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OCR for page 126
6
Computing Technology in the Soviet Union
and Other CMEA Countries
Because computing plays many roles enhancing productivity,
accelerating scientific and technical progress, and even providing
entertainment there is no other technological area in which the
gap between Eastern Europe and the West is so pronounced. This
chapter provides an overview of the Soviet computing industry, a
comprehensive review of the status of major computing technologies
in the Soviet Union, and an assessment of the impact of Gorbachev's
reforms on the future of Soviet computing. The scope of the chapter
is limited in several important ways. First, it does not try to pin-
point the state of the art of Soviet military computing. The chapter
is based solely on unclassified sources of information that cannot
support such a review. However, the chapter does show the pa-
rameters within which the Soviet military largely works and reveals
that it has far less to work with than its counterpart in the United
States. In addition, the limited ability of the Soviets to deploy com-
puters throughout their economy influences the general ability of the
economy to support the military.
Second, the discussion covers mainly the Soviet Union. In some
areas, the East European countries are doing better than the Soviet
Union, but in general the Soviet state of the art reflects the state of
the art in Eastern Europe as a whole. Furthermore, the committee
could not investigate Al countries that might be candidates for export
control regulations, including the People's Republic of China; but
126
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COMP UTING TE CHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTR IES
127
such information about other countries has been included as could
be provided, within the committee's limitations.
Third, the emphasis here is more on what the Soviets have
than on their potential breakthrough technologies. This approach is
necessary to establish a baseline for understanding Soviet computer
technologies across the board, and because specific information about
potential Soviet developments and breakthrough technologies is dif-
ficult to obtain. Potential breakthroughs are covered more generally
in the final section of the chapter, which provides an extensive dis-
cussion of the reforms being initiated by the Gorbachev regime. The
success of the reforms will greatly affect the ability of the Soviet
computer industry to make substantial progress. The implications of
the reforms for export control are also considered.
THE SOVIET COMPUTING INDUSTRY
The basic division of labor in the Soviet computing industry
was established in the early years of the 1960s. The principal high-
level organizations in the industry are listed in Table 6.1, where
their names and acronyms are given along with a synopsis of their
functions. Unless otherwise noted, the organizations listed in the
table were formed before or at the time of the 1965 reorganization of
the economy into a centralized ministry system. With the exception
of the State Committee on Computing and Tnformatics (GKVTI),
which took over a number of high-level functions in 1986, and the
Academy of Science's Department on Informatics, Computing, and
Automation (OlVTA), which was formed three years earlier, the
division of labor has remained! fairly stable (Gusev, 1983~. However,
there has been a blurring of the boundaries as the three major
computing ministries bring out products that overlap (Kovalenko,
1987b).
Like the rest of the Soviet economy, the Soviet computer industry
has been run from above on the basis of plan targets formulated by
the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In the computer industry
the position of the ministries in the planning process is stronger than
in many other industries; some planning functions normally under
Gosplan were transferred to GKVTI in 1986. However, GKVTT did
not receive corresponding financial levers over the ministries, and so
during the period from 1986 to 1988 there was even less centralized
coordination of the main computer ministries than before (Tvakhnov,
1988~.
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128
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
TABLE 6.1 Principal High-Level Organizations in the Soviet Computing Industry
Level Organization
Functions
Highest Military-Industrial
Commission (VPK)
State
Ministry
Academy
of
Sciences
Planning Committee
(G OSPLAN)
Material-Technical
Supply (GOSSNAB)
Computing and
Informatice (GKVTI)
Science and
Technology (GKNT)
Oversees entire military-industrial
complex, including ministries
designated herein by footnote
Until 1986, carried out all
centralized planning with respect
to computing
Allocates most resources according
to plans developed by GOSPLAN
Formed in 1986, oversees most
of computing industry but in a
weaker form than GOSPLAN did
Follows foreign developments in
computing, makes recommendations
for R&D programs
Develops and approves standards
Standards
(GOSSTANDART)
Radio Industry
(Minradioprom) a
Instrument Building,
Means of Automation
and Control Systems
(Minpribor)
Electronics Industry
(Minelektronprom~a
Means of Communication
(Minpromevyazi) a
Electrical Equipment
Industry (Minelek-
trotekhprom)
Department on Formed in 1984; highest Academy of
Informatice Computing, Sciences body that deals with
and Automation computing; oversees considerable
(OIVTA) amount of basic research
Produces mainframes, some micros,
and systems software
Produces minicomputers, control
systems, systems and applications
software, and some microcomputers
Produces chips and other components,
and some microcomputers
Formed in 1974; produces devices for
telecommunications infrastructure
Makes motors, some microprocessors,
and some telecommunications equipment
aMilitary-Industrial Commission oversees operations.
