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O)N~)~/ CON=ICI, AND CRISIS-M~NT
In TE: SPACE STONES SOCLAL SYSTEM (YEAR 2000)
H. Andrew Mi~hener
THE SPACE STAlIONtS CREW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
This papa discusses the organization of the crew on board ~SA's Space
Station in the year 2000. In line with the work of Sells and GurKlerson
(1972), me Active adcq?~ here is that the crew of the Space
Station is not just as a collection of people but a functionir~ social
Dyson. crew ~ are viewed not just as ir~ivi~s, but as
interdeperxierlt parts in a larger structure.
Urger currant plans, the Apace Station will evolve frmn its earliest
form (called the Initial Operating Configuration, or IOCy, which will
exist approximately in year 1993, to a complex form (here m Called the
Second-Stage Operating Configuration, or SSOC) in your 2000. In the BLOC
(1993), the crew of the Space Station will be small (i.e., 6-8
persons). As the Space Station evolves over time, the crew will grow
in size, and by SSOC (2000) it will have grown to 20-30 persons. It is
possible, of course, to view the crew as a system even when Where are
only 6-8 people on board, as In TOC. However, it becomes increasingly
useful to view human relations in system terms when there are more
persons on board, as in SSOC.
NASA has traditionally placed great emphasis on Careful selection
and intensive training of its crews, and the outstanding performance of
NA5A crews aloft attests to the suers of this approach. Selection
and training will continue to play an important part In TOC and SSOC
Space Station Operations. Nevertheless, as ache Space Station evolves
from TOC to SSOC, NA5A will find that it must rely less on selection
am more on intentional design of the on-board social s~rsten to achieve
adequate performance by the crew.
m is will ~ ur because the gr ~ h
on size wall render the crew ~ncr-~=ingly less a collection of
individuals and increasingly more a system with emergent properties.
During the evolution from IOC (1993) to SSOC (2000), important changes
will occur in the social system on board. Not only will the system
increase in size, but it will become differentiated into distinct
subgroups and more complex in structure. These evolutionary changes
will not only affect the Space Station's performance, but also
determine the types of pro bless and failures that occur within the
social system on board.
356
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357
The main purpose of this paper is to assist NASA in developing a
research agenda for the SSOC social system. It ~st be recognized,
however, that neither the IOC nor the SSOC social systems exist today.
This means that reseal ~ is p~vblerratic, because there is no way ~ t
one con ~;reCtly observe these systems or take measurements on them at
this point in time. Slice the IOC and SSOC social systems are yet to
be developed, the essential Question is not research, but planning and
d~siqn--what shape and structure will these systems have and how will
they function. Research becomes useful primarily as an adjunct to the
design problem; that is, it becomes useful to the extent that it
improves some social system designs or eliminates same candidate
designs from further consideration.
To develop research ideas for SSOC, this paper first describes ways
in which the SSOC social system will differ frog the IOC social
system. Next, it discusses three operating problems that may be more
troublesome in SSOC than in IOC. These are (a) supervising and
controlling the diversity of payload activities, (b) hi the
relationship between ctifferentia~ sorrows of crew Myers, with its
potential for intergroup conflict, arxI (c) responding to
viromnenta~ly-induced crises. Finally, sine avenues of research are
suggested regarding these operating problems.
PAR~G ~ IOC AND THE SSOC SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Social Systems in Space
Social systems In space Operate order parameters different fern social
systems on Earth. These parameters, which apply to both the IOC and
SSOC social systems, include:
(a) Perilous ~viro~nt. In contrast to most Earth-based social
systems, the ~ r on board the Space Station (arx! on any Space vehicle)
will face a perilous environment (~ crc gravity, no oxygen) and require
complex life-support. Crew members will face significant hazards and
risks to life.
(b) Relative Isolation. m e social system on the Space Station will
be isolate] from other social systems and fin many respects) self
contained. It will be in contact with Earth only via
teleccmmun1cations, and hence it potentially has some degree of
independence Frau Mission Control on Earth.
(c) Long Duration. m e social systems on board the Space Station,
while transitory compared with those on Earth, will remain An space for
increasingly long *orations. Spans Station crew members will fly
missions that endure 90 days. (me Space Station itself may continue
usefully in orbit for 20-30 years.) From the standpoint of individual
crew members, long-5uration missions may entail stress, psychologist
depression, and diminished performance (Blush, 1980, 1981; Cunningham,
1977; Oberg, 1981).
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358
Exagenously Matted Charges in SSOC
me e~rirorment faced by the Space Station's crew In SSOC will be just
as perilous as that in IOC. However, the Space Station's social system
will not rain constant. NASA has already marinated Canaan Shames In
the social system that are to ~ bets rem IOC (1993) arm SSOC
(2000~. -these yes include:
barge in yew Size
One difference between IOC and SSOC is ye size of the crew on board
ache Space Station. ~ IOC, the yew will be small (6-8 persons) .
SSOC, the crew size will be la By', perhaps 20-30 or even more. mis
increase in size will be made possible by the physical expansion of the
Station. Mbst of the~added crew members in SS0C will be Payload
Specialists, not Astronaut Pilots.
Change in Crew Composition
Several important changes in the composition of the crew will occur
between IOC and SSOC. First, the Japanese and European Space Agencies
wit 1 attach modules to the Space Station in SSOC and place then' own
Astronauts aboard. Whereas the IOC crew will consist of U~A-N~SA
personnel, the SSOC crew will include substantial numbers of several
distinct nationality subgroups: USA, Japan, Europe.
A second change to occur concerns the skill mix of the crew. In
IOC, most crew members will be Astronaut Pilots. In SSOC, there will
obviously still be some Astronaut Pilots on board, but the crew will
include many more Payload Specialists than In TOC. Some calculations
illustrate this point. If it takes two Astronaut Pilots to fly the
Space Station at one time, then a total of four persons will be needed
to fly the Space Station around the clock (assum m g that flight
Operations are never left unattended and that Astronauts work 12 hours
at a stretch.) m e implication is that, in IOC, at lent hoof the crew
members will spend their time flying the Space Station, not conducting
payload operations. me situation In SSOC will be more favorable,
because the number of persons needed to fly the Space Station will
presumably remain about the same (despite the larger physical size of
the Station); most of the additional persons on boar] in SSOC will be
Payload Specialists, who can devote their time to scientific or
manufacturing productivity.
A third change, less well defined at this point, concerns the genre'
Max of the crew ~ SSOC. MESA has shown that it intents to put women
in space, although missions to date have been male dominated.
Presumably the crew of the Space Station will include some women. With
the move from IOC to SSOC, and the accompanying increase in crew size,
there may be opportunity to move the ratio of females/males on board
closer to 1.00, shed NOVA Apt to do this.
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Charge ~ Mission sta~rrent arm Goals
In IOC, the primary mission goals will be, first, to fly the Space
Station arm, second, to construct large Space structures, i.e., expand
the physical stature of the Space Station Arcing cc~nents fiction up
via the Shuttle (Danford et al., 1983~. These goals will dc~ub~ess
apply to SSOC as well.
In SSOC, however, the increased number of Payload Specialists on
board will permit other goals to be pursued. These goals may include
manufacturing and materials processing under conditions of
micro-gravity, and tending and repairing communications Elites.
Other objectives may include conducting scientific experiments,
carrying out remote sensing and meteorological mod taring, and engaging
in flight support (assembly, ma mtenance, checkout, launch, recovery)
for manned or unmanned LEO transfer missions (Danford et al., 1983)
Overall, the goals pursued by the crew members in SSOC will be more
complex and diverse than those in IOC. Expressed more formally, the
SSOC social system will be attempting to optimize what may be construed
as a highly complex mLlti-abjective function (Feeney and Raiffa, 1976).
Change in Onboard AI and Computerization
Current plans for the Space Station Call for an increasing use of
artificial Intelligence (AI) and expert systems over time. me extent
to With AT can be used In TOC and SSOC deperxis both on ache
capabilities of the Space Station's Muters and on the software
itself.
In past missions, the Maters on board NP5A's space vehicles have
not been powerful, due In part to limitations imp by Eibysi~1 size
-and weight. The situation will be sc~at better In TOC. Plans
indicate that TOC Will include scene AT systems, a1Jchough these will be
sn~ll-t~moderate in size. NA5A will, of course, use mainframe
computers on Earth, and these may supplement ache AI routines of the
Space Station's smaller onboard computers. Some AI systems on board
will prod ably serve as consulting devices for the diagnosis of hardware
failures. Other onboard ccmputerization may involve scheduling of crew
activities and maintenance of databases (e.g., materials inventory).
By SSOC, the computers on boar] the Space Station will be faster and
capable of running large AI programs. Moreover, the software will have
evolved ~ th experience on boar] the Space Station, and will become
more wide-ranging in its capacities. Thus, AI and expert systems will
be more prominent in SSOC than In IOC, and SSOC will be more automated.
From the standpoint of the social system, the evolution of
computerization is relevant because AT will become integral to onkoard
decision-making. By SSOC, the AT soft ware will be able not only to
diagnose hardware failures, but also ~ schedule human activities and
perhaps even to resolve conflicts amoral hens r~ardi~ priority of
Jives.
-
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Grouch Structural Charges in SSOC
The exogenous Ages markets by NOVA for SSOC, as list abjure, will
bring about Tnar.y changes in the into organization of the SSOC
social system. Of course. because neither the TOC nor the SSOC social
systems exist today, one m nnot draw firm conclusions about their
structural properties or performance under specified conditions.
