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O)N~)~/ CON=ICI, AND CRISIS-M~NT In TE: SPACE STONES SOCLAL SYSTEM (YEAR 2000) H. Andrew Mi~hener THE SPACE STAlIONtS CREW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM This papa discusses the organization of the crew on board ~SA's Space Station in the year 2000. In line with the work of Sells and GurKlerson (1972), me Active adcq?~ here is that the crew of the Space Station is not just as a collection of people but a functionir~ social Dyson. crew ~ are viewed not just as ir~ivi~s, but as interdeperxierlt parts in a larger structure. Urger currant plans, the Apace Station will evolve frmn its earliest form (called the Initial Operating Configuration, or IOCy, which will exist approximately in year 1993, to a complex form (here m Called the Second-Stage Operating Configuration, or SSOC) in your 2000. In the BLOC (1993), the crew of the Space Station will be small (i.e., 6-8 persons). As the Space Station evolves over time, the crew will grow in size, and by SSOC (2000) it will have grown to 20-30 persons. It is possible, of course, to view the crew as a system even when Where are only 6-8 people on board, as In TOC. However, it becomes increasingly useful to view human relations in system terms when there are more persons on board, as in SSOC. NASA has traditionally placed great emphasis on Careful selection and intensive training of its crews, and the outstanding performance of NA5A crews aloft attests to the suers of this approach. Selection and training will continue to play an important part In TOC and SSOC Space Station Operations. Nevertheless, as ache Space Station evolves from TOC to SSOC, NA5A will find that it must rely less on selection am more on intentional design of the on-board social s~rsten to achieve adequate performance by the crew. m is will ~ ur because the gr ~ h on size wall render the crew ~ncr-~=ingly less a collection of individuals and increasingly more a system with emergent properties. During the evolution from IOC (1993) to SSOC (2000), important changes will occur in the social system on board. Not only will the system increase in size, but it will become differentiated into distinct subgroups and more complex in structure. These evolutionary changes will not only affect the Space Station's performance, but also determine the types of pro bless and failures that occur within the social system on board. 356

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357 The main purpose of this paper is to assist NASA in developing a research agenda for the SSOC social system. It ~st be recognized, however, that neither the IOC nor the SSOC social systems exist today. This means that reseal ~ is p~vblerratic, because there is no way ~ t one con ~;reCtly observe these systems or take measurements on them at this point in time. Slice the IOC and SSOC social systems are yet to be developed, the essential Question is not research, but planning and d~siqn--what shape and structure will these systems have and how will they function. Research becomes useful primarily as an adjunct to the design problem; that is, it becomes useful to the extent that it improves some social system designs or eliminates same candidate designs from further consideration. To develop research ideas for SSOC, this paper first describes ways in which the SSOC social system will differ frog the IOC social system. Next, it discusses three operating problems that may be more troublesome in SSOC than in IOC. These are (a) supervising and controlling the diversity of payload activities, (b) hi the relationship between ctifferentia~ sorrows of crew Myers, with its potential for intergroup conflict, arxI (c) responding to viromnenta~ly-induced crises. Finally, sine avenues of research are suggested regarding these operating problems. PAR~G ~ IOC AND THE SSOC SOCIAL SYSTEMS Social Systems in Space Social systems In space Operate order parameters different fern social systems on Earth. These parameters, which apply to both the IOC and SSOC social systems, include: (a) Perilous ~viro~nt. In contrast to most Earth-based social systems, the ~ r on board the Space Station (arx! on any Space vehicle) will face a perilous environment (~ crc gravity, no oxygen) and require complex life-support. Crew members will face significant hazards and risks to life. (b) Relative Isolation. m e social system on the Space Station will be isolate] from other social systems and fin many respects) self contained. It will be in contact with Earth only via teleccmmun1cations, and hence it potentially has some degree of independence Frau Mission Control on Earth. (c) Long Duration. m e social systems on board the Space Station, while transitory compared with those on Earth, will remain An space for increasingly long *orations. Spans Station crew members will fly missions that endure 90 days. (me Space Station itself may continue usefully in orbit for 20-30 years.) From the standpoint of individual crew members, long-5uration missions may entail stress, psychologist depression, and diminished performance (Blush, 1980, 1981; Cunningham, 1977; Oberg, 1981).