The Soviet hardware production is divided among three main
ministries, with other ministries playing supporting roles:
The Ministry of the Radio Industry (Minradioprom) han-
dles the production of the Unified System (ES) mainframes and has
recently been branching out to build IBM-PC-compatible personal
computers. It will also build one of the two standard microcomputers
for the school computer literacy drive.
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COMPUTING TECHNOL OGY IN CMEA COUNTRIES
129
~ The Ministry of Instrument Building, the Means of Automa-
tion, and Control Systems (Minpribor) builds minicomputers of the
Small System (SM) designation. It also builds microcomputers and
is in charge of a whole series of office machines that range from
calculators to accounting machines.
~ The Ministry of the Electronics Industry (Minelektronprom)
produces microelectronic components and several lines of micropro-
cessors and microcomputers, most of which have the brand name
Elektronika.
~ A number of other ministries produce essential products such
as punch cards, air conditioners, and coatings for magnetic media.
As many as 28 ministries are involved in computer production or
supply of materials and components.
Table 6.2 presents a representative list of the major hardware
production facilities in the USSR. It shows graphically that infor-
mation about plants in the military-industrial complex is harder to
obtain thaninformation about Minpribor plants. Thelist is certainly
incomplete and does not include most production facilities for pe-
ripherals and auxiliary products such as floppy diskettes. There are
at least three plants that produce floppy diskettes, and Minelektron-
prom is said to be refurbishing seven microelectronics plants.
In the early days of Soviet computing, the USSR Academy of
Sciences played a prominent role in hardware development. During
the late 1960s the industrial ministries took the lead in computer
development as the functional duplication of Western architectures
took precedence over all other programs. Most hardware-related re-
search and development is now performed within institutes attached
to the respective computing ministries. The USSR Academy of Sci-
ences lacks equipment and experimental facilities to do more than a
limited amount of hardware research. Higher educational institutions
in general do far less basic or applied research than their Western
counterparts.
As in the Western industrialized nations, the Soviet software in-
ctustry is large and spread out over a great diversity of organizations.
Most ministries have designated at least one "lead" institute that
oversees computerization in its branch and works with Minpribor.
Some branches, such as the Ministry of the Chemicals Industry, have
a large number of software development institutes scattered across
the country.
