illustrated the pressures on each country mitigating against a continuation of the traditional asymmetrical patterns in the relationship. Leaders in both the United States and Japan are well aware of the value of continued and expanded cooperation in security affairs, economics, and science and technology, but governmental institutions and private incentives reflect and help perpetuate long standing asymmetries. Table 3-11 shows that a few Japanese defense technologies have been transferred to the United States since the 1983 exchange of notes. However, these very limited transfers have not resulted in a measurable contribution to U.S. defense capabilities.22

TABLE 3-11 Japanese Military Technologies Transferred to the United States Since 1983a



Japanese Company

Technology for the construction and remodeling of U.S. naval systems


Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries

Technology related to the next-generation support fighter (FS-X)


Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Technology related to joint research on ducted rocket engines


Nissan Motor

Transfers of Japanese technology related to portable surface-to air missiles (Toshiba) and for the digital flight control system on the P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft (Kawasaki Heavy Industries) were also approved but never carried out.

SOURCES: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1994 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1994), p. 74, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 29, 1994.


For a discussion of several of the early transfers, see Steven K. Vogel, Japanese High Technology, Politics and Power—Research Paper #2 (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1989), pp. 36-41.

The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement