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Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
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Culture and Group Cohesion
Boaz Tamir and Gideon Runda
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Introduction
What makes men risk their lives under fire? This is a question that
has occupied many scholars over the years. Military life offers
perhaps the most extreme manifestation of the dilemma that lies at the
heart of manes social existence: the degree of willingness of -
individuals to make personal sacrifices for perceived group interests.
What made men "go over the top" at the Somme, stand under fire in
"squarest at Waterloo, cross the Suez canal in the 1973 Middle East
War, and live underground for years in The San? Why do some military
units break while others hold their ground? Answers have varied from
Freud~s (1936) suggestion that men are driven to war by an unconscious
"death instinct," to Reegan~s (1975) speculation that it is the
consequence of various combinations of rum (or other intoxicating
agents), jingoism, and an untried, youthful machismo. While no
conclusive answers have been given, the fact remains that military
organizations vary quite dramatically, and apparently systematically,
with regard to the group performance.
For the military command, the same question assumes
practical dimensions. To the extent that military decision-makers
have degrees of freedom to influence a.,= ~~.'-,~.,-~ __ ~_.. _..__
(itself an open question), how to most effectively do so becomes a
question of considerable significance for the outcome of military
engagements. Whether articulated or not, this question has been
addressed by military organizations in a variety of ways. Henderson
(1983), for example, illustrates the very different practical theories
of motivation that have guided military organization in countries as
the performance of men under fire
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diverse as the USSR, North Vietnam, Israel, and the United States.
Perhaps the most common variable used to explain performance,
with appeal to both students and practitioners of military
organization, is "cohesion." Grounded in the literature on small-
group behavior, cohesion refers to the quality of the relationships
between members of the small group. Henderson (1983), for example,
defines cohesion as:
The bonding together of members of an organization/unit in
such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each
other, their unit, their mission....cohesion exists in
a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual
soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of
the unit leaders are congruent...with all members willing
to risk death to achieve a common objective. ~
However, to explain performance with "cohesion" thus defined, is to
engage in tautology.
Consequently, efforts to explain the existence of cohesion have
been extensive, both in military and non-military contexts.
Structural variables have been primarily used to explain cohesion. A
sizeable literature on the structural underpinnings of small-group
cohesion has emerged. Numerous studies have attempted to relate
cohesion to group size, span of control, leadership style, length of
tenure, recruitment and promotional practices, benefits packages, the
nature of the task, the available technology, and so forth. While
such structural and task variables no doubt have a significant impact
on performance they are clearly insufficient, having long frustrated
decision-makers eager to influence the nature of "cohesion." Since
the unexplained variance remains considerable, more comprehensive
explanatory variables are needed both for theoretical and practical
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purposes.
The cultural context of military performance has been offered as
an important explanatory factor. Henderson, for example, suggests
that the nature of beliefs and values held by soldiers, as well as the
external ideologies contained in their social, ethnic, and national
groups of origin, mediate the connection between military structure
and cohesion. Cultural variables, however, remain vaguely defined, and
are often offered as an afterthought or a commonsensical and often
tautological retrospective explanation.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of cultural
variables in explaining cohesion more systematically, by
applying Schein~s (1985) model of organizational culture to the
question of cohesion. In the first section, Schein's model will
be outlined. Following that, the use of the model will be illustrated
at the societal, organizational, and group levels of analysis, using
examples mainly from Israeli military history. The main thesis is
that cultural variables have an independent role in mediating the
relationship between structural variables and cohesion. Finally,
specific hypotheses will be outlined with regard to experimental
project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, Training) manning
system.1 Appendix tA) briefly outline major methods for further
exploration .
i. The goal of the new personnel system is to keep the soldiers
and their commanders together for a long period of time. Personnel,
within this system, will be stabilized in their units for definitive
time period. Movement in or out of units between those assignments
periods will be constrained. The goal is to stabilize first term
soldiers in their unit for their initial term of enlistment.
