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THE RC)IF~ OF HIS ~ MARS ~ SPAR
David L. Axis
lN~l~JCllON
lbr~ghout the history of the Apace prugrzan, there has been a dichotomy
of Opinions on Be relative importance of manned and used (i.e.,
robotic) applications. Until the arrival of the chute, Inner and
unmanned operations occupied different sections of NASA Headquarters,
involved differed grow of NOVA field centers, awl were generally
viewer} an citing for Be 1;mi~ furls available. There were (and
still are) areas, such as planetary exploration, where there were no
viable Scions to the use of used systems. The adherents, rather,
tied to the utilit~r of hum ~ space, and the cost of replacing
each of their factions with robotic alternatives.
Any self~contained devil performing a useful fur~tion in ~pace,
whether a human or a robot, must contain the same set of < tic
functions to ad~at~ly perform the mission. In many Em=, of Carrie,
the mission is actually constrained to work amours the limitation of
the state-of-ff~e-art in one or mom of these areas. these basic
functions for autonomy include:
Sensation In order to Irate on Be local ~riron~nt, a s~ em
~ sensors for detectir~ Objects. these topically
break dawn mto redate sensors (such as erosion or ogler
raring systems) arm proximal (such as tactile and fore
sensors) .
taticn Having the capability ~ den Objects does not
translate directly =to the capability for manipulation.
Ending the spatial relationships, having a
knowledge base of both general activities probes, forces
and nations) as well as specific knowledge (specific
satellite design Metal s) are necessary for effecting a
complete system.
Manipulation -this area has trailed Be opera considerably, as many of
the original Apace Objectives clid not involve
manipulative activities. Manipulation to date has been
405
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406
perform by the sample arm of the Surveyor and Viking
lar~ir~ Aft ~ small Ale, and tar He Pate
manipulator System of Be shuttle in larger ~e. None
of these systems has involved any appreciable dexterity
in either the arms or the end effec~cors. Nonetheless,
this area is pivotal for future apace activities, as it
relates to the capability of the spacecraft system to
interact winch, arm to alar, its 1~1 e~riro~nt.
Ion His is a necessary function, often relegated to a
supporting role. me capability to Tnaneu~rer around in
space, either on an existir~ stun re or in free scare.
~ ~ _ .
is rewire for any robotic system to be generally
useful. It might be anticipated that apace system; will
evolve a wider range of lo~ti~re capabilities than
hens have evolved in ~ gravity field. For example,
legs on a human provide both Action arm angering
factions. In the m~cragravi~r ernrirc~t of apace,
Icxx~ion might well be relegate to the equivalent of
arms, which have the finer dexterity and force control
Aid in the absence of damping, arm armoring left to
sets of specialized manipulators with sty, but
little other capability. Ihrusc~s for free~flight
prevision will also be An, at Hat for the
situations not Hairy to minimize us. of
acns~mables.
Sort
This category includes all the other functions n£~c~'y
for the system to exist. This would include power,
cooling/ structural integration, navigaticn, and
. . .
COllllmBllCatlOrlS .
It is interesting to exam me a known autonomous system (a human) in
the context of these functions. the head is the sensor platform,
located in the optimal location for biracial locomotion. The
c~tic~nal A (brain) is Coca with the sensors in the
head, to minimize the length farm vuln~bilit~r) of the high-bar~idth
data paths, particularly vision. me arms form a Anus
manipulative system, arm the legs similarly perform location tasks.
He torso Is Aces ~ of the short functions, as well as
Firm all of the other systems together ~ a self~contain~ unit. the
human boxy ~ thus a Powerful exhale of a possible design for a
rat. Hover, the human paradigm phalli rat be ~ +~ far, as
many of the decimal choirs for a system which stares Eric in a
gravity field may have little logical a~lica~cion in a An optimized
for weightlessness.
He task, therefore, is to cane to an und~sta~ir~ of the past arrt
present roles of Hans arm Famines in apace activities, and
extrapolate ~ ache fur to acne ~ a ~nir01 Restaging of the
capabilities and limitations of each. In fact, it is worth emphasizing
at this point an ~=sentia1 carrion of this pair: it is not an
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
space flight
407
"either' Dice between humans and machines. There are necessary
are sufficient roles for both ~ the foreseeable fur In Space.
