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Crime Control Strategies Using Criminal Career Knowledge The criminal career paradigm suggests three general orientations for crime con- tro! strategies: prevention, career modifi- cation, and incapacitation. This chapter first presents the evidence and conclu- sions on programs intended to prevent young children from becoming offenders. It then reviews efforts to modify ongoing criminal careers through interventions with the family and efforts to change sub- stance abuse behavior and employment status, both of which are associates! with a high frequency of serious offending. This chapter also updates the work of the Na- tional Research Council Pane! on Deter- rent and Incapacitative Effects (Blum- stein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978) by examining the crime control effects of different sentencing policies from an in- carceration perspective. Preventive strategies are intencled to reduce the number of nonoffenders who become offenders. Two types of knowI- edge are needled to design effective pre- ventive strategies: prospective indicators of subpopulations having high participa- tion rates ant! iclentified interventions that recluce participation in targeted sub 109 populations. Although the panel's review of experimental findings on the effective- ness of various interventions in reducing participation fount! little evidence sup- porting specific interventions as preven- tive mechanisms, it die] fire! a few cancli- ciates sufficiently promising to warrant a call for experimental replications. Career mollification strategies are fo- cusecl on persons aIrea(ly known to be criminals and seek to reduce the fre- quency or seriousness of their crimes. Also, modification strategies usually at- tempt to encourage the termination of ongoing criminal careers by creating fear of punishment, by modifying offenders' values, or by expanding opportunities for legitimate alternatives to crime. Career modification strategies, such as counsel- ing or behavioral therapies, intervene cli- rectly in the life of the offender to change criminal behavior. The pane] was partic- ularly interested in the substantial holly of research relating recidivism rates to various interventions, inclucling commu- nity-basecl supervision as an alternative to incarceration, verbal and behavioral therapies intenclec! to inhibit aggressive

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110 and antisocial behavior, substance abuse treatment programs, and programs to im- prove employment prospects. Some of these interventions might also effectively inhibit future participation among nonof- fenders. Methodological problems limit the knowledge that most of these studies provide about the effectiveness of those interventions in modifying the criminal career, but several studies in which large samples were randomly assigned to alter- native treatments provide evidence about the relative effectiveness of some inter- vention programs. Incapacitation strategies focus on the crime reduced as a result of removing offenders from society during their crim- inal careers. While the use of imprison- ment as a means of incapacitation may also have career modification effects by altering offender behavior through in- rehabilitation programs, the "incapacitative effect" refers only to crimes prevented in the community by interrupting criminal careers during peri- ods of incarceration. This incapacitative effect depends fundamentally on the magnitude of individual crime rates, A. Two types of incapacitation are often dis- tinguished: collective incapacitation and selective incapacitation. Collective inca- pacitation refers to the effects of aggre- gate policies involving changes in the average sentences applied to average of- fenders. Collective strategies, such as a percentage increase in all prison sen- tences, were the subject of the previous Pane! on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects (Blumstein, Co- hen, and Nagin, 19781. Selective incapac- itation refers to policies that target in- creased incapacitation more narrowly on selected offenders. One such policy pre- scribes longer prison terms for the few offenders who commit serious offenses at especially high rates. As part of its work, this panel commissioned a reanalysis of recent Rand Corporation data on varia mate rehabilitation CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS lions in reporter] A among inmates and on the selective incapacitative effects of us- ing longer sentences for the high-rate offenders among those inmates. STRATEGIES TO PREVENT PARTICIPATION Research has identified demographic and nondemographic indicators of a high risk of eventual participation in crime. On the basis of the widely measured demo- graphic variables of age, sex, race, and place of residence, young black mates in large urban locations appear to be at par- ticularly high risk of arrest: approximately 30 percent have been arrested by age 18 for an FBI inclex offense (see Blumstein and Gradcly, 1982:Table 11. And while the peak age for the first arrest is 15, there is significant risk at even earlier ages: about one-third of the black males ar- rested by age 18 had been arrested by age 13. As noted in Chapter 2, family charac- teristics associated with the onset of de- linquency at any age include earlier pa- rental delinquency and criminality, poor child supervision, and marital conflict in two-parent households. Early, intense, and diverse antisocial behavior by a child, poor school performance, and low measured IQ are other indications of a high risk for participation in crime. Full-time employment at a young age when school attendance is expected may also be associated with participation in crime. Several problems limit the potential of these factors in focusing preventive inter- ventions. Most important, considerable ambiguity surrounds the interpretation of many indicators, especially the demo- graphic variables, which often function as stand-ins for other unmeasured social and economic factors. In addition, the causal relationship between measured variables and criminal participation is often impre- cise and may vary with circumstances.

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE Many children present some or all of the high-risk characteristics ant! antecedent behaviors but clo not become offenders, and any classification rule invoking the indicators wit! produce many false posi- tives (Loeber and Dishion, 19831.i Al- though the ability to predict future partic- ipation in crime increases cluring the late teenage and adult years, effective options for preventive intervention may well de- crease as the high-risk youth becomes older and less amenable to change. How- ever, some of the relationships observer! at ages blithe earliest at which any of the chilc~hoocI characteristics have been studied in relation to adult offending might also be observable at younger ages. Thus, an important research issue is de- termining the optimal age for interven- tion: if the intervention is early, the iden- tification of high-risk children is likely to produce many errors; if the intervention is late, there will be less chance of suc cess. Experimental Evaluations of Preventive Interventions Early identification of children or teen- agers at relatively high risk of becoming offenders raises the possibility of inter- vention strategies to prevent members of high-risk groups from becoming offencI- ers. During the 1960s and 1970s, federal funding was provicled for many juvenile iThere have been several attempts to develop formal classification rules that could be used to identify predelinquent children. One of the oldest, the Glueck Social Prediction Table, included five family-related factors that differentiated 500 delin- quents from a matched set of 500 nondelinquents (Glueck and Glueck, 1950~. A number of method- ological problems in this work have been identified (see Zeisel, 1968; Hirschi and Selvin, 1973), and in a validation of the scale- which targeted first-grade males in high-delinquency areas in New York City and followed them for 7 years-75 percent of the predictions of delinquency were inaccurate (see Lundman, 1984~. programs, some of which had crime pre- vention as one of their objectives. There is a large body of research evaluating these programs, which has been exten- sively reviewed (e.g., Lunclman, McFar- lane, and Scarpitti, 1976; Wright and Dixon, 1977; Farrington, Ohlin, and Wil- son, 19861. In general, this research has been characterized by small sample sizes and designs that were either nonex- perimental or cTic3 not have adequate con- trols. Also, the follow-up periods have usually been 2 years or less: although these periods are probably adequate to assess the short-term effectiveness of the interventions in correcting antisocial be- haviors, they are not Tong enough to show effectiveness in preventing later criminal activity. However, the panel clid identify some promising experimental studies of interventions oriented specifi- cally toward! the precursor problems of bad family management, Tow school per- formance, and early antisocial behavior. In these few studies, the findings were sufficiently strong to suggest that further replications might establish their effec- tiveness in inhibiting participation in offencling. Interventions with the Family There are a few evaluations of efforts to train parents in identifying problem be- haviors as they emerge and using such modes of discipline as rewards and tirne- out periods to change them. Loeber (1984) reviewed three studies of experi- mental interventions with families of problem but not criminal-children aged 3-14, based on this orientation (Walters and Gilmore, 1973; Karoly and Rosenthal, 1977; Bernal, Klinnert, and Schultz, 19801. Two of the studies clem- onstratecl temporary effectiveness in cor- recting the overt antisocial behavior: re- ductions of about 60 percent in the frequency of the targeted behaviors, ob