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ORGANT ZAT I ONAL CULTURE ~ N THE MI L ~ TAR Y CONTEXT
.
According to Schein (1985), culture refers to a shared world-view
developed by members of a social group. He suggests that:
...culture should be viewed as a property of an independently
defined stable social unit. That is, if one can demonstrate
that a given set of people have shared a significant number of
important experiences in the process of solving external and
internal problems, one can assume that such common experiences
have led them, over time, to a shared view of the world around
them and their place in it.
Culture, in this sense, is a learned product of group
experience and is, therefore, to be found only where there is a
definable group with a significant history.2
This shared world-view is presumed to influence and constrain how
members perceive, understand, and take action in the world. As a
concept, it is applicable to different types of social groupings,
including civilizations, national entities, ethnic groups,
occupations, organizations, and small groups. To the extent that
members share certain views of the world they live in, they may be
said to have a culture. -
A groups culture is manifested at three distinct levels
(see Table 1: Levels of culture and their interactions): Artifacts,
Values, and Basic Assumptions.
Artifacts -- the constructed physical and social environment -- are
.
the most visible level of a culture. These include all external
manifestations of it: language/ clothing' art r technology,
2. Edgar H. Schein Organizational Culture and Leadershio,
Jossey-Bass Publication, 1945, p. 7
4
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arrangement of physical space, and so forth. Taken together,
artifacts are an expression of a shared world-view held by members of
a group or an organization.
However, as guides to a group's culture, artifacts require careful
and knowledgeable interpretation. For example, in the Israeli army,
the dress code of the elite paratrooper unit is very different from
that of the tank corps. Members of the paratrooper unit wear loose,
often intentionally shabby and informal clothing. They typically wear
a variety of civilian caps and ignore military insignia, including
formal signs of rank and status. In the tank corps, in contrast, the
dress code reflects the "spit and polish" image of the British army
(where its founders received their training): there is careful and
detailed attention to formal appearance and status differences.
The dress code is just one artifactual element out of many in the
Israeli army, yet it immediately invites interpretation: Do members
of these two groups perform differently during peacetime? In combat?
Do they have different attitudes about the use of military technology?
Will these units react in different ways to the loss of a commander in
combat, or to the necessity of an individual to endanger himself to
help an injured peer? And areithese artifacts consistent with others?
To answer such questions we must examine a deeper, more systematic
aspect of culture: its values.
Schein suggests that artifacts reflect shared underlying values
for the group members. They serve the normative and moral function of
guiding group members in how to deal with key situations. Group
members are often conscious of the values they claim to share and
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adhere to, and they can usually articulate them. For example, a
number of key values in Israeli combat units guide behavior. "Never
leave a comrade behind" is an organizationally supported and widely
shared value that has guided behavior under fire. This value is
associated most closely with elite infantry units. "Report the truths
is a value that is expected to guide officer behavior: Never offer
misleading or distorted information, even if the truth is personally
damaging. "Follow me" (the leader is first into combat) is a
battlefield value which suggests that commanders always lead their
troops into battle, are always at the front line, and often take great
personal (even unnecessary) risks. Each of the above is a widely
known, frequently articulated, shared value in the Israeli army that
either guides behavior in combat in ways that might contradict concern
for personal safety and advantage, or serves as a shared standard for
evaluating behavior. As we will demonstrate there are myths,
explanations, stories, and behaviors that illustrate these values; and
despite the many documented examples of incongruent behavior (and even
alternative values), they have a demonstrated effect -- at least in
the authors' experience -- on combat performance and behavior.
However, lists of values do not give the entire picture. In
many cases such lists are not patterned, sometimes they are mutually
contradictory, and sometimes they are incongruent with observed
behavior or leave large areas of behavior unexplained. For example,
the values of "personal example" and Volunteering" in the culture of
the Israeli cohort units, that suggest the importance of individual
responsibility to the collective or to his related group, have in the
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past been a source of high status and a guide to the behavior of many
conscripts. However, since the 1982 war in Lebanon, in many combat
units the value of "own a little head", seems to have gained impetus.