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358 Exagenously Matted Charges in SSOC me e~rirorment faced by the Space Station's crew In SSOC will be just as perilous as that in IOC. However, the Space Station's social system will not rain constant. NASA has already marinated Canaan Shames In the social system that are to ~ bets rem IOC (1993) arm SSOC (2000~. -these yes include: barge in yew Size One difference between IOC and SSOC is ye size of the crew on board ache Space Station. ~ IOC, the yew will be small (6-8 persons) . SSOC, the crew size will be la By', perhaps 20-30 or even more. mis increase in size will be made possible by the physical expansion of the Station. Mbst of the~added crew members in SS0C will be Payload Specialists, not Astronaut Pilots. Change in Crew Composition Several important changes in the composition of the crew will occur between IOC and SSOC. First, the Japanese and European Space Agencies wit 1 attach modules to the Space Station in SSOC and place then' own Astronauts aboard. Whereas the IOC crew will consist of U~A-N~SA personnel, the SSOC crew will include substantial numbers of several distinct nationality subgroups: USA, Japan, Europe. A second change to occur concerns the skill mix of the crew. In IOC, most crew members will be Astronaut Pilots. In SSOC, there will obviously still be some Astronaut Pilots on board, but the crew will include many more Payload Specialists than In TOC. Some calculations illustrate this point. If it takes two Astronaut Pilots to fly the Space Station at one time, then a total of four persons will be needed to fly the Space Station around the clock (assum m g that flight Operations are never left unattended and that Astronauts work 12 hours at a stretch.) m e implication is that, in IOC, at lent hoof the crew members will spend their time flying the Space Station, not conducting payload operations. me situation In SSOC will be more favorable, because the number of persons needed to fly the Space Station will presumably remain about the same (despite the larger physical size of the Station); most of the additional persons on boar] in SSOC will be Payload Specialists, who can devote their time to scientific or manufacturing productivity. A third change, less well defined at this point, concerns the genre' Max of the crew ~ SSOC. MESA has shown that it intents to put women in space, although missions to date have been male dominated. Presumably the crew of the Space Station will include some women. With the move from IOC to SSOC, and the accompanying increase in crew size, there may be opportunity to move the ratio of females/males on board closer to 1.00, shed NOVA Apt to do this.

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359 Charge ~ Mission sta~rrent arm Goals In IOC, the primary mission goals will be, first, to fly the Space Station arm, second, to construct large Space structures, i.e., expand the physical stature of the Space Station Arcing cc~nents fiction up via the Shuttle (Danford et al., 1983~. These goals will dc~ub~ess apply to SSOC as well. In SSOC, however, the increased number of Payload Specialists on board will permit other goals to be pursued. These goals may include manufacturing and materials processing under conditions of micro-gravity, and tending and repairing communications Elites. Other objectives may include conducting scientific experiments, carrying out remote sensing and meteorological mod taring, and engaging in flight support (assembly, ma mtenance, checkout, launch, recovery) for manned or unmanned LEO transfer missions (Danford et al., 1983) Overall, the goals pursued by the crew members in SSOC will be more complex and diverse than those in IOC. Expressed more formally, the SSOC social system will be attempting to optimize what may be construed as a highly complex mLlti-abjective function (Feeney and Raiffa, 1976). Change in Onboard AI and Computerization Current plans for the Space Station Call for an increasing use of artificial Intelligence (AI) and expert systems over time. me extent to With AT can be used In TOC and SSOC deperxis both on ache capabilities of the Space Station's Muters and on the software itself. In past missions, the Maters on board NP5A's space vehicles have not been powerful, due In part to limitations imp by Eibysi~1 size -and weight. The situation will be sc~at better In TOC. Plans indicate that TOC Will include scene AT systems, a1Jchough these will be sn~ll-t~moderate in size. NA5A will, of course, use mainframe computers on Earth, and these may supplement ache AI routines of the Space Station's smaller onboard computers. Some AI systems on board will prod ably serve as consulting devices for the diagnosis of hardware failures. Other onboard ccmputerization may involve scheduling of crew activities and maintenance of databases (e.g., materials inventory). By SSOC, the computers on boar] the Space Station will be faster and capable of running large AI programs. Moreover, the software will have evolved ~ th experience on boar] the Space Station, and will become more wide-ranging in its capacities. Thus, AI and expert systems will be more prominent in SSOC than In IOC, and SSOC will be more automated. From the standpoint of the social system, the evolution of computerization is relevant because AT will become integral to onkoard decision-making. By SSOC, the AT soft ware will be able not only to diagnose hardware failures, but also ~ schedule human activities and perhaps even to resolve conflicts amoral hens r~ardi~ priority of Jives. -