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2 served up to 1 month after completion of the program. However, the only study with a follow-up period long enough to discover long-term behavioral changes- 2 years-failed to detect a decrease (Bernal, Klinnert, and Schultz, 1980~. Longer follow-ups and searches of juve- nile court records would be needed to learn whether the interventions suc- ceeded' in inhibiting participation in criminal behavior. One particular intervention with fami- lies family social learning is based on the theory that early antisocial behavior is first learned through imitation of other family members and interaction with them, that ineffective parenting fails to inhibit minor antisocial behaviors from escalating in seriousness, and that these behaviors may lead children into trouble with school authorities or with the juve- nile justice system (see Patterson, Cham- berlain, and Reid, 1982~. The goal of this type of intervention is to eliminate paren- tal behaviors that serve as a model for aggressive antisocial behavior by the child and to suppress the child's antiso- cial behavior when it occurs. Theoreti- cally, parental training could begin at any time before the child reaches high school age. While these preventive approaches have been advocated (Pulkkinen, 1983; Loeber, 1984) and tried, the follow-up periods in the few experimental studies of such interventions have been too short to permit evaluations of their effective- ness in inhibiting participation in oend- ~ng. Preschool Programs The Perry Preschool Project, carried out in Michigan, was primarily directed at improving the school performance of disadvantaged black children through a Head Start program lectual stimulation CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS (Schweinhart and Weikart, 1980~. This Head Start program was unique because it also examined the impact of a preschool program in reducing later criminal activ- ity. Results from a long-term evaluation suggest that the program had generally' beneficial effects. The experimental group of 58 children receiving the enrich- ment showed gains in measured IQ at age 5, although this gain, in comparison with a control group, dissipated entirely by age 14. But at the latter age, the experimental subjects displayed higher school achieve- ment, better self-reported classroom be- havior, and less self-reported participa- tion in offending than the control subjects (Berrueta-Clement et al., 1984~. The find- ings with respect to school achievement were replicated in 10 similar experiments conducted at about the same time, but these experiments did not collect official records of participation in crime or delin- quency (Consortium for Longitudinal Studies, 1983~. Comparisons of officially recorded criminal participation also suggest lower rates among the 58 preschool participants than among the control group of 65: 40 percent of the controls but only 25 per- cent of the participants were charged or arrested as adults.2 While these differ- ences are statistically significant and en- couraging, an intervention based on a sample of this size needs further testing. Replication of the analysis of criminal participation for the other 10 Head Start experiments would be an important next step in furler assessment of the pro- gram's potential for reducing criminal participation. providing intel- and enrichment 2A somewhat smaller difference between pre- school participants and controls was reported with respect to the percent arrested as juveniles (Ber- rueta-Clement et al., 1984~. However, because some arrested juveniles were not included in the analysis, Mat difference is not discussed here.

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE Other Interventions Various school- and community-based preventive interventions have been ex- perimentally evaluated with respect to their electiveness in correcting undesir- able behavior in children identifier! as at 1 CC ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ risk e.g., aggressive, antisocial, vu nerable to delinquency") by parents, teachers, or professional observers. The interventions that have been studied in- clude special school programs to improve self-concept or cognitive skills (e.g., Reckless and Dinitz, 1972; Garrison ant! Stolberg, 1983; Kettlewell and Kausch, 1983), behavior management techniques such as contracting ant! token economies (Stuart, layaratne, and Tripodi, 1976), in- dividual counseling (McCord, 1978; Shore and Massimo, 1979), work-exper- ience programs (AhIstrom and Havighurst, 1971; Hackler and Hagan, 1975; Wodarski et al., 1979), buddy pro- grams (O'Donnell, LyUgate, and Fo, 1979), and- social learning programs (Wodarski and Pedi, 1978; Johnson and Breckenridge, 1982~. The sample sizes in these studies ranged from 32 to 1,000, ant! follow-up periods ranged from none be- yoncI the life of the program up to 30 years. Of these experimental studies, sev- eral interventions seem encouraging, but furler study is needed. One 2-year intervention (Bry and George, 1979, 1980; Bry, 1982) involved points awarded weekly by teachers for good behavior, discussions in group meetings, and extra school trips, and re- ports on behavior were made to parents. A group of 66 seventh-grade students se- lected on the basis of school or family problems was assigned ranclomly to re- ceive the intervention or not. The exper- imental subjects did not experience the subsequent deterioration in school atten- dance and academic achievement that oc- curred in the 33 controls who did not 113 receive the treatment. In a follow-up in- terview 1 year after the program, mem- bers ofthe experimental group reported a participation rate of 33 percent for vandal- ism, auto theft, grand theft, or robbery, compared with a rate of 55 percept among the control group. In another follow-up 5 years after the intervention ended, a search of county juvenile probation rec- ords showed that the participation rate in serious or chronic offending was 9 per- cent ant! 27 percent for experimental and control subjects, respectively. As with the Perry preschool programs, these results are encouraging, but replications in other sites with larger samples are necessary. Summary: Preventive Interventions The major reviews of experimental ev- idence on the effectiveness of preventive interventions suggest some encouraging possibilities, but they do not establish that any approach tested to date effec- tively reduces subsequent criminal par- ticipation. Heac! Start programs appear to improve school performance, and there is evidence suggesting that one such pro- gram reduced later participation in of- fending, but analysis of data on criminal participation from other Heart Start sites is needed to establish the finding more definitively. Social learning programs for families of antisocial preadolescents have sometimes shown short-term effective- ness in ameliorating the early antisocial behavior that frequently precedes delin- quency, but these programs have not yet been evaluates! as effective in pre- venting clelinquency itself Future ex- periments of this type of intervention need to use longer follow-up periods, inclucle searches of juvenile justice sys- tem records, and compare results across alternative family arrangements, such as single- versus two-parent households. The theoretical underpinnings and pro

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114 gram operations of the interventions also need to be made explicit in this research so that results can be aclequately evaTu- atecI and promising interventions tested in other settings. Some of the findings of no difference between treatment and control or com- parison groups may be attributable to reactive effects of the experiment. In pre- ventive interventions clesigned to im- prove conduct at school, for example, children may resent being stigmatized or feel angry at being separated from their classmates. Moreover, since teachers usu- ally know the identities .of the treatment subjects but not of the control group sub- jects, inflated expectations or hostility re- lated to the program could lead to differ- ential subjective performance standards. If either a child's or a teacher's behavior is influenced by the structural character- istics of the experiment, then the program components may not achieve the desired effect. Future experiments of this type of intervention should be aware of these reactive effects. One alternative may be school-based programs that are designed to supplement basic education and are clirected at all enrolled children rather than some selected "high-risk" group (see Greenwood and Zimring, 19851. The design of some interventions may also reflect an incomplete or inaccurate theoretical orientation, which may ac- count for findings of negative effects. Pre- ventive interventions (or career moclifica- tion strategies) groun(led in social learning theory and behavior moclifica- tion may ignore the possibility that cor- rection of the targeted behavioral prob- lems in one setting (say, the home) may not modify them in another setting (such as the school). And, as cliscussed by Loeber (1982), children with conduct dis- orders often display different problem be- haviors in different settings. The typical behavioral intervention, however, fo- cuses on modifying behavior in one set CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS ting, with little or no transfer of program components such as behavioral con- tracts, reinforcements, or punishments- into other settings. Correction of a prob- lem behavior in the home would be inef- fective in inhibiting participation in crime if it were replacer] by disruptive behavior in the classroom. In this case, postintervention evaluations, especially Tong-term follow-up studies that examine police or court records, would be unlikely to show an effect of the narrowly targeted behavioral intervention. In short, most of the evaluative re- search on preventive interventions is nondefinitive because of design prob- lems, small sample sizes, inadequate follow-up periocls, and inacloquate ran- domization. Moreover, because ofthe dif- ficulty and cost of large-scare, fully ran- domizecl experiments, research ant! evaluation in this area might advance more quickly under a two-stage process. In the first stage, quasi experiments and experiments with small samples could explore the effectiveness of many types of programs; in the second stage, the pro- grams that had emerged as most promis- in~ could be replicated on a larger scale with a more rigorous research design. Head Start and social learning programs have shown promise in small-scale dem- onstrations, and they appear to be ready for larger-scare studies. For other types of interventions, more attention needs to be placed on design quality and on full reporting of the initial experimental re- sults. CAREER MODIFICATION STRATEGIES In contrast to strategies intended! to prevent nonoffenders from becoming of- fenders, career modification strategies are directed at identified offenders and are intended to reduce the frequency, seri- ousness, or duration of their criminal ca

