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OCR for page 23
ITT. ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONDENT DATA
As indicated in the section on sampling methodology (Appen-
dix B) 107 residents were chosen at random from the current city
directory in an attempt to get a representative sample of the adult city
population. A separate (saturation) sample was selected in the flooded
area for the purpose of testing hypotheses which might be influenced by
proximity anchor exposure to threat. In the section which follows, our
~ ~ . r
objective Is to give a picture ot respondent characteristics and reac-
tions in the city as a whole. Therefore, the saturation sample will
not be considered at this point, since its inclusion would bias the data
geographically.
After the interviews were completed, maps of the city were
consulted and respondents in the city-wicle sample were divided into
two groups by location: (1) those who lived in the area which had been
inunciatecl during the week before circulation of the false report (N s 53),
and (2) those who lived in the non-flooded area (N = 54~. The two
groups differed significantly in certain of their re spouse s to the false
report, as well as with respect to certain other characteristics. Some
of these differences will not be discusser] here. The groups will be
considered separately except when discrepancies between them are
treated as part of the testing of the formal hypotheses in Section IV of
thi s r eport.
·_0
· , I]
A. Demographic Characteristic s of the Sample
Relatively stable characteristics of the sample will be sum-
marized here. A complete tabular presentation of these data appears
as Appendix D.
Of the 107 respondents, 43 (40. 2 per cent) were male and 64
(59. 8 per cent) female. The median age of respondents was 46. The
s ampl e wa s p r e do minantly lo we r - mi dale cla s s, by definitio n of the
interviewers. However, the socio-economic status of those respon-
dents in the non-flooded area Is generally higher than that of respon-
dents in the flooded area; 46. 3 per cent of those in the non-flooded
area are upper-middle class. This discrepancy conforms to our
expectations from what we know about neighborhoods in the community,
and testifies to the representativeness of the sample. Again, the
educational level of those in the non-flooded area is higher Man that
of residents of the flooded area.
, ~_ ~_ ,
23
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The population of Port Jervis appears to be highly stable.
Sixty-five (60. 8 per cent) respondents had lived in the city for more
than twenty-one years; no one in the sample had lived in Port Jervis
for less than a year. The mean number of people who lived in the
same household as the respondent was 2. S. Thirty-one respondents
had children under ten years of age living with ~em. The family re-
sponsibilitie s of re spondents wer e recorded because there is some
indication (5, 12} that the protection and welfare of children is an
effective predictor of the activities of adults in disaster situations.
The s e data will be examine d whe n we c on s ide r the f or mat hyp othe s e s
of the study.
B. Disaster Experience of Respondents Before Circulation of False
.. . . .
Report
.
The disaster experience of respondents is indicated in Table
opposite. A number of Port Jervis residents (15 per cent of the
sample) had been exposed to flood disaster in previous years. Many
more were directly affected by the 1955 floods; more than half the re-
spondents experienced some loss, either to themselves or to close
friends and relatives. The sample indicates that almost a quarter of
the town's adult population was evacuated at some time during the
week of the floods. Those who escaped damage in some cases served
as hosts to the people who had been driven from Weir homes by flood
water s.
Twenty respondents (18. 7 per cent) had disaster-related jobs.
Six of these worked under the direction of Civil Defense to restore the
city following the flood and 7 worked with the Fire Department. A
few of the latter were actually Volunteer Firemen, but most were
as sisting temporarily during the emergency.
C. The Situation in Port Jervis Before Dissemination of the False
Report
As indicated previously, the Wallenpaupack Dam seems to
have been a long-standing threat in the minds of at least part of the
population and rumors of dam-breaks had pervaded Me town on the
days following the flood. The rumor came as the town was digging out
from the flood and beginning to relax. Forty-five per cent of respon-
dents indicated that they had heard rumors about a dam-break during
24
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EXPERIENCE
Yes
No
TABLE I
DISASTER EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS
Percent IN s 107)
I - I n
?*
Total
P devious disaster experience
Flood experience
Other disasters
Total, previ ous disaster experience
Damage from 1955 floods
Maj or per sonal property lo s s
Major loss to friends, family
Minor lo s s, own or r elative s
Personal los s to business
Irons, nature unspecified
Total, damage from '55 floods
15.0
13.1
~ ..