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360 Grouch Structural Charges in SSOC The exogenous Ages markets by NOVA for SSOC, as list abjure, will bring about Tnar.y changes in the into organization of the SSOC social system. Of course. because neither the TOC nor the SSOC social systems exist today, one m nnot draw firm conclusions about their structural properties or performance under specified conditions. Nevertheless, by considering the proposed systems in light of research findings on Earth-based social systems and earlier space-flight social systems, some plausible conjectures can be made regarding their structure and performance. It seems fairly clear that the SSOC social system, as contrasted with the TOC system, will be mare complex, more differentiated into subgroups, and more decentralized with respect to decision-ma-ding. Complexity m e SSOC social system will be far more complex than that in IOC. me SSOC social system will Include more members (20-30, rather than 6-8), and the complexity of the system will increase nonlinearly with crew size. The primary source of this increased complexity is not just larger crew size per se, but rather the fact that the system's growth will occur via differentiation (elaborated subgoals and subgroups) an] not via segmentation (Sutherland, 1975; cacti, 3979~. This increase in complexity is refle ~ , for instance, in the number of communication channels in TOC as contrasted with that in SSOC. With 8 crew members in TOC, there are 28 channels (assuming that each channel is 2-way and that a crew member does not require a channel to communicate with himself); with 30 crew m ~ ~ SSOC, there are 435 channels. Thus, a 4-fold increase in crew size produces a 16-fold increase in channels. Of course, it may be the case in~SSOC that every crew member will not have a need to communicate with all others, but the increase in structural complexity is nevertheless clear. Increased complexity Will show up not merely in structural measures but also in functional ones. For instance, complexly might become apparent in slower response to emergencies or crises. Today there is no way to measure the response-t~me performance of the SSOC social system. Could one do this, however, ff,e SSOC social system might emerge as slacker (and less predictable) Man the TOC sly; Men resporxli~ to such urgencies as fire on board or a collision with space debris. To mobilize 20-30 persons scat~cered In several Mules fin SSOC) will probably take refire time In to mc~bilize 6-8 in one mile fin IOC). Differentiation The social system in SSOC will be far more differentiated that is, composed of subgroups with distinct identities--than the social system in IOC. The bases for this differentiation will be national origin and

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361 task specialization; there may also be some subgroup differentiation based on gender. Under current plans, Station between TOC and - NASA will add physical mcOules to the Space SSOC, causing an evolutionary expansion in size. NASA itself will supply some meddles, but others will come from foreign space agencies (Japan, Europe). Hence, the crew on board the SSOC Space Station will consist of persons from all three space agencies (USA, Japan, Europe), possibly in proportion to the financial contribution by various participating nations. This means the SSOC crew will consist of subgrc ups that (a) have different national origin (US, Japan, Eurcpe--Brita m, France, Germany, Italy), (b) have different native languages, (c) have different skin color and racial characteristics, making group membership readily visible, (~) have different moral and religious belief systems, and (e) perhaps have different goals and long-term agendas. This SSOC crew profile differs sharply from the far more homogeneous TOC crew profile; in TOC the crew will be single nationality (primarily or entirely USA), single language, consonant beliefs, unitary goals, single command structure on the ground (NASA), etc. Crew members from the three space agencies will, at least to some degree, constitute distinct subgroups on board the SSOC Space Station. Of course, the use of a single language (English) on board will help to lessen subgroup differentiation. Nevertheless, an extrapolation from research on Earth-based social systems suggests that different= ~ the factors noted above (nationality, skin color, native language, belief systems), reinforced by N~SA's plan to ho use together persons from a given country in their own module, will cause the subgroups to have at least a moderate degree of ~n-group identification and wel1_def~ne] boundaries (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Wilder, 1986; Brewer and Campbell, 1976). Another basis for subgroup differentiation present in SSOC (but not in IOC) is task specialization. As noted above, both IOC and SSOC will have Astronaut Pilots, but SSOC will have many additional Payload Specialists. m e SSOC crew, for instance, may include such diverse specialists as a university astrophysicist a commercial materials , . . . . . . . eng beer, and a national security 1nt~lllgence analyst. m e Astronaut Pilots in SSOC may view themselves as a distinct subgroup within the larger social system. They will have similar backgrounds, perform similar activities, and work for the same employer on the ground (ROSA). Whether the Payload Specialists in SSOC will view themERIves as a second distinct subgroup is less clear, because they may differ significantly among theism ves. That is, the Specialists will come from a range of educational backgrounds, work for different employers on Earth, pursue a diversity of objectives while on board the Space Station, an] perhaps even operate under orders to keep their activities secret from others on board. If se me Payload Specialists work interdependently on tasks or report to similar cognacs on Earth, there is he possibility that they will form identifiably distinct, functioning subgroups on the SSOC Span= Station.