Similar to the Scottish "never volunteer and never refuse," the owner
of the Little head" will do his duty and not Openly challenge the
importance of the collective task, but will not assume any further
responsibilities. In general, this attitude represents a newly
introduced element of passive self-preservation that challenges the
old values.
Thus, the examination of values is often inconclusive. This is
in part to the "ideal" nature of values, i.e., if values express-
"espoused theories," then we must determine the variables of "theory
in action."3 In addition, contrasting values often exist within a
single group: Do they represent potential alternatives held in the
collective mind of the group? Do they serve to differentiate sub-
cultures within a single group? Or do they represent a weakness,
strength, or some dynamic not strictly related to effectiveness of the
group?
To get at a deeper and more systematic level that would allow us
to decipher behavioral patterns) and predict future behavior, a third
level of group performance must be understood -- that which is guided
by "basic assumptions."
3. In their analysis of theories of practice, Argyris and Schon
suggest two kinds of theories: "espoused theories" are those that
actors claim guide their actions, "theories in use" are those that are
revealed in practice. There is often a gap between the two. Argyr~s
C. and Schon Donald, Organizational Learning, Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1978.
7
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Basic assumptions comprise the underlying, taken-for-granted
understanding of the nature of the world that is shared by group
members, often at an unconscious level. Since they are taken for
granted and unarticulated, basic assumptions are often unconfrontable
and therefore difficult to change. In stable cultures, these basic
assumptions underlie the patterns of values and artifacts which are
more easily observed. A culture often coma-ins inner contradictions
at the basic assumption level, and contradictions often exist among
its three levels of artifacts, values, and basic assumptions. For
example, a shared basic assumption that characterizes the Israeli
military combat unites t end Israeli society in general) is that there
is an enemy with evil intent out to destroy the collective. Self
preservation requires suspicion, vigilance and eternal conflict. "They
[the enemies] don't understand any other language" is a frequently
heard characterization of the enemy. The role of the individual in
this struggle requires self-sacrifice and risk-taking that express a
debt to the collective. This not only to his peers, but also to the
overall society. This rhetoric of individual commitment to his peers
also differentiates the Israeli from the presumed passivity attributed
to Diaspora Jews. This basic assumption is expressed in the oft-
repeated and now cliched words of a national poet [Alterman], who sees
the "fallen" as the "silver platter that brought forth the state."
These basic assumptions, perhaps less widely shared in Israel today,
nevertheless serve as a basis for interpreting historical events, and
explaining diverse aspects of Israeli political and military life.
8
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In sum, two divisions with similar structures and tasks,
performed differently. The differences can be accounted for by a
cultural explanation. In the next section we will focus on a basic
nucleus unit -- a tank crew -- and identify the cultural elements
that stand behind the artifacts of both Israeli- and Syrian tank
crews.
CULTURE IN THE NUCLEUS GROUP: THE T~K CREW
.
The structure of a tank crew is "cast in iron:" four member enclosed
within an iron frame. However, cultural differences among tank crews
are significant not only between two armies, but also within the same
army and unit. In this section we will examine the differences
between a Syrian and an Israeli tank crew, which characterizes those
crews that participated in the 1973 Middle East War on the Golan
Heights battlefield.
A typical Syrian tank crew as part of an armored division
offensive must follow the leading tank into the front line. The rule
is that if the leading tank is destroyed, the remaining tanks must
bypass it into the front and keep to the offensive. In many ways
this approach resembles, with spme modification, the classic Roman
Falanga tactic.