28. 0 68. 2
15.9
23.4
4. 7
1.9
10.3
Be 7
1 00. 0
56. 1
42. 1
1.9
1 00. 0
Evacuated duri ng 1 95 5 floods
Host to flood evacuees
Befor e the fat s e r eport
During the false report
Precise time undetermined
Total, ho st to flood evacue e s
23~4
6.5
5~6
1~. 9
74e 8
1 e 9
1 00. 0
14. O
85e O
Oe 9
1 OOe O
1 1 1..::1 ~
* "?" means 'undetermined'' in this and later tables.
25
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that week; others had heard such rumors in years before.
respondents tract heard some discussion about the possible consequences
If the Wallenpaupack went out.
D. Spread of the False Report
-
Almostall
The percent of respondents who heard the false report and
those who evacuated are shown in Table 2. Seventy-eight respondents
almost 75 per cent, heard the false report on Saturday night before
they heard loudspeakers or other sources denying the rumor. Some
of those who did not hear the report were out of town; either they had
been evacuated, or had left for other reasons.
A third of those who heard the false report evacuated subse-
quently, while many others prepared to leave but learnedthe report
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Of the entire city sample,
was false before their plans were completed.
24. 3 per cent fled. This fact illustrates the heavy impact of the false
report; i. e., if the sample is accurate, approximately 2100 adults out
of a total population of 9, 000 fled. The official report of the Police
Chief provides an empirical check here on the representativeness of
TABLE 2
PER CENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO HEARD FALSE REPORT
AND PER CENT WHO EVACUATED
EXPOSURE TO AND REACTION
TO THE FALSE REPORT
Per Cent Total
Ye s No Total Number
~100.0 1i
75. 7 1 00. 0
66. 7 100.0 78
Heard the false report
(per cent of total sample)
Evacuated (per cent of total
sample)
Evacuated (per cent of those
who heard false report)
72. 9
24.3
33.3
107
107
26
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the sample. This report states:
". . . It is estimated that between
2, 500 and 3, 000 persons and several hundred cars took part in the
panic. 'I The addition of the number of children to our figure of 2, 1 00
brings it within the range specified by officials at the disaster scene.
Almost 90 per cent of those who evacuated were individuals
living in the area which had been flooded the week before. This fact
will be discussed at length when we consider the formal hypotheses of
the study.
We will now look more closely at the situation and activities
of the seventy-eight respondents who heard the false report on Satur-
day night.
I. Situation of respondent when he heard first threat message:
The time respondents first heard the false report is shown in Table 3
below. The false report began to circulate sometime after 10:30 on
Saturday night, and it continued to spread until after 1:00 in the morn-
ing, though most of the respondents had heard the rumor by midnight.
The median time for receipt of the first threat message was 11:30.
Note that this provides us with another empirical check of the validity
of the sample. As indicated in the description of events, the fire
TABL`E 3
TIME RESPONDENT FIRS T HEARD FALSE REP OR T
Time
Before 11 p.m....
1 1: 1 5 ..............
1 1 30 ~ e e e ~ ~ e ~ ~ e ~ e
1 1 45 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ e e
1 2 00 ~ e
1 2 1 5 ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e
After 12 1 5 ~ e ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~
Undete r mined . . ~ e ~ ~ ~ e ~ e e e
Total
P ercent
(N = 78):k
1 Be 4
10e 3
26e 9
1 Be 4
23e 1
2 ~ 6
Be 8
2~6
1 00. 0
Percentages here refer only to the group of 78 respon-
clents who heard the false report.
27
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truck dissemination of the rumor took place for a period of minutes
around 11:15 that night. Shortly after this official statement of the
thr eat, the bulk of re spondents received it.
The lo cation of r e spondent s i s shown in T able 4 below. Since
the false report circulated late in the evening, it is not surprising that
three-quarters of the respondents who heard it were at home at the
time. It may seem strange that no respondent in the sample was at
any place of entertainment such as a bar or movie when he first heard
the false report. However, we know from key interviews that in one
bar and in the only movie, the bartender and the manager, respectively,
did not transmit the message to people who were there. Respondents
activities at the time the false report was heard is indicated in Table 5
below.
TABLE 4
LOCATION OF RESPONDENT WHEN HE HEARD
FALSE REPORT
Location
-
At ho me e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ e e ~ ~ e ~ ~ e e
Friends, relative s, or neighbor s' house
On the street (walking or driving) . e e e
Working at regular job eeeeeeee.~e
Working at disaster job . eeeeea.~e
Other location. ~e ~.e.