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362 Decentralization The social system An SSOC will be more decentralized than that in IOC. Ih other words, dec~sion-making will be distributed more widely across persons in SSOC than in IOC. Supervisory control over various functions will shift away from a central command an] reside instead with a diversity of specialists. Pressures toward decentralization of decision-making and control in SSOC will come frum several sources. First, as the Space Station evolves f ~ u TOC to SSOC, there will be a change in the Station's mission. Payload operations will become more prevalent and important. As a result, the activities on boar] will become more differentiated and specialized (e.g., materials processing under ~ crogravity, satellite servicing, and conduct of experiments). Most of these new activities will be expertise-based, and they will be controlled by the only persons on board who know how to do them (i.e., Payload Specialists, not Astronaut Pilots). The expansion of expertise on board in SSOC will coincide with decentralization of decision-ma-ding. Many Payload Specialists in SSOC will be employees not of ROSA, but of other organizations on Earth. One implication is that the Payload Specialists presumably will report to different supervisors on the ground. This fact will conduce toward more decentralization of decision-making on beard the Space Station. OPERATING PROBIEM5 FACING THE SSOC SOCIAL SYSTEM As detailed above, the social system on board the Space Station will undergo significant structural changes from IOC to SSOC. m e system will experience a change in mission statement, grow in complexity, differentiate into subgroups, and decentralize in decision-making. mese shifts will produce operating problems for the SSOC social system that were not present In IOC. Although one can doubtless identify many such problems, three are of special interest here. These are singled out not only because they pose special threats loo overall mission performance, but also because they potentially can be mitigated (if not eliminated) through design and research efforts. The three are: (a) The SSOC system will face problems with supervisory-control functions that were not present in TOC. m e burden of coordination will be greater, because the SSOC system will include distinct national subgroups as well as more task-specialization subgroups than TOC. Coordination of activities will be more problematic in SSOC, in part because decision-making will be more decentralized. To some degree, the problems with suFervisory-control functions can be addressed through design efforts prior to SSOC. The broad resear~V~esign issue for NASA is mat type of s~pervisory~ontrol structure will best serve the SSOC system, In the sense of providing greatest efficiency and highest probability of mission success. (b) The SSOC system will pose risks of intergroup conflict that were not present in IOC. The presence on beard of several distinct

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363 subgroups, with potentially opposing interests and objectives, ncr-~.=es the prospect of conflict. The broad research/design question for NASA is what safeguards to build into the system to reduce tee probability of overt conflict occurring. A related question is what can be done to assure that any conflicts that do arise are resolved constructively. (c) The SSOC system may have more difficulty than the IOC system in coping with crises (e.g., fire on board, collision with space debris, etc.). The SSOC social system will probably have more resources than the IOC system for coping with many crises. At the same time, the SSOC system --with its greater degree of differentiation and decentralization--may be worse-off organizationally than IOC and have more difficulty mobilizing to deal with crises. The broad research/design question for MESA is how best to structure the SSOC social system so that it can mobilize adequately deco d-~1 with e e VarlO*US crises. The following sections discuss each of theme problems in turn. Primary focus is on ache nature and genesis of the problems. Attention is also given to design issues--that is, to Hat research ght be done by NOVA prior to SSOC to Litigate these problems. SUPERVISORY-CONIRDL AND OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE The topic-of supervisory control by humans on boar] the Space Station has several dimensions. First, there is the matter of humans' reliance on and control over machines. Under current plans, the Space Station's physical subsystems will include many sensors and control devices to monitor and regulate automatically a variety of outcomes, Including life-support, power sources and management, flight control, thermal control, and traffic control. Thus, when interfacing with machines, the crew members on boar] will enter the Space Station's control . ~ . ~ .. . . ~ ~ ~ . process only in a high-level monitoring, trcubleshootlng, and decision-ma-ding capacity (Kurtzman et al., 1983; Van Tiesenhausen, 1982). A second aspect of supervisory control on the Space Station is the regulation of crew members' activities by other crew members. This topic is of interest here because there will be a shift in the Space Station's onboard supervisory-control structure during the evolution from IOC to SSOC. The following discusses some aspects of this change. The Supervisory-Control Structure A_ used here, the term sunervisorv-control structure refers to than _ . . . . nunctlonal subsystem on board the Space Station which (a) regulates crew activity in the interest of attaining system goals' (b) makes choices among collective behavioral alternatives, and (c) handles dissent, including the treatment of noncompliance by crew members. In social systems on Earth, supervisory-control structures (often called "authority" systems) typically specify who makes what decisions,

