OCR for page 216
216
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
contractor as the highest-priority targets for an attack on U.S. military-
industrial capability;
· 99 key strategic nuclear targets (34 home bases for nuclear bombers
and their associated refueling aircraft; 16 nuclear naval bases; 9 nuclear
weapon storage facilities; and 40 command, communication, and early-
warning sites).
We have assumed 1-Mt airbursts for all these attacks. This provides a
common basis for comparison and is certainly well within Soviet capa-
bilities. More than 1,000 Soviet intercontinental and submarine-based
ballistic missiles carry single warheads with estimated yields of approx-
imately 1 Mt (Arkin, Burrows, et al., 1985~.
Our data base for the U.S. population distribution was obtained from
a tape prepared for the government from 1980 U.S. census data (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1980~. Since the data are for the resi-
dential population, our casualty estimates are for nighttime attacks. How-
ever, the results should be indicative for daytime attacks as well.
Figure 6a shows the cumulative populations around the ground zeros
of the three hypothetical target sets. It will be seen that the populations
around the military-industrial sites are almost as high as those around the
city centers. This is because most of the military-industrial targets are
located in major urban areas, including those around Boston, Detroit, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Rochester, Sac-
ramento, St. Louis, San Diego, San Jose, Seattle, Tucson, and Wichita
(Science Applications Inc., 1984~.
The cumulative population around the 99 strategic nuclear targets is
considerably lower than that around the city centers or military-industrial
sites but still includes tens of millions of people (see the breakdown by
classes of target in Figure fib). Many of these targets are in urban areas
(Table 2~. For example,
· Strategic nuclear bombers or their associated aerial refueling groups
are based outside Chicago, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, Sacra-
mento, Wichita, Fort Worth, and Shreveport (Air Force Magazine, 1985~.
· Aircraft carriers carrying nuclear-armed fighter bombers are based
in San Francisco Bay; and battleships equipped with long-range, nuclear-
armed, land-attack cruise missiles are proposed for bases off both Long
Beach, Calif., and Staten Island in New York harbor.
· The Pentagon and the White House in the Washington, D.C., urban
area and the Strategic Air Command headquarters outside Omaha are
among the most important strategic nuclear weapons command posts. And
a number of other major urban areas are the sites of key radio transmitters
for communicating with ballistic missile submarines, bombers, and mil
OCR for page 217
CASUALTIES DUE TO BUST, HEAT, ED ~IOACTWEF~OUT 217
A
80
60
o 4
he
o
/
20
B
30
25
20
IS
1
10
Is
/ ~
/'
.
..
.
KILOMETERS FROM GROUND - ZERO
/
/
/ / .
/ / .
/ /,.
~' -
-
_.-
-
-
.~
.
.
. -
/
/'
l 10 15 ~20
KILOMETERS FROM GROUND- ZERO
CITY CENTERS
MILITARY- INDUSTRIAL SITES
-
5 20
/
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SITES
COMMAND, COMMUNICATION
AND EARLY WARNING SITES
NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
STORAGE SITES
NUCLEAR NAVAL BASES
STRATEGIC AIR BASES
FIGURE 6 A: Cumulative population around ground zeros for 100-Mt attacks.
B: Cumulative population around 99 U.S. strategic nuclear targets.
OCR for page 222
222
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
p. 139~. Inclusion of such dispersal bases on our target list would have
greatly increased the number of deaths calculated for this attack.
In the case of the attacks on the 16 nuclear navy bases, we have assumed
that, because of their importance, they would be targeted with two war-
heads each. Since submarines are quite hard targets (U.S. Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, 1969) and some of the port facilities might be also, we
have assumed a 1-Mt airburst and a 1-Mt groundburst per port. Since the
nuclear weapons at the nine major nuclear weapon storage depots are
stored in hardened bunkers, we have assumed that they would be subjected
to the same type of attack.
The highest-priority targets for a Soviet attack on U. S. strategic nuclear
forces would be their early-warning radars, their command posts, the
communications links between the command posts, and the ballistic mis-
sile submarines and bombers. According to Blair (1985; p. 182), the
United States has about 400 primary and secondary command commu-
nication and control targets. Of these, 100 are the missile silo launch
control centers and 10 are Minuteman missiles in silos at the Whiteman
missile field that are equipped with emergency radio transmitters that
would be fired aloft if all other forms of communication between the
command posts and the missile fields and bombers failed (Arkin and
Fieldhouse, 19851. These 110 targets have already been included in the
countermissile silo attack component described above. Still other targets
are located at bomber bases that have also been included in the bomber
targets described above. We have therefore included in our attack on U.S.
strategic nuclear forces only 40 additional key command, communication,
and early-warning targets:
· Seven major headquarter and alternate headquarter installations;
· Five early-warning radar installations;
· Ten key naval radio transmitters for communicating to submarines;
· Nine key Strategic Air Command (SAC) transmitters for communi-
cating to bombers;
· Nine key terminals for communication with and control of satellites.