I~ocation undeterminf`~1
Percent
(N = 78)
. .. .
75e 6
S. 1
7e 7
2~6
7. 7
Be O
1 ~ 3
1 OOe O
A large proportion of respondents were with their families
when they received the threat message. We had hoped to be able to
estimate the means of communication people use in large scale disas-
ters when they are separated from their families. The number so
separated in this case, presumably e - lained by the fact that most
28
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TABLE 5
ACTIVITY OF RESPONDENT AT TIME HE FIRST
HEARD FALSE REPORT
Activity
In bed, asleep ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o. o. e ~ e e ~ ~ ee ~ e e .e e ~ e ~ oe ~ a. ~ e ~ ~
Preparing for bed, or in bed, not asleep..ee.e...e.e..ee
Li stening to r adio or televi s ion . . . . . . . e e ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ e ~ e ~ e
Talking, interacting with other individual s . . . e e e ~ e ~ e ~ ~ e ~
Other activities e .. ~.~. ~.~.
Activities undetermined
Total
Percent
(N = 78)
_
33e 3
7. 7
24.4
1 1 e 5
2 1 ~ 8
le 3
1 00. 0
respondents were at home, was too small to allow an analysis to be
made. The location of respondents' families are indicated in Table 6
below.
TABLE 6
LOCATION OF RESPONDENT'S FAKD:LY WHEN
HE HEARD FALSE REPORT
Location
With respondent, or respondent was sure
his family was safe ..eeeeeeeas
Separated from re spondent
With means for a quick check ........
Without means for a quick check .......
Percent
(N = 78)
. . . . . . . . . . 73. 1
14.1
6.4
Undetermined . ~2.6
Total, separated from respondent 23. 1
Loc attain of r e spondent' s family undetermined . . . . . . . . . . 3.
Total, respondents who heard false report .
29
......... 1 00. 0
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Of the eighteen respondents (23. 1 per cent of total) who were
separated from their families at the time they first heard the false re-
port, 11 (61. 1 per cent) reported that they had a means for checking
quickly on the safety of their families; five (27. 8 per cent) reported no
such means. In nine of the cases (50 per cent) in which the respondent
was separated from his family, he made no attempt to communicate
with them in the perioc] which preceded his receipt of denial. In six
cases (33. 3 per cent) he mover] physically to his family, and in the re-
~aining three cases (17. 5 per cent) telephoner] his family.
2. Source and channel of the false report:
a. Exposure to sirens and other noise: As indicates] pre
viously, one major source of the rumor was a fire-truck (or possibly
more than one fire-truck) which broadcast Me rumor over its loud-
speaker and blew its siren. The siren in Matamoras, across the river,
may have been heard in Port Pelvis and perceived as a danger signal.
These and the noise, confusion, and movement in the streets Inlay have
sensitized people to the extent they were expecting bac! news before
they actually heard the false report.
Forty-two (39. 3 per cent) of the 107 respondents in the sample
stated that they heard noise or sirens (separately frosts any threat mes-
sages) on the night of the report. (See Table 7) This number probably
floes not represent the total of respondents who heard such generalized
threat mes sage s, because this question was not specifically asked in
the interview.
TABLE 7
EXP OS URE T O SIRENS AND O THER NOISE
Kind of Exposure
Siren or noise as first exposure to threat .
Siren or noise after verbal threat message
received, but before receipt of denial ..
Did not report hearing sirens or noise, but
heard verbal threat message
Did not report hearing sirens, noise, or
verbal threat message
30
Percent
(N = 78)
.... 24e 3
.......... 1 5. 0
...... 2 3. 4
1 00. 0
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There were, then, eighty-two respondents who heard sirens
anc! not s e, ve rbal thr eat me s s age s, or both. Of the s e, s evenly -eight
heard a verbal message before receiving denial. Four respondents
heard sirens or noise and did not thereafter hear a threat message.
