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OCR for page 61
8 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
A theme underlying the various ways in which companies
have responded to the issues rained in earlier chapters
of this report is that an individual's activities and
compensation are not determined by technology alone.
They result f rom manage r ial choices about how people
should be employed and, in unionized settings, f rom the
relationship between union and management.
In traditional adversarial conditions, union and
management can benefit from a large number of narrow job
classifications. Management pays the average worker less
for performing relatively low-.killed jobs, while the
union has more workers employed as well as an elaborate
job security mechanism to protect workers with high
seniority in specific job classifications. If neither
side trusts the other, such a system will be self-
perpetuating. In the long run, however, this system
may hurt both union and management if their foreign and
domestic competitors employ their workers more effec-
tively and produce higher quality products at lower cost.
The committee's Rite visits produced a good deal of
evidence that both union and management can benefit from
a broader definition of jobs. Management benefits from
workers who are better trained and who can exercise the
judgment needed to operate and maintain expensive
equipment. The union benefits by its members' having
more secure employment, more interesting and challenging
jobs, and higher pay.
Noted in the report are a number of instances in which
cooperation and joint problem solving between unions and
management about ANT were part of a general change in the
balance between cooperative and adversarial processes.
Today's forms of union-management cooperation, often born
of adversity and championed by particular leaders, may
61
OCR for page 62
62
pose complex dilemmas for both union and management as
they move in this direction. These problems may be
complicated by jurisdictional issues between unions.
For example, the site visits suggest that advanced
manufacturing technology requires more skill and knowl-
edge in operation and maintenance than does traditional
technology. How that skill and knowledge will be
distributed between nonunion, white-collar professionals
and workers in the bargaininq unit can be a source of
controversy. Committee evidence suggests that some
managers are reversing a pattern of recent decades and
assigning multiskilled tasks to workers in the bargaining
unit. Direct consideration and discussion of these
issues is a necessary part of implementation planning
for ANT in unionized workplaces. The committee has not
explored how far it in reasonable to go toward joint
planning of technology and other matters of mutual
concern.
QUALITY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Implementation of ANT in a way that benefits managers
and workers (and their undone) requires strong labor-
management relations. In addition, both groups need an
understanding of how to deal with a number of issues that
arise from the introduction of new technology.
Today' ~ competitive environment provides adequate
reason for union and management to improve their rela-
tionship. Self-serving tactics divert the time and
energy of both workers and managers from producing higher
quality products more efficiently and thereby securing
jobs. A better labor-manage~ent relationship can lead to
improved performance regardless of whether the plant
inverts in new technology. But a plant that invests in
new technology is even more likely to reach its full
productive potential if it has a good labor-management
relationship.
Managers would be well advised to begin working to
improve the relationship before introducing new technol-
ogy. One way to begin is to introduce quality-circle or
quality of-working-life programs in the plant. Several
of the unionized sites visited had such programs before
new technology was introduced. Management and union
officials at these sites reported that the programs gave
them experience in working cooperatively on subjects of
mutual interest. These programs helped them recognize
OCR for page 63
63
that it was possible to solve problems and bargain with
the same people, depending on the issue and circumstances.
These programs are particularly important if manager. use
the quality of the relationship as a criterion for
deciding whether to invest in a particular plant.
National contracts affecting most of the unionized
sites visited require management to notify the union of
plans to introduce new technology. One indicator of the
quality of the labor-management relationship is the
willingness of management to notify the union an early as
possible and the extent to which management involves the
union in implementing the new technology. The union
could be involved an early as the selection or design of
the technology. Union officers or members at five
unionized sites (I, X, M, O. and Q) accompanied engineers
on tripe to vendors and made recommendations on what
equipment to buy. Knowledgeable union officers or
rank-and-file employees can also offer ideas on how to
make the equipment operate more effectively on the shop
floor, how jobs might be designed, planning for displace-
ment, training, and no on.
If consulted early, the union may be an advocate for
the new technology, arguing that it is the only way in
the long run to retain members' jobs. In fact, union
officials at two of the sites visited (plants F and O)
specifically said they frequently make this point to
their membership. Such advocacy is much lest likely to
occur if the union in not informed about the technology
until all key decisions have been made. The union may
oppose what it views as decisions made without consider-
ing union members' interest..
Union officials who participate in decisions about the
introduction of new technology are taking some political
risk in the interest of maintaining the health of the
industries and plants where their members are employed.
They might be seen by their members as Being in manage-
meet's pocket,. as one manager put it. Union officiate
willing to take this r isk seem to recognize that greater
risk may lie in doing nothing or opposing everything that
management initiates. The consequence of such a position
may be a plant becoming noncompetitive and subsequent
loss of jobs for union members.
To deal intelligently with issues that arise from the
introduction of new technology, managers and union
of f icials at the industry and plant levels need to keep
up-to-date on developments in ANT and their implications
for labor relations. Corporate managers and national
OCR for page 64
64
union officers are in a natural leadership position to
educate their plant-level counterparts about ANT and to
develop policies to deal with it.
MODIFYING CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
Most of the sites visited were experimenting with
combining existing job classifications into broad-scoped
or multiskilled job classifications. The total number of
job classifications was thereby reduced.
Managers at three unionized plants (F. O. and Q)
agreed to create a new, higher paying classification for
ANT jobs, primarily to prevent the occupants from being
bumped during layoffs. All three sites are existing
plants in which the Majority of workers held traditional
jobs: seniority is plantwide, so workers with high
seniority in such jobs can bump down to lower-rated jobs
to avoid being laid off. With the new job classifica-
tion, management gains come flexibility in assignments
and assures continuity for workers it trains for ANT
jobs. These workers receive higher pay and greater job
security, but the number of job classifications increased
by one. Management at a fourth unionized site (R)
proposed such an arrangement, but the union rejected it
because it did not want to tamper with basic seniority
provisions while a high percentage of its membership wan
laid off.
