|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 1
The Medical Implications of Nuclear War, Institute of
Medicine. @) 1986 by the National Academy of Sciences.
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
Understanding and Preventing
Nuclear War: The Expanding Role
of the Scientific Community
DAVID A. HAMBURG, M.D.
Carnegie Corporation, New York, New York
The consequences of nuclear war constitute the central facts of our age.
Everything else in contemporary experience hinges on them, depends on
them, follows from them. Therefore, it is exceedingly important to get
the facts straight. We deal with a metric that our species has never had
to deal with in the millions of years of its history-a metric involving the
sudden elimination of tens or hundreds of millions of people and perhaps
the deaths of billions in a matter of months. That is something we have
never had to accommodate, and I am not sure we can. Grasping the
meaning of these numbers is a very difficult thing to do, for it constitutes
a qualitative break with the experience of the species. It is not just World
War II written large. It is a fundamentally and profoundly different ex-
perience. So I believe that the facts that scientists are clarifying here
represent the most important facts our species has ever had to deal with.
We all like to see the caring, loving, creating side of human experience.
We want to believe that this side will dominate in world affairs, and
perhaps it will. Indeed, an occasion like this gives some hope that it will,
but let us recall George Bernard Shaw's incisive remark: "We cannot
help it because we are so constituted that we always believe finally what
we wish to believe. The moment we want to believe something, we
suddenly see all the arguments for it and become blind to the arguments
against it. The moment we want to disbelieve anything we have previously
believed, we suddenly discover not only that there is a mass of evidence
against, but that this evidence was staring us in the face all the time."
The tendencies to wishful thinking, to complacency in the face of hard
1
OCR for page 2
2
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR
reality, to avoidance of facts, to denial of the significance of facts these
are perhaps our worst enemies in the nuclear arena. There are people who
believe that we can manage any kind of crisis, take any kind of risk, treat
nuclear weapons like any other weapons, and still come away from every
brink in good shape.
Beyond the fact of the large scale of killing throughout human history,
and the unprecedented scale of killing that now lies before us, is an
underlying fact that deserves our serious attention. Human societies have
a pervasive tendency to distinguish between apparently good and bad
people, heroes and villains, or, more generally, between in-groups and
out-groups. Historically, it has been easy for us to put ourselves at the
center of the universe, attaching a strong positive value to ourselves and
our group, while attaching a negative value to certain other people and
their groups. It is prudent to assume that we are all, to some extent,
susceptible to egocentric and ethnocentric tendencies. The human species
is one in which individuals and groups easily learn to blame others for
whatever difficulties exist, but in terms of the nuclear predicament, blam-
ing is at best useless and most likely counterproductive. We have seen
all too much finger-pointing between the superpowers, and for that matter,
among nations throughout the world.
~C ~. .. . . . .
.
1ne crux or my presentation 1S that the circumstances surrounding nu-
clear war call for a new level of commitment by the scientific community
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. What the world requires is really a
mobilization-something akin to a wartime mobilization of the best pos-
sible intellectual, technical, and moral resources over a wide range of
knowledge and perspectives. We need a science-based effort to maximize
the analytical capability, the objectivity, the respect for evidence that is
characteristic of the scientific community worldwide, and indeed the
worldwide perspective that is itself an integral part of the scientific
community.
These efforts should bring together scientists, scholars, and practitioners
to clarify the many facets of avoiding nuclear war. To generate new options
for decreasing the risk, we need analytical work by people who know the
weaponry and its military uses. But that is far from enough to do the job.
We also need scholars who know the superpowers in depth; people who
know other nuclear powers; people who know third-world flash points;
people who know international relations very broadly; people who know
a lot about policy formation and implementation, especially in the super-
powers; people who understand human behavior under stress, especially
leadership under stress; people who understand negotiation and conflict
resolution and much more. In other words, the relevant knowledge and
OCR for page 3
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
3
skills cut right across all the sciences physical, biological, behavioral,
social.
Analytical studies of this kind are likely to be much more useful if they
are informed by the perspective of policymakers, and policymakers can
benefit greatly from having such studies new ideas, a wider range of
options, and deeper insights in other words, a continuing dynamic in-
terplay between the scientific community and the world of policy.
I want to refer to a few examples of the emerging generation of rather
complex, serious, analytical efforts in the scientific and scholarly com-
munities on the issue of avoiding nuclear war, bringing in heavy intel-
lectual and technical firepower for peace, not for war. I cite examples
that are primarily taking place in the United States because I am more
familiar with them and have actually been involved in some. U. S. activity
has been rapidly increasing in recent years, and I hope there will be similar
upsurges in many countries. Now let us consider some examples of in-
ternational scientific cooperation for avoiding nuclear war.
