technologies—targeted at applications in future weapons systems. This could perhaps be undertaken as an extension of the Systems and Technology Forum. This program should be jointly funded and managed by the two governments, possibly with cost sharing by U.S.-Japan industry teams, and should begin with sufficient funding to support four or five individual projects.
The United States and Japan should initiate a comprehensive security dialogue featuring an integrated discussion of the political-military, economic, technological, and other aspects of the alliance. To maximize the benefits of this dialogue it should (1) be coordinated by special designees of the president and prime minister, (2) establish a common understanding of mutual interests for a vital U.S.-Japan security alliance appropriate to Cold War realities, including roles and missions, defense capabilities and enhanced reciprocal technology cooperation, (3) incorporate discussion of economic as well as political-military issues, and involve the agencies responsible for managing the economic relationship, and (4) include active private-sector participation on both sides.
The Department of Defense should ensure a coordinated approach in future collaborative defense programs with Japan. The imperatives are to achieve greater continuity in U.S. policies and implementation, to achieve coordination in pursuing various U.S. interests, and to build strategies for implementation and reciprocal technology flow before bilateral negotiations are launched. One approach that might be adopted as a minimum is designating a single authority with the responsibility for coordinating strategies toward major systems in which collaboration with Japan is under discussion. In the future if the level of international collaborative activities warrants it, DoD might consider a more formal mechanism such as an International Programs Coordinating Council analogous to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
The Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of Commerce and other appropriate agencies, should continue to build capabilities to monitor and manage dependence on foreign sources of critical technologies, with the goal of ensuring U.S. access. The correct approach to managing this dependence will vary according to the situation. For example, where a high reliance on Japanese sources brings benefits without undue risks, it may make sense to pursue explicit understandings with Japanese industry and government to ensure that U.S. defense needs are met during contingencies. In other cases it might make sense to encourage Japanese sources to establish a U.S. manufacturing facility or to collaborate with U.S. companies. In cases where access to Japanese technologies cannot be ensured, steps could be taken to build a competitive U.S.-owned and -based capability.