Nevertheless, by considering the proposed systems in light of research
findings on Earth-based social systems and earlier space-flight social
systems, some plausible conjectures can be made regarding their
structure and performance. It seems fairly clear that the SSOC social
system, as contrasted with the TOC system, will be mare complex, more
differentiated into subgroups, and more decentralized with respect to
decision-ma-ding.
Complexity
m e SSOC social system will be far more complex than that in IOC. me
SSOC social system will Include more members (20-30, rather than 6-8),
and the complexity of the system will increase nonlinearly with crew
size. The primary source of this increased complexity is not just
larger crew size per se, but rather the fact that the system's growth
will occur via differentiation (elaborated subgoals and subgroups) an]
not via segmentation (Sutherland, 1975; cacti, 3979~.
This increase in complexity is refle ~ , for instance, in the
number of communication channels in TOC as contrasted with that in
SSOC. With 8 crew members in TOC, there are 28 channels (assuming that
each channel is 2-way and that a crew member does not require a channel
to communicate with himself); with 30 crew m ~ ~ SSOC, there are
435 channels. Thus, a 4-fold increase in crew size produces a 16-fold
increase in channels. Of course, it may be the case in~SSOC that every
crew member will not have a need to communicate with all others, but
the increase in structural complexity is nevertheless clear.
Increased complexity Will show up not merely in structural measures
but also in functional ones. For instance, complexly might become
apparent in slower response to emergencies or crises. Today there is
no way to measure the response-t~me performance of the SSOC social
system. Could one do this, however, ff,e SSOC social system might
emerge as slacker (and less predictable) Man the TOC sly; Men
resporxli~ to such urgencies as fire on board or a collision with
space debris. To mobilize 20-30 persons scat~cered In several Mules
fin SSOC) will probably take refire time In to mc~bilize 6-8 in one
mile fin IOC).
Differentiation
The social system in SSOC will be far more differentiated that is,
composed of subgroups with distinct identities--than the social system
in IOC. The bases for this differentiation will be national origin and
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task specialization; there may also be some subgroup differentiation
based on gender.
Under current plans,
Station between TOC and
-
NASA will add physical mcOules to the Space
SSOC, causing an evolutionary expansion in
size. NASA itself will supply some meddles, but others will come from
foreign space agencies (Japan, Europe). Hence, the crew on board the
SSOC Space Station will consist of persons from all three space
agencies (USA, Japan, Europe), possibly in proportion to the financial
contribution by various participating nations. This means the SSOC
crew will consist of subgrc ups that (a) have different national origin
(US, Japan, Eurcpe--Brita m, France, Germany, Italy), (b) have
different native languages, (c) have different skin color and racial
characteristics, making group membership readily visible, (~) have
different moral and religious belief systems, and (e) perhaps have
different goals and long-term agendas. This SSOC crew profile differs
sharply from the far more homogeneous TOC crew profile; in TOC the crew
will be single nationality (primarily or entirely USA), single
language, consonant beliefs, unitary goals, single command structure on
the ground (NASA), etc.
Crew members from the three space agencies will, at least to some
degree, constitute distinct subgroups on board the SSOC Space Station.
Of course, the use of a single language (English) on board will help to
lessen subgroup differentiation. Nevertheless, an extrapolation from
research on Earth-based social systems suggests that different= ~ the
factors noted above (nationality, skin color, native language, belief
systems), reinforced by N~SA's plan to ho use together persons from a
given country in their own module, will cause the subgroups to have at
least a moderate degree of ~n-group identification and wel1_def~ne]
boundaries (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Wilder, 1986; Brewer and Campbell,
1976).
Another basis for subgroup differentiation present in SSOC (but not
in IOC) is task specialization. As noted above, both IOC and SSOC will
have Astronaut Pilots, but SSOC will have many additional Payload
Specialists. m e SSOC crew, for instance, may include such diverse
specialists as a university astrophysicist a commercial materials
,
. . . . . . .
eng beer, and a national security 1nt~lllgence analyst.
m e Astronaut Pilots in SSOC may view themselves as a distinct
subgroup within the larger social system. They will have similar
backgrounds, perform similar activities, and work for the same employer
on the ground (ROSA). Whether the Payload Specialists in SSOC will
view themERIves as a second distinct subgroup is less clear, because
they may differ significantly among theism ves. That is, the
Specialists will come from a range of educational backgrounds, work for
different employers on Earth, pursue a diversity of objectives while on
board the Space Station, an] perhaps even operate under orders to keep
their activities secret from others on board. If se me Payload
Specialists work interdependently on tasks or report to similar
cognacs on Earth, there is he possibility that they will form
identifiably distinct, functioning subgroups on the SSOC Span=
Station.