Since this conference is a medical one, it is appropriate to point out
the recent activity of medical organizations in this field. A serious, world-
wide effort has been made to stimulate public awareness of the harsh facts
of nuclear war. Many different facets of the problem have been illuminated
by analytic work and education of the public on the basis of best available
information. Prominent in this effort have been the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,
World Health Organization, British Medical Association, and the Amer-
ican Medical Association; others have contributed as well. The central
point is that a kind of awakening has occurred in the medical community
to the responsibility of addressing the immense nature of the threat to
public health.
The present meeting is an activity of the National Academy of Sciences,
which in 1980 established the Committee on International Security and
Arms Control (CISAC), chaired for several years by Marvin Goldberger
and now headed by Wolfgang Panofsky, both distinguished physicists.
There is a counterpart "CISAC" in the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
chaired by academician E. P. Velikhov, also a physicist of note. Both
committees are staffed by people with rich backgrounds in arms control
and international security. CISAC's main function is to meet with its
Soviet counterpart twice a year, once here and once in the Soviet Union,
with a good deal of preparation between meetings. The discussions have
dealt with almost all the major topics of the arms control field; in fact,
CISAC has primarily been an arms control committee. These meetings
have made it possible to consider in an open-minded, exploratory way a
OCR for page 4
4
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING NUCI:PAR WAR
variety of major issues between our two countries. There has been a
minimum of boilerplate; a minimum of hostile rhetoric; and a good deal
of serious, thoughtful discussion based on the facts of the awesome nuclear
stockpiles: ways to reduce those stockpiles, ways to balance them, ways
to increase their stability, and ways to enhance safety in their maintenance.
CISAC has also had the useful function of educating the members of
the National Academy of Sciences. For the past 3 years, it has conducted
in-depth seminars immediately preceding the annual meeting of the Acad-
emy, and hundreds of Academy members have participated in both oc-
casions. The first was a broad coverage of the arms control field and the
second a specific focus on strategic defense. CISAC also put together a
volume called Nuclear Arms Control: Background and issues, published
by the National Academy Press in 1984. Indeed, it has been altogether a
constructive and stimulating body both in its activities in this country and
in its interchange with Soviet counterparts over its history. And 1986
should see further extension in the range of its activities.
In 1985, there was a new initiative in the National Academy of Sci-
ences the creation of a Committee on the Contributions of the Behavioral
and Social Sciences to Avoiding Nuclear War. This group explores in
depth some of the topics that are represented in this meeting as well as
others. It is an-enterprise of great potential importance and we may well
find it useful to approach the Soviet Academy in due course about some
counterpart group.
Now let us move to another important organization in this country, the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). This is
a very interesting organization because it is a kind of broad umbrella group
covering all the sciences. It is deeply engaged in national science policy
and is an important articulator of relationships between the scientific com-
munity and the government, a useful link between that community and
the society at large, and in recent years a very active participant in the
arms control and national security fields.
In 1981, AAAS established the Committee on Science, Arms Control
and National Security to encourage its own members to become more
informed on these matters and more deeply involved in them and, also,
to provide links between the scientific community and the policy com-
munity. It has been very effective, in my judgment, in fostering a lively
interplay between scientists and policymakers on arms control and inter-
national security issues.
The AAAS annual meeting is a very large gathering that evokes a great
deal of public interest and media coverage. AAAS also holds about 10
major symposia each year on reducing the risk of nuclear war. They cover
arms control, of course, but also approaches beyond arms control, such
OCR for page 5
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNE
s
as crisis prevention, about which I will say more later.
The official journal of the AAAS, Science, has increasingly given ex-
tended coverage to the issues under discussion at this meeting and related
ones. Under its new editor, Daniel Koshland, there is a commitment to
increase even further the coverage of subjects pertinent to the avoidance
of nuclear war. In November 1985, AAAS's magazine for the lay reader,
Science 85, had a special issue on science, technology, and peace. Co-
inciding with its publication was a symposium for journalists based on
this issue.
AAAS also sponsors seminars for members of Congress and their staffs.
The most recent one centered on crisis prevention and nuclear risk re-
duction. This year, for the first time, AAAS will have a highly visible
and very-high-quality meeting that will be the first of an annual series of
national colloquia on avoiding nuclear war, bringing together the scientific
and scholarly communities with a wide cross-section of national leaders
and the public at large.