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364 who evalll~t=C whose performance, and who influences t gives orders to) wham. No doubt the supervisory-control structure on the Space Station will entail such specifications, with the added characteristic that some prerogatives will reside with crew members on the Space Station while others will inure with N~SA personnel on the ground. Supervisory-control structures can assume a wide variety of forms. For instance, at one extreme there is the archetypical military command model with hierarchical lines of authority an, command. In pyramided structures of this type, control flows from the top down, while information flows up (M~sarovic et al., 1970). At another extreme there is the equalit~rian model with a flat authority structure. In the Space Station context, such a model might consist of equally-ranked Astronauts aloft, not taking orders from a crew member on board, but each reporting to someone on Earth. A third supervisory-control structure--falling between the extremes of hierarchy and equali~y--is the heterarchy. A heterarchic=1 structure is one that resembles a network, the nodes of which are relatively independent control systems and the Arcs of which are the lines of communication passing between the nodes (Sutherland, 3975~. On the Spare Station, the nod== in such a structure might be individual Task Specialists, or possibly teams of Socialists. It follows that one important research/~-=ign issue is exactly which supervisory-control structure should be deployed on board the Space Station. Since this issue is important both in TOC and in SSOC, it is useful first to look briefly at the TOC situation. Supervisory-Control Structure in IOC The main objectives of the Space Station crew during IOC will be to fly the Station and to expand its physical structure (add new habitation mc~ules and platforms). Any of several alternative supervisory-control structures might suffice in IOC to accomplish these objectives, although some structures are probably better than others. m e question, then, is which to deploy. NINA might base its choice on such procedures as trial-and-error or extrapolation from previous experience with space flight supervision. Alternatively, systematic research cad be used to narrow the choice by eliminating sane carxli~te structures. More Specifically, NIP ght correct simulations on the gray to test varicus outlines from different super~risory~ontrol structures. Sit rations might be done under conditions that closely replicate those found in space ~ e.g., high stress, high noise, restricted communication, 90-5ay duration, backs similar to those done in space, and so on. important outcome Measures include productivity levels, crew satisfaction, lack of conflict, adequacy of response to emergencies, etc. Multiple replications could be run on each of several alternative supervisory-control structures using standard experimental designs. m e results should provide a fair idea of how the alternative supervisory-control structures will perform.

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365 Without the results of such I, it is hard to maw what type of structure will eventually be deployed. A plausible conjecture, however, is that the Space Station's TOC supervisory control structure twill, at least to she degree, risible a starboard "military c~narx] Gel" with hierar~hi~1 1~= of authority arm Inane. There is a general terxiengy for grams facing perilous er~viro~Tents to organize ff~elves hierarchically, primarily because it strengthens their capacity to reexport] to emergencies and crises (Helmreich, 1983; Harrison and Cormors, 1984). This pattern maurs not only in Space missions, but ~ submarines, under~;eas r~r~ vessels, North Sea oil rigs, and polar expeditions. mast likely, the IOC system will be no exception. March the su~risory control structure on board during IOC will presumably involve a designated "Mission demander" (or same such title) with authority to issue orders to subordinates. Of ~ urge, the 6 or 8 Astronauts on b ~ Curing TOC are going to be competent, skilled, and resourceful persons. They will have been selected via a rigorous scree mng process, and there will be little reason to doubt their capacity for decisive action. Nevertheless, their roles will be fairly restrictive and afford little independence, and they will essentially be taking orders frog Mission Control on Earth and from their Mission Commander on board the Space Station. Relations Between the Crew and Mission Control Both ~ TOC and in SSOC, one research/design issue deserving consideration by NASA is the exact allocation of control between Mission Control on Earth and the crew on the Space Station. The viewpoint taken here is that the Space Station will not be "autonomous" or independent of Mission Control. Because many mom taring and control functions are better performed on the ground than in space, Mission Control will exert considerable influence over a wide range of crow members' activities and decisions throughout TOC. Crew members, however, will probably retain control over such things as the inventory of items ~ board the Space Station and the flaw of traffic in and art the Space Static. Mbre problematic is whether crew meters will have control over the school ire of heir awn day~to~ay activities. C>n one hat], Mission Control ne ~ s ass ~ r ~ that ~ w m ~ en; are performir~ adeq lately and thus may wish to exercise strong supervision aver sche*u1e=. On the other hand, tasks which are easy to perform on Earth may consume great time and energy under m1crogravity in space (Sloan, 1979~. m is may reuse Mission Control to expect too much and cculd lead to oversch-~lHing of daily activities by personnel on the ground. Excessive regulation of crew schedules by Fission Control can produce role overload on space missions (Helmreich et al., 1979). Even worse, lock step regulation of the crew's scheme by Mission Control sight result in such labor prcb1ems as the well-publicized one-~ay "strike in spaces' that occurred *tiring the 1973 Skylab mission (BaIbaky, 1980; Cooper, 1976~. To achieve a workable balance, what the