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130
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
TABLE 6.2 A Sample of Major Hardware Producers in the Soviet Union
Plant
Subordination
Elka Plant
Leningrad Svetlana
Association
Pavlovskiy Posad Plant
"Eksiton"
Voronezh Elektronika
Association
Zelenograd Complex
Kiev Elektronmash
Production Association
imeni V. I. Lenin
Kiev Plant of Computers
and Electronic Control
Machines (VUM)
Kishinev Calculating
Machine Plant
Kursk Calculating
Machines Plant
Leningrad Electrical
Machines Plant
Livny Experimental
Factory of Computer Graphics
Moscow Elektronmash
Scientific Production
Association
Orel' Computer Machines
Plant
Ryazan' Order of Lenin
Factory of Calculating-
Analytical Machinery
Severodonetsk Scientific
Production Association
Impuls' imeni XXV s"ye~da KPSS
Smolensk Calculating
Machine Factory
Taurage Calculating
Machine Assemblies Plant
Tbilisi Control Computer
Works
Vil'nyus Factory of
Computers imeni Lenina
Vil'nyus Sigma
Association
Vinnitsa Plant "Terminal"
Kazan' Computer Plant
Minsk Computer
Technology Production
Corporation
Moscow Calculating
Machines Plant (SAM)
Moscow Radio Plant
Penza Computer Works
Yerevan Elektron Plant
Minelektronprom
Minelektronprom
Minelektronprom
Minelektronprom
Minelektronprom
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minpribor
Minradioprom
Minradioprom
Minradioprom
Minradioprom
Minradioprom
Minradioprom
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COMP UTING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
131
Minpribor runs the Tsentroprogrammsistem software house and
institutes that are part of the Soyuzsistemprom production associ-
ation. These institutes are the backbone of the Soviet applications
software industry. They are software specialized and generally have
a stock of standard software that they use in the systems that they
develop. These institutes farm out parts of systems (e.g., docu-
mentation) to design bureaus, and it is not uncommon for three or
four different organizations to work on one system. Inside enterprises
there are departments for software development where maintenance
of management information systems (M1:S) principally takes place.
The USSR Academy of Sciences does a large amount of its re-
search in basic software areas and plays a lesser role in the devel-
opment of applications software. Related organizations include: the
Department for Informatics, Computer Technology, and Automation;
the Interbranch Scientific Technical Complex for Personal Comput-
ers; various institutes of cybernetics; various institutes for economic
management; various important scientific institutes (e.g., the Physics
Institute imeni Lebedev); and major republic computer centers (e.g.,
Novosibirsk). These institutions develop applications for their own
use and play an important part in defining the theory of how comput-
ers should be applied. They do not have a main mission of developing
software for customers.
In the realm of networking and databases, a few major players
stand out. The AD-Union Scientific Research Institute of Applied
Automated Systems is in charge of links with Western networks and
runs the Moscow portion of the network for the USSR Academy of
Sciences. The Institute of Electronic Computer Technology in Riga
develops the software for this system and has a large experimental
computer network. The Scientific Research Center for Electronic
Computer Technology in Moscow develops networking systems soft-
ware, such as the Soviet equivalent of SNA. The All-Union Scientific
Research Institute of Problems of the Organization of Management
has been working on the network needed] to implement the nation-
wide system for economic information (OGAS). Many of the other
institutions that play a major role in networking are part of the
USSR Academy of Sciences and are noteworthy because of the LANs
they have built. The community of people involved in networking is
less visible than it is in other computing areas.
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132
GL OBA L TRENDS IN COMP UTER TE CHNOL O G Y
BASE COMPUTING TECHNOLOGIES
Component Technologies, Microelectronics, and Manufacturing
Of all the Soviet computing technologies, the least information is
available about component technologies. Some results of theoretical
research are available, but it is difficult to determine what is being
developed and what is in production on the basis of this literature.
Two approaches to fining in the gaps are to work from the top
down and from the bottom up. The first depends on high-level
statements by Soviet officials that give an overall picture of the Soviet
microelectronics scene, and the second pieces together occasional
references to devices in a large body of literature.
The most general assessment of Soviet microelectronics comes
from the Soviets themselves. According to Yevgenly Velikhov (1987),
the vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the chair-
man of its Department for Informatics, Computing, and Automation,
. . . in both logical design and "memory" the most fundamental
work we lag by two generations. At present, we have a dearth
of 64K memory media while abroad, they are beginning to sell
megabyte media tchips] more than ten times cheaper.
Velikhov has acted as a personal adviser to Gorbachev and is clearly
in a position to make such statements. More information is provided
by an unusually candid round-table analysis of the Soviet comput-
ing industry, in which Velikhov and other high-ranking computer
ministry officials, including the ministers themselves, participated.