The way in which a typical Israeli tank crew operates in the
counteroffensive is distinct from its Syrian counterparts. The -
~sraeli crew must be flexible enough to react independently, even
when it loses communication with its unit. Not only the commander,
but the entire crew must understand the mission and be able to
31
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implement it. Thus, the commander can be replaced if injured and the
tank can keep to its mission. In contrast to the Syrian approach,
the Israeli approach can be viewed as a modern interpretation of
classic cavalry warfare.20
The cultural differences are manifested Inca number of revealing
practices. First, the crew's attitude toward the position of its
commander, i.e., whether he should stand with his head out of the
tank, and expose himself to greater risk by not having armored
protection, or whether he should remain closed within the turret.
This artifact is rooted in leadership values.
A Syrian commander who participate in the "line offensive" stays
closed within the turret. Individual innovation is not required; his
mission is strict and well-defined. Furthermore, an enclosed
commander requires less commitment from his crew since he takes fewer
personal risks. In this system of narrow job definitions, nobody in
the tank crew can take over if the commander is injured, and his
well-being is necessary for the crew to keep operating. When a
commander is disabled the crew loses its ability to function and
hence the commander must be protected to the same extent as the other
crew members. Since the operatiion requires very simple actions, it
is expected that the crew members will remain disconnected from their
commander's stressful environment, and it is assumed that their
access to accurate information would cause damage by increasing their
anxiety and ability to function.
20. See a good description of such a cavalry warfare in John
geesan The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, 1976. Chapter 2, Agincourt
Battle.
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There is no great room for maneuvers and changes; the division's
success is determined by accurate strategic planning and the critical
mass required to execute the tactic. A major unplanned environmental
event can prevent the fulfillment of the mission. The artifacts of a
Syrian tank crew would, among other things, consist of strict
hierarchical bureaucracy to an inflexible response to changing combat
conditions, and restricted predefined individual roles based on
narrow job definitions. The tight Syrian hierarchical control is
marked by a reluctance to be creative or innovative, and by a desire
to follow the path of least resistance.
In different, a common practice in the Israeli armor force is-
that the upper part of the tank commander's body should be outside
the turret. This position gives the tank commander immediate and
direct knowledge of his environment, and enables him to make choices
at his own discretion. Here the value of "follow me, n as well as the
overall military values concerning the role of it commander corps,
dictate the way in which the tank commander stands during combat
(with his upper body out of the turret). In fact, frequently, in an
attempt to improve his view, a tank commander will stand high in the
turret, and even disobey his commander order to stand low. By
standing with part of his body out of the turret, the tank commander
exposes himself to higher risk only for the sake of active
participation in and correct information about the battle. As a
result of this typical artifact, during all combat in which Israeli
armor participates, tank commanders are at highest risk and have the
most casualties.
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Second is the organization of communication in the tank. This
artifact reflects deeper values is the fundamental disparity in the
use of communication techniques. In a Syrian tank frequently there
is no radio: the tank commanders simply follows their commander, or
strict orders that have been given in advance.. In a higher ranking
commanders' tank (platoon level), the only person who listens to
regimental communication networks is the commander, while the other
crew members have access only to the internal. The network is
designed so that only from the commander position can an individual
member access external networks.
In contrast to the Syrians, a common practice by Israeli crew
members is to listen to all radio channels of command. They do so
despite the fact that it makes the tank radio channel more difficult
to follow. In other words, within a culture of narrow job
definition, the tank driver should listen only to the tank commander:
The function of the driver is explicit and as such his radio system
should be channeled only to his tank commander. In an Israeli tank,
technically each crew member can listen to all channels to which the
tank commander is listening.21
The assumption underlying the last two examples is that each
Israeli individual in combat should have a large amount of accurate
information about the combat, both before and during his unit's
operation. For that matter the Israeli crew must develop informal
21. This is true even if the tank commander is also ~ division
or battalion commander. In this case the tank crew are listening to
the entire division's or battalion's radio channels.
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hierarchical boundaries that consist of a common ability to innovate,
contingent upon broad job definition and social cohesion.
Hence, since the crew's values determine that every individual
shares all information even when such information is not directly
re levant for him. However, the common practice is to try to get a
better view of the close environment and to keep a connection with
the broad picture by listening to the radio. The artifact that
indicates this pattern of sharing information, is rooted in values
such as mutual commitment, and the basic assumption that all Israeli
individuals and groups are in pursuit of a common goal.
Values, rather then structures, are frequently used as a basis to
define combat behavior. The importance and the emphasis~that is
given to the necessity to share information among all ranks in the
Israeli army is case in point. The functional consequences is
twofold: First, it is instrumental in fulfilling an innovative job;
and second, it sets the stage for internal replacement of any crew
member, especially the commander, so that another member can lead the
force. Namely, within the context of sharing information, every
individual and even every unit is replaceable; sharing information is
also the framework that enables a unit to adapt to rapid
environmental and internal structural changes.
In sum, we can confidently assume that further examination of a
military unit's basic assumption that would reveal related behavioral
and performance variables. Social cohesion, based on common values
and basic assumptions, rather on a particular structure in such a
unit is fundamental for implementing the mission.
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CONCLUSION
In this essay we used Schein's (1985) model of organizational culture
to explore the relationship of cultural variables and military
cohesion. The focus on culture should not be interpreted as an
ignorance of other types of variables. In particular, we recognize
the centrality of structural and task (or functional) variables in
determining the relation of military cohesion and performance. These
variables, however, have received more than their fair share of
attention from scholars who have applied social theory to the
analysis of the military organization. The purpose of this paper was
to introduce and examine the contribution of the relatively neglected
dimension of organizational culture to the analysis of military
performance.
The paper challenges some of the structural-functionalist
assumptions that have guided much of the research on organizational
performance. We assert that the overemphasis on linear relations
between structure and function is an inadequate explanation of social
action. The concern with expected consequences typical of
structural-functional explanations, rather than with the causes of
social action that lie in the riealm of culture, often leads to a
distorted view of organizations. Thus, an organizational design
based upon a strict functional and task analysis risks inadequacy by
ignoring cultural variables that mediate, limit, constrain, or
enhance performance. These variables are necessary to explain
organizational diversity under similar conditions. Overconcern with
the expected consequences or the organizational goals, at the expense
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of the causes of a particular social action is analogous to designing
a military unit for an environment characterized by a lack of
ambiguity, "plain, n nclean" and specific combat. Such an approach
suffers from an overdeterministic view of human behavior. In
addition, this approach also manifests an assumption of social
homogeneity, while not considering the diverse origins of the unit
groups and individuals.
To be fair, the structural-functionalist contains the seeds of
Schein~s cultural perspective, manifested in Parsons attempt to
understand the social origins of the organization by proposing the
concept of a cultural value-system. In Parsons' view, an -
organization is tied to society by the value-system which it shares
and by its functional requirement which it can only meet through the
society and which must be satisfied if it is to survive.22 However,
the notion of a semi-independent cultural sub-system is the least
explored one. Hence, by suggesting unidirectional culture diffusion
--from the top down-- the structural-functionalist's approach does
not explore the notion of sub-cultural development, and the reality
of diverse organizations performing within the same "functional"
realm. Hence, a major question remains open: how and why do diverse
organizations arise and operate within the same functional
boundaries.23
22. Parsons Talcott (1965) "an Outline of the Social System",
In Parson ed. Theories of Societies, New York: Free Press, pp 30.
23. The counts r argument that each organ) Nation has some unique
manifest or latent social function Chat explains its specific form
(Merton, 1949) is at best tautological.
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J9.r
Parsons' underutilized notion of a "cultural system" served as
the departure point for Schein's culture framework. Schein's model
is in fact an additional but necessary development of the structural-
functional model, in which cultural variables become endogenous to
the analysis. Thus, the organizational culture framework should be
considered as a theoretical extension which tries to connect the
structural-functional relations among the three basic analytical
levels -- societal, organizational, and group.
