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2 Historical Evolution of OST Decision Making This chapter provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the DOE-EM program and of OST in particular. OST's decision-making structures have evolved over fume, with an increasing responsiveness to site user-determined needs and a greater focus on monitoring and assisting the deployment of technologies for DOE-EM site cleanup and waste management activities. BACKGROUND OF DOE-EM AND OST When the Manhattan Project began, DOE and its predecessor agencies were not subject to external federal or state regulation. Beginning in the 1970s, however, federal legislation waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity from state and federal environmental laws was enacted. Nevertheless, DOE resisted application of external chemical hazardous waste regulations for several years, until a suit (LEAF v. Homely was successfully brought against it. A 1984 federal court decision rejected DOE's contention that the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA:the nation's centerpiece of "cradle-to-grave" hazardous waste management legislation~id not apply to DOE because of the Atomic Energy Act. In 1987, DOE acknowledged that RCRA applied to the hazardous waste component of mixed (i.e., hazardous and radioactive) wastes. The need for DOE to comply quickly with RCRA was made more compelling by the 1992 Federal Facility Compliance Act, which specified that federal agencies would be subject to fines and penalties for violations of RCRA. In addition, section 120 of the 1986 Superband Amen~nents and Re-authorization Act made clear that the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or ''Superfiuld'' law) applied to federal facilities, giving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states explicit oversight responsibilities concerning the cleanup of legacy waste sites. Early Years The first Assistant Secretary of DOE-EM, Leo Duffy, serving under then Secretary of Energy Admiral James Watkins, approached the mission of EM in the optimistic "can-do" spirit that had typified the nuclear weapons research, development, and production missions of DOE and its predecessor agencies, as well as the early optimism that the U.S. Congress and others had brought to the task of cleaning up the nation's legacy waste sites under Superband. This attitude was reflected in commitments made by DOE, beginning in 1989, within the context of tripar~ agreements (DOE, EPA, and the host state) concerning remediation at several major DOE sites. By the early 1990s, however, this optimism had become tempered by the realization that the cleanup of DOE sites was likely to take far longer and require far more funds than first anticipated (Russell et al., 1991~. 20

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Historical Evolution of OST Decision Making 21 The early years of OST have been characterized to the committee as a time of headquarters control over decisions (Frank, 1997b). During these inaugural years, program staff were hired and money was allocated directly by then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technology Development Clyde Frank, prior to the establishment of a more formal program structure for decision making. Integrated Demonstrations and Integrated Programs In a reorganization of the program structure of EM-50 in the early 1990s, several program units (i.e., integrated demonstrations and integrated programs) were created. Some of these were administered at field sites, with an emphasis on large-scale demonstration of developed technologies as a key goal. In setting up this technology development program structure, DOE proceeded on the basis that currently available, conventional cleanup and waste management technologies were not always effective, and could be costly, and that new technologies were needed to remedy these shortcomings. As a result, DOE initially established three major RD&D areas for the technology development prograrn~ound water and soil cleanup, waste retrieval and processing, and waste minimization and avoidance. Each major RD&D area was to be supported with "integrated demonstrations" in which multiple technologies would be tested at a particular DOE site and would ultimately result in a complete system to address a site problem, Tom technologies for site characterization and remediation to technologies for monitoring (GAO, ~ 992~. The first integrated demonstration of technologies for cleaning up chlorinated solvents in soil and ground water at the Savannah River Site was initiated in 1990 and was followed by seven additional integrated demonstration projects begun In 1991. By 1992, however, DOE officials realized that the integrated demonstration approach requ*ed more resources than were available and began to revise their approach toward one in which individual technologies, rather than integrated technology systems, would be emphasized. The individual technologies were to be focused in specified areas, such as characterization and monitoring and mixed waste processing (GAO, 1992~. . . . ~ . . . . By 1994, approximately 10 integrated demonstrations, tour Integrated programs, anct seven other program units within OST had been formed (DOE, 1994b). Despite the efforts in creating these programs and demonstrations, few of the new technologies were actually used in cleanup applications. These issues helped shape the next internal DOE reorganization and new program management structure. The new structure was intended to rectify several problems. Some of them had been identified in a report that noted the technology development program's lack of measurable performance goals, clear cost estimates, and schedules for integrated demonstration projects (GAO, 1992~. This report also noted the absence of clear decision points to eliminate poorly performing or inappropriate projects. Also identified by DOE (DOE, 1994a) and noted in a subsequent GAO report (GAO, 1994) were other problems: a reluctance on the part of various groups (including regulators, local officials, and other stakeholders, as well as field officials and on-site contractors) to endorse the use of innovative technologies; failure of DOE's program offices, especially He Offices of Waste Management (EM-30), Environmental Restoration (EM-40), and Science and Technology (EM-50), to work together effectively; and flawed decision making, which excluded EM-50's technical experts Dom contributing to technology decisions at particular sites. To remedy these problems, new OST program units were created in 1994, as described next. New Headquarters Promotes and New OST Program Units, 1993-1994 In 1993, under the Clinton administration, Haze} O'Leary was appointed Secretary of Energy, and in May 1993, Thomas Grumbly became Assistant Secretary for EM. He brought to his DOE position a philosophy of openness and "stakeholder involvement," as did Secretary O'Leary (DOE, 1994a). In