We assume that these 40 targets would be attacked with 1-Mt airbursts
with seven exceptions:
· The White House, the Pentagon, SAC headquarters at Offut Air Base,
Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado; and the Alternate National Mil-
itary Command Center near Fort Ritchie, Md. All of these are high-priority
targets, and at least three have underground command posts.
~ SAC's two survivable low-frequency transmitters.
It is assumed that each of these seven targets would be attacked by a
1-Mt groundburst as well as by a 1-Mt airburst.
OCR for page 223
CASUALTIES DUE TO BUST, HEAT, kD PROACTIVE FALLOUT 223
Fallout Casualty Mode!
Nuclear explosions create a great deal of short-lived radioactivity
mostly associated with fission products. We have made the standard as-
sumption in our calculations that one-half of the yield from the attacking
weapons would be from fission. In the case of airbursts, the fireball would
carry this radioactivity into the upper atmosphere, from which it would
slowly filter down as a rather diffuse distribution called "global fallout"
over a period of months to years. In the case of an attack on so-called
"hard" targets such as missile silos, which can withstand high overpres-
sures, the nuclear weapons would have to be exploded so close to the
ground that surface material would be sucked into the fireball, mixed with
the vaporized bomb products, and carried by the buoyancy of the fireball
into the upper atmosphere. There, much of the bomb material and surface
material would condense into particles, a large fraction of which would
descend to the surface again within 24 hours in an intense swath of "local
fallout" downwind from the target.
Various models have been developed to describe the effect of winds in
distributing this early fallout. Our calculations were done using the WSEG-
10 model developed by the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the
Department of Defense (Schmidt, 1975~.
Our wind data base, which also comes from the Department of Defense,
contains the wind speed and direction at five different altitudes on a 2-
degree latitude-longitude grid for the entire Northern Hemisphere for a
"typical day" of each month of the year (U.S. Defense Communications
Agency, 1981~.
Radiation Protection Factors
The WSEG-10 model predicts the doses that would be received by a
population standing fully exposed on a perfectly flat surface. These doses
must be reduced by dividing by the protection factors that account for the
shielding effects of the shelters in which the population would take refuge.
Wooden and brick residences have average protection factors of about 2.5
and 5, respectively (U.N. ScientiSc Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, 1982; p. 62), and below-ground residential basements typically
offer protection factors of 10-20 (Gras stone and Dolan, 1977; p. 441~.
We have assumed in our calculations that one-half of the population would
be in shelters with effective protection factors of 3, and one-half would
be in shelters with protection factors of 10.
Protection factors of more than 100 are often discussed by those who
argue that the USSR (or the United States) could effectively shelter its
populations from radioactive fallout in improvised shelters (e.g., Nitze,
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224
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
1979; p. S100801. Such protection factors are unrealistic, however, be-
cause they assume implicitly that it would be possible for the sheltered
population to stay in shelters without interruption for several weeks. Even
staying inside a perfect radiation shield for the first 2 days and coming
out thereafter for only 2 hours a day would result in a decrease in the
shelter's effective protection factor from infinity to about 20. Additional
radiation doses would be absorbed because, within a relatively short time,
most of the population would be drinking water and eating food contam-
inated with radioactivity.
Population Radiation Sensitivity
The WSEG-10 model takes into account the well-known fact that mam-
mals can survive larger cumulative doses of radiation if these doses are
delivered over a longer period of time. This is done by assuming that 90
percent of the radiation damage is repairable and that this repair proceeds
exponentially at a rate of 3.3 percent of the remaining unrepaired damage
per day (30-day average repair time). Making this assumption, we can
calculate the total unrepaired radiation dose as a function of time. At some
time, as the intensity of the fallout radiation declines, the rate of biological
repair will exceed that of accumulation of new damage and the total
radiation damage will peak. The level of this "peak equivalent residual
radiation dose" determines the probability of death. If no biological repair
were assumed, the total absorbed dose out to 6 months would be 30-60
percent higher than the peak residual dose calculated by the WSEG-10
model, depending on the fallout arrival time.