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366 Space Station news is an arrar~gement whey Mission Control can specify (lor~er-=nge) goals to be achieved, File crew I; can express and to sane Three enforce thew preferences Ranier local work flar and task-allocation. One approach to such an arrangement is bask on experience in earlier Space missions. Both the Hessians and Americans have report sane success with t=.~k-assig~nt prepares wherry elisions r~arli~ mission art related tacks are made ladler the hierarchical meet, and decisions r~ardir~ offer activities and tiering arrangements are made d~ratim=1ly honor and Rev, 1975; Nelson, 1973~. Although promising, these results pertain primarily to short~uration missions, and their applicability to forger duration missions is still an ppen question subject to further research. Another approach to the issue of day-t ~ day task so flirt is to rely heavily on co mpu~=r software. This approach will be relevant in SSOC, and may also be applicable in TOC. Many large projects of various types are managed on Earth today via project planning software. Task scheduling on the TOC Space Station wit 1 probably not be so complex as to require software more elaborate than that available today. In fact, computer software for project management on the Space Station will not only be useful ~ achieving optimal allocation of tasks to crew members, but may even emerge as a tool for conflict resolution between the Space Station crew and Mission Control. Supervisory Control Structure in SSOC As noted above, the social system in SSOC will be larger, Ire cc~r~lex, more differentiated, and more decentralized than that in TOC. En consequence, the supervisory-control structure in SSOC will be more elaborate than that in TOC and probably will assume a fundamcnt~lly different form. - Functions of Supervisory-Control in SSOC the SSOC supervisory-control structure must be geared to handle many of the same functions as the TOC system. These include flying the Space Station, coordinating with Mission Control on Earth, and building (expanding) the Space Station. In addition, it will have to handle other functions, such as processing materials and servicing sad, as well as serving as a node in a larger communication and transportation network in space. The SSOC social system will include not only Astronaut Pilots, but also a large number of Payload Specialists (perhaps as many as 20 of them). Regulation of these Specialists may prove a complicated task. Mbst Payload Specialists will be highly educated professionals knowledgeable in theft respective specialties. Many will be accustomed by prior employment to working under supervisory-control structures permitting a high degree of independence and autonomy. On the Space Station, they may be performing activities (such as research) that are

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379 stress. The hierarchical structure will enable the TOC system to focus resources, restrict non-adaptive responses (such as argumentation or countermanding), and achieve an adequate level of communication among crew members. In general, it can provide the high level of interpersonal organization needed to respond to crises. crisis Management in SSOC m e SSOC social system will have more resources than the IOC system to deal with crises. For example, its hardware may have better sensors to anticipate crisis-precipitating events before they happen, its expert-system software may provide more accurate diagnoses of problems, and its crew may include a greater mix of skills useful during crises. Nevertheless, crisis-management in SSOC will present its own problems. The incidence of crib== may be higher in SSOC than An IOC, because there will be more things to go wrong. There will be more crew members to get sick, more area to get hit by space debris, mo ~ big-experiments to blow up, more on-board hardware to men function, etc. Moreover, the organizational form of the SSOC social system will make it more difficult to respond adequately to crises. m e SSOC system may have more difficulty switching from normal operating mode to crisis operating mode than the IOC system. m e SSOC social system will be larger, more complex, and mare differentiated than IOC. Mbreaver, as noted above, supervisory-controa and decision-making in SSOC will be decentralized in normal operating mode. The presence of different nationality groups and of many Payload Specialists performing diverse tasks will create a heterarchira supervisory-control structure. If a crisis arises. the supervisory-control structure in SSOC must coordinate the response of -distinct subgroups living m different physical modules and pursuing divergent goals. This task is not Impossible, but it will be more difficult than in IOC. An all likelihood a shift f ~~` normal coeratinq mode to crisis operas m g mcde in SSOC will entail a quick move fr~u a decentralize] heterarchi~1 structure to a centralized hierarchical one. Failure to move back to a hierarchy during a crisis in SSOC will leave the system vulnerable. If the Space Station relied on a decentralized system during cuss, it would risk lack of coordination among crew members, less-than-optimal deployment of resources to dP=1 with the problem, and perhaps even disagree corer the best type of reimpose to the eme~er~cy. Although a shift frown heterarthy deco hey during crisis seems Vilely, the exact form of SSOC Command during crises is an ~ resign issue. Danford et al. (1983) have suggested that it would be appropriate to have control during crisis rest In the hares of a Specialized safety officer or "Isis lead This sth~ he scone merit, but it may also create excessive c~lexi~ because Mat it reins yet anther fond of control beyond the heterar~hy-plus-Mission Sparkler stnlature discuss above. A superior alternative might be