H~RICAL PERSPECIIV~ ED SPAC:E: FI,IGHr
With ~ limier payback capability of party Mauri systems, there was
no viable alternative to the use of unmanned sand ~ ites. -these party
payloads wed ~ of sensor packages, cc~nications gel', arxl
support systems, anti were rehire to do ncrthing mod than
c~ser~/F~asure and report their firings. Even t - my, many of the
sat=llit== being launched to orbit are still limit to these
functions; for the Dreg Of this paper, these systems may be
considers to be s~rcibotic ~ems.
It sag clear that Be original intention of the Mercury program
was to use Be humans as an e~riment=1 subject, ~ order to study the
effects of spaceflight en humans. the choice of e~peri~ Dairy
test pilots for May astronauts led to scam predictable
408
vehicle cad be acutely described as a Spacecraft, since Hi had
ache capability ~ Lange orbits and achieve rendezvous. The New had
windage which faced forward, and hushes Pith card be Honed and
closed again in flight. Even in larding, the vehicle was positioned to
allow the crew to sit upright, and much development effort took place
tcwar~s a Rcgallo~wing recovery system which would have allowed Gemini
to maneuver to a landing on the dry lake Ken at Edwards Air Force Base.
Even ~ the midst of this manual spacecraft, additional elements of
automation had to be incorporated. me Gemini was the first spacecraft
to fly with an on-koard computer, used for calculating rendezvcus
maneuvers and for control of the lifting reentry. Althcogh many of the
procedures used for rendezvous and docking were natal in nature, the
complexities of orbital mechanics require] the use of ground or
on-board computer calculations; the crew were primarily used as
interpreters of visual and rater data.
m e presence of humans on board Apollo may be considered as entirely
a political dec ~ ion, as the entire objective of the Apollo program was
to place a man an the moon and safely return him to earth. He greater
complexities of the spacecraft and mission led to a return to automated
systems, after the largely manual nature of the Gemini spacecraft.
Thus, [or exe - le. many of the abort modes were autc'Datic=1ly
initiate, although the crew did agitate for pal cancel of launch
vehicle trajectory as a backup for the Saturn flight control stern.
the manual clodlcir~g tec~hnigges Merely during Gemini were utilized by
Apollo in lunar orbit.
Apollo age m showed the utility of humans as a robust backup
system. It was not possible to do a survey of landing sires down to
the ~ Hen of all possible hazards to the Lunar Mbdule; it was therefore
planned that the pilot Could take over and steer the lunar lander to a
safe landing site. A his system worked well in every instance: the
initial aim point for Apollo ll, for example, turned cut to be right
the middle of a boulder field. M~nu21 control of the landing vehicle
allowed the targeting of landings next to an unmarred Surveyor
spacecraft, adjacent to a deep lunar rid le. and in the lunar
highlands. This greatly auymentcl the data return, as later flights
were t~e~ into areas of greater geologist impost, winch fewer
Lions for cafe lay sites.
me presence of humans to pilaf the landers into safe locations may
be ~ to the Viking Bandits on Mars a few yeah; later: since
the up Fiches did not have the image processing and decision
nuking capabilities of humans, both of ye larxling craft had to be
targeted to the flattest, poshest, and therefore least tah~ting
larkling sips available. Similarly, ye Soviet Uhi~ performed lunar
e~lorati~ with Canard vehicles. Hover, the quantity of staples
retard differed Rae Apollo by 3-4 orders of magnitude; since t^he
samples wed selects rarxianly frown the immediate location of the
landing vehicle, it may be assumed that the quality of samples varied
widely form Apollo as wEl1.
Skylab, as the first American space station, involved the long-term
habitation of space by humans. Indeed, one of the major objectives of
Skylab was to study the effects of long-term space flight on human
409
physiology; hardener, to use this Objective as a justification for
manned space flight constitutes circular logic. Ah mare may ins~cead
be said of the other science cibjecti~res of Skylab, such as earth
He ~ r ~ s, solar physics, and E pace Operatic s. In all of these, the
Skylab crews played an essential role in the sucks of the mission.
since Skylab was constructed of surplus Apollo components, there was
little significant difference between the two programs in the
automation levels of the vehicle system themselves. m e only
significant difference was in tile experiment packages, which in Skylab
represented a later generation of technology from the spacecraft
hardware. For example, the solar observing instruments ~ the Apollo
Telescope Mbunt couId be (and were) operated remotely from the ground.