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22 Decision Making in the DOE-OST addition, under Crumbly a new emphasis was placed on risk as the most important criterion for deciding which aspects of cleanup should be tackled first, as well as a focus on technology development and strengthening relationships with the private sector (DOE, 1993b). In 1993, a working group was established by Grumbly to develop a new approach that would focus environmental research and technology development activities across DOE on its most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems. Although EM-50 had, since 1989, been responsible for managing DOE's environmental applied research and technology development, substantial related and separately funded technology development activities were being carried out by EM-30 and EM- 40, as well as by private industry external to DOE-EM. (As a result of budget pressures, most of the EM- related RD&D in these other DOE organizations ceased as of FY 1998.) In addition, other DOE offices, such as the Office of Energy Research, were seen as potentially contributing to EM technology development efforts. Grumbly's working group included participants from across DOE and had customer and supplier representation (DOE, 1993a). The group's efforts started in August 1993 and led to the document, A New Approach to Environmental Research and Technology Development at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 1994a), which identified fives major problem areas, called Focus Areas: contaminant plume containment and remediation; mixed waste characterization, treatment, and disposal; high-level waste tank remediation; landfill stabilization; and facility transitioning, decommissioning, and final disposition. The Focus Areas, and other activities such as crosscutting RD&D areas, were to be managed by a new team structure. Key features ofthe new management approach (DOE, 1994a) were the following: . A Steering Committee composed of upper-management representatives from each organization, with other top-level DOE officials serving as ex-officio members. The committee's purpose was to ensure that the technology development program remained responsive to EM priorities. Management Teams for each of the Focus Areas, with the core team consisting of one representative each from other major offices within the EM program, as well as "an Operations Office representative, as appropriate" (DOE, 1994a, p. i-9.) Lead Organizations for each of the Focus Areas the lead organization being selected by the Management Team with the approval of the Steering Committee, based on proposals submitted by candidates. This organization could include "DOE Operations Offices, National Laboratories, Management and Operations (M&O) Contractors, universities, non-profit or not-for-profit organizations, industry, or other interested organizations" (DOE, 1994a, pp. I-13~. Individual organizations or consortia could apply. In practice, management of the Focus Areas and Crosscutting Programs has been established at DOE-EM operations offices. Implementation Teams for each Focus Area, supervised by the Lead Organization, to be responsible for day-to-day technical management within the Focus Area. Focus Area Review Groups, whose membership was to be chosen on an ad hoc basis Tom scientists, engineers, and interested stakeholders to work with the Management and Implementation Teams. Site Technology Coordination Groups (STCGs) at each DOE-EM site, to work with the Management and Implementation Teams of the various Focus Areas to ensure that site needs were identified and addressed and that technical solutions were implemented. Membership of each STCG was to include Operations Office personnel, together with operating contractor and laboratory personnel Dom the site. Local regulators were to be kept informed of technology development, and stakeholder and public interest groups were to be actively involved win each STCG. iTwo of these five, the Contaminant Plume Containment and Remediation Focus Area and the Landfill Stabilization Focus Area, were combined in 1996 to form the Subsurface Contaminants Focus Area.

