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THE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ENGINEER . . . . . Chalmers Sherwin I am very happy to be here talking about a subject which is very dear to my heart, but I am not sure many profound or new thoughts come up. I interpret the term Unpolitical responsibility' somewhat more narrowly than most people do. I think that there is a very big political problem, but I would address myself to a more limited one, which is the activity and responsibility of scientists and applied scientists or engineers- as they are sometimes called-in the public administration of re- search and development. I think that is a big job in its own right, and I would like to talk about that aspect of the public application, the public management of science. First of all, as I walked in, I heard Professor Jordan discussing something he had read. It must have been Derek Price's book, "Little Science - Big Science.' A key point that Derek Price made-as you will remember-is the remarkable growth of science and all its applications over the past 300 years. It just happens that the last 15 years has been the time of its most rapid growth, and now it is about three per cent of the gross national product. The Federal Government put $15 billion into RDTSE, as it is called, research and development and test and evaluation, and private industry and other sources put in another three or four billion dollars. So it represents about three per cent of the gross national product. Ten years ago it was only about one per cent and twenty years ago less than one-halt of one per cent. During this period it has become big business, in the real sense of the word. It has, I believe, produced a profound and irreversible change in society, and above all, in government. Up to that time it could be tolerated in its own corner of the world. The activities of the Federal Government, for example, in science and technology, before the start of the 19
Second World War were very modest-about .2 billion/yr.-less than two per cent of today's expenditure rate. The whole government, as a matter of fact, had an operat- ing budget of around $8 or $10 billion dollars a year. Thus, the current RDTSE budget of $15 billion (even after allowing for a factor of two or so in the value of the dollar), represents a management jot which is comparable in size with the whole Federal Government alone in 1950. The shift from being a little operation to a big opera- tion is what has changed its basic character. And this is the thing which is mainly my own personal concern. Now, the first reaction of the scientific and engineering profession to this changing status came during the war, when from 1940 to 1945 a very large number of first-rate scientists and engineers were drawn into the government management of science and technology, where they carried responsibility on a large scale. They left in droves in 1946. The period that followed might be called the age of advisoritis. During this period the technical people said, '"Although I do not want to be in the government, it is important to advise the government on some of these technical problems that are here." During the late 40ts technical boards were formed in all sorts of government departments and divisions just to give tech- nical advice to people in the government who were expected to make the big complicated decisions. This age has continued ever since the late 40ts and has, in my opinion, just about come to the end of the road. The time for advising the "general-purpose managers" on technical problems in the government is pretty well over. Most of the technical problems should be handled, in my opinion, by people who have adequate technical basis, actual personal knowledge, and who are willing to take responsibility. Such people still need advice, but of a very specific, selective type. For example, the Atomic Energy Commission early brought into its highest-level management structure, an advisory board, as everyone else did at the time, but it has gone far beyond this. Today the Commission has three scientific people actually on its governing board at this time, out of the five. This represents one of the highest concentrations of professional technical people with real responsibility in the government in the United States. Some other countries have such situations somewhat the same as this. In Russia, for example, a large fraction of the top government people with scientific and engineering responsibility are also professional technical men. In the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and many other countries, technical people are taking more and more responsibility in the management of government scientific enterprises. 20
The same trend is observed in our own Defense Department. There has been a growth of opportunities for responsibility for professional technical people. Thus, for example, the three assistant secretaries of the services today are people with extensive scientific or engineering education and experience. Also, in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engi- neering, of which Harold Brown is the Director, there are oppor- tunities for people with scientific and engineering education and experience to take an important responsibility in management of the Defense Department RED programs. In these positions the scientist is not an adviser to the government. He is, rather, an integral part of the decision-making machine and shares the responsibility, the excitement, and the frustrations that go along with managing an operation of this size. However, it has been most remarkable-considering the im- portance and excitement of the task-how much difficulty we have had in recruiting people to actually work in the government and to take this responsibility. Most universities have been extremely slow in encouraging their technical people to enter actual govern- ment service in positions of responsibility. However, there have been a number of people that have come out of the defense industry into Defense Department positions. This is partly because they recognize the value of understanding how the government works. After this experience they can go hack and be much more effective. But on the whole, there have been no new techniques invented to encourage people to enter the government service in scientific and engineering positions. problems of government a lone This profession, of for several hundred they have been able professional skills several public servi after on the part of Now, one profession which has made its peace with modern _ _ time ago is the legal profession. course, has been indispensable to government years, and they have found many ways in which to apply their specialized training and their in the public interest. Indeed, they have ce careers which are all honorable and sought the practicing legal profession. Private practice is still an honorable and proper func Lion of the legal profession, but they also have a very great tradition of public service. They have built up a whole series careers in public _ judiciary system. Both in the federal and the state systems we find professional legal people are accepting heavy public responsibility. service. The most remarkable organization is The government has built up a very fine tradition of excellence and honor in its court system. When people are asked to be members of the Supreme Court, or, as a matter of fact, even to become members of the Circuit Court, very few turn it down. It is regarded as a great honor. 21 of the