Since the end of World War II, the standard assumption used in official
U.S. estimates of deaths from radiation has been that, in the absence of
intensive medical treatment, a 450-rad peak residual dose would cause a
50 percent fatality rate from radiation sickness within 60 days (LDso =
450 reds) (Lushbaugh, 1982; pp. 46-57~. However, this number is near
the top of the current range of uncertainty (Lushbaugh, 1982~. In 1960,
Cronkite and Bond estimated that, in the absence of treatment with an-
tibiotics and blood transfusions, the LDso would be 350 reds. Their es-
timates were based principally on a comparison of the hematological
effects of radiation on a group of Marshall Islanders, after the fallout from
a U.S. nuclear test in 1954 accidentally exposed them to 175 reds, with
similar hematological effects in dogs subject to radiation exposures in the
laboratory. Cronkite and Bond assumed that the lethality curve for humans
would be parallel to that of the dogs and estimated that human fatalities
would begin at about 200 reds (Cronkite and Bond, 1958; p. 2491.
Recently Rotblat analyzed the recalculated doses from Hiroshima and
OCR for page 225
CASUALTIES DUE TO BUST, HEAT, ED ~IOACT~E FALLOUT 225
estimated an LDso for Hiroshima of 220 reds (Rotblat, 19861. This is
much lower than that estimated for the Marshallese by Cronkite and Bond.
Rotblat's lower value for the people of Hiroshima may reflect synergistic
effects of radiation dosage with the traumatic effects of the explosion and
its aftermath. The population surviving the immediate effects of a large-
scale nuclear attack on the United States would certainly also find itself
under multiple stresses, including emotional shock, hunger, unsanitary
conditions, and possibly exposure to cold weather. We have therefore
estimated fallout deaths for an LDso of 250 reds as well as for 350 and
450 reds. We approximated the associated lethality curves as straight lines
parallel to the Cronkite-Bond curve (see Figure 81. Numbers of cases of
severe radiation illness were estimated by assuming that everyone would
get seriously ill from radiation sickness at radiation doses where anyone
died.
Cancers
In addition to the short-term radiation illnesses and deaths from fallout,
there would also be a large number of radiation-caused cancers in the
longer term. In calculating these cancers, we use the "linear hypothesis"
that the probability of developing a radiation-caused cancer is proportional
to the radiation dose. According to the linear dose-effect model in the
1.0
o.e
As
c:3 0.6
J
m 0.4
o
CL
0.2
o _
o
l ~ /
.1 1
i / .
LD50:250 / 5~0
(RADS)
T _
//
/ 1
.
.
.
SENSITIVITY
-- - -- HIGH
M EDI UM
....... -LOW
200 400 600 800
PEAK EQUIVALENT RESIDUAL DOSE ( RADS)
FIGURE 8 Three possible population sensitivities to ionizing radiation.
OCR for page 226
226
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
1980 report of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, a radiation dose of 109 person-
rads would result in 0.4-1.25 million extra cancers in the general pop-
ulation, of which 0.17-0.5 million would be fatal. (National Academy
of Sciences, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,
1980.)
The cancer dose is calculated assuming no biological repair. This means
that the population cancer dose would continue to increase even after
radiation levels had fallen to the point where the population sheltered
below ground felt that they could emerge without risk of short-term ra-
diation illness. We assume that they might emerge at 2 weeks and that
the average protection factor would be 3 thereafter for the entire popu-
lation.
Ranges of Casualties Calculated for Attack on
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Targets
We have calculated the fallout patterns for the attack on U.S. strategic
nuclear forces described in Table 3, assuming typical February, May,
August, and October winds. Figure 9 shows, as an example, the calculated
pattern for typical February winds.
The large fallout patterns originate at the six Minuteman-MX missile
fields, each of which would absorb the equivalent of hundreds of 0.5-Mt
groundbursts. The long fallout pattern originating in mid-California is due
to an attack on the 16 missile silos at Vandenburg AFB. The other smaller
fallout patterns are each associated with a 1-Mt groundburst on a total of
66 bomber, aerial tanker, nuclear-navy, nuclear-weapons storage, and
command and communications facilities. Three contours for the un-
shielded, peak residual air-dose are shown:
· 3,500 rads. Within this region, given an LDso of 350 reds and our
assumed sheltering posture (half the population with a protection factor
of 10 and half with a protection factor of 3), more than three-quarters of
the population would die.
~ 1,050 rads. Within this region, given an LDso of 350 reds, more
than half of that part of the population with an effective protection factor
of 3 (i.e., one-quarter of the total population) would die.