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Historical Evolution of OST Decision Making 23 Much of this program structure was adopted in 1994-1995 and is in place today. The major restructuring of OST's way of doing business in early 1994 was a significant midcourse correction a shift away from the informal mode of decision making in OST's first years, toward a much more structured, multilayered approach, as well as a shift from developer-driven to user-driven priorities. This shift was made within the context of increasing pressure to show results Dom a program that had, at that point, spent more than $500 million with few of its technologies deployed at the sites. Implementation of the New Approach Focus Areas, Crosscutting Programs, and STCGs were chartered in 1994 (see Box 2.1), although all STCGs were not fully operational until later. During 1994-1995, the lead management of the Focus Areas was moved to DOE field offices, and during ~ 997, Crosscutting Program management was also moved Tom headquarters to field offices. Sharpening the OST Focus on User Needs Prior to 1995, the DOE-EM cleanup program had no firm total cost estimate associated with it. Technology development activity in the Integrated Demonstrations/Industry Program (TD/IP) was conducted in the spirit of developing and demonstrating good projects, which if shown to be meritorious would presumably lead to their recognition and implementation by the user community. The year 1995 brought several developments that changed this approach. The "Train Wreck report" (Blush and Heitman, 1995) noted the first major budgetary shortfall for DOE-EM; in response to congressional Inquiry into the future and utility of national laboratories, the Galvin report (DOE, 199Se) argued for their continued support, and the Baseline Environmental Management Report (BEMR) (DOE, 1995c) provided the first total life-cycle cost estimate for the 70-year EM program. The year 1995 was the "high-water mark" for OST fielding, as well as the beginning of reduced funding for internally funded technology development work conducted by the other, problem-owning EM offices. The reports cited above, along with budget cuts, helped shape a climate in which OST focused on users' technology needs for the near future and on accomplishing technology development work responsive to such user requests. The STCGs were established in 1994-1996, and needs statements were collected formally and used in program Darning, as a key basis for making decisions on what projects to filmy 1996-1997 Changes in Top-Leve! DOE-EM Goals In 1996, Thomas Grumbly resigned and Alvin Aim was appointed Assistant Secretary for EM. Soon after assuming this position, Alm introduced a new priority objective of reducing the mortgage of the DOE- EM program by completing the cleanup of as many DOE sites as possible within 10 years, an effort supported by Secretary Federico Pena when he became Secretary of Energy in early 1997. The strategic plan to achieve this the "Ten-Year Plan" (later called the "2006 Plan" and still later renamed the "Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure" plan), has 2006 as the completion goal for most sites, although not for the major DOE-EM sites (DOE, 199Sa). In this management approach for the EM program, cleanup jobs were cast as a set of separate projects to be managed, most to be completed within 10 years, with priority given to work that would reduce the program's budgetary requirements beyond the year 2006 (i.e., reduce the mortgage by doing work to place facilities in low-cost maintenance or remediated conditions). The increasing emphasis by OST on meeting near-term needs of cleanup activities scheduled to be completed

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24 Decision Making in the DOE-OST BOX 2.! Summary of OST Program Structure, 1994-1998 The major internal program units within OST that fund technology development projects are Focus Areas and Crosscutting Programs, which are organized around subject areas (see Table I.! for these names) reflective of DOE-EM cleanup challenges. Each program obtains input in the form of lists of technology needs from each site. Additional program units, not shown below, address university and industrial technology input and international collaborations. Site Technology Coordination Groups Each major EM site has an OST-funded STCG, which is a group comprised in some cases of DOE employees only and in other cases with representation from site contractors and interested non-DOE stakeholders. The STCG is tasked with developing a list of site technology needs based on input from the site problem owners, prioritizing them, and forwarding them to OST Focus Areas. The STCGs generally have working groups in each major subject area. More detail on the composition. function and methods of STCGs is presented in Appendix B. Focus Areas and Crosscutting Programs , , Focus Areas and Crosscutting Programs are OST program units (see Table ~ . ~ and Appendixes C and D) that perform the following tasks: compile site-specif~c technology needs into a single DOE complex-wide list; prioritize these needs to reflect complex-wide priorities across sites; generate packages of work as budget entities for which to solicit funding; solicit technology development work proposals by issuing Requests for Proposals and evaluating the responses; allocate funds to projects selected from among the proposals; monitor progress of each funded project; demonstrate, when appropriate, the technology at a DOE-EM site, to engender adoption by the user community; and involve, where appropriate, a private-sector company in development work. Each Focus Area and Crosscutting Program has developed a different process and methodology as well as different criteria (see Chapters 4-5 and Appendixes C-D for more detail on these steps). Other OST Programs Other OST programs that fund technology development work (see Appendix E) include the Industry Program and the University Program. These program managers interact with Focus Area and Crosscutting Program managers to define relevant and appropriate scopes of work for their contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. As with the Crosscutting Programs, the industry and University Programs use the Focus Areas' prioritized lists of technology needs to determine priorities and work scopes. An "iterative-colIaborative" process of communication among program managers is used to lead to refinements of the technical specifications for bids and better knowledge by Industry and University Program managers of EM-specific technical challenges that the solicitation is designed to address.