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Decentralization
The social system An SSOC will be more decentralized than that in IOC.
Ih other words, dec~sion-making will be distributed more widely across
persons in SSOC than in IOC. Supervisory control over various
functions will shift away from a central command an] reside instead
with a diversity of specialists.
Pressures toward decentralization of decision-making and control in
SSOC will come frum several sources. First, as the Space Station
evolves f ~ u TOC to SSOC, there will be a change in the Station's
mission. Payload operations will become more prevalent and important.
As a result, the activities on boar] will become more differentiated
and specialized (e.g., materials processing under ~ crogravity,
satellite servicing, and conduct of experiments). Most of these new
activities will be expertise-based, and they will be controlled by the
only persons on board who know how to do them (i.e., Payload
Specialists, not Astronaut Pilots). The expansion of expertise on
board in SSOC will coincide with decentralization of decision-ma-ding.
Many Payload Specialists in SSOC will be employees not of ROSA, but
of other organizations on Earth. One implication is that the Payload
Specialists presumably will report to different supervisors on the
ground. This fact will conduce toward more decentralization of
decision-making on beard the Space Station.
OPERATING PROBIEM5 FACING THE SSOC SOCIAL SYSTEM
As detailed above, the social system on board the Space Station will
undergo significant structural changes from IOC to SSOC. m e system
will experience a change in mission statement, grow in complexity,
differentiate into subgroups, and decentralize in decision-making.
mese shifts will produce operating problems for the SSOC social system
that were not present In IOC. Although one can doubtless identify many
such problems, three are of special interest here. These are singled
out not only because they pose special threats loo overall mission
performance, but also because they potentially can be mitigated (if not
eliminated) through design and research efforts. The three are:
(a) The SSOC system will face problems with supervisory-control
functions that were not present in TOC. m e burden of coordination
will be greater, because the SSOC system will include distinct national
subgroups as well as more task-specialization subgroups than TOC.
Coordination of activities will be more problematic in SSOC, in part
because decision-making will be more decentralized.
To some degree, the problems with suFervisory-control functions can
be addressed through design efforts prior to SSOC. The broad
resear~V~esign issue for NASA is mat type of s~pervisory~ontrol
structure will best serve the SSOC system, In the sense of providing
greatest efficiency and highest probability of mission success.
(b) The SSOC system will pose risks of intergroup conflict that were
not present in IOC. The presence on beard of several distinct
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subgroups, with potentially opposing interests and objectives,
ncr-~.=es the prospect of conflict.
The broad research/design question for NASA is what safeguards to
build into the system to reduce tee probability of overt conflict
occurring. A related question is what can be done to assure that any
conflicts that do arise are resolved constructively.
(c) The SSOC system may have more difficulty than the IOC system in
coping with crises (e.g., fire on board, collision with space debris,
etc.). The SSOC social system will probably have more resources than
the IOC system for coping with many crises. At the same time, the SSOC
system --with its greater degree of differentiation and
decentralization--may be worse-off organizationally than IOC and have
more difficulty mobilizing to deal with crises.
The broad research/design question for MESA is how best to structure
the SSOC social system so that it can mobilize adequately deco d-~1 with
e e
VarlO*US crises.
The following sections discuss each of theme problems in turn.
Primary focus is on ache nature and genesis of the problems. Attention
is also given to design issues--that is, to Hat research ght be done
by NOVA prior to SSOC to Litigate these problems.
SUPERVISORY-CONIRDL AND OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE
The topic-of supervisory control by humans on boar] the Space Station
has several dimensions. First, there is the matter of humans' reliance
on and control over machines. Under current plans, the Space Station's
physical subsystems will include many sensors and control devices to
monitor and regulate automatically a variety of outcomes, Including
life-support, power sources and management, flight control, thermal
control, and traffic control. Thus, when interfacing with machines,
the crew members on boar] will enter the Space Station's control
. ~ . ~ .. . . ~ ~ ~ .
process only in a high-level monitoring, trcubleshootlng, and
decision-ma-ding capacity (Kurtzman et al., 1983; Van Tiesenhausen,
1982).
A second aspect of supervisory control on the Space Station is the
regulation of crew members' activities by other crew members. This
topic is of interest here because there will be a shift in the Space
Station's onboard supervisory-control structure during the evolution
from IOC to SSOC. The following discusses some aspects of this change.
The Supervisory-Control Structure
A_ used here, the term sunervisorv-control structure refers to than
_ . . . .
nunctlonal subsystem on board the Space Station which (a) regulates
crew activity in the interest of attaining system goals' (b) makes
choices among collective behavioral alternatives, and (c) handles
dissent, including the treatment of noncompliance by crew members.