The leading firms have learned to place five ~layers] on 2 1/2-mm
printed circuit boards, while we cannot place more than two in
the same space. They are Serially-producing 36-layer wafers,
whereas we call 20-layer wafers an achievement. (Kovalenko,
1987b)
Furthermore, the number of areas in which the Soviets lag behind
the Western state of the art is said to be in the dozens. Table
6.3 shows the results of these lags in the production of selected
microprocessors and chip sets. The Soviets have actively pursued
a strategy of making their own functional duplications of selected
Western chip sets. Unlike reverse engineering, which implies that the
"reverse engineer" has learned to make exact copies of the device,
functional duplication is a weaker form of copying where the end
product will function in the same manner as the original, even though
it was not built in exactly the same way. The lag between the time
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COMP UTING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
TABLE 6.S Selected Western and So~riet/East German Chip Comparison
Western Chip
Approximate
Year of
So~riet/East German Equivalent
Approximate
Year of
Name Appearance Name Appearance
Intel 4004 1971-1972 U 808 (GDR) 1978
Intel 8008
Intel 8080 1973-1974 K 580 1978-1979
Intel 300 1974 K 589 1978-1979
Chip used in 1975 K 581 1978-1979
LSI-11
AM 2900 series 1975 K 1804 1982-1983
Zilog ZB0 1976-1977 U 800 (GDR) 1980
Intel 8748
Zilog Z8000 1978-1979 U 8000 (GDR) 1983-1984
Intel 8086/88 1978-1979 K 1810 1983-1984
Intel 80286 1982-1983 No equivalent
yet seen
Intel 80386 1985-1986 No equivalent
yet seen
SOURCES: Stapleton, 1988; Stapleton et al., 1985.
133
that the original Western chip appeared and the time the Soviets
were able to produce a functional duplication has consistently been
about five years. One knowledgeable Soviet thinks that it would take
at least three years to set up production of Intel 80386-like chips in
the USSR, and that by the time production actually started, they
would be obsolete.
In general, silicon processing for integrated circuits is the pre-
dominant microelectronics process. The Soviets grow their own sil-
icon ingots and have developed their own equipment (with the help
of East Germany) for processing the silicon and for manufacturing
integrated circuits. The capabilities in silicon ICs are roughly at
the 3-micron level versus the routine use of the 1.2- to 1.5-micron
level in the United States. In the United States the cutting edge of
research is in submicron feature sizes. In the Eastern bloc countries,
experimental production at roughly the 1-micron level has begun at
the East German Karl Zeiss enterprise.
The bottom-up approach of putting together many references to
individual devices confirms the statements of Velikhov and others.
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134
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
TABLE 6.4 Partial Inventory of East European Memory Devices
Western
Chip Equivalent Technology Function Size
K 565 RU 1A I 2107 B NMOS DRAM 4096 x 1 bits
K 565 RU1B 8 kbits
K 565 RU2 S RAM 4 kbits
K 565 RU 2A I 2102 A NMOS SRAM 1024 x 1 bits
K 565 RU 3A MK 4116-4 NMOS DRAM 16,384 x 1 bits
K 573 RF 1 I 2708 NMOS EPROM 1024 x 8 bits
K 573 RF 2 I 2716 NMOS EPROM 2048x 8 bits
KM 537 RU 1 HM 6508 CMOS RAM 1024 x 1 bits
K 555 VZhl
K 556 RT 5 I 3604 TTL PROM 512 x 8 bits
K 1801 RYe 1-00 NMOS ROM 4096 x 16 bits
U 214
U 224
U 2316D NMOS PROM 2048 x 8 bits
NOTE: U series are East German; others are Soviet.
SOURCES: Konopel'ko and Losev, 1986; Stepano`', 1983; Sypchuk et al., 1983.
Table 6.4 lists a number of East European memory devices ranging
in size from about 1 kbit to 64 kbits.