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380 simply to r~ntralize contact during a crisis arourx:] brie regular leader (Mission Smarter). R~n~lization art the Mission Snarler will work best if NASA trains Sew I; ~ specific skills for d-~1 ing with different of crises. That is, scone chew Seers will be specialists ~ Cupid with one type of crisis and other crier Hers with another type of crisis. Thus, when a crisis occurs, ~ thins will happen. First, Sew ~ will a ordinate Acura the Mission ~mnand~r; and record, the Mission demander, assists by those persons So are specialists in the particular type of crisis at hard, will direr the efforts of the entire crew to cope with the Wendy. This approach brings both special Mortise and str~hened Hand to bear in a crisis. A related rcsear~V~esign issue concerns the use of AT art cauterization to aid decision-maki~ *tiring crises. Expert systems that diagnose the causes of handle failures will be Rational increasingly as the Space Station moves Frau TOC to SSOC, and these may impose the ~ and accuracy of the arew's efforts during crises. To some degree, ~ systems will be able to supplant (even supplant) ache knowledge arx] Mortise of Sew members. On the other hall, use of AI system= in the analysis and diagnosis of life-threatening events raises the issue of tn~st--to Hat extent will crew ~ trust software-based diagnoses. Ibe use of AT may affect He only how the cam is organized to Ape with crises, but also Hat mix of skills is (and is not) plank on by and has crew Ha; are trained. mese are matters that can be a~c~'essec] through research art design efforts. One final rest arch/design issue concerns the impact of computer-mediated communication during crises. As noted above, computer-mediated communication will be even more important and prevalent in SSOC than in IOC. Whether ccmputer-mediated communication enhances or inhibits satisfactory responses to crises is an open question. It was noted above that computer-mediate] communication may be less effective than face-to-face communication for reaching consensus on issues where the "correct" answer is not civic us. Some crises on board the Space Station may have clear-cut diagnoses, but for those that do not, computer-mediated communication may prove more a liability than an asset in achieving adequate response from the crew. m e ~ m~effectiven-~c of computer-mediated communication during crises an important research topic. St~RY OF RESEARCH AND DESIGN ISSUES This paper has discussed issues that arise in the de-sign of the SSOC social system. Attention has been given to three broad problem areas: (a) the characteristics of the SSOC supervisory-control structure, (b) the potential for conflict within the crew, and (c) the capacity of the SSOC system to resporx3 to crises if they arise. Specific research suggestions are satirized belay.

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381 Issues Regarding SSOC S~rvisory~ontrol C>ne important zesear=/design issue for NOVA is what type of s~pervisory~ontrol stnlcLure will best serve the SSOC social system, In the sense of pr~ridir~ the greatest efficier~c~r and highest probability of mission success. mere am a wide Variety of su~risory control structures that might be deployed on board the Space Station- hierarchical, eq~litarian, heterar~im~1 exact nature of the system to be used is an open issue. It he been pry here that the Space Station's . . . . . . .. _ . , etc.--ar~ the su ~ isory-control structure will take the form of a hierar ~ y ~ IOC, and that it may subsequently shift in the direction of a heterarchy in SSOC. This is really no more than a conjecture, however. MESA can make decisions regarding the form of supervisory-control structure to be used in IOC and SSOC on the basis of trial-and-error or past experience with space flight s ~ lesion. Alternativelv. it Fort make . , . ~ _ _, , _ _ _ _ _,_ _ them on the basis of research findings, such as those Obtainable form s;~n~lations conducted on the ground. Specifically, it was suggest above that NPJ;A fright conduct situations to test various outcomes fen different su~isory control spruces. -these simulations would tee done under conditions that clo ~ ly replicate those fauna in space e.g., high stress, high noise, restricted communication. GO-dav duration. tacks similar to those done ~ _ _ , ~ m space, an] so on. Major outcome measures include productivity levels, crew satisfaction. lack of conflict. adeouacv of response to emergencies, etc. . . ~ ~ , , , _ _ _, _ Multiple replications could be run on each of several alternative supervisory-control structures using experimental designs. m e results should provide a ~ eful indication of how the alternative supervisory-control structures will perform ~ space. One design s~b-problem is to determine the appropriate division of control between Space Station crew and Mission Control on Earth. One concrete manifestation of this problem is the issue of who should have control Corer the crew's ~y-~ay task assignments. Various suggestions, include the use of AI project playgirl software to abolish task Figments, were di =~. A second ~l~;ign sub~pmblem is to determine the appropriate division of control within ye Space Station's crew. Feebly ache Task Specialist n SSOC will be afforded =~me Force of independence with rye to they particular activities, but ye exact range ~ unclear. The Mission ~=r's role during SSOC will likely shift to coordination of other's activities, but the exact definition of the vle's purgatives arm powers is problematic. A relay issue is the selection criteria ~dir~ chew officers; this mate s made more complex by the illusion of Few ~ freon other space agencies (Japan, Europe). Nether the role of Mission Snarler will be restrict ~ Nay Astrcnauts or Open to Few i; fan other countries is a realign issue that NINA might address.