In these cases, either the respondent did not attempt to find out the
cause of the disturbance or, when he did, was answered with a denial
me s sage rather than a threat me s sage.
b. Exposure to verbal threat messages: Seventy-eight
respondents were exposed to threat messages of this sort. Only the
first, seconc! and third messages which they received were recorded;
since only seven respondents heard even three threat messages, the
cutting point appears to be a reasonable one. A total of 106 threat
messages were heard by these respondents. From Table (3 which fol-
lows, it c an be s e en that the thr e at me s s ag e s we r e lar g ely tr an s mitte c]
through unofficial sources. The pattern of sources for all three threat
messages is quite similar. A detailed comparison of these sources
with the sources of denialmessages willbe made whenthelatter are
pre sensed.
3. Content of the false report: We know the content of ninety-
two of the 106 threat me s sage s which the respondents remembered hav-
ing received. Eighty-six of these mention that a dam had broken,
while the other six were warnings to evacuate without the specific
cause being stated. Of the messages whose content we could] determine,
45. 7 per cent included advice to evacuate, either with or without adcli-
tional information about a dam having broken. For a detailed] analysis
of the content of the threat message, see Appendix D, Table G.
A study of an evacuation of Panama City, Florida, (7) con-
clucled that more beach area residents left their homes than did town
residents because the former received more strongly worded admoni -
tions to leave. In Port Jervis, there was no increase in the tendency
to flee when the respondent was advised to do so in the threat message
he received. This may be explained by the fact that Port Jervis resi-
dents had been discussing the consequences of a dam-break for some
time before the false report gained currency. Thus the situation may
have been predefined as one which would necessitate flight, so that
advice on this issue was almost irrelevant.
Fifty-one per cent of the persons in the previously flooclec3
area who received threat messages said that the messages included
31
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TABLE 8
SOURCE AND CHANNEL OF VERBAL THREAT MESSAGES
SOURCE AND CHANNEL
Percent (N=78) Receiving
Fir st Second
Me s s age Me s s age
6.4 5.1
3.8 0.0
6.4 2.6
16. 7 7. 7
15.4 2.6
39.7 6.4
24.4 10.3
79. 5 19.2
3.8 0.0
00.0 Z6.9
_
178121 ;
Third
Me s sage
Total
Number
of
Me ss age s
.
Official Sources
Fire truck loudspeakers
Officials at communica
t~on centers
Officials away from com-
munication centers
Total, official sources
Unofficial Sour ce s
Relative s
Friends
Stranger s
Total unofficial sources
Source Undetermined
1. 3
O. O
O. O
10
3
7
1. 3
2.6
2. 6
2. 6
20
16
38
29
.
7. 7
O. O
83
3
Total, percent respondents who
heard threat messages
9. 0
Total, number respondents who
heard threat messages
7
106
32
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advice to evacuate, whereas only 32 per cent of those in the non-
flooded areas who received threat messages said that they received
advice to evacuate. This difference is not statistically significant.
(Chi-square - 1. 71; P - ~ 20> . 10~. Although the flooded population
reported receiving advice to flee most often, and also fled most often,
flight was evidently not a result of this difference in message. For
those who did evacuate, both between and within the flooded and non-
floodecl groups, the inclusion of advice to flee does not increase the
p robability of flight.
E. Reactions of Respondents to the False Report
· . . . ... .
1. Belief in the false report (See Table 9 below): Although
. .
the false report was in most cases transmitted through unofficial
channels, often by a stranger in the street, only eight (10. 3 per cent)
respondents maintained consistent disbelief; six of these eight are
from the non-flooded area of the city. Sixty-two per cent of
TABLE 9
BELIEF IN THE FALSE REPORT
Degree of Belief
At least partial belief
Complete belief after one exposure to
thre at me s s age . . e · · ~ · · · e
Complete belief after two exposures ..
Complete belief after three exposures ...
Partial belief (regardles s of number
of exposures) ............
Total, at least partial belief .
Consi stent di sbelief, r egardle s s of numbe r
of expo sure s
Percent
(N- 78)
.. 61.5
5. 1
2. 6
85. 9
Degree of belief impossible to determine
........3.~3
Total per cent hearing false report 100. 0
33
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alone in his response. (~) Flight was closely limited to small, proxi-
mal geographical areas, within both the previously flooded and the
previously non-flooded sections of town. (3) the sight of others fleeing
affected the flight behavior of respondents.
While we question the~validity of the responses to this ques-
tion for the reasons just given, we present below the statements of
respondents in the city-wide sample in part C of Table 17.