Now I turn to another organization, the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Its Committee on Inter-
national Security Studies (CISS) has just completed a major study of
weapons in space, reported in the most recent issue of Daedfalus. A book
based on this project is forthcoming. CISS is also completing a project
on Crisis, Stability and Nuclear War, conducted jointly with Cornell Uni-
versity, that looks particularly at crisis management issues, command and
control communication questions for both U. S . and Soviet nuclear forces,
delegation of authority in time of crisis, and the very dangerous interplay
of military alerts between the superpowers.
The American Academy will soon be publishing a volume that analyzes
whether the superpowers place too much emphasis on the technical aspects
of weaponry and not enough on underlying political and psychological
factors that exacerbate conflict. It aims to illuminate underlying factors
in the U.S.-Soviet relationship that make the weapons so dangerous.
The American Academy is actively supporting Pugwash. Pugwash, of
course, was the pioneering international forum in this field. Active interest
continues, and one phenomenon of the American participation is a growing
involvement of young scholars. Pugwash is dealing with critical issues:
conventional deterrence in Europe, regional conflicts that can lead to
nuclear war, and the ramifications for Europe of strategic defense.
The American Academy is also trying to enlarge the role of U.S.
universities and colleges in addressing nuclear issues. It has started a
Kistiakowsky visiting scholar program honoring the late scientist who was
the President's Science Adviser in the Eisenhower administration. In this
program, distinguished scholars visit smaller colleges and universities that
OCR for page 6
6
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR
are starting courses and other activities in this field. Perhaps the most
striking of the American Academy's outreach efforts occurred some months
ago in a meeting held jointly with the Planetary Society and with the
cooperation of the National Academy of Sciences. The meeting was de-
voted to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and antisatellite (ASAT) matters,
including effects of the BMD and ASAT programs on U. S . -Soviet political
relations, on the superpowers' strategic stability, and on civilian uses of
space. This meeting was covered extensively by the national news media
in this country. Finally, in connection with the American Academy's
Weapons in Space Project, there is a U. S.-Soviet activity led on the Soviet
side by academicians Velikhov and Segdaev, together with Professor Frank
Long of Cornell University.
Let me now mention a set of studies being supported by the Carnegie
Corporation of New York on different facets of strategic defense and to
some extent dealing also with the way the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) impinges on other security uses of space and on civilian uses of
space. This is, after all, an exceedingly complex area: technical feasibility,
economic considerations, strategic considerations, international relations;
there are so many facets affected by SDI that it is important to have a set
of objective, analytical, science-based, independent studies. These studies
are open to full critique, will be published, and should be useful to gov-
ernments and the public. I have already sketched the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences study. There is another being done in the University
of California system headed by Professor Herbert York and involving
various campuses of the university, as well as the special laboratories
associated with the University of California. The American Physical So-
ciety is also conducting a study with the cooperation of the U.S. De-
partment of Defense. And the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, headed by the former Secretary of Defense, Dr.
Harold Brown, and the United Nations Association of the United States
are each conducting their own studies. The earliest such study came from
Stanford University, with Drell and Parley as the principal authors. More
recently, the Stanford group completed a report on a specific space defense
research program that would be consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty and with improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
The crisis prevention approach deserves mention here. In essence, it is
an antidote to complacency in the spirit of science: raising questions,
challenging assumptions in seeking ways to reduce the risk of the use of
nuclear weapons, looking at factors that influence the use of these weap-
ons. Basically it is preoccupied with the prevalence of error and mis-
judgment in human affairs.
OCR for page 7
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
7
Crisis prevention simply says that it is too dangerous to think that we
can manage nuclear confrontations like the Cuban Missile Crisis time after
time and get away with it. There are too many sources of both human
and mechanical error and, above all, the interaction between human and
mechanical error that is enormously exacerbated in time of crisis.
It is appropriate in this medical meeting to reflect on the wider signif-
icance of the growing research literature on iatrogenic illness. For those
of you not close to medicine, the term refers to medically induced illness.
Most of the studies indicating the serious nature of this problem are coming
out of our very finest hospitals. Even with splendid institutions, a science-
based profession, and highly disciplined teams of workers, tragic mistakes
are made. Our power is greater than ever before, both for better and for
worse, and not just in medicine. It has been my personal good fortune to
relate to leaders in government, science, technology, medicine, and busi-
ness. They have earned my respect. Yet I have witnessed serious mistakes
in each of these spheres.
In the nuclear war arena, we have only one mistake to make. This is
the first time in history that we really cannot afford one serious mistake.