New job classifications need not be created to gain
flexibility in assignment. At two of the unionized
plants (I and M), workers in skilled trades informally
agreed to perform work normally performed by other
skilled trades. All received the same pay and retained
their skilled trades identification under the contract.
Thus, flexibility can be greater in practice than it may
appear to be on paper. Workers have important reasons
for retaining their skilled trades identification. State
laws may specify criteria for apprentice and journeyman
status in a particular trade, and workers may need their
identity as electrician, pipe fitter, millwright, and so
on, if they leave their present employer and seek a job
on the open market. Lines of demarcation between trades
within a particular plant are established by custom and
past practice. In come cases, the plant culture and the
degree of trust between the local union and plant
management can offer as much flexibility as a formal
change of rules.
OCR for page 65
65
INTEGRITY OF TEE BARGAINING UNIT
Management and union need to agree on criteria for
what work will remain in the bargaining unit. Thin task
is complicated by the blurring of distinctions between
professional and shop-floor work with AMT. As a result,
both parties may view the introduction of AMT as an
opportunity to try to change the bargaining unit in their
own favor. The outcome most likely to avoid controversy,
at least initially, is the status quo; jobs that replace
work done by members of the bargaining unit can remain in
the bargaining unit. This appears to be the solution
most likely to avoid controversies that would interfere
with the implementation of AMT technology. But it is
important to recognize that this approach may or may not
lead to an optimal use of the new technology, and
therefore must be carefully considered.
Union and management at several of the plants visited
raised issues related to the diminishing boundaries
between management and work force functions with AMT, but
no trend was apparent in how they were dealing with it.
Computer programming by production workers, for example,
was an issue in some places but not others. The coe-
mittee talked to shop-floor workers in nonunion nettings
who could write, or at least proofread and edit, software
programs. In some unionized settings, programming by
shop-f loor workers was an issue because of the impact
it might beve on the bargaining unit. At one unionized
site (plant O), the issue was not the worker's ability
to write or modify programs, but that the program in
question involved scheduling, which is traditionally a
management function.
EMPLO ~ ENT SECURITY
Employment security is often a prerequisite for union
acceptance of changes described in this report. The job
classification system, for example, currently serves in
part as a Mechanism for handling layoff and shift assign-
ments. It will be difficult for union and manageannt to
agree on reducing job classifications when bumping rights
and shift preferences are based on seniority in classifi-
cations. A system of radically fewer job classifications
is more likely to be accepted in a new, highly automated
plant than is a gradual shift to fewer classifications
in an existing plant. Fewer job classifications in any
OCR for page 66
66
plant means that straight seniority will eventually play
a greater role in determining bumping and shift prefer-
ences; a plant with a single job classif ication would
have a pure seniority system. A gradual shift to fewer
job classifications, however, will still provide safe
niches for some employees, and they will not readily give
them up.
Most of the sites visited had policies for providing
employment for workers displaced by technological
change. Such workers were offered other Jobs with the
company and retraining where necessary. The majority of
the sites, however, did not guarantee job security in a
business downturn. Many of the plants expected to employ
fewer workers in the next few years, but thought they
could handle the reduction by attrition and plant tran.-
fer.. m e management at one site (plant F) anticipated
that it would employ the same number of workers in 10
years, even though it expected to invest heavily in new
technology, because it foresaw a substantial increase in
business.
Employment security may be greater, in general, for
workers in highly automated plants as labor costs shift
from variable to fixed. A stable but smaller number of
workers will be required to operate the plant regardless
of the volume of output. Protection can be provided to
workers who might otherwise be displaced by technological
change, however. A company can guarantee employment, for
example, as long as an employee is willing to be trained
for a new Job. The 1984 agreement between General Motors
Corporation and the United Auto Workers established the
Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS), to which employees
displaced by new technology can be assigned at full pay
and benef its. While in the ~bank, ~ employees can be
a-signed to training programs or to fill in for other
workers who are themselves in training programs. A
similar program is the Protected Employee Program (PEP)
at Ford Motor Company.
None of the companies visited reported any involuntary
loss of employment directly attributable to technological
change. Workers whose jobs were displaced by new
technology were being retrained for new jobs or given
the opportunity to transfer to another plant within the
company. The plant managers believed that attrition
would be sufficient to accommodate any work force
reductions that resulted from new technology. Some of
the plants had workers on layoff because of a decline in
business. Workers or union officials interviewed at the
OCR for page 67
67
plants, however, did not view the layoffs as the result
of new technology.
Most sites had stable employment because of increased
demand for a superior product or because they were
bringing previously subcontracted work back into the
plant. The reason for the latter is that the new tech-
nology in so expensive that plants try to run two and
three shifts a day to shorten the payback period on the
investment. While plants that do previously subcon-
tracted work may not suffer loss of employment, the
companies that lost the work probably will.
One aspect of employment stability directly under
management's control is how well it plans for plant
start-up with new technology. If a company plans for
too rapid a start-up to full capacity, it will need a
much larger number of support and maintenance personnel
early, but may have to reduce that number as the plant
approaches steady-state conditions. Planning for a
gradual buildup to full capacity may permit a more
predictable increase in the personnel needed to operate
the plant and avoid the need to lay off people later.
Personnel planning requires care in both unionized and
nonunionized settings. Management has less flexibility
in unionized settings, however, because of its limited
ability to hire nonunion people, such as ~job-shoppers,.
to cope with temporary surges in personnel needs. Unions
rarely accept the employment of people who would normally
do the work of members they represent.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
bargaining unit
