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OCR for page 117
CHAPTER VIII
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CONTROL
OF RESEARCH
In the preparation of the preceding chapters the writer has noted
some phases of the conduct of research which do not directly relate
to the points covered in those chapters, but which are pertinent to the
general purpose in view. Before attempting to define desirable limits
of central financial control of scientific endeavor within state govern-
ments, a brief summary of these points will therefore be undertaken.
It appears very clearly that the states which have been studied
have no clearly defined policy with regard to the extent to which scien-
tific investigation shall be undertaken nor with regard to the condi-
tions under which it shall be prosecuted. There is no segregation of
funds for scientific research, no accounting in terms of research
projects under way, no summary of results achieved, no correlation
of work or workers, no plan for future proj ects and no eRective
machinery for making such plans on a comprehensive scale. The
state governments drift along as one incident or another happens to
bring about the establishment or the abandonment of scientific work.
Many scientific divisions, of course, have carefully matured plans,
but the state as a whole has no plan. The state government is not
conceived as a research agency, and plans in terms of administrative
responsibilities to which scientific investigation is secondary. Granting
that the administrative responsibilities are necessarily of primary,
importance, it may still be urged that the coordination and planning
of scientific investigation is worth while in order to further a function
which, if secondary, is nevertheless of great importance.
It has been impressed on the writer many times that success in
obtaining adequate financial support for scientific work depends far
less upon the budget methods employed than upon the personality of
the scientist, or department head representing the scientist, as that per-
sonality is revealed to the appropriations committee of the legislature.
This committee contains usually the leaders of the legislative body,
who are men of considerable experience in the actual operation of
government and who know pretty accurately how-far it is wise or
feasible to go in appropriating money. In most cases, perhaps, they
are not very clear as to the value or importance of specific pieces of
research; nor can it be said that they are usually competent to evaluate
the professional standing of an histologist, a bacteriologist, or a
psychiatrist. :Finding themselves not competent to make decisions on
the technical importance of the scientific projects which are proposed
~7
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118 FINANCIAL CONTROL OF RESEARCH
to be financed, they necessarily fall back on their evaluation of the
scientist as a man. Hence the personality of the scientist, his manner
before a committee, his attitude toward the committee, his under-
standing of the responsibilities of the committee, his personal relations
with committeemen, the way in which and the extent to which he
presses his requests come to count for more than the scientific import-
ance of his projects. This fact becomes of less importance, perhaps,
when the requests have been reviewed by a budget official and have
received his approval and when they secure his support before the
... . . . .. .
~ ,
committee; but even in that case, the personality of the scientist is
important in determining the amount of the appropriation.
The writer has come to the opinion that the scientists are neglecting
an important practical duty in failing to secure greater publicity for
the scientific work which they are carrying on. In the long run j the
state will support research to the extent that the voters understand its
importance; more narrowly, to the extent that legislators, governors,
and men prominent in public life understand its importance. There
is now more than ever a very heavy pressure on the state for expendi-
tures which cannot be avoided; and on the other hand, a very insistent
demand for a reduction in taxes. Scientific endeavor is not unlikely
to be caught between the upper and nether millstone, unless it can
satisfy the political authorities of the state of the value of its work.
This need not be done with an undesirable display of scientific virtues
nor in any spirit of arrogance, but rather by an honest presentation
of the fundamental importance of science in the work of government
and by making clear the increasing necessity for calling on science
in ever greater measure to perform the tasks of the state. This is
a duty which perhaps falls on other agencies and groups than the
scientists themselves engaged in work for the state; but that it is a
duty of first rate importance there can scarcely be doubt.
Recent methods of handling budgets and making appropriations
have raised the problem of elasticity in departmental and division
funds. A highly segregated budget tends to destroy the discretion of
the administrative officer in conducting his department, so that in
order to permit a reasonable elasticity other devices must be employed.