Over the long term it is vanishingly improbable that, in this field where
the stakes are much higher than any other, we could operate indefinitely
in an error-free environment. That is what the crisis prevention approach
addresses. It involves a variety of strategies and techniques.
One fundamental point of crisis prevention is to avoid subjecting either
superpower to any threatening surprises. The upgrading of the Hotline is
a useful step in that direction. Another idea of crisis prevention is to reach
agreements that deal effectively with situations that are predictably sen-
sitive and potentially explosive; perhaps the best case in point involves
the rules of sea agreement between the U.S. and Soviet navies. It is highly
probable that, during the course of this meeting, somewhere on the high
seas U.S. and Soviet naval vessels or naval aircraft have encountered each
other. They might have had a very nasty, unpleasant, dangerous exchange
if not for the fact that the rules for such encounters are well established,
codified in books on the ships at sea, and updated and clarified every year
at a high-level conference between the two navies. All this is done in a
professional, low-key manner that has survived political vicissitudes be-
tween the two nations.
Similarly we had a recent agreement on nuclear terrorism, a very ap-
propriate subject to worry about between the U.S. and Soviet governments.
It is only a start, but a step in the right direction. This year, too, we have
had systematic regional consultations where we tried to clarify vital in-
terests in touchy situations. It may not mean anything more than informal
OCR for page 8
8
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR
understandings about what are crucial interests, but it too is a step in the
right direction. Finally, in this crisis prevention approach, one needs
institutional mechanisms that provide a professional exchange of infor-
mation and ideas on a regular basis about matters that could become highly
dangerous. In this domain, the best example is the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC). The SCC has worked well for more than a decade.
Various suggestions about risk reduction centers in Washington and Mos-
cow are now under active consideration; they build on the SCC experience
and could provide a useful long-term mechanism for crisis prevention.
Crisis prevention endeavors go beyond arms control. They do not make
assumptions about the levels of stockpiles or the hostility between the two
nations, only hope that both will change for the better. That would be a
highly desirable therapeutic outcome, but the question is, what do we do
until the doctor comes? Until that fundamental change in the relationship
occurs, can we alter the circumstances surrounding the likelihood of use
of nuclear weapons?
We in the scientific community are beginning to give the problem the
attention it deserves. There is so much more to be done. When we leave
this meeting, I fervently hope that each of us will ask, What more can I
do? Who can I enlist in the effort? How can I widen that network? What
tasks are being neglected? What organizations and institutions am I familiar
with that could do more useful work in this field?
One more point and a vital one: the scientific community must address
the sources of conflict; it must go beyond the manifestations of conflict
or the weapons that make so much damage possible. What is there in
human nature and human interaction that increases the risk of hatred and
destruction, and what can be done to resolve conflicts?
Scientific study of human conflict is only beginning to expand. It is
being stimulated now by the deep concerns that we all share at this meeting,
and yet the status accorded this field of inquiry has been low, the support
has been minimal, and the institutional arrangements have often been
inadequate. I regard it as one of the greatest challenges of science policy
in the remainder of this century to find ways to understand the nature and
sources of human conflict and, above all, to develop effective ways of
resolving it short of disaster.
The world is now, as it has been for a long time, awash in a sea of
ethnocentrism, prejudice, and violent conflict. The historical record is full
of every sort of slaughter based on invidious distinctions pertaining to
religion, race, nationality, and so on. The human species seems to have
a virtuoso capacity for making invidious distinctions and for justifying
violence on whatever scale the current technology permits.
OCR for page 9
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
9
That is old; but what is new indeed, very new and very threatening-
is the destructive power of our weaponry; not only nuclear but enhanced
conventional, chemical, and biological. What else is new is the worldwide
spread of technical capability. Thus, it is possible almost everywhere to
make or at least to use effectively the weapons of high technology. What
is also new is the miniaturization of weapons, which opens up all kinds
of dangerous possibilities for terrorism. And the technology that permits
the widely broadcast justifications for violence is new, too. Moreover,
there is an upsurge of fanatical behavior. Taken together, these devel-
opments provide a set of conditions that give us a growing capacity to
make life everywhere absolutely miserable and disastrous, even aside from
the fact that two nations probably have the capacity to render human life
extinct.
In this kind of world, the scientific community must pull together in a
reasonably unified way so that the physical, biological, behavioral, and
social sciences can address these profound and pervasive problems. This
will require cooperative engagement over a wide range of scientific activity
and will necessitate overcoming some of our own internal barriers within
the scientific community.
