3

Re-engineering the Logistic System

The emerging concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) precludes pauses to build a resupply base ashore between the time of a landing and the beginning of the main operations against opposing forces. Today's logistic support system for amphibious operations is still, in many respects, tailored to the older concept of operations calling for pauses to resupply. To be able to move on the main objective from the sea while delivering support as needed directly from a supply base on ships to maneuvering forces ashore, the logistic support system will have to be re-engineered. Unless this is done, inability to provide logistic support will prevent full implementation of the new OMFTS concept. Critical implementation issues include lift availability to support troops inland; adapting the assault and follow-on echelonment to the new maneuver concept and patterns; and devising methods to find and gain access to needed supplies without taking time to search and sort bulk cargo.

LIFT TO SUPPORT THE INITIAL ASSAULT ECHELON

As suggested by the hypothetical scenario depicted in Figure 1, the initial assault echelon in the new formulation of OMFTS will be widely dispersed. In an opposed landing situation, the echelon will have landed in hostile territory where land lines of communication using truck transport will not exist until landing forces consolidate their positions and connections. In this circumstance, resupply of the forward combat elements of the initial assault echelon will have to be by air, using mainly the vertical lift aircraft (CH-53E and V-22) organic to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF).

Some augmentation of this lift for resupply by airdrop will be feasible in circumstances where the absence of medium-high-altitude air defenses and the range to rear basing allow use of fixed-wing cargo aircraft such as the C-130 or C-17 for airdrops. The Advanced Precision Aerial Delivery System (APADS), which is based on steerable parafoils carrying resupply pallets and is being developed by the Army with Marine Corps participation, will allow delivery of loads of up to about 20 tons within 100 meters of a target landing point from a 20-kilometer offset. The following observations assume that the vertical lift aircraft organic to an MEF will provide the normal landing and resupply lift during the initial assault operations, with long-range airdrop as an emergency backup.