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE reers.3 Interventions intended to modify criminal careers are most frequently eval- uated in terms of the fraction of offenders rearrested or reconvicted within a speci- fied follow-up period- the recidivism rate. While providing a gross measure of reductions in criminal activity, the recid- ivism rate does not adequately distin- guish which aspects of careers are af- fectecI by an intervention. If follow-up periods are short relative to the average interval between arrests, for example, it is often difficult to distinguish arrest-free intervals during a still-active career from career termination. Moreover, unless re- ciclivism is defined by crime-specific cri- teria, it would fait to detect reductions in offense seriousness a desirable career modification. Few studies, however, have used measures that aclequately tap the different dimensions of criminal careers. A broad array of modification strategies was examined by Lipton, Martinson, ant! Wilks (1975) ant] by the earlier Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques (Sechrest, White, and Brown, 19791. While that panel found no treatment strat- egies that were widely effective in reduc- ing recidivism, they conclucled that some treatments may be effective for certain groups of offenders and recommended more rigorous and imaginative research on offender rehabilitation. Among the in- terventions that the panel consiclered es- pecially worthy of further considerations were alternative sentencing ant! confine- ment arrangements, extensive family in- terventions, employment and vocational programs, ant] increaser! support after an inmate's release from prison. In assessing the crime control potential of such career modification strategies, this pane! did not 30ther strategies can affect behavior through broader environmental or social influences, such as changes in sanction or economic policy. These pol- icies, while not directed at individual offenders, can modify criminal career dimensions. ~5 replicate the previous comprehensive re- views. However, adopting a career per- spective, it die! consider the implications of large-scare experiments involving al- tematives to standard criminal ant! juve- nile sanctions as well as evaluations of family interventions, employment pro- grams, and postrelease support programs not explicitly incorporated in the earlier reviews. In adclition, in view of the dem- onstrated relationship between the inten- sity of substance abuse ant] the frequency of offending, the pane! also reviewed sev- eral recent large-scare studies ofthe effec- tiveness of treatment of substance abuse in modifying criminal careers. Among the selected studies, some show sufficient general promise to warrant furler explo- ration; they are discussed in the remain- cler of this section. Career Modification: Community-Based and Family Treatment Programs juveniles Inclividually oriented treatment pro- grams for juvenile offenders are typically introducer] as altematives to regular juve- nile court processing (either incarceration or probation). The programs most often inclucle community-based treatment such as counseling, group therapy, or voca- tional programs; treatment of the entire family; or in some cases, diversion from the juvenile court altogether (see reviews by Clarke, 1974a, b; Farrington, 1982; Farrington, OhTin, ant! Wilson, 19861. Studies of the programs permit compari- sons of subsequent recidivism rates for those processes] in the regular juvenile court system (inclucling residential treat- ment and probation) with those assigned to community-based treatment, diversion programs (including family treatment and no treatment), ant! intensive supervised probation. In nearly all the stu(lie(1 pro

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116 grams, samples of persons arrested or re- ferred at about the same time and age were randomly assigned to an experimen- tal or control group. Such randomization minimizes problems involving selection bias and lends confidence that postinter- vention comparisons between experi- mental and control groups are a valid measurement of the differential effect of the experimental intervention on offend- ing frequency, or at least on recidivism rates. The majority of follow-up studies on alternative treatments concluded that ju- venile delinquents treated with group therapy, usually supplemented by home visits or intensive parole with additional supervision, had recidivism rates that were no higher than delinquents released from training schools.4 Other studies that reported Tower recidivism rates for alter- native treatments had methodological problems that affected the validity of the results. For example, in the Provo exper- iment (Empey and Erickson, 1972), treat- ment subjects had lower recidivism rates than the training school controls, but the randomization features of the experiment broke down because the judge was reluc- tant to institutionalize some offenders. During a 2-year follow-up period of the California Community Treatment Pro- gram (Palmer, 1974), youths randomly as 4Examples of the studies include Pond (1970), Empey and Lubeck (1971), Palmer (1971, 1974), Jesness et al. (1972), and Lerman (1975~. Institu- tional programs for juveniles and adults were exten- sively reviewed by Sechrest, White, and Brown (1979), and a recent update (Farrington, Ohlin, and Wilson, 1986) reports that group counseling in juve- nile institutions has little effect on recidivism. See also Coates, Miller, and Ohlin (1978) for a discus- sion of the experience in Massachusetts, which closed virtually all its juvenile correctional institu- tions in the 1970s. In their place, the state devel- oped a network of community-based facilities (resi- dential and nonresidential); this change has had no substantial effect on juvenile recidivism rates (see also Lundman, 1984~. CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS signed to the alternative parole program had lower recidivism rates, based on pa- role revocations, than those sent to an institution. But a later review of these results (Lerman, 1975) pointed out that rearrest rates of the two groups did not differ. Apparently, parole revocations fol- lowing arrest were used more frequently for those who had been institutionalized. Recent experimental studies of alterna- tive diversion programs also report recid- ivism rates that are no different from those associated with standard juvenile justice system processing.5 In one such study at the Oregon Social Learning Cen- ter (see Reid, 1983), 70 chronic juvenile offenders (average age, 13) were ran- domly assigned either to a privately oper- ated, family-oriented behavioral treat- ment program or a regular counseling program run by the juvenile court, and a third group of 38 similar juveniles was selected as an additional control group. The family intervention techniques in- cludec! training parents to identify and record antisocial behaviors, emphasizing family negotiation strategies for better parent-child interactions, and behavioral contracts for both Me child and parents. Follow-up data from juvenile court rec . 5See Venezia (1972), Baron, Feeney, Thornton (1973), Quay and Love (1977, 1979), Berg et al. (1978), Berg, Hullin, McGuire (1979), Byles and Maurice (1979), Mrad (1979), and Severy and Whitaker (1982~. In addition, one large evaluation of diversion programs as alternatives to either release without treatment or further penetration of the juve- nile justice system reported that the recidivism rates associated with the three groups-diversion, re- lease, and regular processing-were virtually iden- tical in follow-ups conducted after 6 months and 1 year (Dunford, 1981~. This study involved over 2,500 juveniles in four states who were referred for offenses other than personal crimes or status of- fenses, and who were randomly assigned to one of the three comparison groups. Slightly under half had a previous record of arrest and most were male. Diverted juveniles received individual and family counseling along with some employment, educa- tional, and recreational services.