4. Flight behavior of respondents: As indicated in Table 2,
twenty-six respondents fled as a direct result of hearing the threat
messages. We wish now to examine four aspects of the behavior of
this group:
( 1 ) With whom did the re spondent flee ?
(2) How quic kly did he flee ?
~ 3) What did he take with him in flight ?
(4) Unde r what conditions did he return to Port Jervis ?
Table 18 indicates that no one of the respondents evacuated
alone. Of those who did flee, six (23. 1 per cent) attempted to assist
community members (who were not in the party fleeing with the re-
spondent) before they left.
TABLE 1 8
NATURE OF FLIGHT
Nature of Flight
-
Solitary flight . . . e ~ ~ ~ e ~ e ~ ~ e ~ ~ e e e ~ ~ e ~ ~ e e e ~ e e e ~ ~ e e
Flight with family (no attempt to assist others) . .
Flight with f amity and/ o ~ neighbor s (no attempt s
to assist others). e ~ ~ e e ~ e ee e e e e e e ~ e ~ ~ ~ e e ~ e
Flight with family and/or neighbors (after attempts
to as sist others) . e ~ ~ e e e e e e e e e e e e e e ~ e ~ e ~ e ~ e e e ~ e e e
Information not obtained. . e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e ae ~ e e ae ~ e ~ e
Total respondents fleeing
Percent
(N = 26)
Be O
e e ~ e e e e e ~57. 7
e e e e ~2 3 e 1
Be 8
40
1 00. 0
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Flight generally took place immediately after receipt of the
f fir s t warning me s s age . Twenty- one ~ 8 0. 8 p e r c ent) of tho s e who fled
left immediately after hearing the first false report. Two (7. 7 per cent
waited for a second threat message, and two waited for a third. One
respondent fled after appreciable delay, but after hearing only one
thre at me s s age .
Many Port Jervis residents had made preparation for evacua-
tion because of the generally prevailing flood conditions. In determin-
ing things people think of taking with them in flight, we made a distinc-
tion between respondents who indicated that they had made prior
preparation and those who had not.
Some of those who contemplated flight were stopped before
they left by receipt of denial; in many of these cases, respondents had
decided what they would take with them in flight. When this was so, we
recorded the things the respondents had planned to take, even though
they did not finally flee. In thirty-eight cases we were able to deter-
mine the kind of thing respondents decided to take with them in flight.
These findings are presented in Table 19 below.
TABLE 1 9
MATERIALS RESPONDENTS PLANNED TO TAKE IN FLIGHT
AND ITS RELATION TO PRIOR PREPARATION
Prior Preparation
Survival
Value
Mate rial
Percent of Respondents Taking:
_ Only
Non- survival
Value No
Mate r tat Mate rial T o tal
100. C
100. C
foot
_
Ye s, prepared
No, unprepared
,
All, prepared & unprepared
60. 0
63.6
63. 2
40. 0
9. 1
1 3. 2
41
~
Percent
N (N s 38)
5
33
. .
38
1 3. 2
86. 8_
100.0
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If we consider flight separately from other manifestations of
belief, we can draw at least one interesting comparison. Of those who
heard the threat message, approximately one-quarter (26. 9 per cent)
evacuated immediately after receipt of the first warning. The likeli-
hood of flight drops tremendously if the respondent does not flee im-
mediately after receiving the first warning. When those who had fled
heard the fir st denial me s s age, only 2 3. 1 pe r cent returned home
immediately. More than one denial message was generally necessary
to reassure the population which had fled. In the discussion which fol-
lows more detailed consideration will be given to respondents' activi-
tie s afte r denial .
F . Di s s emination of the Denial Me s s age s
_
1. Frequency: The denial message began to spread at approx
_
imately 11:40 that night. In collecting data on these messages, it wasim-
possible to get respondents to give a clear estimate of the number of
times they heard denials. Unlike the threat messages, denials were
given through mass media broadcasting at frequent intervals. Had a
respondent tuned his radio to the local station, or were fire-trucks
equipped with loudspeakers passing through his neighborhood, he might
hear a denial message every few minutes for a period of hours. Re-
spondents could give only a general idea of the number of these messages
they heard, although they could recall with some accuracy the different
sources from which they heard denials.
From the general statements of respondents, we attempted to
develop reliable categories for coding the number of messages received.