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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century 3 Re-engineering the Logistic System The emerging concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) precludes pauses to build a resupply base ashore between the time of a landing and the beginning of the main operations against opposing forces. Today's logistic support system for amphibious operations is still, in many respects, tailored to the older concept of operations calling for pauses to resupply. To be able to move on the main objective from the sea while delivering support as needed directly from a supply base on ships to maneuvering forces ashore, the logistic support system will have to be re-engineered. Unless this is done, inability to provide logistic support will prevent full implementation of the new OMFTS concept. Critical implementation issues include lift availability to support troops inland; adapting the assault and follow-on echelonment to the new maneuver concept and patterns; and devising methods to find and gain access to needed supplies without taking time to search and sort bulk cargo. LIFT TO SUPPORT THE INITIAL ASSAULT ECHELON As suggested by the hypothetical scenario depicted in Figure 1, the initial assault echelon in the new formulation of OMFTS will be widely dispersed. In an opposed landing situation, the echelon will have landed in hostile territory where land lines of communication using truck transport will not exist until landing forces consolidate their positions and connections. In this circumstance, resupply of the forward combat elements of the initial assault echelon will have to be by air, using mainly the vertical lift aircraft (CH-53E and V-22) organic to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). Some augmentation of this lift for resupply by airdrop will be feasible in circumstances where the absence of medium-high-altitude air defenses and the range to rear basing allow use of fixed-wing cargo aircraft such as the C-130 or C-17 for airdrops. The Advanced Precision Aerial Delivery System (APADS), which is based on steerable parafoils carrying resupply pallets and is being developed by the Army with Marine Corps participation, will allow delivery of loads of up to about 20 tons within 100 meters of a target landing point from a 20-kilometer offset. The following observations assume that the vertical lift aircraft organic to an MEF will provide the normal landing and resupply lift during the initial assault operations, with long-range airdrop as an emergency backup.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century A major challenge in this resupply is the transportation of bulk liquids: fuel and water. In the absence of pipelines and ground transport, these commodities would be delivered in 500-gallon pods slung under the delivery aircraft (a V-22 could carry two such pods; a CH-53E could carry three). In the simple scenario hypothesized, 40 pods per day might be needed to support a battalion (minus) landing team having 700 Marines and a Forward Arming and Refueling Position (FARP) for their supporting helicopters. The bulk liquids would make up more than 65 percent of the daily sustainment tonnage needed for a battalion with a six-gun artillery battery. For a unit with no artillery, the liquids would make up nearly 90 percent of its daily tonnage requirement. The artillery constitutes the greatest part of the heavy lift load. More than 20 CH-53E sorties would be needed to transport six guns with their trucks and trailers to the landing zone for this hypothetical landing team, and the artillery ammunition load would constitute about 80 percent of its daily resupply tonnage. (The committee estimates that the total daily resupply tonnage [excluding bulk liquids] for this battalion [minus] would be about 37 short tons, compared with 7 tons for the team without artillery.) Calculations of the number of lift sorties required show that, accounting for aircraft availability and other essential uses for the airlift in an MEF during these complex landing operations, the available vertical lift force could support two battalion (minus) landing teams with artillery, at the distances being considered, or possibly three if the lift is stretched to its probable limit. Without the artillery, the same lift could support four landing teams comfortably, and possibly five. Thus, a substantially larger and more capable force could be landed forward in the first assault echelon if the force were to rely wholly on long-range fire support from the fleet to deliver heavy firepower on the enemy. Building the commanders' confidence that the long-range fire support will be ready and available when needed and called for, with the same reliability and responsiveness as their organic artillery, will require all the force and system changes described previously, as well as much experience in exercises and even some operations. The acceptance of reliability by commanders is essential if the logistic constraints inherent in the new OMFTS concept are to be extended to more useful boundaries. For this reason the limiting case of “no artillery forward with the first assault echelon” proves to be the most interesting one to consider for planning purposes. The initial landings against opposition will place the first assault echelons in hostile territory. The entering and supporting airlift will need continuous protection from enemy fire. Of special concern will be the shoulder-fired, IR-guided SAMs discussed earlier (pp. 33, 57-58). If not appropriately countered they can devastate the new OMFTS concept. However, several approaches can be taken to counter them, involving tactics, defense suppression, and countermeasures.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century The initial landings will be designed to settle in unoccupied and unguarded landing zones, thereby achieving tactical surprise. For those landings, and for resupply, the vertical lift aircraft can fly at low altitude, taking advantage of terrain and vegetation for masking where possible, and avoiding overflights of areas where enemy forces are known to be. Night operations would predominate. Such tactics are better suited to internal load carriage; carriage of external loads (e.g., vehicles and fluid tanks) forces the aircraft higher and exposes them more, but flying as low as possible could still be helpful, depending on the time of day, terrain, and vegetation. Alternatively, these aircraft could fly at high altitude en route if descent to the landing zones were known to be safe. For initial landings and important resupply missions, if there is concern that transit and landing areas are occupied by enemy forces, SEAD can be undertaken. Combat aircraft can be used to suppress known enemy forces. Transit and landing areas can be cleared by long-range fire support as necessary, with overflights and landings avoiding populated areas. The bomblet-loaded NTACMS weapon discussed earlier could be an especially effective weapon for this purpose, since it can arrive with no warning and it would have a large area of effectiveness. Finally, work should proceed to reduce the IR signatures of the aircraft involved. The committee recognizes that this is not easy for these large aircraft. However, even a certain degree of shielding of the IR emissions would narrow the field from which the enemy defenses could fire, and would therefore work well together with the low-altitude and night operations tactics. Also, the Marine Corps should adopt the Army's Advanced Tactical IR Countermeasures System/Common Missile Warning System for its CH-53E and V-22 aircraft as soon as that system is successfully developed. These steps will alleviate the danger from enemy defenses, but they cannot eliminate it altogether. There will inevitably be losses, which will have to be accepted as part of the maneuver battle. But the known dangers must be kept in view during operational planning, and all known means to avoid or reduce danger and to minimize losses must be taken. FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT TO THE INITIAL ASSAULT ECHELON All the above steps will not ensure indefinite support for the forward combat elements against strong opposition that can maneuver against them. Rapid follow-up will be needed, to establish a link between the forward maneuver elements of the initial assault echelon and the follow-on assault and support echelons that will constitute the main landing force, as illustrated in

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century Figure 3, based on the scenario of Figure 1. The link will have to be secure and move over and through terrain controlled by friendly forces. It may be an air link at first, and subsequent temporary air segments may be required where gaps are created (e.g., by bridges destroyed), but ultimately truck transport on the ground will be essential. The effective combat endurance of the forward combat elements will be measured in days, not weeks. It will depend on the enemy's combat capability and the U.S. forces' ability to maneuver to attack the enemy, the effectiveness of the long-range fire support, and the security of the resupply links and continued availability of the aircraft. The committee's study of potential combat situations involving OMFTS showed the continued need for follow-on assault and support echelons on the beach. While these echelons will be lighter than those envisioned in current operational concepts and plans, it will nonetheless be essential that they rapidly build land links to the initial assault forces. The need for rapid closing with the initial assault forces by the follow-on echelons will probably require redesign of the echelonment for the entire amphibious operation. A modest combat service support area ashore will be needed. This will not be a major supply depot with enough materiel to sustain a lengthy campaign. Rather, it will contain a few days' supply, to serve both as a reservoir from which maneuver forces can draw when resupply from the sea base is interrupted, and as a “settling chamber ” to smooth any disparities between the flow of supplies from the fleet and the demand for supplies by the operating forces. In the absence of a suitable port under friendly control, unloading equipment and supplies will have to take place over the beach using logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) capability. Most cargo is in containers, but vehicles—trucks and armored fighting vehicles—are also involved. Ship-to-shore transport alternatives include lighters, if they have suitable places to load and unload, various landing craft, and temporary causeways, usually floating. Loading of the lighters and landing craft depends on cranes aboard ship, aided by auxiliary crane ships, or, in the case of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC), which can go onshore to unload, loading in the well-decks of amphibious assault ships. There are still some logistic support ships in the force that can unload directly onto the beach, but these are scheduled to be retired during the time period being considered in this study. A key limitation of all the LOTS systems is inability to load and unload in sea states beyond the lower boundary of sea-state 3 (approximately 3½-ft waves), because of the relative motions between ships and lighters and between lighters and the beach during cargo transfer operations. In some geographic areas sea-state 3 or worse conditions are encountered as much as half the time, and at best more benign conditions exist up to about only 70 percent of the time.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century Figure 3 Follow-on echelon link-up with initial assault echelons.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century Ability to conduct LOTS operations in sea-state 3 conditions would increase the available operating times to 70 to 90 percent of the total time available. Programs are under consideration to overcome this sea-state 3 barrier, at least to the extent of permitting loading and unloading in sea-state 3 conditions. They include the possibility of computer-stabilized cranes; a proposed advanced modular causeway that would function as a stabilized lighterage system that could be assembled in different configurations and that could be beached for roll-off discharge of vehicles; and a proprietary proposal by an industrial firm for a landing ship quay/causeway (LSQ/C), which would station a modified very large crude carrier off a beach, resting temporarily on the bottom, to establish a stable pierhead offshore from which an elevated causeway would be deployed across the beach. The causeway sections, designed to function through sea-state 5, would have adjustable legs resting on the bottom so that the causeway would not rise and fall with the waves but would be limited only by the severity of the wind and the action of overwashing or breaking waves. Additional means (perhaps aided by stabilized cranes and floating platforms on which the LCACs can rest adjacent to a ship) are also needed to load cargo onto LCACs and other lighters from the major logistic ships. LCACs are designed to be loaded in the well-decks of amphibious assault ships, and these ships are designed to carry Marine Corps forces and their equipment to a landing location and unload them rapidly before carrying out other combat support functions. The amphibious ships, like the maritime prepositioned ships (MPSs), and the LCACs, are not well configured for supporting large-scale sustainment operations because they lack the capability to routinely receive, handle, and selectively transport and discharge large quantities of generalized materiel. However, LCACs are, in essence, large-capacity lighters able to carry up to 85 tons, depending on distance to be traveled (a proposed heavy-lift version of the LCAC would carry up to 150 tons). After discharging their initial assault cargo on the beach they can contribute very usefully to sustainment. They are made of aluminum and therefore subject to damage from bumping or hard landing of containers in the bottom, and so means are needed to load them safely alongside logistic support ships at sea when there are waves of significant height. The logistic support ships themselves must be redesigned to suit them to modern cargo transport and handling concepts. In the future, most support cargo will likely be carried in standard 8 ft × 8 ft × 20 ft containers. Ships designed to function as logistic bases at sea must be able to stack these containers for easy access below-decks and provide for automated access to and movement of any container. (Means to identify which containers are of interest at any particular time are discussed in the next section.) The ships must have large internal “hangar” space for breaking and rearranging loads as needs change, and shop space for repairs and construction as needed. There must be