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Historical Evolution of OSTDecisior' Making 25 Headquarters Oversight Role | Headquarters oversight of these program units includes the important task of proposing to the | Office of Management and Budget and to Congress the division of the overall OST budget among them. The most direct control that headquarters-based OST managers presently exercise is in the formation of targeted budget levels for each OST program unit (with the internal review budget [TRB] planning exercise) and in the refinement of these levels in budget adjustments, such as at the annual Program Execution Guidance (PEG) review. In their overview role, OST headquarters managers are free to look for weaknesses in a proposed program on any basis (e.g., programmatic or technical). Currently the Environmental Management Advisory Board and upper-level management bodies provide some evaluations and input into headquarters decisions. During 1996-1997, Dr. Clyde Frank, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for OST, created a "Board of Directors," consisting of himself and the most senior DOE official at each of the four DOE sites hosting the Focus Areas. This five-person body made decisions on any aspect of OST's program that it though important to discuss and vote on. Issues decided by such voting included allocation of the OST budget to subordinate program units (e.g., Focus Areas and Crosscutting Programs) within OST (these allocations then became OST's budget requests for those program units, submitted as part of the federal budget process). This board was replaced by the Technology Acceleration Committee in 1997-1998, and, more recently, by the EM Integration Executive Committee. prior to 2006 is provided by C`Iinkage tables" that relate technology needs statements, OST's technology development projects, and the project number (the Project Baseline Summary, or PBS) of the EM cleanup job to which it would be applied. THE DEPLOYMENT BARRIER From the beginning, OST faced difficulty in getting its technology developments used in the field. Approximately 700 technologies have received at least partial OST support since 1989; fewer than 20 percent of them have been implemented at DOE-EM sites (GAO, 1998~. Many factors affect the value of this deployment rate. For examcle. an RD&D program heavily ~ , `- - ~ - , focused on late-stage developments would show a higher deployment rate than a program with more early-stage research-oriented projects. However, an RD&D portfolio overly concentrated on late-stage work would not be in the nation's best interest because it would fund proportionately less innovative work that is at early stages of development. Therefore, a balance must be struck between a significant number of deployments (a necessary measure) and other considerations. One possible way to provide this balance is to add other performance measures, such as estimates of the dollar value of cost and risk reductions that implementations of OST-developed technologies will achieve in the long term. In response to this perceived technology deployment "barrier," OST made changes designed to increase adoption by the user community of technologies it developed or identified. The ASTD program, formerly the Technology Development Initiative (TDI), was instituted in 1997 to address institutional and other barriers to the deployment of new technologies on DOE-EM site cleanups. Top management level initiatives, including the creation of a Technology Acceleration Committee (TAC), were also designed to address these barriers. These efforts are described in greater detail below.

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26 Decision Making in the DOE-OST Accelerated Site Technology Deployment Top-Level Efforts to Promote Deployment A July 3, 1997, DOE memorandum (Alm, 1997) from Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Alvin Alm called for the creation of an upper-level management committee, the TAC, chaired by Alvin Aim and consisting of the EM Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DASs) and five DOE field office managers. This group in effect replaced the Board of Directors that Clyde Frank had established as the most senior DOE body in which OST has representation. The TAC's chief function was to help to deploy technologies; to this end, the Aim memo called for senior managers to be accountable for achieving results. The TAC met twice (September 1997 and January 1998) to seek ways to promote the use of innovative technologies in the DOE-EM complex. As of April 199S, top-level oversight was provided by the EM Integration Executive Committee. The effectiveness of this upper-level management involvement is unlulown to this committee.

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Historical Evolution of OST Decision Making 27 CHAPTER SUMMARY This chapter's brief history of EM underscores the impact on OST of the range of broad-based priorities, the emerging importance of key management personnel in DOE in setting national priorities such as risk and mortgage reduction, and the significant shifts of direction-for cleanup efforts across the DOE complex (i.e., from a long-term to a shorter-term focus on user needs). The evolution of OST program units reflects a growing awareness of barriers to the deployment of new technologies. Part of the rationale for the reorganization of program units over the years was a recognition of the deployment issue as a performance measure and as an EM-wide internal problem. Hence, OST has attempted to facilitate deployment of new technology with more targeted program structures addressing internal barriers and incentives to change. A fundamental question remains whether the DOE-EM climate still lacks the proper incentives to encourage the use of innovative techniques. Previous NRC reports (NRC, 199Sa) and other sources (U.S. Congress, ~ 997; GAO, ~ 994; NETAC, ~ 995) addressing this point have discussed characteristics of DOE- EM site cleanup activities that may discourage such use. These include a culture that avoids taking chances, an unwillingness by site managers to change an already-established baseline remediation approach, a perception of job loss by the work force once the environmental waste cleanup problem is declared solved, and an unwillingness to jeopardize established stakeholder agreements. Such characteristics imply that the barriers to deployment are very complex and are at least in part external to EM-50. The limits of OST's authority and interactions with other program offices within DOE-EM define an institutional environment whose complexity provides an important context for OST decision making. These issues are treated in Chapter 4, following an examination of practices useii~} to other organizations in industrial, nonprofit, and/or environmental technology development settings.