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE ores for the three groups revealed that, by 1 year after intake, the juveniles in the experimental treatment group hac! expe- rienced a more rapist decrease in the average number of officially recorclec3 of- fenses than juveniles in the other two groups. However, after 3 years, the differ- ences between the groups hac! disap- pearect. Inconsistent results from other studies that compare personal counseling, family crisis counseling, and specific forms of behavioral family therapy with regular processing suggest the neec! for furler attention to the nature ofthe intervention. Individual and group counseling, whether in institutions or in the commu- nity, appear to have little effect in modi- fying the criminal behavior of serious juvenile offenders. The more recent be- haviorally oriented programs, however, appear more promising, at least in the short term. In one diversion experiment that was based on behavioral reinforce- ment principles, juveniles referred by the police engaged in specialized family pro- grams designed to affect family commu- nication, coping skills, and negative envi- ronmental situations. The experimental group had Tower rearrest rates in the fol- low-up year than those observed in a no-treatment control group in one of two sites (Binder, Monahan, and Newkirk, 1976; Binder, no... The total study in- volved 1,104 juveniles, but the control groups had fewer than 100 youth at each site. Similar experiments carrier! out by Davidson et al. (1977) and Alexander and Parsons (1973) also reported some differ- ences between experimental and control groups, but the sample sizes in those studies were small. These encouraging short-te~-~ results suggest that behavioral approaches to treatment may warrant ex- perimental replication with more serious juvenile offenders, evaluation in other sites, longer follow-up periods, and larger control groups. , ~. . . 117 Adults Experimental research on adults has generally found no benefit from various community-based interventions (e.g., Lamb and Goertzel, 1974; Folkard, Smith, and Smith, 1976; Lich~anan and Smock, 1981), which were not considered by the earlier Pane! on Research on Re- habilitative Techniques. A new type of sentencing alternative, intensive commu- nity surveillance, is presently being con- sidered in several states as an option for aclult felons currently sentenced to prison or regular probation (see Petersilia et al., 19851. Such programs would usually com- bine multiple weekly contacts with a probation officer with mandatory employ- ment, community service, possible re- strictions on movement (e.g., evening curfews), ant] restitution. This type of intermediate sentence could be imposer! in place of incarceration on offenders who are identified as needing more supervi- sion and control than is usually provided by regular probation, but less than repre- sented by incarceration. Several evaTua- tions of these programs are currently in progress. Summary: Community-Base and Family Treatment Programs Experimental research suggests that for juvenile offenders, community-based treatment does no worse than routine juvenile justice system processing" in- cluding use of probation and training schools in affecting recidivism. These programs may be preferable because of their lower cost and reduced restrictive- ness, but they may not be acceptable in all communities. If incarceration is re- placed by these programs, juveniles gen- erally may view the risk of serious pun- ishment as small, and victims may fee! that justice is not being served. Perhaps most important, few experiments are

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118 available that might provide information about the effects of community-based in- terventions on the offense frequency and seriousness of adult offenders, although some recent intensive surveillance pro- grams (for a review, see Petersilia et al., 1985) warrant careful evaluation. Some therapeutic and behavioral inter- ventions appear successful in reducing antisocial and criminal behavior for juve- niles when evaluated in small-scare ex- periments, but no specific intervention emerges as being consistently effective. Many other interventions exist (for exam- ple, outdoor education programs, physi- cally oriented approaches like Outward Bound, and restitution programs for juve- niles), but few of these alternative treat- ments have yet been experimentally tested (see Greenwood and Zimring, 19851. As discussed in the above section on preventive interventions, the general ab- sence of definitive results within a vast evaluation literature suggests a need to focus evaluation resources on careful, well-designed replications of small-scale programs that are especially encouraging, either because of some positive empirical ~_ a, results or promising theoretical perspec- of criminal activity. In some studies, in tive. At present, the results of studies on creases or decreases in daily narcotics use career modification strategies may appear were associated with parallel changes in discouraging pertly because ofthelackof individual offending frequencies (Wish continuity and cumulation that results and Johnson, Volume II; McGIothlin, from an approach to evaluation that views Anglin, and Wilson, 1978; Ball et al., each study as a separate entity rather than 1981; Ball, Shaffer, and Nurco, 19831. as part of an ongoing investigation. Fur- There are also limited data that suggest thermore, many studies that show no ef- that decreased use of alcohol may be fects suffer from poor research designs associated with reductions in violent, as (i.e., small samples, lack of randomiza tion, short follow-up periods); the lack of effect is not necessarily because of inef fective interventions. Careful inspection of these no-effect findings can be useful in designing subsequent follow-up exper iments in a sustained series of cumulative research. However, even promising experimen CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS tat findings must be tested in practice because interventions that appear suc- cessful in a small short-term experiment may fait to have an effect once the pro- gram is implemented on a larger scale or in the context of the criminal justice sys- tem. Most career modification strategies (as well as preventive interventions) are pilot studies with limited samples, run by a small committed staff. It is possible that any positive results are the result of the commitment of the innovators, therapists, counselors, and other staffto their specific intervention. Several researchers have cautioned that because the level of staff commitment may decrease when a pilot effort is expanded to a large program or transferred to another jurisdiction, the success of the pilot program may not be renlinat~d in the new setting (see Reid, 1983; Greenwood and Zimring, 19851. Career Modification: Substance Abuse Treatment Recent empirical research on drug use and criminal involvement indicates that, at the individual level, intensity of drug use is strongly correlated with frequency saultive criminal events (see Collins, Vol- ume II; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982a, 1984~. In light of these findings, the rate of commission of some types of crime by drug-using offenders might be reduced through effective drug abuse treatment programs. A considerable literature exists on the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE programs in reducing individual criminal behavior in drug-using criminals.6 Most research is directecl at the treatment of narcotic affliction, especially heroin, al- though research on treatment for other drugs, such as PCP and cocaine, is in- creasing. Several studies, such as those of the California Civil Addict Program, have shown that court-orclered drug-free out- patient treatment accompanied by super- vision, including urine testing, and weekly visits to a parole officer is associ- ated with recluced criminal activity and higher rates of employment (e.g., McGIothTin, Anglin, and Wilson, 1977; Collins and Allison, 1983; Anglin and McGIothlin, 1984~. Other studies have also found that legal pressure is positively relater! to retention in treatment pro- grams. This research is important be- cause time in treatment is a significant factor in the reduction of criminal behav- ior after treatment (see Collins et al., 19~34; Hubbard et al., 1984~. The evidence regarding the effects on illegal behavior of methadone treatment for heroin afflicts (which is rarely court orderecI) is less consistent. Some studies show modest reductions in nondrug crim- inal behavior, but only methadone clients in treatment for 2 to 3 years have substan- tially fewer arrests (e.g., Lukoff, 1974, 1976; Sechrest, 1979; McGIothTin and Anglin, 1981~. In the Drug Abuse Report- ing Program (DARP), several types of treatment have been examined, and methadone programs also appeared to lower arrests, but the largest reductions in criminal behavior occurred during treatment (see Sells et al., 1976; Simpson et al., 19781. The Treatment Outcomes Prospective Study (TOPS), however, reports more fa 6Some of this literature is reviewed in Wish and Johnson (Volume II); see also Sells (1979), Gandossy et al. (1980), Collins et al. (1982a, by, Cooper et al. (1983), and Kaplan (1983:208-235~. ~9 vorable results. TOPS is following clients voluntarily admitted into a drug treat- ment program of their choice to assess the effectiveness of different treatment serv- ices, although it does not include a nontreatment comparison group (see Hubbard et al., 19831. A recent report indicates that voluntary clients in metha- done maintenance treatment programs self-reported significantly Tower levels of "predatory" criminal behavior 12 months after treatment ended, especially if they remained! in treatment for at least 3 months (Hubbard et al., 1984~. Similar effects were found for clients in voluntary outpatient drug-free programs. Because the TOPS clients chose to seek treatment and the outcome measure was self-report- ed criminal activity, their motivation to succeed may be an important factor in the results such that they cannot be attributed solely to the effects of the treatment pro- grams. In addition to the criminal activity and drug results in the TOPS study, full- time employment after treatment in- creased for outpatient cirug-free clients, but it declined somewhat for methadone clients (Hubbard et al., 19841. Less is known about the effect of resi- dential treatment programs on criminal behavior for heroin or other drug users, but most of the available research con- cludes that residential treatment appears to reduce criminal behavior (see Coombs, 1981; DeLeon, 1984; Hubbard et al., 19841. These types of programs are most likely to accept clients with the worst recent criminal histories and the most extensive patterns of drug use, but they are also more likely to be resisted by drug users, and some ofthe methods used (e.g., strict punishments, group pressure) have been controversial. Many of these pro- grams are privately operated and usually do not publish statistics on the criminal behavior of clients after treatment. A federal criminal justice initiative known as TASC (Treatment Alternatives