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century an upper deck from which V-22 and CH-53E aircraft can operate and there should be, if possible, the means discussed above to load LCACs. While building many new ships with these characteristics may appear as a formidable budget obstacle in these times, the MPSs can be reconfigured to have many of the necessary characteristics when they are reconditioned, as will be necessary after some years. Some storage capacity may have to be sacrificed, however, to accommodate materiel handling. Existing logistic support ships, and leased commercial ships that can be expected to have many of the necessary characteristics, could also be so reconfigured. The advances described above will all be needed to ensure that major supply depot operations at sea remain viable during OMFTS. (A vastly different alternative, the MOB under consideration by the JCS, is discussed below.) INCREASING DISTRIBUTION EFFICIENCY The logistic system today is not able to meet the needs of forward fighting forces without great excesses of supply in the system and without much wasted motion in locating needed supplies. For example, during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, of more than 40,000 containers sent to the theater, over 20,000 had to be opened and the materiel they contained spread over a large area simply because there was no visibility into the containers' contents. The responsiveness of the logistic system was degraded by thousands of duplicate orders placed because of operational units' inability to know the status of their requisitions. Moreover, although an enormous amount of materiel was shipped to the theater, much of it was not readily available to our forces because of the poor visibility and control over assets in-theater. DOD has launched an initiative to remedy the situation brought to light by the Gulf War. Called Total Asset Visibility (TAV), the initiative seeks to identify and track all materiel, whether issued to units, stored in warehouses, undergoing repair or manufacture, or in transit from one location to another. This enormous undertaking is now in its early stages. However, a TAV Executive Steering Committee has been established including the logistics chiefs of all the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the commander of the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Vice Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). A Joint Program Office is to be established to provide day-to-day coordination and management of the effort. The Marine Corps has initiated experimentation with industry technologies that will be especially helpful in tracking and handling materiel in-theater. Packaging will have to be revised so that the standard 8 ft × 8 ft × 20 ft containers contain materiel packaged for a sequence of anticipated unit needs

