evaluation, and related activities; and $2 million (20 percent) for support for the intergovernment mechanism and related specialized committees to oversee the entire activity. The total U.S. contribution would be $10 million per year and Russian institutions would be expected to cover most of their own costs.

The proposed joint efforts could build a considerable level of trust between the scientific communities of Russia and the United States in a way that would help change the tone of diplomacy on the international security aspects of dangerous pathogens. Such efforts could have profound effects–both direct and indirect–in reducing the threats of proliferation and terrorism. Also, the program will make many contributions to combating dangerous infectious diseases, while serving as a model for global efforts when the dangers of new and reemerging diseases are being recognized more fully in many countries.

One likely effect of such a multiyear program in Russia is a structural adjustment of its research enterprise dealing with dangerous pathogens. Research projects will be increasingly concentrated at a handful of the best institutions, which would become centers of excellence. To the extent that other institutions remain viable, they should be motivated to find work outside the area of dangerous pathogens.

Thus, there is a high probability this program will help achieve DOD objectives of nonproliferation and reconfiguration of the former Soviet BW complex into a less diffuse, less uncertain, and more public health oriented establishment.