In social systems on Earth, supervisory-control structures (often
called "authority" systems) typically specify who makes what decisions,
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who evalll~t=C whose performance, and who influences t gives orders to)
wham. No doubt the supervisory-control structure on the Space Station
will entail such specifications, with the added characteristic that
some prerogatives will reside with crew members on the Space Station
while others will inure with N~SA personnel on the ground.
Supervisory-control structures can assume a wide variety of forms.
For instance, at one extreme there is the archetypical military command
model with hierarchical lines of authority an, command. In pyramided
structures of this type, control flows from the top down, while
information flows up (M~sarovic et al., 1970). At another extreme
there is the equalit~rian model with a flat authority structure. In
the Space Station context, such a model might consist of equally-ranked
Astronauts aloft, not taking orders from a crew member on board, but
each reporting to someone on Earth. A third supervisory-control
structure--falling between the extremes of hierarchy and equali~y--is
the heterarchy. A heterarchic=1 structure is one that resembles a
network, the nodes of which are relatively independent control systems
and the Arcs of which are the lines of communication passing between
the nodes (Sutherland, 3975~. On the Spare Station, the nod== in such a
structure might be individual Task Specialists, or possibly teams of
Socialists.
It follows that one important research/~-=ign issue is exactly which
supervisory-control structure should be deployed on board the Space
Station. Since this issue is important both in TOC and in SSOC, it is
useful first to look briefly at the TOC situation.
Supervisory-Control Structure in IOC
The main objectives of the Space Station crew during IOC will be to fly
the Station and to expand its physical structure (add new habitation
mc~ules and platforms). Any of several alternative supervisory-control
structures might suffice in IOC to accomplish these objectives,
although some structures are probably better than others. m e
question, then, is which to deploy. NINA might base its choice on such
procedures as trial-and-error or extrapolation from previous experience
with space flight supervision. Alternatively, systematic research
cad be used to narrow the choice by eliminating sane carxli~te
structures.
More Specifically, NIP ght correct simulations on the gray to
test varicus outlines from different super~risory~ontrol structures.
Sit rations might be done under conditions that closely replicate those
found in space ~ e.g., high stress, high noise, restricted
communication, 90-5ay duration, backs similar to those done in space,
and so on. important outcome Measures include productivity levels,
crew satisfaction, lack of conflict, adequacy of response to
emergencies, etc. Multiple replications could be run on each of
several alternative supervisory-control structures using standard
experimental designs. m e results should provide a fair idea of how
the alternative supervisory-control structures will perform.
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365
Without the results of such I, it is hard to maw what type
of structure will eventually be deployed. A plausible conjecture,
however, is that the Space Station's TOC supervisory control structure
twill, at least to she degree, risible a starboard "military c~narx]
Gel" with hierar~hi~1 1~= of authority arm Inane. There is a
general terxiengy for grams facing perilous er~viro~Tents to organize
ff~elves hierarchically, primarily because it strengthens their
capacity to reexport] to emergencies and crises (Helmreich, 1983;
Harrison and Cormors, 1984). This pattern maurs not only in Space
missions, but ~ submarines, under~;eas r~r~ vessels, North Sea oil
rigs, and polar expeditions. mast likely, the IOC system will be no
exception.
March the su~risory control structure on board during IOC will
presumably involve a designated "Mission demander" (or same such
title) with authority to issue orders to subordinates. Of ~ urge, the
6 or 8 Astronauts on b ~ Curing TOC are going to be competent,
skilled, and resourceful persons. They will have been selected via a
rigorous scree mng process, and there will be little reason to doubt
their capacity for decisive action. Nevertheless, their roles will be
fairly restrictive and afford little independence, and they will
essentially be taking orders frog Mission Control on Earth and from
their Mission Commander on board the Space Station.
Relations Between the Crew and Mission Control
Both ~ TOC and in SSOC, one research/design issue deserving
consideration by NASA is the exact allocation of control between
Mission Control on Earth and the crew on the Space Station. The
viewpoint taken here is that the Space Station will not be "autonomous"
or independent of Mission Control. Because many mom taring and control
functions are better performed on the ground than in space, Mission
Control will exert considerable influence over a wide range of crow
members' activities and decisions throughout TOC. Crew members,
however, will probably retain control over such things as the inventory
of items ~ board the Space Station and the flaw of traffic in and
art the Space Static.
Mbre problematic is whether crew meters will have control over the
school ire of heir awn day~to~ay activities. C>n one hat], Mission
Control ne ~ s ass ~ r ~ that ~ w m ~ en; are performir~ adeq lately and
thus may wish to exercise strong supervision aver sche*u1e=. On the
other hand, tasks which are easy to perform on Earth may consume great
time and energy under m1crogravity in space (Sloan, 1979~. m is may
reuse Mission Control to expect too much and cculd lead to
oversch-~lHing of daily activities by personnel on the ground.