We found that it was possible only to make a few broad distinctions;
i. e., respondent heard one, a few, or many denial messages. There-
fore, mo st of the information concerning denial s was broken down c are -
fully by source and channel of transmission, making use of the accurate
responses in this area.
The minimum average number of denials heard by respondents
(before or after belief in the denial) is well over three. Denial mes-
sages are, then, far more frequent than threat messages. Most respon-
dents heard fewer than two threat mes sage s. This information is pre -
sented in Table 20 below.
42
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TABLE 20
NUMBER OF DENIALS HEARD BY RESPONDENTS
~I. .
Number of
Denials
One
2 -4
5 or ~ore....
Total
Percent (N=78)
of Respondents
1 9. 2
33. 3
47. 4
100.0
2. Source and channel of the denials:
.
TABLE 2 1
NUMBER OF SOURCES OF DENTAL AND
NUMBER OF DENIAL SOURCES BEFORE BELIEF
Number of
Denial Sources Never
2- 3~ ~~ 4-6 Believed ?
.
Number of Denial Source s 33. 3
Numb e r of Denial Sour c e s
Before Belief
44. 9
Total
Percent
(N = 78)
55. 1
37. 2
10.3
1.3 100.0
6.4 9.0 2.6 100.0'
. . .
Table 21 indicates that only 44. 9 per cent believed the denial
after hearing it from one source (and they may have heard numerous
messages from any one source), while 61. 5 per cent of respondents
believed the first threat message. (Table 9)
Sources for the denial message (Table 22) differed greatly
from threat sources (Table 8~. Of the 189 messages whose source we
can determine, 79.4 per cent were transmitted by officials, while only
18. 9 per cent of the threat messages were transmitted by officials.
43
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We had hoped to be able to compare sources which led to belief in the
threat with sources which led to belief in the denial. However, because
of the difference in the actual sources, there are insufficient data for
such a comparison.
TABLE 22
SOURCE AND CHANNEL OF DENIAL MESSAGES
Percent (N=78) Receiving
Source and Channel
Official Sources
Fire-truck loudspeaker
Lo cat r adio s tation ~ WDLC
Central official (face-to-
face contact)
Central official (telephone
c outact)
Official on the street
Total, official sources
Unofficial Sour c e s
Relative
Friend
Stranger
Total, unofficial source s
Wate r did not c ome
Undetermined
_
Total, percent respondents
who heard denials
5. 1
14.1
10.3
O. O
100 0
RO a
Fir st
Message
25. 6
1 5. 4
9. 0
Second
Message
26. 9
33.3
O. O
Third
Mes sage
24. 4
29. 5
T otal
Numbe r
of
Messages
60
61
Message
Le acing
to
Belief
1 5. 4
29. 5
1. 3
7.71. 32.69 3.8
11.53.80.012 3.8
69.265.357.8150 62.8
1. 31.36 5.1
5. 10. 015 3. 8
3.85.115 _2.6
29.510.26.436 11.5
2.61.33 11.5
1.3 :46 1 13 11 '+
66.7 ___ 91.0
Total number respondents | 78 | 63 52 | 193 ! ~
*Some respondents felt reassured only when the flood water did not come when
they expected it; a number of respondents did not feel safe until some time the
next day, although they had heard many denial messages before then.
3
8
9
~6
3
4
10.3
44
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From the preceding discussion, it is clear that we can make
no inferences from these data as to the sources which were most
effective in eliciting belief, given an equal number of exposures. Var-
iables other than frequency of exposure also contaminate these data:
(1) The fire-trucks were generally broadcasting earlier in the evening
than was the radio. Presumably, additional cues later at night, such
as the sight of other cars returning, increasing quiet in the streets,
and so forth, may have made it easier for respondents to accept denial
from source s which transmitted the me ssage later. (2) An examination
of Table 27 will show lih et, since the radio did not come on until after
midnight, it was not heard as a first source for denial as often as it
was a second source. In fact, for first and second messages, the
numerical quantity of radio reports increases as total messages cle-
crease. Since the radio report was frequently a confirmation of a pre-
vious me ssage from another source, we must allow for the pos sibility
that it was believed more often because it came as a reinforcement of
(any) other me s sage.
These same data do, however, provide us with another em-
pirical check on the validity of the obtained responses. We know from
official reports the times at which fire-trucks and radio were broaci-
casting the denial. The increase in radio messages and the decrease
in fire-truck messages as time passes is entirely consonant win the
official time reports.