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144 Sense will be followed by arrest, convic- tion, and incarceration, and S. the average time served by those incarcerated. Under these conditions, active offenders are in- capacitated during a fraction of their crim- inal careers, I, while during a fraction (1 - I), active offenders are free to commit crimes on the street. It can be shown (Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar, 1973:Appendix; Shinnar and Shinnar, 1975:Appendix) that the incapacitated fraction of careers, I, is given by AJS(T S ~ ~ J . (5-1 ) 1 + AJS( ) The fraction of careers that active offend- ers are not incapacitated, i.e., when they are free on the street, is given by 1 - 1 = T 1 + AJS T,{ + S In both Equations 5-1 and 5-2, the frac- tion TR/(TR + S), which takes account of the reduction in crimes avoided because of spontaneous career termination during incarceration periods, S. reflects the like- lihood that an offender is still active in a career after serving a sentence; the re- maining fraction, S/(TR + S), is the likeli- hood that a career terminates while a sentence is being served. 21 2iThe expression for the likelihood that a career terminates while a sentence is being served de- pends on how career lengths and sentence lengths are distributed among offenders. The result re- ported here applies when career length is distrib- uted exponentially with mean residual length TR and when sentence length is also distributed expo- nentially with mean length S. Such distributions are generally compatible with observed patterns of ca- reer termination and with the distribution of time served by offenders. CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS Equations 5-1 and 5-2 can be used to estimate the annual numbers of crimes committed by active offenders who are free and of crimes averted for active of- fenders who are incarcerated. Crimes committed, C, are calculated as C = N X A X (1 - 1) , (5-3) while crimes avoided through incapacita- tion, CA, are calculated as CA = N X A X 1. (5 4) Combining Equations 5-3 and 5 4 yields the total number of potential crimes. The reduction in crimes through incapacita- tion, CA/(C + CA) is equal to I in equation 5-1. Likewise, Equations 5-1 and 5-2 can be used to estimate the size of the annual inmate population, R. The average daily inmate population in a year (reflected in person-years in prison)22 is given by (5-2) R = NO AX (~1-1) HIS. (5-5) Some careers terminate during prison terms, and so not all inmates reflected in R are active offenders. When focusing on a single offender, the expected time dur- ing that offender's residual career that he spends incarcerated is given by rA = TR X 1. (5-6) Similarly, in any year, the number of active offenders found in an annual in- mate population is given by RA = N X 1. (5-7) When Equations 5-5 and 5-7 are com- bined, the fraction of total inmates (R) who would be active if free (RA) is given by 22Each unit of R is equivalent to one inmate incarcerated for a full year. Use of average daily population allows for population turnover during a year as some inmates are released and new commit- ments take their place in the inmate population.

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE RAIR= NXI = TR N X A X (1 - 1) X JS TR + S While the total number of inmates (R) is easily observed, the total number of active offenders (N) both in ant! out of prison cannot be observed directly. The size of the active offender population, however, can be estimated from the in- mate population. First, by applying the fraction in Equation 5-8 to the total num- ber of inmates in a year, the number of active offenders among inmates (RA) can be estimated. Then, with an estimate of I in Equation 5-7, the total number of ac- tive offenders, N. can be estimated. When TR is much larger than S. spon- taneous career terminations are less likely, and the portion of a sentence dur- ing which an offender would be inactive becomes negligibly small. For reasons of analytical convenience and because reli- able estimates of TR have only recently become available, researchers have ig- nored career termination among inmates. With this approximation, the fractions of careers spent incapacitated and free are given by the simpler formulas: AJS 1 + AJS and 1 (5-1') 1 1 - 1* =, , ~ ' 1 - 1. (5-2') 1 + AJS Ignoring career termination, the annual count of crimes committed is given by the product of the offender population, the indiviclual offending rate, and the portion of a year offenders are free to commit crimes: C*=NxAx(l-I*~. (5-9) This value of C*, which is less than or equal to C and which fails to take account 145 of spontaneous career terminations dur- ing incarceration, understates the number of crimes that are committed and so over- states the number of crimes that are avoided by incapacitation. Because of spontaneous career termination during incarcerations, only a portion of the total time served during a career can be counted as reducing crimes through inca- pacitation; the time spent incarcerated after a career ends has no incapacitative effect. Failure to exclude the time served after career termination thus overstates the portion of a career that an offender spends incarcerated (I* 2 I), and under- states both the time he is free on the street t(1 - I*) _ (1-I)] and the estimate of the number of crimes he commits (C* c C). When time served (S) is longer relative to residual career length (TR), the under- estimate of crimes committee] is also larger. If there were no career terminations, the average daily incarcerated population would be the product of the number of crimes committed annually (C*) times the expected time served per crime (IS): R* = C* X JS = N x A x (1 - 1*) x [s. (5-10) The underestimate of crimes committee! when career termination is ignored leacis to a similar underestimate of the size of the inmate population, and the value of R* ' R. While the fraction of a career during which an active offender is incar- cerated is overestimated (1* 2 1), the total time spent incarcerated is underesti- matecl. This underestimation occurs be- cause as an offender commits more crimes during a career (C 2 C*), his vulnerability to incarceration also in- creases, but increasing portions of the incarceration time are server! after his career terminates. As time served (S) in- creases relative to resiclual career length (TR), the time spent incarcerated after the ens! of a career also increases, and the

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146 underestimate of the average daily incar- cerated population gets larger (R* C R). When career termination is ignored, all inmates are assumed to remain active in their criminal careers, ant! PA* = R*. In this case, the total number of active of- fenders, N. is estimated from Equation 5-10, which reduces to R* = RAM = N x 1~. (5-10') Applying the Mode! to Estimate the Effects of a Collective Incapacitation Policy Equations 5-3 and 5-5 can be used to estimate the responsiveness of crime lev- els to changes in incarceration levels from incapacitation alone. The elasticity of crime (E), or the percentage change in crime accompanying a 1 percent change in the expected prison stay per crime US)' is given by dC JS d(JS) C -A2NTR2/(TR + S)2 = [1 + AJSTR/(Ta + S)]2 JS CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS change in the expected prison stay per . . crime IS given Dy dR JS d(lS) R AN[1 + AJS2TR/(TR + S)2] = [1 + AJSTR/(TR + S)]2 x_ JS ANJS 1 + AJSTRI(TR + S) 1 + AJS2TRI(TR + S)2 (5-12) 1 + AJSTRI(TR + S) Likewise, the elasticity of the annual in- mate population to changes in ~ or S alone is given by the same expression, since ER]S = ER] = ER,S. The elasticities in Equations 5-11 and 5-12 can be combined to form a cost/benefit ratio reflecting the percent- age change in the annual inmate popula- tion required to achieve a 1 percent change in the volume of crimes. This cost/benefit ratio is given by ER]S 1 + AJS2TRI(TR + S) (5-13) X I- Ecus -AJSTR2/(TR + S)2 AN 1 + AJSTRI(TR + S) AJSTR2/(TR + S)2 (5-11) +AJSTRI(TR+S) The expression in Equation 5-11 also gives the elasticity of crime with respect to changes in J or S alone, since it can be shown that EC IS = Ec ~ = Ens. The elasticity of the total annual inmate population with respect to a 1 percent The expressions in Equations 5-11 to 5-13 differ significantly from those cle- rived by Cohen (1978:Appendix B), which ignored the role of career length. The importance of taking career length into account is examined here by upciat- ing the Cohen (1978:Appendix C) esti- mates of the relationship between inmate populations ant] crime reflection with new estimates that rely on more recent data from 1981 and that include the effect of career length. The upciated estimates rely on (lata on all new commitments from court to state prisons in 1981, me

