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OCR for page 451
SYNOPSIS OF GENERAL AUDIENCE: DISaJSSICN
Folly the presentations by the invited ~x3sium firs, tee
pros were fined to dimension arx! =ent Frau the floor. A
synapsis of the Marks macle Ming this Orion of coven discussion Is
printed belabor.
Stephen Hall, NASA Marshall Apace Flight Center, referring to the
ap~t lack of acceptance of Bert systems by many potential users
(mentioned by Struck) asks, "Is this a fury limitation of
exert sy~;t~c; or if not, Mat can be force to =# potential user
acceptance?" In reply W;llimn Star~k of New York University
suggests that there are ways to teach people to trust eat systems.
Starbuck pointed Ant that there are factory so irk prorate;, for
example, that people now trust. Many factory schedulers use Smith
padres but have no idea how they work arxt couldn't replicate then if
they wanted ha. After Bird them for a Period of time Off learn to
adopt then. One key to acceptance ~ that ~ users learn that Bran
· . . . . · · . · .
if Be ~ may not be able to explain Law it derived me answers
to a prdblen, it can present the sol~icn arx} provide an indication of
has good it firm the archer or solution is. Over tom, the
correlation of predict arm coed resays instills confiders In
the user.
Guilio Varsi, NA5A Headquarters, sagest that act erg attention
he been paid to the in pact Rich Be degree of media gauze can have
on the acceptance art performance of Apace missions, art raised Be
question of the agree to which such Aura ~ appropriate. He cited
the heroic image of the as~cronauts created to Ate. He Ice
whether they are likely to receive this sod degree of Sure in the
future arm ho this he or lack of it may influence future
performs e. Varsi also twenty on Be issue of mission safety,
Pointing cut that in addition ~ the criteria of Performance and fit,
_ - ,
, e ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8
safety especially as relet" to humar1 safeW ached be of continuing
concerns. Varsi ashy the question "As we more from the heroic to the
routine, what ~ the real level of risk we are prepare to sustain?"
As a final point, Varsi Twenty that many interesting ~r~ issues
ark questions for investigation were raised Muir the sy~6iurn arx] he
s~estei that an ordering Of these mead issues should be pmvic3-ed,
highlighting their urgency not so Oh fern the sta~o~nt of priority
but rather from ache sequencing or logic ~ be follies In atta~ir~
451
OCR for page 452
452
these problems. He asl - , ''Is there any one reseat prearm sequence
that offers a more effective parch ~ addressing the critical "sues
than any Or one?"
In reply to Vars~'s comments cn rink adversity art safety, David
Akin of ~ T pointy ant ~ at, in his ~ risque, NASA Is already orders
of magnitude more risk adversive than the undersea o ity, and if
anything, MESA is kecceinq even more so in light of the Challenger
accident. Akin suggested that if anything is going to drive people out
of space entirely it is being absolutely risk free. The ultimate in
risk adversity is for humans not to go into space at all. While
robotic devices may appear to expand the options, ~ reality the
considerations of risk advemi~ apply to equipment as wel1. Akin
potty out that in deciding to risk a one~f-a-kir~ $100 million
Sclerotic service' to service a satellite with an unfired solid
rocket motor, the saw issues of risk adversity most be raised for the
r ~ as w ~ d be rats ~ for the crew In a manned Hi ~ fan. To put
the issue In prcger perspective it ~ necessary to consider risks and
risk adversity in space in relation to potential risks and risk
adversity in other fields.
Allen Newell of Carnegie-Mellon cbeerveS that no Hatter how
dangerous it is, people believe it to be important and still want to go
into span. One of the rem ities which Ant be fact is that }fly bairn
so deft for the first 25 year';, Petrels of National and World
exaltations of safety ~ Apace operations are very high and as a
Nation we will suffer fran that high level of expectation` In the
future.
Oomph Loftus of NASA Atchison Space Center observed that an airplane
that is safe in peacetime is too dangerous to go to war. '~J.e pointed
cut that in an adversary relationship an airplane is needed that to at
the peak edge of performance in order to proceed in its mussicn.
~ flus .nted that this is an important point when thinking of space
operations beta,:-=- space operation is not a venture in isolation it is
a competition. It is an exploration at a frontier and safety standards
carmot be set so high that the faultier is forfeited. At this point
Session 7 of ~ ~;ium was concluded.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
macle ming