3. Content of the denials: Five of the 136 denial messages
.
whose content we could determine were ambiguous in their statement.
These messages said, with some differences in wording: ''There is no
basis for the rumor at the present time; we are now checking with
officials at the Dam. " Such messages always occur as a first denial
message; this fact provides us with an additional empirical check of
the data. Presumably such reports were received between 11:30 and
11:45, the time at which we know officials were attempting to verify the
false report.
Consultation with radio announcers at the local radio station
revealer} that they made special efforts on three counts in wording their
cl enial me s s age s: ( 1 ) They avoided any mention of a dam, as suming
that partial receipt of a broadcast might contribute to the disturbance.
(2) They mentioned official sources with whom they hac3 checked the
false report. ( 3) They rotated announcer s, so that people me ght hear
45
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the voice of some announcer whom they knew and in whom they had
confidence. The specific wordings which resulted from these decisions
are reflected in Table H in Appendix D.
Twenty - s even denial me s s age s r eport an official check for
verification. Forty-seven specifically mention a dam. Twenty-five
messages tell the population to remain home or to go home.
G. Reactions to the Denial
_
1. Denial action: (See Table 23) Only six of the respondents
who had fled (23. 1 per -cent) were willing to return home immediately
TABLE 2 3
RESP ONDENTS' AC TIONS UPON REC HIP T OF DENIALS
A. Fleeing Population
Percent of
fleeing popula
tion (N=26)
Percent of
Total popula-
tion tN=78)
Returned home immediately after
he aring fir st denial
Returned after second denial
Returned after third denial or more
Returned after appreciable delay
but after only one or two denials
Information not obt ained
~ .
B. Non-fleeing Population
23.1
11.5
50.0
1 1. 5
3. 8
Percent of
non -fle eing
population(N = 52 )
-
_ 7.7
3. 8
16. 7
3.8
1. 3
- .
Percent of
Total popula
tion (N=78)
Had planned to flee but were
stopped by receipt of denial
Believed report, but had not
planned to flee
Stayed on regular or disaster job,
regardle s s of belief 1 3. 5
Never believed, so took no action 17. 3
Information not obtained 1. 9 1. 3
Can attempt was made to develop reliable categories which would indi
cate how long those who fled remained out of the city. So many respon
dents were unable to estimate this time interval that this attempt was
abandoned.
46
32. 7 21. 8
34. 6 23. 1
9. 0
11.5
OCR for page 47
after hearing one denial message. Three (11. 5 percent) waited for a
second denial mes sage; thirteen (50 per cent) clid not return until after
they had heard three or more denial messages. Three others (11. 5
per cent) returned after appreciable delay, but after having heard only
one or two denial messages. The information could not be obtained
for the other respondent who fled. Of the fifty-two respondents who
did not flee, seventeen were in the process of evacuating when they
received the denial message. Eighteen others believed the false report
but had not contemplated flight. Seven respondents stayed on their
jobs, regardless of belief.
2. Denial communication: Twenty respondents (25. 6 per cent)
communicated the denial message to others in face-to-face contact.
One fireman among the respondents helped broadcast the message over
the fire -truck loudspeaker system. No respondent used arty other
channel to communicate the message. Fifty-six respondents (71. 8 per
cent) never transmitted the denial message to others.
H. Attitudes Toward Disaster Groups
1. Civil Defense: The local Civil Defense organization was
active In t ~ ooa re ' lee worn, and also took an active part in di spelling
the effects of the false report. Of the seventy-eight respondents,
twenty -four ~ 30. 8 per cent) spontaneously expre s sed approval of the
group's disaster work. When the others were specifically asked to
comment on this question, thirty-eight more (48. 7 per cent) expressed
approval. Eleven respondents (14. 1 per cent) felt that they did not
have sufficient information to comment. This data is presented in
Table 24.