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382 Issues firm for Conflict ~ SSOC the risks of ~nter~onal and inter conflict will be greater in SSOC Off n IOC. This is ~ e In part because the SSOC system will include many Urns with distinct identities (Task Specialists/AsJcranztuts; and U~/Japan/~). The broad resear~Vdesign question for NINA is wit saf~uan~ to build into the SSOC system to reduce the probability of overt conflict concurring, anti to resolve conflict if it occur';. A wide variety of steps can be taken ~ the design of the SSOC pysten to reduce the probability of conflict. Son discussed in this pair include: (a) Specify Objective functionts) for the SSOC crew such that the attainment of goals by one ~ does not prevent the attainment of gals by other ~r~(s). Approach; to this include the use of superordinate goals and game-theoretic analysis of slalom interaction. One implemn=tion ought involve ~t~ software (project scheduler routines) to ppti~nize not just productivity, but also grcup Overlap. (3~) Incorporate }~a~-~ roles ~ the SSOC social system. An Open question is how to interface these roles with the activities of the Space Station's Mission O=a~r and over officers. (c) Structure Interpersonal contact amazing crew merrd3ers to promote cohesive ram polarizing relations ac ~ s the s ~ r ~ In SSOC. ~ w members flight be assigned tasks with an eye to creating interdependence and cross-linkages between nationality grcup6. Like wise, module living and sleeping assignments sight be made to pro mote contact across nationality groups. (~) Use of the communication media on board the Space Station to promote non-polarizing interpersonal contact and cross-linkages between members of subgroups. Cc mputer-mediated communication ~ especially probl ~ tic in this respect, for it may worsen, not improve, the prospects for intergroup conflict. N~SA may wish to develop some rules or ''etiquette" regarding use of computers for communication. (e) Then moving frill IOC toward SSOC, MESA may need to make some adjustments in the criteria used to select crew members and in the content of Astronaut training. In this regard, a researchydesign issue for NASA is to discover which personal attributes of crew markers best serve to enhance linkages between subgroups in SSOC. Another issue is to determine what conflict resolution skills should be taught to crew Hers. Issues Regarding Response to Crises in SSOC Ibe SSOC social system may have more ctifficul~r than the TOC system mobilizing to de=1 with various Arises arm Urgencies on board. This will occur not only because SSOC is a larger system, but also because it is more heterar~i~a~ ~ fond with decentralized decision-~kir~. lhe broad redesign question for USA is how best to structure the SSOC social system so that it can mobilize adequately for crises.

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383 Sam writer; have suggest placing control during crises in the hams of a Specialized safety officer or "crisis leader." This proposal has scam merit, but a better alternative may be to realize conch art the regular Mission ~mnander. NOVA may wish to investigate this r~ear~V5esign issue more closely. Spreader, NASA might investigate the use of AI expert systems to help d=~] with crises~e software sys~cern Ames the crisis advisor, assisting or even supplanting human decision-makir~. Use of expert systems in this context may improve diagnosis of the prdblen, as well as ~# speed arm accuracy of rinse to the emerger~cy. Finally, NASA may wish to investigate the (in)effecti~reness of cc~uter-~;ated Fornication during crises. Nether ~ter-media~ ~mn~nication Lances or ir~ibits Senses to crime= is an ppen question. She crises on Card the Space Station may nave clear cut Diagnose:;, but for those that do not, ~~=r-~;ated cc~nication may preread or diminish an adequate repose freon the crew. The effects of c~ter-mediation on Fornication during crises merits scrutiny. RE~EN~F~ Amens, J. S. 1976 me structure arm dynamics of behavior In organization Mary roles. In M. D. Dunette, ad., Handbook of Industrial arm Organizational Psychology. Chicago: Rar~-MdNally. Pat, Y. 1969 1976 Contact hypothesis In ethnic relations. Bulletin, 71:319-342. Psychological me role ~n~r~ contact ~ arise of prejudice and ethnic relations. In P. A. Lutz, ea., Awards the Elimination of Racism. N - r York: P~amon. Balbal~, E. M. L. 1980 Strike in Space. n1~~.~S Schools Blake, R. R., arm Mouton, J. S. Case #1-431-008. Boston, He: Harvan] 1968 Corporate Excellence mr~ Grid Organization Devel~nt. Hansen: If. 1976 Diary of an OD Man. Houston: If. 1984 Restoring Trust Between Grams in Conflict. Jossey-:~cs. San F~ancisco:

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