Howe van', the Inboard crewmen could provide more immediate decisions
when faced with fast-breaking phenomena, and ~ fact managed to record
solar flares from their inception. Modifications to the Inboard
control panel of these instruments Curing the course of the Skylab
mission were primarily to increase the ate; 1 ity of. the crew to make
initiate Eta records for use orient, by the addition of an
ins~cant-prmt scope camera.
Of greatest signifiable, perhaps, was the role played by He crew
in the repay of the workshop and Invasion of the mission. Pensive
e~crav~hicular activities (E~s) were perform to free the jangle
solar array, and to depth a sample to reduce temperatures ~ Be
workshop to habit~hie levels. me three Skylab As Clearly
repair fails equipment, Bach inside arm abusive of the apace
station, ark con rly made possible the such=== of the pro3ran: had
Skylab been an unmanned station with the state-of-the-art robotics of
its time, it clearly would have had little or no recourse beyond those
capabilities left by the launch accident.
The greater complexity of the Space Shuttle has led to the greatest
amount of automation yet. Flight crews have referred to the Orbiter as
the Selectric airplane", since almost all functions are controlled
through the four general-purpose computers (GPCs). The atmospheric
flight characteristics of the Orbiter are such as to be Dracti~lY
unflyable without stability augmentation.
Although a manNa1 direct
Mae does exist, few of the flight crew have Ah success In this Moe
In trait simulations, arm even this male relies on Be GPCs
~n~rpret harm controller Eta arxi nary motions of the flight
acn~cro surfaces. A though the flight con~crol system is capable of
flying the vehicle all the way through larking ("autolarxI"), it is
interesting to Rae that no crew has yet allowed this to be testy cn
they" recession: the Per always takes curer in control stick
steering Ale (i.e., sthl3ilit~r augment - ) at subsonic transition, or
Mainly by Me pre flare maneuver at 2000 feet altitude. this Is
representative of many of Me lessons lean-to face Chute Cations:
ache flight crew have now beer cat in the role of systems managers, but
still d~ active involvement In all safer, critical a~*s of the
mission. It ~d be unwise to assume Cat this tram will not
contirme into the era of the apace station.
-
-
410
CAPABILITIES AND I~qArIONS
It has been said hat humans are the only self-pr~ra~ing, hippy
is aut~c~us debris= capable of Beirut ma~s-pr~:ed by
unskilled fair. Be Cat as it may, there are significant 1;m;tations
on both humans and machines In ache space ~riro~ment. H;avir~ evolved
In he environment of the earth's surface, it is necessary ~ (= same
degree) take the conditions of earth along with humans In Apace.
Constraints to be consider~l include atmosphere, ~s~m~bles, volume,
work Ales, ail Gravity.
Humans reed Bert above a partial pressure of approximately 3 psi
~ order to survive. through the Apollo program, ppace~xaft were
sallied Offs a pup antigen a~sphe~ at 4 psi. This simplified
several operational problem: the stnlcLures could be simpler, as the
internal prep were lee=; Only a Girdle gas had to be stored and
deliver - ; arm there was no r ~ in ~ t for dent ~ genification prior
to an extravehicular activity. However, the Apollo 1 fire showed
graphically the primary d;C~*vantage of a singlergas system.
In Skylab, the atmosF here was kept as 5 psi, with m tragen forming
the additional partial pressure beyond that required for oxygen. While
this reduced the flame propagation problem, the crew was 1~== than
satisfied pith the atmosphere, as it was difficult to carry =~
corwersations beyond their initiate vicinity. Current plans for the
Space Station assume a sea-le~rel pressure of 14.7 psi, as used cn the
Oliver. Delis decision Is coupled into the choice of avionics: the
soa-le~rel pressure of ache Orbiter was partially chosen to allow the use
of "off-~clf" Spooled Aries. this had an effect cn
habitability, as the Her of coolers fans ~ the Biter cr'3a+== an
appreciable aunt of raise, thus limiting co~nrersatims to the
IBM ~ ia ~ vicinity of the irxli~riduals. The Orbiter has been c ~ rated
extensively at 10.2 psi during pre-breathe cycles prior to an EVA, but
this requires a significant pcher-~own of avionics to prevent
overheating.