The reverse appears to be the case in the case of the scientific and engineering jobs that the government has to offer, even if they have a great deal of responsibility. The people who take them do so in spite of the low status of such positions in the eyes of many of their con eagues. The legal profession has not only moved into the judi- ciary, and done an outstanding professional job' but in addition, they have moved into law-making, and into just about every aspect of government management. In any case, they have found and undertaken those respon- sibilities in the government where legal knowledge is essential to the proper management of public affairs. Along with this acceptance of responsibility, they have built up a high tradition of public service. Now, it is this sort of thing which I feel is needed among scientists and engineers. They must find the proper areas where they can take responsibility and where they can, in fact, be most effective. They too must build up a tradition of public service. The scientific community must set up standards. It must evolve a system of social pressure which will encourage people to take on these occupations, and then it must judge their performance. When they have done a good job, they should be honored and en- couraged by every means available to the community-just as out- standing creativity in research is now uniquely recognized and appreciated. After all, as you well know, about 80 per cent of all the support that goes into RED is provided through the Federal Govern- ment, which is a most remarkable state of affairs. The scientific community has a very big stake in how this is handled. The problem of government management on a big scale is not easy. It is not at all obvious what needs to be done even if the most qualified scientists and engineers move into jobs of management. No one before has ever tried to run an RED business this big. You ask the scientists and engineers, "Do you want more research?" "Of course." "Do you think you need a bigger budget?"' "Of course." Or some administrator in the government says, "Do you think you need more money?" tOf course." Naturally, next year we want $100 million for this prob- lem and $200 million for that, and the budget has been going up and up and up. But how many scientists and engineers are inter- ested in what happened to the last billion dollars. It is almost impossible to find anyone seriously and systematically asking, 22
"What has happened to what was spent some 20 years ago, or ten years ago, or even five years ago?" There is a touching faith in the scientific community that more research is always needed, that money is always required. Few ask, ''What did we do with the other money? Did it pay off? Did it have any influence on effect? Above all, were there any ways in which it was administered better than others?" Now, one of the things I have started since I came to Washington is a systematic study in the Defense Department on this very problem. We are systematically examining the military systems which exist today and asking, What are the key advances that have come out of research, out of experimental developments and applied research?" Once we have identified these key advances, we then ask, "Where did they come from, how were they supported and managed, and how long ago were they started?" For example, in a typical missile, a particular advance in chemistry causes the specific impulse of the fuel to go up one per cent. This significantly increases the effectiveness of the missile by greatly increasing the pay load, which in turn can buy more range or more accuracy. We are interested in the things that have occurred since 1946. ~ am talking therefore mainly about applied research. We are going back and ask, "Where did the key ideas get started?" "Who paid for them?" "Did somebody mastermind it from Washington, or did it come from some government lab, or by giving a contract?" And so forth. "Was the money provided so that the research people at the working level had the initiative to make these inventions?"' "Who showed its feasibility?" "How was it accepted?'" "Is there a pattern of productivity in the discovery of the key advances?" We are going to ask, "What has been the payoff of the basic and applied research that has been done in the past ten to fifteen years?" Approximately $5 trillion has been spent by the Defense Department in this area, but as far as I can find out very little has been spent in asking how it happened and in what way it paid off in greater military effectiveness. I am quite certain that we will find this money has been the best investment the government has ever made in terms of military effectiveness per dollar, because we have already dis- covered that most of the systems we have today simply could not have been designed with the technology of 1946. 23
A question of particular interest is, "What does this historical analysis tell us regarding the proper balance between centralized management and de-centralized management of research and applied research?"' I personally believe that the creation of key advances is strongly correlated with "level of effort" type of support, but we shall see. Let us turn to another problem of big-scale RED manage- ment. How can the management keep its judgment? How can the managers keep alive technically? This has not been answered fully. The judicial profession has an interesting solution. It is organized so that the judges are forced to practice law with the lawyers by the very process of hearing the cases. They debate and study technical points of law as they come up. These are often critical to the decisions. The truth is that technical scientific points are also crucial in many government decisions. Whether or not a ballistic- missile defense system is practical hinges on the details of re- entry aerodynamics, the kinds of radar reflections which occur, the kinds of opitcal effects which occur, etc. How easy it is to make jammers or decoys? These are all technical matters, and they are absolutely essential to the decision. In contrast to the judges who are forced to "practice law" with the lawyers, most of the government technical decision makers do not actually argue in detail with the working scientists and engineers. All too often they listen to briefings by people who are three echelons away from the working scientist and engineer. What is needed Is more direct communication between the working scien- tists and engineers and the high-level technical decision makers. New inventions are needed. I have a personal policy of spending an average of one day a week in defense laboratories in "shirt sleeve" discussions of representative research programs with the scientists and engineers who are doing the work. This is a very delightful task. A fringe benefit of my job. I believe it can and should be widely practiced. We are going to have to make changes in our government methods of managing technical people as well as in managing sci- entific enterprises. Higher executive salaries are desperately needed. Better career planning for government technical people is also needed. These are just a few of the things that are going to have to happen, but the key thing is that the scientists and engineers are now 'big boys." They have to face up to their new responsibilities. They cannot pretend somebody else is going to run the technical affairs of the world and somebody else is going to run the technical affairs of the government, and that someone else is going to be so clever as to do what they want. They have 24
to "move in, tt wherever appropriate, to positions which control policy and then take on responsibility. I agree with Dr. Calhoun that science and engineering are the primary revolutionary forces in our society. However, we have to recognize that, like it or not, this force will be financed and be controlled to a very large degree by the Federal Government- unless, of course, we can invent a better way, of which I have not heard. Therefore, until the experienced leaders in the scientifi and engineering communities move into the Federal Government, into the places where they are needed, into the places where they are appropriate, I hope that the community will be very charitable in its criticisms of how the government supports and manages its technical affairs. 25 c