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century rather than for bulk shipment. These containers will be liftable by the available vertical heavy lift in an MEF, the CH-53E. A variety of automated information technologies (already being applied in the commercial world) are being explored, from linear bar codes for individual item identification to reprogrammable radio-frequency tags that can, on being queried, announce a container's contents to a distance of 300 ft, with the possibility of relaying such information to remote locations via satellite. These technologies, in combination with automated databases, will, when implemented, enable tracking and access to needed supplies without wasted time or motion. Not the least of the benefits, in addition to system responsiveness, will be a great reduction in the quantity of supplies needed in the logistic system to effectively support an operation. Overall, the idea is to package the materiel once, and then move the package via any and all modes necessary to the ultimate user. The system should be a comprehensive, end-to-end set of processes that encompass packaging, handling, and transport by all modes. To the extent possible, packages based on the standard containers should be configured and assembled in the continental United States (CONUS) and then transported unopened to the user (so-called “unitized” loads). Any required breakout or assembly in-theater would be done aboard the logistic ship (or MOB, discussed below) and the revised, re-assembled package then sent on to the unit. However, break-bulk shipping and pallet distribution of dry cargo must be minimized or eliminated as they are too inefficient to meet the high-volume, time-sensitive throughput requirements. Many problems remain to be solved to apply these technologies effectively, to establish the needed level of supply visibility so that the logistic system will be responsive enough to reduce the need for large supply depots ashore to support intense combat by maneuvering forces inland. Not the least of the problems remaining is the need for reconciliation of requirements and increased equipment standardization across the Services, so that incompatibilities will be minimized as TAV is implemented. The committee strongly endorses these initiatives, especially those being undertaken by the Marine Corps to ensure rapid location, identification, and offloading of supplies in-theater. In the committee's judgment, the new concept of OMFTS cannot work unless the initiatives are successfully concluded. The committee also suggests that, as part of implementing these initiatives, the Marine Corps invest further in its logistic analysis capability. Although some logisticians are starting to think about the ramifications of OMFTS, the current dearth of applicable quantitative analysis is troubling. A small cell of analysts devoted to evaluating alternatives and cost-benefit trade-offs could yield large dividends in setting the course for future Marine air-gound task force (MAGTF) logistics.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century An important part of OMFTS logistics is communications. Lack of adequate tactical communications has been a chronic problem for logisticians. Most logistics communication is made up of messages, usually long, about resupply needs, and is considered of routine priority in comparison with intelligence- or combat-related communications. However, for the responsive logistic support of forward elements in OMFTS to work in the new mode, these communications will have to be accommodated in faster, higher-capacity links. Communications associated with daily logistic support to forward combat elements, possibly isolated on the ground and changing location frequently, will have to be accorded the same precedence as tactical communications that call for firepower to support them. OMFTS logistic communication can benefit from access to the great diversity of civilian systems that will exist at the time of implementation; the potential utility of the civilian systems constitutes one reason that linkage to those systems in the overall unit-to-headquarters communications architecture is recommended on pp. 45-46. Although commercial channels are not as secure as the military links, some encoding of logistic messages over them will be possible, at least to the extent that by the time messages are decoded they will no longer be current and useful to an opponent in high-tempo operations. The commercial systems will be well suited to logistic traffic and should represent a useful alternative for this application if tactical military links become overloaded or the logistic requirements are preempted by other emergency calls such as calls for fire support. MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE The Joint Staff has been exploring various industry proposals to create a mobile offshore base (MOB) using floating oil platform technology. In one of the proposals, the base would be made up of six semi-submersible modules, each 500 ft long by 300 ft wide, to produce a 3,000-ft-long structure. The modules would be assembled and interconnected in quiet waters. The platform would constitute an operations and logistics base, having all the characteristics described above for modern logistic support ships, as well as the capacity to store internally as much supply as a major base ashore. It would be extremely stable in high seas, with the runway surface well above all but the largest waves expected. In addition to CH-53E and V-22 aircraft the platform would be able to accommodate C-130 aircraft (and possibly C-17s at a 4,000-ft-long configuration proposed by another vendor); and with the addition of a ski-jump on one end, conventional take-off launch (CTOL) combat aircraft could use it (as demonstrated by the former Soviet Union 's carrier Kuznetsov). The assembled platform would be self-propelled and, with the aid of tugs to help