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE clian time server] by first-time releasees from state prisons in 1981, and the num- ber of index offenses known to the police in 1981. In estimating the cost/benefit ratio in Equation 5-13, residual career length, TR, is set at 10 years remaining in a career. An adjusted value of five crimes per of- fencler per year is used for the individual crime rate, A. This corresponds to a value of A of about 20 crimes per year. How- ever, since the same crime may involve more than one offender, the rate for indi- viduals must be discounted by the aver- age number of offenders per crime. On the basis of data from the national victim- ization surveys, it is estimated that there are an average of two offenders per crime (Reiss, 1980b); this adjustment recluces A by half Also, since crime recluction is measured in terms of crimes known to police, the rate at which victims report crimes to the police (also estimated from national victimization surveys) is used to reduce the value of A by half again to reflect only the reduction in crimes that are known to police (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 19831. The updated data and estimates are presented in Table 5-6 and Figure 5-2. As was previously found (Cohen, 1978), the upciated cost/benefit ratios displayed in Figure 5-2 depend strongly on the value of expected time server! per crime, IS. If sanction levels are already high (say, IS above .05 for A = 5 and TR = 10), the additional costs in terms of the percent age increase in prison population re- quired to achieve a 1 percent reduction in crime are not unreasonable. Below IS = .05, however, the increases in prison pop- ulation associated with a 1 percent de- crease in crime are much larger. On the basis of 1981 data, only one jurisdiction, Washington, D.C., has a sanction level above IS = .05. The esti- mated prison increase to achieve a 1 per 147 cent reflection in index crimes known to the police in Washington is 3.7 percent when career length is ignored and 6.8 percent when career length is included. In contrast, several states (Hawaii, Mas- sachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Norm Dakota, Rhode IsTanc3, and Utah) have values of.7S less than .01, and they require increases in prison population of more than 20 per- cent to achieve only a 1 percent reduction in crime. The prison population increases will be larger if A and TR are smaller than assumed here and smaller for larger val- ues of A and TR. Several large changes in.IS between 1970 and 1981 are also noteworthy. IS clecreased by at least 40 percent between 1970 and 1981 in seven states (Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and North Da- kota) and increased by a similar amount in two states (Hawaii and New York). The cost/benefit ratio increased between 1970 and 1981 in states where IS declined and clecreased in the states where IS in- creased. The differences in cost/benefit effects for different states are due to the consid- erable differences in the base levels of crime and prison populations for different values of.IS. At high values of IS, the system is operating effectively and pre- sumably aIreacly has a sizable proportion of offenders in prison and a fairly low crime rate. Any increase in.lS wit! only marginally increase the initially large prison population, while making a large fractional dent in an already low crime rate. At Tow values of JS, with a high crime rate and relatively small prison population, the changes that result from increasing IS will have a greater propor- tional impact on an initially small prison population. If one includes finite career length and the associated possibility that offenders

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148 ._ _4 c) C) o > C. .4o ~ ~ to C. Ed C) ~ h_ Cot 4- C) ~ o C) o o 4~ C. ah. oo .= C. Cal I U. o U. . - C. Cat a, .~ 5- Cat CS ~ o Ed ~ .= ~ ~ ~ be ~ ~ ~ ~ Ce .U) C,) ~ C) C: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ :i ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ > 0 ~ ~ - ~ =~ ~ 11 ~ o c.) ~ ~ .= ll ~; ~ ~ o ~ d '3 ~ a' a ~=,~>,= r~ ~ c~ =.= ~ ~ ~ .= ed ~ O ~o d U) 4 - ~o _ _ U' 3 a ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ O S~. O ~ z C) ~o ~, (, O o 4 - C~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ 4~ et C~ ^^^^^^~____~ c~ 0 c~ ~ c~ oo 0 0 _ c~ ~ 0 oo oo 0 0 ~n C~ C~ C~ C~ C~ _ ~ C~ C] C~ _ _ ~4 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + _ _ _ _ _ _ _' ~ ~ oo cD ~ o c~ c] ~ ~ ~ ~ oo - ~ 0 o co u: c~ u: c~ ~ oo 0 ~ 0 ~ o ~ c~ o ~ 0 cO ~ ~c~ co 00 ~ oO 0 ~ c~ oo ~ 0 oo In ~ ~ c~ ~ 0 O o ~ o cD U: C'] CD C';1 ~14 - 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - ~ ~ 0 ~ d4 c~ 0 C~ ~4 00 di - co C~ ~ oo ~ ] 0 CS ~ ~ oO O ~-' C~ ~D ~ 0 ~ C~ O ~ _ c~ _ oo c~ u, ~ d~ oO ~ C~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 - - - c] o - - c~ - o c~ - o - - o o o o o o oo o o o oo o o o ooo o o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'o o ~ o o o '~ o o '~ o o ~ o o ~ ~ o c~ o - o ~ o c~ ~ u) c~ o ~ - ~ ~ - - o oo u) 0 o ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oo o c~ 0 c~ c~ 0 0 o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - c] 0 ~ - CD - O O O ~ ~ C~ 0 c~ 0 C~ _ c~ ~ O ~ ~ _ C~ 0 ~ C] 00 ~ ~ O O- C~ CD ~ - c] o - c~ o o - - o o c~ - - - - o o o oooooooooooooooooo C~ 0 0 ~ C~ C~ ~ CO O 0 0 CO CD U) ~ oo 0 C~ C~ ~ 0 C~ ~ C~ 0 ~ ~ oo 0 oo ~ ~ ~ oo 0 C53 ~ ~ _ C] ~ ~ ~ ~ _ 00 ~ ~ 0 C~ ~ C~ -^ C~ C~ _^ C1^ C1^ _ Cg^ C1^ C~^ _ d4 ~ c~ co O oo 0 C~ ~ -~ O O oO c~ 0 ~ C] oo 0 ~n ~ c~ oo ~ C~ 0 0 ~ ~ C~ O O CO oO O ~ O CD C~ ~ O ~ ~ C] ~ 00 (D ~ C~ C~ _ C~ 0 C~ ~ C~ 0 C~ oo ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ C~ 0 ~ C] 0 ~ ~ _ Co CV) C~ C] ~ C~ oo CO C':} C~) ~- =4 w) oo _ oo C~ ~ _ C~ CO C~ di - Cd ~ >~ ~ ~ ,x, c, o 3 3 ~ o .~ ._ o . - ~, ~ ~ =.~=a~ .= .= o ~ ~ 3 Z Z Z Z Z