Excessive regulation of crew schedules by Fission Control can
produce role overload on space missions (Helmreich et al., 1979). Even
worse, lock step regulation of the crew's scheme by Mission Control
sight result in such labor prcb1ems as the well-publicized one-~ay
"strike in spaces' that occurred *tiring the 1973 Skylab mission
(BaIbaky, 1980; Cooper, 1976~. To achieve a workable balance, what the
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Space Station news is an arrar~gement whey Mission Control can
specify (lor~er-=nge) goals to be achieved, File crew I; can
express and to sane Three enforce thew preferences Ranier local
work flar and task-allocation.
One approach to such an arrangement is bask on experience in
earlier Space missions. Both the Hessians and Americans have report
sane success with t=.~k-assig~nt prepares wherry elisions
r~arli~ mission art related tacks are made ladler the hierarchical
meet, and decisions r~ardir~ offer activities and tiering
arrangements are made d~ratim=1ly honor and Rev, 1975; Nelson,
1973~. Although promising, these results pertain primarily to
short~uration missions, and their applicability to forger duration
missions is still an ppen question subject to further research.
Another approach to the issue of day-t ~ day task so flirt is to
rely heavily on co mpu~=r software. This approach will be relevant in
SSOC, and may also be applicable in TOC. Many large projects of
various types are managed on Earth today via project planning
software. Task scheduling on the TOC Space Station wit 1 probably not
be so complex as to require software more elaborate than that available
today. In fact, computer software for project management on the Space
Station will not only be useful ~ achieving optimal allocation of
tasks to crew members, but may even emerge as a tool for conflict
resolution between the Space Station crew and Mission Control.
Supervisory Control Structure in SSOC
As noted above, the social system in SSOC will be larger, Ire cc~r~lex,
more differentiated, and more decentralized than that in TOC. En
consequence, the supervisory-control structure in SSOC will be more
elaborate than that in TOC and probably will assume a fundamcnt~lly
different form. -
Functions of Supervisory-Control in SSOC
the SSOC supervisory-control structure must be geared to handle many of
the same functions as the TOC system. These include flying the Space
Station, coordinating with Mission Control on Earth, and building
(expanding) the Space Station. In addition, it will have to handle
other functions, such as processing materials and servicing sad,
as well as serving as a node in a larger communication and
transportation network in space.
The SSOC social system will include not only Astronaut Pilots, but
also a large number of Payload Specialists (perhaps as many as 20 of
them). Regulation of these Specialists may prove a complicated task.
Mbst Payload Specialists will be highly educated professionals
knowledgeable in theft respective specialties. Many will be accustomed
by prior employment to working under supervisory-control structures
permitting a high degree of independence and autonomy. On the Space
Station, they may be performing activities (such as research) that are
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stress. The hierarchical structure will enable the TOC system to focus
resources, restrict non-adaptive responses (such as argumentation or
countermanding), and achieve an adequate level of communication among
crew members. In general, it can provide the high level of
interpersonal organization needed to respond to crises.
crisis Management in SSOC
m e SSOC social system will have more resources than the IOC system to
deal with crises. For example, its hardware may have better sensors to
anticipate crisis-precipitating events before they happen, its
expert-system software may provide more accurate diagnoses of problems,
and its crew may include a greater mix of skills useful during crises.
Nevertheless, crisis-management in SSOC will present its own problems.
The incidence of crib== may be higher in SSOC than An IOC, because
there will be more things to go wrong. There will be more crew members
to get sick, more area to get hit by space debris, mo ~ big-experiments
to blow up, more on-board hardware to men function, etc. Moreover, the
organizational form of the SSOC social system will make it more
difficult to respond adequately to crises. m e SSOC system may have
more difficulty switching from normal operating mode to crisis
operating mode than the IOC system.
m e SSOC social system will be larger, more complex, and mare
differentiated than IOC. Mbreaver, as noted above, supervisory-controa
and decision-making in SSOC will be decentralized in normal operating
mode. The presence of different nationality groups and of many Payload
Specialists performing diverse tasks will create a heterarchira
supervisory-control structure. If a crisis arises. the
supervisory-control structure in SSOC must coordinate the response of
-distinct subgroups living m different physical modules and pursuing
divergent goals. This task is not Impossible, but it will be more
difficult than in IOC.
An all likelihood a shift f ~~` normal coeratinq mode to crisis
operas m g mcde in SSOC will entail a quick move fr~u a decentralize]
heterarchi~1 structure to a centralized hierarchical one. Failure to
move back to a hierarchy during a crisis in SSOC will leave the system
vulnerable. If the Space Station relied on a decentralized system
during cuss, it would risk lack of coordination among crew members,
less-than-optimal deployment of resources to dP=1 with the problem, and
perhaps even disagree corer the best type of reimpose to the
eme~er~cy.