In some states the practice is to allow deficiencies to be incurred to be
met by the succeeding legislature. The experience of Pennsylvania
is a striking illustration of the financial difficulties that are likely to
ensue. In other states transfers are allowed from one item to another,
with varying degrees of central supervision. In other states, the
departments are granted contingency funds with full discretion to use
them for-any proper purpose. Finally the practice has developed of
building up either departmental contingency funds or a single fund at
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IN STATE GOVERNMENTS
119
the disposal of the governor or of some central financial agency. The
purpose of itemization is to secure a greater degree of legislative
control and to ensure proper use of funds. While this purpose is
attained, the resulting harm from a non-adjustable appropriation
brings about evils which require relief by some one of the methods
here described. Examination of a considerable number of states seems
to indicate a tendency to cure the evil not by freeing the hands of
the divisions but by setting up a general contingent fund at the dis-
posal of the chief- executive. On grounds of easy adjustment of funds
a single large contingency fund is preferable. On grounds of the
power which control of such funds vests in chief executives some fear
has been expressed. It is an open question for which no answer has
been found in the course of this study as to what extent sympa-
thetic consideration has been given to requests for contingent allot-
ments from the funds of the chief executive, as compared with requests
for other than scientific purposes.
varies from bureau to bureau, depending in part upon the amount,
and in part upon the character, of expenditures. Large institutions
dealing with changing problems experience great need for contingent
funds; and likewise the character of research is such that a good claim
for such freedom can be sustained. In the interests of economy, how-
ever, the writer sees no objection to providing contingent funds for
the scientific bureaus by means of a departmental fund to which it
will have access on the same terms as do other bureaus.
The need for a contingent fund
In the matter of travel allowances to attend conventions beyond the
borders of a state, many of our commonwealths have a rather provin-
cial attitude. From the point of view of attainment of scientific
achievement the opportunity to attend scientific conferences of various
sorts is, of course, indispensable. If a conference is held within the
state, the views of the division or department as to attendance prevail.
If the conference is in another state, however, the consent of the
governor or the finance department is commonly required. So far as
could be ascertained, no serious trouble has arisen on this point; but
it is undoubtedly true that many requests for travel allowance are not
made because a refusal is anticipated. Moreover, this sort of a.
decision is not one which the chief executive of any state should be
called upon to make.45 The sensible solution of the question would
seem to be to allow the finance officer to fix the maximum amount
allowed for travel, if it is not fixed in the appropriation act, and to
allow the head of the division tat emnln~r the. film corned linen n~ he
thinks most desirable.
It may be noted in passing that in the case
46 See the article by Governor A. E. Smith, How We Ruin Our Governors, in
National Municipal Review, Vol. X, p. 277.
.. . . .
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120
FINANCIAL CONTROL OF RESEARCH
of universities with which the writer is familiar there is a control on
travel for university purposes, and in most cases universities do not
undertake to pay the expenses of their faculties for attending scien-
tific or professional meetings, unless, of course, they specifically
represent the university.
The writer has been impressed with the dangers inherent in the lack
of continuity of state government. This danger increases pari passe
with the integration of responsibility, and is the more serious where
successive elections swing in favor of one party and then another.
These tides of political success and failure sweep into the key offices of
government, men who many times are inexperienced in the conduct
of public affairs and who, once they get in touch with the work of the
divisions over which- they preside, are too commonly replaced by
others equally inexperienced. Thee present experiment in integrated
and unified control of state administration cannot be productive of
its expected results unless by law or by tradition the element of con-
tinuity, which was much more characteristic of the old regime, can
be retained. Scientific work above all requires persistence, steadiness,
regular financial support, continuity in personnel, freedom from
extraneous influences; all of which are threatened by an electoral and
administrative system which may change the overhead control every
two years.
On the other hand, upon broad grounds of public policy the integra-
tion of authority and the co-existence of long terms of office may
necessitate the development of more adequate means of control, which
in turn would open the way to the possibility of frequent changes.
The solution of this paradox seems to come back to a constantly
increasing care in the original selection of important public officials.
The new regime in state government raises a problem in an acute
form for every department, but especially perhaps for the departments
engaged in professional, technical or scientific work. This problem is
to secure and retain as financial supervisor a man of high ability,
firmness combined with tact, and a vision of the wide range of state
functions which will enable him to approach each department with
understanding and a desire to cooperate with their plans so far as the
general financial policy of the state may permit. In the long run this
may prove to be the turning point of the whole plan. If the appointees
are primarily politicians, concerned with jobs and elections, or pri-
marily business men, intent upon a narrowly conceived program of
tax reduction, or primarily bureaucrats desiring to wield power, it is
certain that the advantages which may arise from central financial
supervision will be largely nullified. It is not easy to see from what
source the financial supervisors of the next decade are to be drawn.