A biological or ~ , such as a human, ~ powered by a series of
chaff reactions, and must be repl ~ regularly. In a totally
open-loop system (that is, no attempt at recycling anything), humans
will require approximately 5 kg/day of food, water, and oxygen.
Recycling water and air will reduce this to 1 kg/person-day: this is
equivalent to 540 ha of claimables for a span crew aver a 90 day
resupply cycle. Even without recycling, then, Disables are not a
pacing icon for a space station if the crew sizes are key ~1.
Hose figures also do not talce into at: such Operational factors as
air lop, inefficiencies ~ recycling, or food carried for reasons
Mayors base~le~rel nutrition, and therefore the actual figurer play
for consoles ~ apace stations will be higher than these academic
= . Many of the technic; for effective Steeling are Adherently
highly ex~rir~n+~1, and ~1 r - iire a great ,~ of Avert prior
to operational use.
Sixties have shown a dirt zelationdhip been habitable volume
arm crew performance; the minim volume is also a furx~tion of mission
~ration. In a - ;tion to He working volume, humans need ~ have
411
Fred facilities for eating, exercising, and personal hyger~e, and are
usually best provided with scan private Portions for radiation arxt
sleep. Deciding con Pose issues are same of the most difficult choices
In interior statics Reign, as there is often no clear relationship
between prod timidity arxi volume; irked, there ~ often no generally
agreed-upon metric for pr~uctivi~r i~f. Other desirable
Edifications ~ a spay designed for lor'~cerm hen ~
include windows (es many errias large as the structural designers can
be forced to in~rpo~te), a=loblcs, and radiant escape paths in case
of co~inger~cies such as hull penetration or fire.
Fens are not capahie of working "art the cloaks: say amount
of relation is repair", along with natural ha~keeping art other
support functions art a sufficient amount of sleep. A normal 40 hair
week represents a 24% Fly Cycle for a human. Assigning fire hours per
day for normals, hying, and excercise represents a further 23% of
the tine, leaving 55% of the duly for sleep, radiation, art germinal
off-key activities. this may be Gary ~ ache averages for Skylab:
25.6% excerpt cooperation (work), 33.9% reals, hoping, ark
exercise, ark 40.5% for sleep, rest, and other. It is interesting that
the net percentage of time spent on experiments ~ so close to that of
a typical 40 hour week; the exhaustive pace reported by the Skylab
crews clearly demonstrated the increased overhead associat ~ with
living in space. Evidence indicates that the work pace established in
Skylab wand be difficult to maintain cover indefinite periods on a
Apace station: therefore, planners ~st either accept icier than Donna
guy circles on experiments ark other axtput~rien~ activities, or
plan ways of au ~ mating ~ e house ~ ping fur ~ ions deco bring these back
~ line (frump a perspective of limed with comparable activities
associated with living an earth.
One of the origins of the increased housekeeping times is the
necessity of adapting to acetone living in the weightless environment.
Althcogh it can certainly be maintained that insufficient experience
has yet been obtained to provide definitive conclusions in this area,
clearly it will be difficult to overcome the ~ [lions of years of
evolution in a gravity field in a brief time, an] some performance
degradation In weightlessness is to be expected in the foreseeable
future. Physiological reactions to expensed ~crogravity include a
Dyer of hormone ark flay shifts: the only long-term effect which
seems ~ be both serious ark progressively degenerative is a
d~alcificaticn of bone material. this effect can be retarded to same
degree by sty ~ Ads exercise, particularly involving compression of the
large bones of the leg: this has led to the development of treadmills
with elastic cords replacing some of the force of gravity, aliening
aerobic running exercises.