There is one final feature about the scientific community that is worth
bearing in mind. I think it is fair to say that the scientific community is
the closest approximation we now have to a truly international community,
sharing certain fundamental interests, values, and standards, as well as
certain fundamental curiosities about the nature of matter, life, behavior,
. .
and the universe. The shared quest for understanding is one that knows
no national boundaries, has no inherent prejudices, no necessary ethno-
centrism, and no barriers to the free play of information and ideas. So,
to some extent the scientific community can provide a model for human
relations that might transcend some of the biases and dogmatisms that
have torn us apart throughout our history and have recently become so
much more dangerous than ever before. Science can contribute greatly to
a better future through its ideals and its processes as well as through
the specific content of its research and all these need to be brought to
bear now on the problem of human conflict. As I see it, the essential
scientific outlook flows from some very old and cardinal features of human
adaptation through our long history as a species. The evolution that is
distinctively human centers around our increasing capacity for learning,
for communication chiefly by language, for cooperative problem solving,
for complex social organization, and for advanced toolmaking and tool
using. These attributes have gotten us here by enormously enhancing our
capabilities, not only to adapt to the widest variety of habitats, but also
OCR for page 10
10
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR
to modify our habitats profoundly in ways that suit our purposes.
Now we are challenged as never before to find ways in which these
unique capacities can be used to prevent us from destroying ourselves and
especially to prevent the final epidemic; to prevent that will make possible
the search for a decent quality of life for everyone on the planet. If we
have lost our sense of purpose in the modern world, perhaps this per-
spective can help us regain it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Some Recent Books Published by Scientific Organizations
Concerned with Nuclear War
Adams, R., and S. Cullen, eds. 1981. The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on
Nuclear War (Physicians for Social Responsibility). Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago
Press.
American Psychiatric Association. 1982. Psychosocial Aspects of Nuclear Developments
(APA Task Force Report No. 20). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.
British Medical Association. 1983. The Medical Effects of Nuclear War. New York and
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Cassel, C., M. McCally, H. Abraham. 1984. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: A Source
Book for Health Professionals (Physicians for Social Responsibility). New York: Praeger.
Chivian, E., S. Chivian, R. J. Lifton, and J. E. Mack, eds. 1982. Last Aid: The Medical
Dimensions of Nuclear War (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War).
San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman and Company.
The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 1981. Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and
Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. New York: Basic Books. (Translated by Eisei
Ishikawa and David L. Swain.)
Ehrlich, P., C. Sagan, D. Kennedy, W. O. Roberts. 1984. The Cold and the Dark: The
World After Nuclear War (Center on the Consequences of Nuclear War). New York:
W. W. Norton.
Griffiths, F., and J. Polanyi, eds. 1979. The Dangers of Nuclear War (A Pugwash Sym-
posium). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Harwell, M. A., and T. C. Hutchinson, with W. P. Cropper, Jr., C. C. Harwell, and
H. D. Grover, eds. 1986. Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War. Volume II:
Ecological and Agricultural Effects. SCOPE 28 (Scientific Committee on Problems of
the Environment, International Council of Scientific Unions). New York and Chichester:
John Wiley & Sons.
Leaning, J., and L. Keyes, eds. 1984. The Counterfeit Ark: Crisis Relocation for Nuclear
War (Physicians for Social Responsibility). Cambridge: Ballinger.
London, J., and G. F. White, eds. 1984. The Environmental Effects of Nuclear War
(American Association for the Advancement of Science Selected Symposium No. 98).
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Long, F. A., D. Hafner, and J. J. Boutwell, eds. 1986. Weapons in Space (American
Academy of Arts and Sciences). New York: W. W. Norton.
OCR for page 11
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
11
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control.
1985. Nuclear Anns Control: Background and Issues. Washington, D.C.: National Acad-
emy Press.
National Research Council. 1985. The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear
Exchange. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Peterson, Jeanne, ed. 1983. The Aftermath: The Human and Ecological Consequences of
Nuclear War (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences). New York: Pantheon Books.
Pittock, A. B., T. P. Ackerman, P. J. Crutzen, M. C. MacCracken, C. S. Shapiro, and
R. P. Turco, eds. 1986. Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War. Volume I: Phys-
ical Atmospheric Effects. SCOPE 28 (Scientific Committee On Problems of the Envi-
ronment, International Council of Scientific Unions). New York and Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons.
Thompson, James. 1985. Psychological Aspects of Nuclear War (The British Psychological
Society). New York and Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
World Health Organization. 1984. Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services:
Report of the International Committee of Experts in Medical Services and Public Health.
WHO Pub. A36.12. Geneva: World Health Organization.
OCR for page 12
Representative terms from entire chapter:
arms control
