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Human Factors in Automated and Robotic Space Systems: Proceedings of a Symposium (1987)
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE)

Page
147
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Page
147
Front Matter (R1-R14)
Symposium Summary (1-10)
Opening Session (11-12)
Welcome (13-14)
Introduction (15-16)
Keynote Address: Human Factors Research for the NASA Space Station (17-28)
Session I: System Productivity: People and Machines (29-30)
Productivity in the Space Station (31-81)
Discussion: Comments on System Productivity: People and Machines (82-86)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (87-88)
Session II: Expert Systems and Their Use (89-90)
AI Systems in the Space Station (91-112)
Expert Systems: Applications in Space (113-141)
Discussion: Comments on Expert Systems and Their Use (142-146)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (147-148)
Session III: Language and Displays for Human-Computer Interaction (149-150)
Change in Human-Computer Interfaces on the Space Station: Why it Needs to Happen and How to Plan for It (151-175)
Cognitive Factors in the Design and Development of Software in the Space Station (176-200)
Discussion: Designing for the Face of the Future: Research Issues in Human-Computer Interaction (201-207)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (208-208)
Session IV: Computer-Aided Monitoring and Decision Making (209-210)
Robustness and Transparency in Intelligent Systems (211-233)
Decision Making-Aided and Unaided (234-262)
Discussion: Issues in Design and Uncertainty (263-274)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (275-276)
Session V: Telepresence and Supervisory Control (277-278)
Teleoperation, Telepresence, and Telorobotics: Research Needs for Space (279-291)
Telerobotics for the Evolving Space Station: Research Needs and Outstanding Problems (292-319)
Discussion: Comments on Telepresence and Supervisory Control (320-322)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (323-326)
Session VI: Social Factors in Productivity and Performance (327-328)
Social Stress, Computer-Mediated Communication Systems, and Human Productivity in Space Stations: A Research Agenda (329-355)
Control, Conflict, and Crisis Management in the Space Station (356-389)
Discussion: Conflict and Stress in the Space Station (390-401)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (402-402)
Session VII: The Human Role in Space Systems (403-404)
The Roles of Humans and Machines in Space (405-417)
Sharing Cognitive Tasks Between People and Computers in Space Systems (418-443)
Discussion: Comments on the Human Role in Space Systems (444-450)
Synopsis of General Audience Discussion (451-452)
Conclusion (453-454)
Concluding Remarks by Allen Newell (455-456)
Concluding Remarks by Thomas B. Sheridan (457-462)
Appendix: Symposium Program (463-464)

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OCR for page 147
SYNOPSIS OF CAL AUDIENCE DIS=JSSION Concerns of several varieties were expressed about the knowledge engineering aspects of e ~ systems. Members of the audience with direct experience with developing expert systems gave these remarks special cogency. Expert systems se ~ to work better where good extensive formulations of the knowledge base already exist. Attempting co Develop anal Knowledge ease ~~ part or One expert system effort often fails. The domains of expert systems are often exceedingly narrow, limited even to the particularity of the individual case. Given the dependence of the knowledge in expert systems upon the informants, there exists a rain danger of poor s`ystems if the human experts are full of erroneous and imperfect knowledge. There is no easy way to root out such bad knowledge. On this last point it was noted that the learning apprentice systems ~ . ~ . .. . . . . . . The human ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ . . alscussea In Mltanellts paper provide some protection. · . . . . experts give advice for the systems to construct explanations of the prior experience, and what the systems learn permanently is only what these explanations support. Thus the explanations operate as a filter on incorrect or incomplete knowledge from the human experts. Concern was expressed about when one could put trust in expert systems and what was require J to validate them. This was seen ~~ a major issue, especially as the communication frum the system Acted towards a clinked "Yes sir, will do". It was pointed out that the Issue Was exactly the same complexity with humans and with machines, in terms of the need to accumulate broad-band experience with the system or human on which to finally build up a sense of trust. Trust an] validation are related to robustness in the sense used in Newell's discussion. It was pointed out that one path is to endow such machines with reasoning for validation at the moment of decision or _ _ _, , . . . .. , _ _ _ action, when the context is available. This at least provides the right type of guarantee, namely that the system will consider some relevant issues before it acts. To make such an approach work requires providing additional global context to the machines, so the information is available on which to make appropriate checks. Finally, there was a discussion to clarify the immediate-knawledge vs search diagram that Newell used to describe the nature of expert systems. One can move along an isobar, trading off less immediate-kna~riedge for more search (moving Can and to the right) or,, 147

OCR for page 148
148 vice-versa, more immediate-knowledge for less search (moving up and to the left). Or one can move toward systems of increased power (moving up acrves the isobars) by pumping in sufficient additional knowledge and/or search in same combination. The actual shape of the equal-performance isobars depends on the task domain being covered. They can behave like hyperbolic asymptotes, where further tradeoff is always possible at the cost of more and more knowledge (say) to reduce search by less and less. But task drains can also be absolutely finite, such that systems with zero search are possible, with all correct response simply known. For these, there comes a point when all relevant knowledge is available, and no further addition of knowledge incrust-= performance. #

Representative terms from entire chapter:

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