Some effort has gone into exams Ming the options for providing
appreciable gravity on a space station, by rotating the components to
provide a centripet~ alteration. His effect can be quantified as
g = w2r
412
where w is the angular velocity, and g is the effective acceleration at
a radius of r. rally plans (prior to Skylab) indicated that an angular
velocity of 4 rpm would be acceptable, producing a required radius of
55.8 m for earth-normal gravity. Some research has suggested that 3
zisu (99.3 m) might be a better rotational velocity for human
adaptation, even with a select crew pupation. If selection straps
are relaxed to most of the gentry population, that implies a rotation
sap of ~ by, with a resultant radius of 894 m rehire.
Viably, it would be Ply caroled and expensive to provide
stations of ~ is size. One method of easing this r ~ ir ~ t would be
to provide partial gravity: an early space station proposed with a
radius of 25 m at a sp ~ rate of 4 rem would have produced an apparent
gravity of .45 g. However, nothing is known of the effects of partial
gravity on bone decalcification or other microgravity effects; this is
cleanly an important reseat issue to be Ames by a space
static. Short of this information, He logical approach is probably
that being considered: ~ not provide artificial gravity, arm route
the crews at intervals ~ n to be safe, such as three conchs.
It would be unwise, however, to overly emphasize the limitations of
humans, without sump equal attention to their assets. The capabilities
of humans have been ~~nnstrat~d reneabed1v thrcu~hout the history of
~~_~ ~~ ¢1: ~ -
-
. _ ~
IG" -~— i- The list of experiments repaired! satellites
retrieved' and messiahs saved would be +~ lord to go into In this
paper. Of Grater imE'ortarK:e than reviewing the indivi~1
performer Is to memorize Be individual capabilities which Inane
1:hen possible.
~ al dexterity '~ ~ria~sly highly critical for those tasks
requiring physical manipulations. No manipulator has yet been
developed with affirm remotely aE~prna~ir~ the dexterity of the human
hand. See experimented efforts ~ this direction (the u~I hand
and the Saliency hand) have priced impressive manipulator arm at the
current time. me apE?rnadh taken In the rn~cl~' arm the ~
nitie; (the o ~ r two areas for application of general-purpose
robotics) have tended towards the use of simple and effectors, and the
alteration of tasks to allow for limited dexterity. To some extent,
the same ~ true of space systems designed for EVA involvement:
current pressure suit gloves are sit 1 far more dexterous than
manipulator and effecters, and are likely to continue to evolve in the
future.
Strength ~~ (perhaps surprisingly) sat 1 an important issue in
m~crogravity. The Remote Manipulator system of the Orbiter is capable
of manipulating payloads up to the Orbiter limit of 65,000 lbs., but is
severely strength-limited, and therefore handling time goes up as mass
goes down. me most capable system for retrieval has been shown to be
an EVA astronaut in the Manip~a~r Foot Restra=ts, attached to an RME;
with its joints lo~. this configuration was used for grappling He
two HS-376 sat-1 lites retrieved on subtle mission She 51-A, as well as
He I-~-C~t H3-393 satellite captured, repairs, arm re released on Sale
51-~. this last pure es - :ially, with the It to despin
and capture, and later Aspen and deploy a massive satellite, could not
have ~ effected without the strum and dexterity of a human.
413
finis raises an interesting side point: In mast robotic systems
available today, manipulators are specialized for either stretch of
dexterity, but not both. moss an use for positioning large maS=Pc
generally do not have the positioning accuracy of arm used for exact
pointy or positioning tasks with lightweight payloads. 1~ some
extent, the ~c~grzlvity e~riron~t of space may thy to help this
problem, as no appreciable str~ of the art will go to maintaining
its position in ache absence of external forces. At ache same time, Pass
limitations tend to price lightweight space manipulator designs,
raring either tasks adapt to their fle~cibili~<, or sc~phisticat
ensatory oo~l systems to actively reduce the structural ryes.
In goal, humans are excellent adaptive control systems. humans
routinely change gains artful algorithms ~ on ye ~hysi~1 parented;
of the system being controlled, arm are capable of adapting and
changing to a acutirmously varying system, within limits. humans
improve with practice, arm can transfer learnt rinses to new
control tasks of a sitar nature.
Herons are e ~ curly suited for rapid processing art Integration of
visual data. From the first manned orbital flights, crews have
reported being able to =~= features an the ground indistinguishable
from the best photographic records. Nuances of color, sharing, and
pattern may be instantly apparent to a human, yet be below the
resolution of an electronic Imaging system. Humans have the capability
to receive and derive ppacial information from both static arm dynamic
manes, and contirmously redate they world model based on visual dsta.