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IN STATE GOVERNMENTS
121
They might properly comprise a compact professional group like the
city managers, and like them develop an esprit de corps which would
safeguard the system. They are more likely in the near future to be
what they have been in the recent past, men of long experience in the
,' , , _ ~
auditing, accounting, or other services of the state, who are drafted
for the new work because of their wide familiarity with the state
administration. They have not commonly been men of broad training,
although among their number have been men of high capacity. Their
task is one of enormous difficulty, almost certain to stir up disagree-
ments and ill-feeling at best; but the opportunity to render service
to the state is equally great. From the point of- view of the scientific
agencies, the danger is that even modest research programs may be
squeezed out by an administrative official who is intent upon saving by
elimination, rather than by ensuring value received for money spent.
If the budget officials can be secured with an open mind on research
programs and a fair understanding of the special conditions which
research requires. this problem will disappear.
_ _ 1, . . . ... . .
_ . , · . . ~ . · ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1
It has been soul that ~t a central noaro unctertaKes to censor one
printing of scientific manuscripts, it ought to assume responsibility
for selecting the research projects out of which the manuscripts arise.
This responsibility obviously will not be assumed by supervising
officials interested in finance; but the remark suggests that those who
are interested in safeguarding the status of science in government
might properly undertake to devise a scientific supervision of the
choice of projects for consideration. An advisory board drawn from
the field covered by a government laboratory, composed - of men
technically qualified and appointed for long terms of years, might be
able not only to suggest lines of inquiry but might prove to be ~
powerful buffer between~the laboratory and administrative officials
inclined to push their powers to the limit. The writer believes that
too little use has been made of the power which resides in organized
bodies of scientists, not only to protect but to encourage the conduct
of research in government.
-
State universities understand the value
of the support of an organized alumni body; and there is equal expecta-
tion that the support of organized scientists would mean as much to
state scientific agencies. There is a profound respect for scientific
achievement in the mind of the intelligent men who for the most part
make up our legislative bodies; and this respect should be capitalized
to ensure a proper degree of freedom for the state institution engaged
in scientific activity. The Illinois Board of Natural Resources and
Conservation illustrates to a certain degree the type of organization
the writer has in mind, although it does not serve as a means for
building up the interest and activity of organized scientific groups.
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122
FINANCIAL CONTROL OF RESEARCH
:For this wider purpose a comprehensive state scientific council com-
posed of affiliated scientific and engineering societies may be sug-
gested. The functions of the council might properly consist in support-
ing the scientific interests of the state government as other organiza-
tions stand back of the special activities in which they are interested.
Such support would be useful at the time when budgets were under
consideration, as the council could send representatives to explain and
defend the requests made for scientific investigation. It would be
useful in linking up government research with the great body of
organized scientists from among whom research workers are obtained.
Such a council could make a very effective opposition to forms of
central financial control which it felt to be harmful. It could guar-
antee the continued preservation of scientific freedom from political
interference. :Fundamentally it could educate people and public
officials to a more complete understanding of the conditions under
which research is most eDectively prosecuted.
The writer found no evidence of hostility toward research expendi-
tures either on the part of administrative officials or legislative mem-
bers. In some cases research has rather definite promise of economic
results the fruits of which are gathered by powerful classes in the
community. Thus the various phases of agricultural investigation
mean greater returns to the farming interests, which dominate the
legislatures of the mid-western states. In other cases there is no
immediate economic promise, but the hope of ultimate financial
returns, as in the search for mineral resources carried on by geological
surveys.
No exact methods of measuring the relative success or failure of
systems of financial control in relation to the conduct of scientific
investigation present themselves. Some evidence can be secured by
study of the financial history of institutions and agencies, and by
comparison of one period with another; certain conclusions can be
reached by conference with the men most directly concerned, but
there is no method of inquiry which will segregate a method of finan-
cial supervision and measure its influence alone.
Personalities,
inherited traditions, physical circumstances, the views of legislators,
social inertia, all combine to produce a result in which the system of
financial control is only one of the variables. The present methods of
control in turn have been in operation for a relatively short period,
and it is perhaps early to attempt to state any conclusions. We can
watch an evolution, and gather evidence which will help to formulate
ultimately the conditions under which scientific enterprise and
the necessities of adequate control of public expenditures can be
harmonized.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
scientific work