In 1985 the Soviets reported a 2-Mbit chip from the Donetsk
PhysicaJ-Technical Institute. In late 1987 this was the largest re-
portect Soviet chip, but it has not been demonstrated. Based on a
lag of about three or four years before laboratory devices show up
in the West, this 2-Mbit device would be comparable to Western
developments at the time. However, since there is no further infor-
mation about it, it may have remained in the laboratory because
it is hard to believe that the Soviets would not be publicizing this
chip if they were about ready to begin commercial production (Trud,
1985~. Devices with 4-Mbit capacity are now under development in
the West.
More recent chips that have been demonstrated have consid-
erably smaller capacities. At the 1988 Leipzig Spring Fair, Karl
Zeiss demonstrated a number of IC memory devices, including 64-
kbit CMOS static RAMs, 4-kbit CMOS fast static RAMs, 256-kbit
CMOS dynamic RAMs, 16-kbit Static RAMs, and 64-kbit dynamic
RAMs. Memory chips that can store 1 Mbit are in the development
stage. These devices probably reflect the state of the art for memory
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COMP UTING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
135
devices in Eastern Europe. It was asserted that series production
of 256-kbit chips began in 1987 and that 40,000 had been produced
by Spring 1988. It was also stated at the Fair that 4 million 64-kbit
RAM chips had been produced in Dresden, but no independent con-
firmation of these figures is available. Based on the table and other
reports, it appears that the 64-kbit memory devices are the upper
bound of what is practically available now. The memory chips in
predominant use in Soviet computers probably remain the K 565
series.
Velikhov and the round table pointed to a number of causes
for the lag. First, the necessary design technology is not available.
Velikhov (1987) says, "But given that we have little equipment, we
are unable to design new generations of TCs." Designers have to
"raise their hands in helplessness" because they cannot get aD the
necessary pieces to fit together. The absence of supercomputers and
powerful workstations for designers certainly plays a role here. In
addition, engineers are subjected to a host of regulations, and the
need to get approval at every stage of the process slows things down
greatly (McHenry, 1987a).
Second, there is a "critical inadequacy" of IC production equip-
ment. Once again, Velikhov (1987) states:
The capabilities of the organizations that design and manufacture
the required technical equipment are not up to the task of the
accelerated development of our microelectronics or the necessary
rates of modernization.
Velikhov asserts that the USSR production is only about 10
percent of the volume of IC production equipment in the West. In
recent years the Soviets and East Germans have been more open
about showing their semiconductor production equipment to the
world. Much was displayed recently at the 1988 Leipzig Spring Fair.i
The Soviets showed operational wafer transfer units, and automatic
chip, ballL-bond, en cl ultrasonic bonders. An align and expose stepper
was on display but not in operation. Large photographs of production
lines using this equipment were shown, and Soviet engineers claimed
that such equipment had been available for several years.
An even bigger display was put on by Karl Zeiss (GDR) that
showed assembly equipment, such as wafer prober, chip-bonder,
1 See Chapter 3 for an overview of the venous steps in the semiconductor manu-
facturing process.
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136
GL OBAL TRENDS IN COMP UTER TECHNOL OG Y
reactive ion etcher, sputterer, computer-controDed equipment for
analysis of defects, align and expose stepper, and electron-beam
photolithographic equipment. Zeiss engineers stated that this was
third-generation equipment and that they had shipped more than
60 such systems of ah generations to other CMEA users. They have
shipped four or five electron-beam systems. They also stated that
about 80 percent of the IC manufacturing equipment made by Zeiss
is shipped to other CMEA countries, mainly to the USSR.
Zeiss's promotional package at the Fair showed equipment cov-
ering the entire range of VEST production, with the exception of
equipment to produce high-quality wafer slices. Included were equip-
ment for electron-beam exposure (ZBA 21) and devices for ion-beam
etching and ultrasonic bonding using aluminum silicon wire (AlSi)
and gold, respectively. These are machines associated with achieving
precision improvements and cost reductions. The ZBA 21 has a pro-
ductivity not much better than two 4-inch Si wafers per hour or two
5-inch by 5-inch glass-reticle-masks per hour. Some critical devices,
such as the electron-beam inspection system, the photomask com-
parator, the photomask inspection instrument, and perhaps even the
ion-beam etching system, were shown hand drawn rather than pho-
tographed, so it is uncertain whether these devices are operational
and available.