The human capacity, for judgemnt is certainly well~isa~ss", but it
ght be maintained that there Is a greater utility for lav-lesrel
r ~ it than for Shall ~ tual decision-making capabilit~r. For
example, neutral buoyancy tests of EVA show a human capacity for
instinctive maneuvering ~ the simulated weightiest environment,
resulting ~ improvement in task performance without the need for
restraints, and without consci ~ consideration of body actions. m is
sort of maneuvering, which is computationally complex for a robot, can
be performed by a human ~ "backgrcond" mode while concentrating on
task plane mg. While expert system shells will be important for error
diagnosis and strategic planning, it is the robotic equivalent of
reflexes, instincts, and common sense which will provide the greatest
challenge for the artificial intelligence community.
nmmE RE;E~ Arm
Quantitization
Many of the important derisions on the applications of humans and
machines in space have been (and are currently being) Act on
prejl~;r== from limited prior experience, a priori arguments, and
large, costly system ant yses which have no meaningful underlying data
base. Certainly, the path of following East experience will probably
result in an operable space station. However, much could and should be
done to formulate and follow a logical plan for grcNnd-based analyses
414
and simulations/ and flight experiments, which would produce a
rEacirgfu1 data base an human and machine capabilities and limitations
~ each of the cperational categories needed for a successful space
station program. There are two caveats for such a program: first, of
course, the research must be performed. But equally important, the
pruyr~m managers must be willing to listen and act on the outcomes of
the research, and not revert to ''tried and true" solutions for the sake
of engineering conservatism.
Apprcpriate Roles
One of the cutgrc~ths of the data base development described above
would be a greater quantitative undersban~ing of the appropriate role=
of humans and machines in space operations, and the most favorable
cabbinations of each to ac~npli~h any particular task. Ihis nay imply
He altering of traditional roles. For example, as ctiscus-~ earlier,
the flight crew has insist can ma=tair~ an active, controlled role
In he areas critical to safer of flight, or of mission suedes.
Hirer, the happy - riate) rising adversity of mission planners prohibits
Intuitive solutions to any problem Rich can be foreseen prior to
flight. This has led to ~ plead of chaises which die the
appropr late actions of b ~ the flight c ~ w are the go ~ controllers
in any contingency. But, it might be argued, this algorithmic approach
cbvia+=c the need for most of those capabilities currently unique to
humans, such as insight and judgement. Shouldn't this argue for
automated s ~ to implement corrective action in the Event of
critical malfunctions? ~~
In response to this question, an interesting parallel may be drawn
from current findings in aeronautical human factors. With the
increased autonomy of transport flight control systems, the airline
flight crew are assuring to greater extents than ever the role of
system managers. Flight control ~ s have become capable of
completely controlling the aircraft from liftoff through touchdown and
rollout. However, serious accidents have already oocurreS in airline
~rice, due to a flight crew which Is neither fully aware of the
intricacies of the flight control Tyson, nor highly practiced In
marshal control of the aircraft. It so cI-=r that, Short of removing
the flight Tic crew and automating airliners;, too Ah automation
brad amen onfid=mce and inatt==tiv=~ess In the cockpit; the same ~~l
probably be found in E\pace flight.
the oar fusion of this aft is ~ s;ha~r that it is not enough to
fully Understand the limitations and capabilities of each of the
Arena tOlogies: the interactions of the pin= may be far Ore
important to safer and minion sac than the pin= Chores.
since the possible ~ er of infractions Is a oabbinatorial problem,
it ~ h ~ GAS to pow ~ ate a rigorous or analytical solution to th'=
problem. It is clear, however, that it must be approached in a logical
and methodic=] way if programs as complex as space station are to be
successful.