~ 300 rads. Outside this region, given a protection factor of 3 or more,
few deaths would occur from radiation illness.
To get an adequate idea of the sensitivity of our results to the monthly
winds, we have also done casualty calculations for May, August, and
October winds.
OCR for page 227
CASUALTIES DUE TO BLAST, HEAT, AND RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 227
:__
~ ~ ~ = -
q~ 1 1
jet
e:~1
-
~, ~_
ret
my'
_ at, V) ~
~_~S
KEY
· ~ 3500 RADS
0 1050- 3500 RADS
~ 3~ - 1050 IS
i\
FIGURE 9 Fallout pattern in a February attack on U. S. strategic nuclear targets.
Table 4 shows our estimated ranges of deaths and total casualties due
to blast, fire, radiation sickness, and cancer. Shown explicitly is the
sensitivity of these results to the choice of blast-burn casualty model,
radiation sickness LDso, and cancer-risk coefficient. The ranges in each
subcategory show the variation associated with the choice of winds. The
range shown for the total deaths reflects the combined effect of the var-
iability associated with the winds, the LD,oS' and the cancer dose-risk
coefficients. Table 5 shows ranges of deaths from blast and burn and from
fallout for the components of the attack. The summed total of the upper
ends of the ranges of casualties calculated for these component attacks
exceeds the maxima given for the total attack in Table 4. In part, this is
because some of the same people would be killed by different subattacks
and in part because the winds that maximize the fallout casualties from
the counter-silo attack tend to minimize the fallout casualties from the
other component attacks.
Overall, taking into account the different estimates associated with the
two blast-burn casualty models, we find that there would be 13-34 million
deaths and 25-64 million total casualties from this "counterforce" attack.
Figure 10 shows how these estimates vary with low and high assumptions
about casualty rates and with different months of the year.
How do we explain the fact that the lower end of our range of estimated
OCR for page 228
228
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
TABLE 4 Deaths and Total Casualties from Large-Scale Attack on U.S.
Strategic-Nuclear Targets (in millions)
Blast Radiation Illness
and L~Dso (reds) Cancer Riska
Fire 450 350 250 Low High Totalb
Deaths
Overpressure Model 7 5-6 7-8 9-14 1-3 4-8 13-28
Conflagration Model 16 4-5 6-7 8-12 1-3 3-7 20-34
Total Casualties
Overpressure Model 14 7-9 11-16 17-29 3-6 10-20 25-63
Conflagration Model 19 7-8 10-15 15-27 2-6 9-19 28-64
aFor the survivors of the short-term effects of blast, fire, and radiation sickness, assuming
an LD50 for radiation sickness of 350 reds. "Low" ("high") cancer risk means a probability
of 0.17 (0.5) million extra cancer deaths and 0.4 (1.25) million total extra cancer cases for
each 109 person-reds absorbed dose.
bThe totals were added before rounding so they may differ from the sum of the individual
rounded subtotals.
TABLE 5 Deaths and Total Casualties from Subcomponents of the
Large-Scale Attack on U.S. Strategic-Nuclear Targets (in millions)
Blast
and Fire
Fallouta Totalb
Deaths
Class of Target
Missile Silos 0.1-0.2 2.2- 14.9 2.4- 15.0
Bomber Bases 4.2-6.7 0.5- 3.6 4.7- 9.9
Naval Bases 1.0-3.3 0.4- 4.5 1.4- 7.4
Command and Control 1.4-4.0 0.1- 2.4 1.5- 5.9
Weapons Storage 0.3-0.9 0.2- 2.3 0.5- 3.1
Total Casualties
Class of Target
Missile Silos 0.3-0.3 3.7-31.5 4.0-31.8
Bomber Bases 7.4-8.1 1.3- 8.6 8.9-16.0
Naval Bases 2.8-4.6 1.1-10.0 3.9-13.8
Command and Control 3.5-5.3 0.2- 4.7 3.9- 9.1
Weapons Storage 0.7-1.4 0.5- 5.8 1.2- 6.5
aFallout deaths and total casualties are those from both immediate illness and long-term cancers.
The low value occurs in August and the high value in February for attacks on missile silos. The
reverse is true for the other target types. The results for May and October were always between
these two extremes.
bThe low and high values for the totals are not simply the sum of low and high values in the
columns labeled "Blast and Fire" and "Fallout." The totals are sums of numbers corresponding
to the same input assumptions.