Certain open technical journals and academic papers reveal de-
taiTs about Soviet research in areas such as materials processing,
device and process modeling, discrete device manufacture, and sil-
icon submicron lithography. Epitaxial growth of silicon is a stan-
dard part of the Soviet IC production process, and in recent years
there has been research on polysilicon for metal oxide semiconductor
(MOS) gates. The Shutnikov Crystallography Institute continues to
do original work on the growth of single-crystal epitax~al silicon on an
amorphous substrate, a process it calls "diataxy." The use of lasers
to stimulate and control silicon deposition, the use of ion-beam de-
position of epitax~al silicon, and work on silicon nitrate also continue
to be reported by Soviet researchers.
A third reason for the lag cited by the Soviets is that the nec-
essary ultrapure materials are not available to them (KovaTenko,
1987b):
Materials are an even deeper source of problems. And again the
problem is not that there are thousands of [materials] but rather
that the majority of them should be ultrapure and have unique
properties.
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COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
207
indicate that there is a formal proposal to shift the structure of
industrial imports to provide a substantially larger supply of foreign
computer equipment. This increase, if implemented, will come at the
expense of chemical and petrochemical imports.
The Soviet 12th Five-Year Plan gives particular emphasis to the
expansion of industrial cooperation agreements, which establish a
long-term relationship between a Soviet enterprise or ministry and
its foreign partner. A study of 218 Soviet industrial cooperation
agreements with Western firms found that 54.6 percent of them
involved coproduction or specialization in production; 27.1 percent
provided for delivery of plant or equipment—usually by the Western
partner; 7.3 percent were joint ventures and another 6.9 percent other
types of joint projects; and 4.1 percent were licensing agreements.
The plans for perestrolka also provide for substantial expansion
of such Tong-term industrial cooperation, which can take many forms:
licensing of patents, copyrights, and technological know-how;
long-term two-way trade between partners involving exchange
of industrial materials and components and intermediate products;
joint research and development;
subcontracting for the provision of specialized services or
components;
· sales of equipment or turnkey plants together with provision
of technical assistance;
sales of equipment or capital goods with deferred payment
out of sales of the resulting products; and
~ joint ventures, or coproduction.
The motivation to formalize patent rights at this time reflects a
primary interest in acquiring Western licenses.
Soviet efforts to expand industrial cooperation agreements are
also directed toward Eastern Europe. At the extraordinary CMEA
Council Session in December 1985, the members of CMEA elaborated
a program to create mutaBy compatible technologies throughout the
Soviet bloc and to set up a framework for political negotiation of eco-
nomic areas of specialization in five areas: electronics, automation,
nuclear energy, new materials, and biotechnology. A key feature of
the CMEA investment program is the allocation of scarce invest-
ment resources in the East European economies to fund long-run
projects that are of particular interest to the Soviet Union. Joint
specialization was already extensive in computers where the Soviet
Union has Tong benefited from East European expertise. The Rand
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208
GL OBA L TR ENDS IN COMP UTER TE CHNOL O G Y
database of specialization agreements identifies S88 such treaties,
including: 4 multilateral and 9 bilateral agreements for automated
production systems and robots; 9 multilateral and ~ bilateral agree-
ments in microelectronics; 5 multilateral and 15 bilateral agreements
in computers; and ~ multilateral and 12 bilateral agreements for
communications equipment.