Schein's culture model adds two significant dimensions to
organizational analysis: first, a rigorous analysis of the internal
dynamics that account for the uniqueness of a given organizational
culture, rather then the external forces embodied in Parsons' value-
system that mold organizations into a specific societal function.
This enables us to examine sources and processes (rather then the
structure and function) that lead to organizational diversity, and
offers variables (such as leadership and socialization) that are
controllable by decision makers.
Second, Schein's model explains cultural constraints on
organizational performance in situations where pure structural and
functional considerations would! suggest successful outcomes. In
Schein's view, basic assumptions --learned ways of viewing the
world-- often constrain or enhance organizational performance
independently of other variables. This perspective offers decision
makers a way of understanding the limits of structural design
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decisions, as well as those of organizational strategies and
policies. For example, an analysis of the new COHORT MANNING system
that considers Schein's culture framework will provide both the
policy-maker and the military scholar with an important dimension
that is missing from the structural-functionalist perspective.
In sum, the organizational culture framework suggest that
organizational structure is not only a result of external forces, or
inherent in the nature of the organizational goals, function, task or
technology, but a consequence as well as a symbol of the most
fundamental cultural factors that develop within the organization.
Namely, while the structuralist argument emphasizes top down causal
links, and in fact presents a highly constrained and deterministic
image of individual choice and behavior, the cultural argument adds
perspective that is derived from the bottom up and thus emphasizes
variables that are potentially controllable by individual decision
makers as well as other participants. Overall, it adds sets of
cultural variables that must be understood and taken into account by
anyone who would influence the nature of military life, and the
outcomes of military performance.
SOME COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO PROJECT "COHORT MANNING"
Our discussion of the relationship of culture~structure and cohesion
in military setting has a number of implications for project COHORT
MANNING. In essence we claimed that the impact of the structural
arrangements on attitudinal and performance outcomes in meditated by
culture variables that are at least partly independent and should be
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taken into account in the planning stage. COHORT MANNING is
primarily program that defines the structure and the shifts of units.
What impact it will ultimately have on the performance of military
units under various conditions is --if~we are right-- not a simple
question. These outcomes might very quite dramatically under the
same structural conditions as a result of culture variables. An
analysis of these variables might help in designing the project and
in practice its outcomes. AS an example of hypotheses that are
derived from a cultural perspective, we offer the following:
1. T relations between structure and performance
COHORT is necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining
military horizontal-cohesion. Thus, cohesion might disrupted by
contradictory basic assumptions. The racial tension among peers in
the US army in Vietnam, as described by Moskos, is a point in case.
2. The Dynamics Factors:
COHORT socialization can be destructive to vertical-cohesion, by
producing a subculture that rejects external intervention. For
example, John Van Maanen (1983) asserts that as a result of the
cohort structure in the Harvard Business School, its graduates
develop cooperative horizontal values, but are much less conformist
as subordinates. In contrast, at the MIT Sloan School of Management
the graduates are trained individually, and hence friendship among
peers is rare, but graduates are much more conformist as
subordinates.
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socialization in a Cohort unit is designed in an attempt to
"break" the individual as a private citizen, and remold him as a
member of a cohesive unit. A conflict between the values of a person
as a citizen and as a soldier could be developed.
A COHORT scheme blocks the ambitious individuals from promotion:
A soldier who desires to be an officer will find it much more
difficult, not only because of the structural determination, but also
as a consequence of the cohort culture that suppresses individualism
and demands loyalty to the group.
3. Demographic Element - -
A COHORT unit that consists of individuals who enlisted without any
other economic choice will develop low self-esteem and internal
distrust: instead of having an elite spirit, the second-class spirit
will be in force.
4. Ideological Element
The COHORT scheme can develop internal values that will contradict
civilian legal principles such as the military subordination to the
civil political regime, and the ethic and moral foundation of the
society.
4