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149 _ ~ ~ _` ~ '_ ~ '_ ~ ~ _ _` ~ _ ~ oo o C~ C~ ~ ~ C] C~ ~ o C~ _ C~ C~ oo CO C~ + + + + + + + + + + + + + _ _ _ ~ _' ~ _ . ~ ~ _' . ~ C~ ~ o o C~ ~ _ U) _ ~ ~ ~ CD _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ CO o ~ oo o ~ ~ C~ C~ o ~ _ C~ _ _ C~ _ C~ . _ _ ~ _ CO C~ ~ _ ~ oo o C~ C~ ~ ~ _ ~ 0 ~ C] _ ~ o _ _ o _ C~ C] o ~ _ o o o o o o o o o o o C . . . . . . . . . . . , oo , C~ 1 _ ~ o ~. C~ ~ C~ C~ o o~ o~ o C~ C~ C~ ~ C~ C~ o o ~ o _ o C~ C~ Oo _ oo co ~ u, _ ln ~4 IO C~ C~ CS . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ _______C~__ o C~ ~ o oo ~ oo oo _ CD ~4 C~ C] oo C~ ~ C~ =4 _ ~ _ ~ ~ oo o CS _ ~ C~ C~ ~ oo oo ~ _ ~ oo 0 ~ oo C~ C~ ~ _ _ - oo ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ o o _ _ c~ cn oo o CC o ~ U: C~ ~- ~14 O) o 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u, 0 0 0 ~ cs ~ 0 oo c~ ~ 0 _ _ co ~ oo c~ 0 0 oo ~ ~ c~ _ oo c~ - _~ d ~' 0,_ O ed O a~ ~I,) ~ > _ _ ~ ~ ~ a) ~4 ~ cd =~0~0~0~m - 0 0 3m =~= ~ ~ _ ~_ ~ ,~ _ ~ ~.,, (,, 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ 0~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ (,, 00 0 ,, ~:, ~ . ,,: ~ ~ ,= ~ , < e E c 0 ~' E E- ~ e 5 E _ ;) ~ ~ t ~ 5 e - :, O = <~) ~ ~ ~ ~ o .Cd ~, 0 C24 ~ ~ ~ ~ o~ . ~4 _ ~4 00 ~ 0 C] U: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 00 0 ~ ~ ~ CD ~ ~ ~ CS ~ 00 ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ ^ o C4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 3 ~, , ~ ~ ~ ~ E ~ _ 5 _ 5 5 E 5 O 5 ~ ,_ '5 9 ~ ~ E `~. E 5 ti ~ B E :, O ~' ..Q--~ ^= ~ o Q) ~ ~ =0 ~ =0 c,, ,=- ~ ~ ~ = to ~^ s0 ~ ~ O .C) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~o~ ~ ~ ~ 4 .= ~.~ ~ ~ ^.= O - ~ 5 ~ X~ ~ 5 ~

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150 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS 45 40 35 ._ o In ~30 .o - {L , ~ Q 25 0 ~ ~ c ~ ._ c ~ ~ x ~ - ~ ' ._ - o ._ 20 . _ . - . - m c, ~ ~10 15 o . _ _ . \ .~. i \ ~ \ ~- _ - - - - . ~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 Expected Time Served per Crime fJS) in 1981 (years) FIGURE 5-2 Cost/benefit ratio with career length for selected states as a function of imprisonment sanction levels, IS, prevailing in 1981. Note: Cost/benefit ratio with career length is derived using Equation 5-13 with A = 5 and TR = 10. end their criminal careers while incarcer- ated, the estimates of prison population increases for each 1 percent reduction in crime will always be larger (see Table 5-61. The magnitude of this increase in the cost/benefit ratio varies with the length of time servecl. As indicated in Table 5-7, the longer the time served relative to resiclual careers of 10 years, the greater is the impact of including career length in the analysis. As found in nine states, for time served of 1 year or less, the

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE TABLE 5-7 Effect of Including Career Length in Cost/Benefit Ratio (A = S. TR= 10) Median Time Served (years) > 1.0 > 1.5 and and c 1.0 c 1.5 s 2.0 > 2.75 Mean percent in- crease in cost/ benefit ratio Standard deviation of percent in- crease in cost/ benefit ratio Number of states in 1981 19.6 30.5 40.5 75.5 1.6 2.8 2.7 16.3 9 14 6 2 cost/benefit ratio increases an average of 20 percent; for time served in six states of between 1.5 and 2.0 years, the cosUbene- fit ratio increases an average ot 4u per- cent. The impact of including career length is largest in two jurisdictions with very Tong time served: the cost/benefit ratio increases 87 percent in Washington, D.C., and 64 percent in Hawaii, where time served was 3.3 years and 2.75 years, respectively. Applying the Mode! to Estimate the Effects of a Selective Incapacitation Policy The model of a criminal career pre- sented in this section was also used to generate altemative estimates of the ef- fects of a selective incapacitation policy applied to predicted high-rate robbers found among Califomia inmates. The analysis used the basic approach devel- oped by Greenwood (1982), but with re- sults derived from the reanalysis of the original inmate survey data done for the panel by Visher (Volume II). I51 (See Chapter 6 and Visher EVolume II] for discussions of the scale itself.) On the basis of reanalysis of the survey data, Visher (Volume II) estimated Tower val ues for the mean individual crime rates in the three offender groups. Several other values of parameters for the incapacita tion model shifted slightly when she reestimated the incapacitative effects in Califomia (see Visher, Volume II:n. 23; Appendix A, Table 41. The Visher inmate distribution for the three offense-rate groups is presented in the top row of Table 5-8. These estimates do not account for the effect of career termination on the inmate population. In particular, as careers get shorter, the in mate population wit! include increasing numbers of inmates who have ended their criminal careers while incarcerated; if they were released, these inactive in mates would no longer commit crimes. The total inmate population (R) can be partitioned into active inmates (RA) and inactive inmates (RI) using the relation ships developed in Equations 5-5 and 5-8. Estimates of the numbers of active inmates found in the total inmate popula tion are presented in the three bottom rows of Table 5-S for residual robbery careers of 15 and 5 years, using the cur rent average time served found in each offender group (see Table 5-9, below). As time served increases from low- to me dium- to high-rate offenders, the propor tion of active offenders in the total inmate Population for that offender group de creases: for residual careers of 5 years, the proportion of active offenders is 79 per cent among Tow-rate inmates, but it is only 67 percent among high-rate inmates. The numbers of active inmates in Ta ble 5-8 provide the basis for estimating the total number of active offenders in California inmates convicted of rob-each offender group, whether incarcer bery are partitioned into three groupsated or free in the community. Using the low-, medium-, and high-rate offendersfraction of careers that offenders spend based on their scores on a seven-factorincarcerates! (1) from Equation 5-1, the scale developed by Greenwooc! (19821.number of active offenders (N) is esti . . .

