to send
surplus food to famine nations?
Should
Should not:
No opinion:
72%
20%
8%
8/55 What should federal government do with
surplus food it has?
Give it away: 76%
Sell it: 14%
Destroy it: 2%
Give it to what country?
U.S.:
Needy country:
Specific country
(India, Korea, etc.):
50%
14%
36%
8/55 Give some to USSR as goodwill gesture?
Good idea: 30%
Poor idea: 60%
Unsure: 6%
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143
Sell at reduced price to USSR?
Good idea: 46%
Poor idea: 44%
Unsure: 10%
12/55 Idea of "soil bank," paying farmer not to
grow?
Good idea: 29%
Poor idea: 47%
Unsure: 24%
Farmers only asked.
Good idea: 49%
Poor idea: 32%
Unsure: 19%
8/61 Reliefer must take any job offered at going
wage.
August 1961 November 1964
Favor 84% 85%
Oppose 10% 7%
No opinion 6% 8%
8/61 Persons coming to new area must prove they
are not doing so to obtain relief before it
is granted.
August 1961 November 1964
Favor 74% 69%
Oppose 16% 22%
No opinion 10% 9%
8/61 Force mother to name illegitimate child's
father in court.
August 1961 November 1964
Favor 73% 64%
Oppose 16% 24%
No opinion 11% 12%
11/64 Overall feelings on welfare.
Favorable: 43%
Mixed: 45%
Abolish it: 6%
No opinion: 6%
OCR for page 144
144
11/64 Amount of money spent in your area on
welfare.
Too much:
Not enough:
About right:
No opinion:
20%
18%
33%
29%
Guaranteed annual incom
9/65 5/6812/68
Favor 19% 36%32%
Oppose 67% 58%62%
No opinion 14% 6%6%
Guaranteed work to each family wage earner
of certain income.
Favor 78%
Oppose 18%
No opinion 4%
May 1968 December 1968
79%
16%
5%
OCR for page 145
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OCR for page 148
OCR for page 149
OCR for page 150
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