TABLE S-1. Report Recommendations

1. Balancing future and present harm

When making decisions, commanders should consider long-term health effects that any action may have on their troops.

2. Philosophy of radiation protection

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should develop and clearly express an underlying philosophy for radiation protection, including justification and optimization.

3. Communicating risk

Military personnel should receive appropriate training in both radiation effects and protection in a way that neither inappropriately minimizes effects nor creates unwarranted fear.

4. Radiation dosimetry, records, and reporting

Troops expected to be in radiation areas should have individual dosimeters. DoD should also maintain exposure records, with strong privacy assurances, and make these available to the exposed individuals.

5. Follow-up

Given the tests that are currently available and their limitations, monitoring programs for cancer (whether spontaneous or radiogenic) should be limited to those testing and monitoring programs included in guidelines for the general population.

Historical Perspective and Rationale

During the Cold War era, NATO and the U.S. Army instituted policies involving radiation dose limits and control measures to be used in the event of global nuclear war. The U.S. Army also has in place a radiation safety and protection program—comparable to civilian occupational protection programs-for personnel involved in routine duties involving possible radiation exposure. In the post-Cold War setting, however, military scenarios involving radiation exposure rarely reflect global nuclear war but more often consider limited nuclear exchanges, terrorist actions with improvised nuclear devices, conventional explosives employed as a means of disseminating radioactive materials, or nuclear power plant accidents. Military operations involving such situations are not covered by either the guidelines designed for nuclear war or the programs in effect for occupational duties.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), recognized a need to plan for potential radiation exposure of military forces in Europe that might occur during the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In response, SHAPE staff, with U.S. Army participation, developed the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Directive Number 80-63, ''ACE Policy for Defensive Measures against Low Level Radiological Hazards during Military Operations" (NATO, 1996).

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