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152 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS TABLE 5-S Distribution of California Inmates Convicted of Robbery by Predicted Robbery Frequencies Low Rate Medium Rate High Rate Total Percent Percent Percent Percent Number Active Number Active Number Active Number Active Total Inmatesa 2,865 4,942 5,942 13,749 Active Inmatesb TR = ~2,865 100 4,942 100 5,942 100 13,749 100 TR = 15 years 2,629 92 4,361 88 5,118 86 12,108 88 TR = 5 years 2,257 79 3,532 71 4,007 67 9,796 71 aData from Visher (Volume II:Note 23~. bThe number of active inmates (i.e., inmates who do not end their criminal careers while incarcerated) is estimated from Equations S-5 and 5-8, where SL.OW = 1.347, Smell = 1.997, and SHigh = 2.415 years (Table 5-9, below). When there is no career termination (TR = 00), the number of inactive offenders is negligibly small, and so all inmates are considered active. mated from N = RA/I. This procedure is used to estimate the size of the offender population under current incarceration policies; see Table 5-9. Section A of Table 5-9 presents the estimates of the current values of the various sanction risks faced by robbers in California. In the absence of any reason- able empirical basis for distinguishing sanction risks, the same probabilities of arrest, conviction, and incarceration for a crime are used for all three offender groups. The basis for these estimates is described in Greenwood (19821. Average time served is estimated separately for each group on the basis of the inmates' reports of their expected release dates. Using the relationships developed in Equations 5-3, 5-5, 5-9, and 5-10, Table 5-9 provides estimates of the number of robbery inmates and the number of rob- beries committed by adults in California under both the current policy and an alternative, more selective incarceration policy. The estimates are developed sep- arately for each offender group and Men combined to yield estimates of total in- mates and total crimes. The more selec- tive policy reduces time served to 1-year jai} terms for all predicted Tow- and me- dium-rate offenders' while increasing time served for all predicted high-rate robbers to twice the current prison term found among high-rate robbers. Alterna- tive estimates are provided for the cases when there is no career termination (Ta- hle 5-9. Sections A and B) and when the residual robbery careers are 15 years (Sections C and D) and 5 years (Sections E and F). Within any offender group (e.g., high- rate offenders), failure to account for ca- reer termination leads to the same per- centage errors for the expected number of crimes anc! for the expected inmate pop- ulation under any incarceration policy. For example, if the crimes committed under some policy are underestimated by 10 percent, the number of inmates under that policy is also underestimated by 10 percent. If an incarceration policy varies across offender groups, however, the magnitude of the estimation errors will vary across the groups and depend on the relationship between S and TR in each group. This variation across offender groups contributes to the much larger impact of career termination on the estimates of prison population than on crime reduc- tion. In Greenwood's illustrative policy, high-rate offenders are assigned the long- est time served. Failing to account for their career termination under the pro- posed policy leads to large underesti- mates of crimes committed and of inmate

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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES USING CRIMINAL CAREER KNOWLEDGE TABLE 5-9 Estimates of Effects on Crime and Inmates of a Highly Selective Incapacitation Policy for California Inmates Convicted of Robbery Values of Parameters for Offenders 1S3 Parameters of the Model Predicted Predicted Predicted Low Medium High Rate Rate Rate Total Current Policy- No Career Terminationa Average annual robbery frequency (A) 0.9 8.1 20.8 Probability of arrest and conviction .03 .03 .03 Probability of incarceration, given conviction .86 -.86 .86 Probability of incarceration, given a crime U) .0258 .0258 .0258 Probability of prison, given incarceration (p) .12 .27 .46 Average jail tells in years (s) 1.0 1.0 1.0 Average prison term in years (S) 3.892 4.692 4.075 Average time served in years [S = (1 - pus + pS] 1.347 1.997 2.415 Fraction of time free (1 - 1*) .96967 .70555 .43554 Number of inmates (R* = RA*) 2,865 4,942 5,942 13,749 Number of offenders (N = RA*II*) 94,461 16,784 10,527 121,772 Number of crimes [C* = N X A X (1 - 1*~] 82,437 95,920 95,367 273,724 Selective Policy No Career Terminationb Average time served in years (S) 1.0 1.0 8.15 Fraction of time free (1 - 1*) .97731 .82714 .18609 Number of inmates [R* = N X A X (1 - l*) X US)] 2,144 2,901 8,568 13,613 ~-l~o)C Number of crimes [C* = N X A X (1 - 1*~] 83,086 112,450 40,748 236,284 ~-14%)C Current Policy TR = 15 Years Fraction of time free (1 - 1) .97210 .73083 .47253 Total inmates (R = RA + RI) 2,865 4,942 5,942 13,749 Number of active inmates [RA = TR/(TR + S) X R] 2,629 4,361 5,118 12,108 Number of inactive inmates [R.= S/(TR + S) X R] 236 581 824 1,641 Number of offenders (N= RA/I) 94,229 16,202 9,703 120,134 Number of crimes [C = N X A X (1 - 11] 82,440 95,912 95,367 273,719 Selective Policy TR = 15 Years Average time served in years (S) Fraction of time free (1 - 1) Total inmates [R = N X A X (1 - 1) X JS)] Number of active inmates [RA = TR/(TR + S) X R] Number of inactive inmates [RI= Sl(TR + S) X R] Number of crimes [C = N X A X (1 - 1~] - 1.0 .97870 2,141 2,008 1.0 .83618 2,831 2,654 8.15 .26083 11,069 7,172 133 177 3,897 4,207 82,999 109,737 52,642 16,041 (+17%) 11,834 245,378 (-10%)

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154 TABLE 5-9 Continue] CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS Values of Parameters for Offenders Predicted Predicted Predicted Low Medium High Parameters of the Model Rate Rate Rate Total Current Policy TR = 5 Yearse Fraction of time free (1 - 1) Total inmates (R = RA + RI) Number of active inmates rLRA = TR/(TR + S) X R] Number of inactive inmates [RI = Sl(TR + S) X R] Number of offenders (N= RA/I) .97595 2,865 2,257 .77028 4,942 3,532 608 1,410 93,846 .53365 5,942 4,007 1,935 15,375 8,592 13,749 9,796 3,953 117,813 Number of crimes [C = N X A X (1 - 1~] 82,430 95,929 95,370 273,729 Selective Policy TR = 5 Yearse Average time served in years (S) Fraction of time free (1 - 1) Total inmates [R = N X A X (1 - 1) X IS] Number of active inmates [RA = TRI(TR + S) X R] Number of inactive inmates [RI= Sl(TR + S) X R] Number of crimes [C = N X A X (1 - 1~] 1.0 1.0 .98102 .85168 2,138 1,781 357 82,858 2,736 2,280 456 106,066 8.15 .37552 14,111 5,366 8,745 67,111 18,985 (+38%) 9,427 9,558 256,035 (-6%) aThe variable values are based on a reanalysis of the original survey data available in Visher (Volume II). No adjustments for career termination are made. bThe selective policy involves 1-year jail terms for all inmates convicted of robbery and predicted to commit robbery at low or medium rates, and doubling the length of prison terms from 4.075 years under current policy to 8.15 years for all inmates convicted of robbery and predicted to commit robbery at a high rate. No adjustments for career termination are made. CThe difference between a decrease of 1 percent in the inmate population compared to a 1 percent increase estimated by Visher and the difference between a reduction of 14 percent in robbery and a 13 percent reduction estimated by Visher (Volume II) arises from differences in rounding the outcomes of various intermediate calculations. Remaining robbery careers (TR) are estimated to last 15 years. eRemaining careers (TR) are estimated to last 5 years. population for high-rate offenders. With their higher values of A and greater incar- ceration risk per crime, however, high-- rate offenders also contribute a much larger proportion to the inmate total than they do to the crime total for the three offender groups. As shown in Part F of Table 5-9, when remaining careers are 5 years long, high-rate robbers (both active and inactive) under the Greenwood pol- icy contribute 75 percent to total robbery inmates, but only 26 percent to total rob beries by adults. Because of the greater representation of high-rate robbers among inmates, their larger underesti- mates have more influence on the results for all inmates. The differences in the size of errors found across offender groups combine with differences in the contribu- tion of different offender groups to total crimes and total inmates to result in finite careers having a larger effect on estimates of inmate populations than on crime re- duction.