Although a shift frown heterarthy deco hey during crisis seems
Vilely, the exact form of SSOC Command during crises is an ~
resign issue. Danford et al. (1983) have suggested that it
would be appropriate to have control during crisis rest In the hares of
a Specialized safety officer or "Isis lead This sth~ he scone
merit, but it may also create excessive c~lexi~ because Mat it
reins yet anther fond of control beyond the heterar~hy-plus-Mission
Sparkler stnlature discuss above. A superior alternative might be
OCR for page 380
380
simply to r~ntralize contact during a crisis arourx:] brie regular
leader (Mission Smarter).
R~n~lization art the Mission Snarler will work best if NASA
trains Sew I; ~ specific skills for d-~1 ing with different
of crises. That is, scone chew Seers will be specialists ~ Cupid
with one type of crisis and other crier Hers with another type of
crisis. Thus, when a crisis occurs, ~ thins will happen. First,
Sew ~ will a ordinate Acura the Mission ~mnand~r; and record,
the Mission demander, assists by those persons So are specialists in
the particular type of crisis at hard, will direr the efforts of the
entire crew to cope with the Wendy. This approach brings both
special Mortise and str~hened Hand to bear in a crisis.
A related rcsear~V~esign issue concerns the use of AT art
cauterization to aid decision-maki~ *tiring crises. Expert systems
that diagnose the causes of handle failures will be Rational
increasingly as the Space Station moves Frau TOC to SSOC, and these may
impose the ~ and accuracy of the arew's efforts during crises.
To some degree, ~ systems will be able to supplant (even
supplant) ache knowledge arx] Mortise of Sew members. On the other
hall, use of AI system= in the analysis and diagnosis of
life-threatening events raises the issue of tn~st--to Hat extent will
crew ~ trust software-based diagnoses. Ibe use of AT may affect
He only how the cam is organized to Ape with crises, but also Hat
mix of skills is (and is not) plank on by and has crew Ha; are
trained. mese are matters that can be a~c~'essec] through research art
design efforts.
One final rest arch/design issue concerns the impact of
computer-mediated communication during crises. As noted above,
computer-mediated communication will be even more important and
prevalent in SSOC than in IOC. Whether ccmputer-mediated communication
enhances or inhibits satisfactory responses to crises is an open
question. It was noted above that computer-mediate] communication may
be less effective than face-to-face communication for reaching
consensus on issues where the "correct" answer is not civic us. Some
crises on board the Space Station may have clear-cut diagnoses, but for
those that do not, computer-mediated communication may prove more a
liability than an asset in achieving adequate response from the crew.
m e ~ m~effectiven-~c of computer-mediated communication during crises
an important research topic.
St~RY OF RESEARCH AND DESIGN ISSUES
This paper has discussed issues that arise in the de-sign of the SSOC
social system. Attention has been given to three broad problem areas:
(a) the characteristics of the SSOC supervisory-control structure, (b)
the potential for conflict within the crew, and (c) the capacity of the
SSOC system to resporx3 to crises if they arise. Specific research
suggestions are satirized belay.
OCR for page 381
381
Issues Regarding SSOC S~rvisory~ontrol
C>ne important zesear=/design issue for NOVA is what type of
s~pervisory~ontrol stnlcLure will best serve the SSOC social system,
In the sense of pr~ridir~ the greatest efficier~c~r and highest
probability of mission success.
mere am a wide Variety of
su~risory control structures that might be deployed on board the
Space Station- hierarchical, eq~litarian, heterar~im~1
exact nature of the system to be used is an open issue.
It he been pry here that the Space Station's
. . . . . . .. _
. ,
etc.--ar~ the
su ~ isory-control structure will take the form of a hierar ~ y ~ IOC,
and that it may subsequently shift in the direction of a heterarchy in
SSOC. This is really no more than a conjecture, however. MESA can
make decisions regarding the form of supervisory-control structure to
be used in IOC and SSOC on the basis of trial-and-error or past
experience with space flight s ~ lesion. Alternativelv. it Fort make
. , . ~ _ _, , _ _ _ _ _,—_ _
them on the basis of research findings, such as those Obtainable form
s;~n~lations conducted on the ground.
Specifically, it was suggest above that NPJ;A fright conduct
situations to test various outcomes fen different su~isory control
spruces. -these simulations would tee done under conditions that
clo ~ ly replicate those fauna in space e.g., high stress, high noise,
restricted communication. GO-dav duration. tacks similar to those done
~ _ _ , ~
m space, an] so on. Major outcome measures include productivity
levels, crew satisfaction. lack of conflict. adeouacv of response to
emergencies, etc.
. . ~
~ , , , _ _ _, _
Multiple replications could be run on each of
several alternative supervisory-control structures using experimental
designs. m e results should provide a ~ eful indication of how the
alternative supervisory-control structures will perform ~ space.