The Gorbachev initiatives propose increased reliance on indus-
trial cooperation by means of joint ventures with foreign partners
in the West as well. Although the initial regulations were relatively
unattractive to prospective Western partners, the actual details of
agreements worked out since the original regulations were published
indicate that considerable flexibility is possible. In any event, the
Soviet leadership is promoting joint ventures actively, and Western
businesses are exploring the possibilities for joint production with real
interest. Of the 36 joint venture agreements signed as of May 1987,
32 were with Western firms. In June 198S, the Soviet's No. 2 foreign
trade official, {van {vanov, estimated that Western companies had
invested $30 million in capital in 46 joint ventures since the start
of l9S7, while the Soviet Union had committed more than twice as
much.
The original provisions for joint ventures published in Jan-
uary 1987 provide that the Soviet side must hold 51 percent of
the enterprise ownership and appoint the chairman of the board and
director general of the firm, but the agreement may specify that cer-
tain decisions require a consensus of the board members. The foreign
partner may provide the official responsible for quality control. En-
terprise profits bear a 20 percent tax, excluding income reinvested in
the firm, and the enterprise is to be subject to Soviet labor and trade
union regulations. It is not subject to central planning, but it must
deal with a foreign trade organization to acquire materials directly
from the Soviet economy. It can import for hard currency without re-
striction and keep its hard-currency earnings, but all hard-currency
imports must be covered by hard-currency exports. Repatriation
of profit is limited to the amount of hard-currency earnings of the
firm an arrangement that precludes import-substituting joint ven-
tures. Coincident with the new regulations, 21 Soviet ministries and
more than 70 large firms received the right to deal directly with for-
eign firms, and the corresponding departments of the Foreign Trade
Ministry were transferred to direct ministry control.
Although the U.S. Department of Commerce has a long-standing
policy of blocking all computer joint ventures with the Soviet Union
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COMP STING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
. . ~
.
209
under U.S. export control regulations, both Western and Soviet press
reports detail a proliferation of proposed joint ventures relating to
computer products and computer controls. Some examples are listed
below.
The Dialog joint venture links six Soviet partners and a con-
sulting group in Chicago, Management Partnerships International.
The Soviet partners are the Ministry of the Automobile Industry,
Moscow State University, the Central Economics Mathematics In-
stitute, the Computer Center of the USSR Economics Achievements
Exhibition, the Institute of Space Research, and the Vneshtekhnika
foreign trade organization. Dialog hopes to make Soviet designed
IBM-XT clones using Asian parts and software for sale in the Soviet
Union. Its goal is 5,000 PCs during the first year, and the first lot
was being assembled as of July 1988. The Dialog venture includes a
production line for PCs at the Kamaz truck factory in Naberezhniye
CheIny, and a factory for diskette production. Participants project
annual production of up to 18,000 and sales of $160 million. Dialog
recently received an unusually warm endorsement in the government
newpaper ~zvestiya, and the affirmation that Soviet programming
talent is worthy of a U.S.-USSR joint venture is clearly a source of
pride.
~ Another joint venture links Elorg, the Soviet trade agency
for computers, and three U.S. partners: New Software International
in Attleboro, Mass., Innovation Computer in Cleveland, Wis., and
Silicon Valley's California Micro Electronic Systems. The Western
partners plan to ship IBM-PC-compatible kits to the Soviets from
which they will assemble computers.
~ Wang Laboratories is talking with parties in the Soviet Union
about a joint venture to build PCs in Moscow for sale throughout
Eastern Europe, but it specifically says that Wang will not build its
VS line of minicomputers there.
.
A recent issue of Datamation reports that 10 Western com-
panies have come forward with proposals to set up joint personal
computer production plants in the Soviet Union.
Reuters has reported that the British engineering contractors
Simon-Carves Ltd. have signed a £246 million contract to build a
plant to make nonstrategic computers in Armenia (Radio Liberty,
1988~.
~ U.S. Applied Engineering Systems has struck a deal for pro-
ducing computer control systems at the Nizhnekamsk chemical plant
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210
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining
and Petrochemical Industry.
~ U.S. Combustion Engineering is leading a consortium of Mc-
Dermott International, the Soviet Ministry of Oil Refining and Petro-
chemicals, and the Japanese firms Mitsui and Mitsubishi. On June
2, 1988, the Asian Wall Street Journal published an interview with
Charles Hugel, president and CEO of Combustion Engineering, who
said that site preparation for two huge petrochemical complexes in
Tobolsk and Surgut was expected to begin this year.