415
Grave Metrics
A E~1~ With ~ at ~ conceptually sin pie arm, in i~ler~ntatio',,
difficult ~ ~t of appropriate metrics for human arm machine
performance ~ Space. Performance irxlices he on took performance
~ ~ be unique, or specialize to ~ small su~et of tasks. TrXtif~=
had ~ mare generic factors, sum as motions or s~bba~, ~st Scale
in account ~ fact that humans arm machines may be able to perform
Off same tad;, }'ut will likely use different techniques
a~pli~g Off. Even Tong 1;~;~ ~Nniti~, ~= ~ An, =
has yet to form any Is on the appropriate Its to
ice neani~1 ~arisons between tasks; or experiments. his will
be tale ~ larger measure as the field Awards to income a wider Garde
of human arm rcibc~ic activities.
An Assent of Art tr;—
Almost all of Off designs currently pry for telercitx)tic systems
are highly anthr~tric: that is, hey term towards a robotic
Application of ache human focal. Artist's concepts s;haw a head (sensor
platform), with two an County on a toy, arm with one or two "legs"
,,~1 for gra~lir~. -this approach is understandable for a pyst~snwhi~h
is designed to incorporate (or at Act Alice) —Desperation, but its
ass~m~ion for a fully robotic Tyson can only be apprised to
Engineering consezvatism ("stick with a known configurations. Scam
recent r~:s fee simulation indicate that a ~ of manipulators
much lirni~ Frees of Freon, designee] to perform ~ I; or
dedicated tasks, may offer performance increased over ~
anthr~r~?hic general-purpose manipulators. me human form, evolved
a Gravity field for~effective protection Frau pr~a~rs, :~ not
drily ~ best adaptation for Apace activities, arm alternate
for arxt technologies phalli be encourage arm studied carefully.
CON=rlSI~
IME: (FAR?) FUI=E
Given sufficient tone, support, arm determination, human beings have
d~nstra- - ~t they are capable of doing almost any physical or
int=~tual task. Ibey have shown aver the last quart~tury Bat
they are fully capable of living and working in space, performing a
wide varied of tasks, freon the routine arm Insane to innovative,
initiate actions needed ~ save a mission or a life. One may
estate a row unit of ~rent: the "h~nff~ivalent", or a
system in Apace with the sad effectiveness as a single human. Such a
syst~n might be cadged of a full-time human, living and wor}cing in
~pace; of a human in Space working part-time with a robotic system; of
a tele~rated sylvan controlled for a human on ache grad; or even of a
fully autofocus root with learner and reasoning capabilities.
416
It is cheer that the "h~nan~ivalent" presence ~ Space is on a
monoton~ca1ly-~ncr-~=ing acre. As ache societies on earth start to
gem advantages Frau Apace, the nor for capabilities in Apace will
continue ~ grow. This implies a parallel grc~;h ~ the z~t to
curate musingly ~ Apace.
As a fraught experiment, let us pink that pomt In Me future at
which machine svs~ have became as capable as a human.
-
It may e~ren
be MacPaint that this point is not ~ the far distar~c frame:
manipulative capabilities are airhead approadhi~ that of a human In a
pressure suit, and human Elisions on-orbit have been constricted to
aigori~m~ic logic trees "gaily implement on modern computers. It is
cl-=' that, at scam pout in time, machines will be capable of
performing ev~ythi~ currently done by has in Apace. At that
point, will we (as a nation, or a civilization) pull all Me people Ant
of space, and Ray totally on robotic systems to continue ache
exploration and exploitation of this last, infinite frontier?
At this philosophical question, the author has reached the limits of
his original Earl. History indicate= that humans are capable of
perfor~ung important, complex tasks in the space err=. As
adaptive Mania, hens have only begun to learn how to Rate
this near e~riron~nt.
However, much of mane" space flight to date has been involved with
avert the I;,nitations of biological orb. Are evolution of
robotic syrups he been orders of magnitude Ore rapid than Mat of
biologic=] so; Mere ~ no reason to assume that this new
evolution will stop Art of full human capacities, parti—Yearly if
asu~ against the Array Ignited capabilities of humans ~
space. It is clear that both systems have s ~ the are ~ sea;
that the best mixture of each is a time-depen~ent solution; and that,
for the foreseeable future, the presence of each in space Is an
absolute neaeC=ity for the effective use of the other.
. _ . . . · . .
If continued
aeve~cpmene or robotic systems renters numans on space obsolete, that
sect be a rational, conscious decision made by society as a whole,
based on factors beyond these appropriate to an er~iT~rir~ Nervier
paper.
BTpr.T~IY
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