One design s~b-problem is to determine the appropriate division of
control between Space Station crew and Mission Control on Earth. One
concrete manifestation of this problem is the issue of who should have
control Corer the crew's ~y-~ay task assignments. Various
suggestions, include the use of AI project playgirl software to
abolish task Figments, were di =~.
A second ~l~;ign sub~pmblem is to determine the appropriate division
of control within ye Space Station's crew. Feebly ache Task
Specialist n SSOC will be afforded =~me Force of independence with
rye to they particular activities, but ye exact range ~ unclear.
The Mission ~=r's role during SSOC will likely shift to
coordination of other's activities, but the exact definition of the
vle's purgatives arm powers is problematic.
A relay issue is the selection criteria ~dir~ chew officers;
this mate s made more complex by the illusion of Few ~ freon
other space agencies (Japan, Europe).
Nether the role of Mission
Snarler will be restrict ~ Nay Astrcnauts or Open to Few i;
fan other countries is a realign issue that NINA might
address.
OCR for page 382
382
Issues firm for Conflict ~ SSOC
the risks of ~nter~onal and inter conflict will be greater in
SSOC Off n IOC. This is ~ e In part because the SSOC system will
include many Urns with distinct identities (Task
Specialists/AsJcranztuts; and U~/Japan/~). The broad
resear~Vdesign question for NINA is wit saf~uan~ to build into the
SSOC system to reduce the probability of overt conflict concurring, anti
to resolve conflict if it occur';.
A wide variety of steps can be taken ~ the design of the SSOC
pysten to reduce the probability of conflict. Son discussed in this
pair include:
(a) Specify Objective functionts) for the SSOC crew such that the
attainment of goals by one ~ does not prevent the attainment of
gals by other ~r~(s). Approach; to this include the use of
superordinate goals and game-theoretic analysis of slalom
interaction. One implemn=tion ought involve ~t~ software
(project scheduler routines) to ppti~nize not just productivity, but also
grcup Overlap.
(3~) Incorporate }~a~-~ roles ~ the SSOC social system.
An Open question is how to interface these roles with the activities of
the Space Station's Mission O=a~r and over officers.
(c) Structure Interpersonal contact amazing crew merrd3ers to promote
cohesive ram polarizing relations ac ~ s the s ~ r ~ In SSOC. ~ w
members flight be assigned tasks with an eye to creating interdependence
and cross-linkages between nationality grcup6. Like wise, module living
and sleeping assignments sight be made to pro mote contact across
nationality groups.
(~) Use of the communication media on board the Space Station to
promote non-polarizing interpersonal contact and cross-linkages between
members of subgroups. Cc mputer-mediated communication ~ especially
probl ~ tic in this respect, for it may worsen, not improve, the
prospects for intergroup conflict. N~SA may wish to develop some rules
or ''etiquette" regarding use of computers for communication.
(e) Then moving frill IOC toward SSOC, MESA may need to make some
adjustments in the criteria used to select crew members and in the
content of Astronaut training. In this regard, a researchydesign issue
for NASA is to discover which personal attributes of crew markers best
serve to enhance linkages between subgroups in SSOC. Another issue is
to determine what conflict resolution skills should be taught to crew
Hers.
Issues Regarding Response to Crises in SSOC
Ibe SSOC social system may have more ctifficul~r than the TOC system
mobilizing to de=1 with various Arises arm Urgencies on board. This
will occur not only because SSOC is a larger system, but also because
it is more heterar~i~a~ ~ fond with decentralized decision-~kir~.
lhe broad redesign question for USA is how best to structure
the SSOC social system so that it can mobilize adequately for crises.
OCR for page 383
383
Sam writer; have suggest placing control during crises in the hams
of a Specialized safety officer or "crisis leader." This proposal has
scam merit, but a better alternative may be to realize conch
art the regular Mission ~mnander. NOVA may wish to investigate
this r~ear~V5esign issue more closely.
Spreader, NASA might investigate the use of AI expert systems to
help d=~] with crises~e software sys~cern Ames the crisis advisor,
assisting or even supplanting human decision-makir~. Use of expert
systems in this context may improve diagnosis of the prdblen, as well
as ~# speed arm accuracy of rinse to the emerger~cy.
Finally, NASA may wish to investigate the (in)effecti~reness of
cc~uter-~;ated Fornication during crises. Nether
~ter-media~ ~mn~nication Lances or ir~ibits Senses to
crime= is an ppen question.
She crises on Card the Space Station
may nave clear cut Diagnose:;, but for those that do not,
~~=r-~;ated cc~nication may preread or diminish an adequate
repose freon the crew. The effects of c~ter-mediation on
Fornication during crises merits scrutiny.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
ssoc social