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century control it and perhaps provide some additional propulsion, it could displace from one offshore location to another across the ocean at speeds on the order of 4 to 8 knots. The cost of the bare base, configured but not loaded for use, is estimated at somewhere between $1 billion and $2 billion, when allowance is made for the preliminary nature of the quotes. Such a base could provide many opportunities to support forces in littoral warfare. The ability to move it from place to place means that a single base, loaded to support an MEF, could be stationed in an ocean and moved to any area where a crisis creates the need. It could be emplaced at sea outside the territorial waters of any nation, avoiding sovereignty issues at sensitive times. Aircraft from all Services could operate from it, making the airdrop option for logistic support of forward combat elements more attractive. Such a base could minimize the need for onshore supply depots, although with the risk of operational disruption by weather or enemy action the need would probably not be wholly eliminated. As with any experimental concept, the MOB proposal poses problems that must be taken into account. Although the basic platform technology is well known, important aspects of the technology in this application have not been tested. The creation of a long, free-floating platform for deep-sea use, its assembly at sea in sections, and its use for takeoffs and landings of large transport aircraft would all be new endeavors. While any problems attending the construction and use of such a platform could certainly be solved in time, they could increase costs more than would be tolerated. Moving the platform over long distances would, because of its sheer bulk, be a major and costly engineering task. Displacement over long distances at the low speeds achievable would reduce responsiveness to sudden crises; for example, it could take 20 days or more, not counting setup time at each end and possible delays caused by weather en route, to move the platform 4,000 miles. This means that the need for ships to support initial action would not be completely obviated. A major base like this would, in an MRC against a capable enemy, be a prime target for antiship cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles, or even air attack. While the platform would be essentially unsinkable, a determined attack could lead to enough damage to cause a “mission kill” for a long period of time. Therefore, either effective defenses would have to be built onto the platform, raising its cost significantly, or large portions of the fleet would have to be devoted to protecting it in a more or less static location. Finally, even though the platform could technically be stationed outside the territorial waters of a sensitive nation, international political problems could still attend its proximity to an unwilling host, as experiences along the North African, Indian Ocean, and Pacific littorals have illustrated from time to time.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century Table 3 Comparison of Two Kinds of Offshore Logistic Bases   SHIPS AS “WAREHOUSE OFFSHORE” MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE PRO Mobile, maneuverable; dispersion lends protection Rapidly deployable to another location Embedded within fleet for individual ship protection Can operate land-based fixed-wing aircraft Provides highly flexible loading/offloading; extremely stable platform More, more permanent offshore depot storage—upto 27M sq ft CON Ship unsuited as indefinite offshore logistic base Loading/offloading less flexible than large base Subject to scattering in heavy weather Technical risk and cost for untried system More easily subject to TBM and CM attack, “mission kill” Strategic mobility complex and slow Although some of these problems can be severe, none of them is significant enough to discourage interest in the MOB concept based on initial examination. A comparative summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed MOB and the more conventional support concept based on logistic ships is presented in Table 3. This comparison suggests that, although the MOB concept is attractive for many reasons, the necessary information to decide whether to pursue it further is not yet in hand. The initiation of studies and simulations leading to a detailed Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) is indicated. SUMMARY OF NECESSARY ACTIONS It is indicated above that with appropriate re-engineering of the logistic system to support warfare along the littoral, as many as four or five landing teams having the strength of light battalions without organic artillery could be logistically supported from the sea by the organic vertical lift in an MEF, up to 75 to 100 miles inland, in an initial assault under the newly emerging concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. These initial assault forces would bring heavy firepower to bear on enemy forces from long range, fixing the opposition and destroying much of it. They would set up and facilitate the maneuvers of the main landing force against the objective(s) of the operation. Depending on enemy reaction and strength, a landing on the beach, establishing secure support links with the forward combat elements and consolidating the entire operation into a unified maneuver force, could be accommodated within a few days of the initial assault, at most. Instead of a large resupply depot being built on the

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century beach, the base would be kept at sea, with only a few days' supply kept on land to smooth the flow of support. In summary, the Navy and Marine Corps should take the following steps toward re-engineering the logistic system to make logistic support of the new OMFTS concept viable: Examine, and revise according to need, the echelonment of initial and follow-on assault and support forces to suit the advanced concept of operation. Revise materiel packaging and movement protocols and procedures so that unitized loads in standard 8 ft × 8 ft × 20 ft containers arranged according to anticipated need, rather than as bulk cargo, can move from loading points (possibly in CONUS) directly to users with a minimum of need for break-bulk sorting and repackaging. As part of this effort, participate in and capitalize on DOD's TAV program; pursue ongoing experimentation with Automated Identification Technology for tracking cargo; and coordinate with the other Services to prevent conflicting interfaces that would interfere with interoperability. Build the appropriate logistic C3 system to support the concept (as described on page 77), and re-classify the communications precedence, capacity, and timeliness as “tactical ” in nature, rather than “administrative,” as logistic communications are usually treated. Obtain appropriate intelligence and devise flight and defense suppression tactics and countermeasures, including signature reduction and other possible means, to enable the vertical lift aircraft of an MEF (the CH-53E and the V-22) to penetrate reliably and with a high degree of safety to the dispersed positions of the forward combat elements, to provide them with logistic support until secure land lines of communication are established. Acquire the capability to move LOTS in sea-state 3 and, as part of this, provide for use of LCACs as logistic carriers between merchant ships and shore after their missions in the amphibious assault have been completed. Configure logistic ships to suit their roles as logistic depots at sea. Undertake the studies and simulations necessary to complete COEAs of (1) the MOB concept in comparison with ship-based means for

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century providing logistic support from the sea to forces maneuvering ashore and inland, and (2) the LSQ/C for providing offload capability in sea states greater than 3. Make available to U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters a logistics analysis capability to help plan and evaluate the changes to the logistic system needed to support the new approaches to OMFTS.