TABLE 24
A T T I T UDE T O WARD CI V! L DEF ENS E A GE NC Y
Respondent's Attitude
Percent
(N = 78)
Spontaneous approval
Spontaneous Hi s app royal
When specifically asked, approval
When specifically asked, disapproval
Cannot estimate
Undetermined by interviewer
Total respondents
47
30.8
1. 3
48. 7
1. 3
14.1
3. 8
100.0
OCR for page 48
2. Other groups: Respondents were asked to name any other
groups which they thought had done a good or bad job during the disaster
period. The relevant data is presented in Table 25. The American
Red Cross (the only outside agency) was mentioned spontaneously
twenty-nine times, and in four of these cases (13. 8 per cent) it was
with disapproval. Specific groups other than the American Red Cross
were mentioned spontaneously 148 times, and in five of these cases
(3. 4 per cent) it was with disapproval. There is some evidence in the
literature that there often is a certain amount of resistance to groups
from outside the community which move in after a disaster has occurred.
The infrequency of disapproval mitigates against any meaningful ex-
amination of thi s i s sue with the se data. Re spondents generally felt
that the local Fire Department did a good job during the disaster period;
79. 5 per cent of respondents specifically named this group, and always
with approval for its activities.
TABLE 25
ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISASTER GROUPS
Group
Police Department
Fire Department
American Red Cross
Other Groups
Unspecified Groups
I. Advice to Others
Approval
Attitude Expressed
Dis approval
14. 1 1. 3
79.5 0.0
32. 1 5. 1
59. 0 3. 8
53. 8 0. 0
_
Unmentioned
84. 6
20.5
62. 8
37. 2
46. 2
Total
Percent
(N = 78)
-
1 00. 0
1 00. 0
1 00 e O
1 00. 0
1 00. 0
Respondents gave a variety of suggestions regarding action to
be taken in case of the occurrence of further disasters of this sort.
Twelve (15. 4 per cent) respondents advised others to turn on their
radios, to check for confirmation, or wait for a siren before evacuat-
ing. This last emphasizes the threat potential the siren had for the
population. Five (16. 4 per cent) respondents advised others to check
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with officials, but specified no channel. Nine Gil. 5 per cent) advised
othe r s to "keep calm. " One r e spondent re commended evacuation.
Seven (9 per cent) were unable to give any advice. Eleven (14.1 per
cent) gave miscellaneous advice, such as "Next time tell them not to
take down the dikes to build playgrounds. . . " In twenty cases (25. 6
per cent) the interviewer failed to collect this information.
J. Summary
We estimate that approximately three-quarters of Port Jervis
residents heard the rumor the night of August 20, 1955. The impact
of this false report on the population is indicated by the fact that a
third of those who heard it evacuated subsequently. Respondents also
heard siren signals, both from the fire-truck and from a siren blowing
in Matamoras. Since the siren was perceived by marry as the official
signal of impending disaster, it added credibility to the verbal report.
Almost 90 per cent of the respondents who actually fleet Port Jervis
were those who lived in the area of town which had been inundated dur-
~ng the flood.
In addition to those who fled, another 23 per cent of respon-
dents who heard the false report were preparing for flight when they
were stopped by receipt of the denial message. An analysis of the
activities of those who fled shows us that they generally left immediately
after receiving the first threat message. Evidently, people who delayed
evacuation for any length of time were likely to receive disconfirmation
in time to keep them at home.
Thirty-two per cent of respondents who heard the report
made some attempt to verify it before flight. A large number of resi-
dents maintained some level of community responsibility during the
threat period, even in those cases where they believed the false report.
Some attempted to rouse neighbor s and friends, to seek verification
for others as well as themselves, and to keep the community relatively
calm. Some of these same people later fled.
No one in Me sample fled alone. Families and neighbors
evacuated together, usually after packing cars with food, blankets and
other survival material. It is significant, however, that about a third
of those who fled did not take any possessions at all when then evacua-
ted. This group may have felt that they had no time to gather things
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together, that the period of inundation would be too short to necessi-
tate their taking anything along, or they may have been too agitated to
think of collecting their belongings.
Although most of the people who fled had left after hearing
one threat message, less than a quarter were content to return to Port
Jervis after hearing one denial. Half waited until they heard three or
more denial messages. Of the total respondent population, 61. 5 per
cent believed the first threat message, while 44. 9 per cent believed
the first denial message to which they were exposed.
This fact is perhaps surprising when we consider the sources
of threat and denial messages. Approximately 20 per cent of the threat
messages were transmitted by officials, while almost 80 per cent of
the denials were transmitted by officials. While threat messages were
usually communicated in face-to-face contact with friends, family and
strangers, the denial messages were broadcast through mass media
such as loudspeaker systems and the local radio station.
50
Representative terms from entire chapter:
threat messages