OCR for page 229
CASUALTIES DUE TO BEST, HEAT, kD PROACTIVE FALLOUT 229
80
60
LL
o
o To
A
3
-
20
~ _
~ _
in.
u-r~ ~ ,,, l)
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
FEB MAY AUG OCT
t- BW MODEL
LD50 ~ 4~ R
LOW CANCERS
2- MEDIUM ARE MODEL
LD50 ~ 250 R
HIGH PACERS
INJURIES, ILLNESSES
PACER DEWS
FLOW DEWS
BUST AND BURN DEATHS
FIGURE 10 Major attack on counterforce targets. The bars labeled "1" cor-
respond to assumptions that would cause the fewest deaths; bars labeled "2"
correspond to the assumptions causing the most deaths.
deaths is approximately equal to the upper end of the range of 3.2-16.3
million deaths calculated by the DOD in 1975 for a major counterforce
attack on the United States (U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 1975; pp. 12-24~?
The low end of the DOD's range of deaths is apparently associated
with the optimistic sheltering posture that was criticized by the Office of
Technology Assessment review panel. Using a less optimistic sheltering
posture, somewhat like that used in this paper, and assuming a 550-kiloton
airburst and groundburst over each silo, the DOD analysts estimated 5.6
million deaths resulting from an attack on U.S. missile silos alone (as-
suming March winds). This is quite close to the 4.9 million deaths that
we find for February winds if we, like the DOD analysts, assume an LDso
of 450 reds and neglect cancer deaths.
The upper end of the DOD range of estimated deaths is associated with
a sheltering posture similar to that we have used. However, the DOD
analysts made a number of other assumptions that correspond roughly to
those that characterize the lower end of our uncertainty range:
· The overpressure model was used to calculate blast and burn cas-
ualties.
· An LDso of 450 reds was used for calculating the number of deaths
from radiation sickness.
· Cancer deaths were ignored.
OCR for page 230
230
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
The DOD analysts did assume March winds for their calculations an
assumption that would tend to maximize the fallout casualties from the
attacks on the missile silos. This assumption was offset, however, by their
omission of most of the targets in three of the five subsets of targets
considered in our aback: strategic command, communication, and early-
warning facilities; nuclear storage sites; and the ports for naval ships that
have recently been assigned a strategic role with the deployment of long-
range, sea-launched cruise missiles. As may be seen from Table 5, these
target sets account for a large fraction of the total number of deaths
calculated for our counterforce attack.
As has already been noted, our own range of 13-34 million deaths and
25-64 million total casualties would be higher if we included other likely
targets, such as potential bomber dispersal bases. Our casualty numbers
would climb higher still if we added estimates of the numbers of deaths
and illnesses from the economic and social collapse that could be expected
following such an attack.
CONCLUSIONS
Some of our results show clearly the enormous casualties that only 1
percent of the current Soviet strategic arsenal could inflict on the United
States, even if the targets were military-industrial or strategic rather than
population per se. We have also found that, as counterforce attacks become
more comprehensive, the distinction (in terms of casualties) between
"counterforce" and "counterpopulation" targeting becomes increasingly
blurred. We expect to find similar results for U.S. counterforce attacks
on the USSR.
These casualty estimates have a critical bearing on the debate over the
possibility of "limited nuclear options" as part of a strategic doctrine.
Either superpower contemplating such an attack should be well aware of
the fact that such attacks even if limited to military targets could cause
casualties that approach those from all-out attacks. We emphasize this
point especially because the significant underestimates in the published
DOD casualty estimates for counterforce attacks suggest that U.S. policy
concerning counterforce attacks is not fully realistic. Certainly this ap-
peared to be the case during the recent debate of the "window of vul-
nerability" of U.S. ICBMs. Virtually no attention was given to He casualties
that would result from an attack on U.S. missile silos.
Other work has shown that, even after such a devastating aback, either
superpower would retain a residual capability to destroy the cities and
economic infrastructure of the other many times over (e.g., Feiveson and
von Hippel, 19831. And it seems likely that the other superpower after
suffering tens of millions of deaths would launch at least as horrendous
OCR for page 231
CASUALTIES DUE TO BLAST, HEAT, AND RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 231
an attack in response. Therefore, the only conceivable rationale that the-
oretically could be used to justify a strategic counterforce attack would
be the certainty that the other side had already committed itself to a major
nuclear attack a certainty that could not be achieved in the real world.
It is our hope that national decision melters will develop a better un-
derstanding of the "collateral" consequences of hypothetical first strikes
and of the enormous destructive capacity of the weapons that would sur-
vive. That understanding should make them less likely to seek counterforce
capabilities or to fear such attacks from the other side.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
strategic nuclear