~ There have been discussions between the Central Economics
Mathematics Institute and IBM Europe to license the MS/DOS
operating system. If any PC product is licensed, it will probably be
MS/DOS.
Dataease Tnternational has signed a letter of intent with an
organization in Kiev. A joint venture wiD market the Dataease
microcomputer database management system in the USSR if the
agreement moves forward.
~ At least one U.S. training firm is vigorously pursuing the
market for training trainers for MS/DOS, LOTUS 1-2-3, and other
common products using Russian-language-speaking trainers.
~ PC World- USSR, a new publication from TDG, will give West-
ern computer companies much easier access for advertising their
products in the USSR.
A Soviet agreement with the Harvard Business School wiB
give Soviet firms assistance in drafting contracts and legal agree-
ments with Western business firms. An agreement on some standard
international contracting arrangments would help to Tower the costs
of negotiating joint arrangements. An agreement between Harvard
and the USSR Research Institute of External Economic Affairs wiB
allow Harvard Professor Paul Lawrence and Igor Faminsky, director
of the USSR Research Institute, to develop management guidelines
for future joint ventures and to publish composite case studies for
use in American and Soviet business schools.
On the surface, these agreements give the impression of a vast
opening up of the Soviet market and of firms racing to take advan-
tage of it. However, it is likely that real developments will be more
modest than the euphoric forecasts in the Western media because the
interests of the Soviet leadership and of Western businesses are not
identical. The Soviets hope that their opening to Western markets
will bring them expanded hard-currency sales and credits and an in-
fusion of modern technology and management skills, but they may be
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COMP UTING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
211
overestimating both the ability of their own inflexible organizations
to assimilate new technologies at arm's length and also Western wiD-
ingness to provide state-of-the-art technology and direct investment
in circumstances that offer many uncertainties. The Soviet leader-
ship may be responsive to the pressure for change that is sure to build
up when important groups among the scientific and managerial elite
begin to react to the evidence of Soviet backwardness and isolation.
Western companies for their part want access to Soviet markets anct
do not want to jeopardize already established sales operations in the
West.
Most Western businesses are wining to undertake small export-
oriented ventures only as a first step in a process they hope wig
ultimately give them access to the large Soviet market. Absent that
prospect, they would not choose to locate microcomputer production
for the world market in Minsk or Yerevan; it is easier to go to South
Korea or Taiwan to set up a low-cost manufacturing operation. Few
companies will want to enter barter agreements that force them to seB
Soviet hard-currency-producing products in the West as a means of
repatriating profits, and realistic prospects are greatest for ventures
that can build on established Soviet exports.
As the computer-related joint ventures gear up, they win not
have an immediate impact on the supply of computer goods in the
USSR, nor is it clear what will happen after they produce their ini-
tially small batches. It is possible that the Soviets will then gear
up production using Soviet components to avoid large hard-currency
bills; but no matter how creative the joint venture agreements ap-
pear, the Western partners must ultimately receive hard currency
or its equivalent, and the Soviets only have so much hard currency
and equivalent to spend. The computing joint ventures may have
their biggest impact in transferring Western management techniques
and production know-how rather than in Tong-term sales of Western
products in the Soviet marketplace.
Perestroika and Soviet Internal Constraints
The new conditions of glasnost and perestroika are making it
easier for the Soviets to use active technology transfer mechanisms.
For example, it is now easier for technical people to travel to the West
who are able to engage their Western counterparts in meaningful
conversations. The PRC, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other
countries have made long-term investments in sending students to
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212
GL OBA L TR ENDS IN COMP UTER TE CHNOL O G Y
the United States for advanced training, and it is possible that the
Soviets will start sending increasing numbers of students as well.
U.S. universities wiD have neither the desire nor the means to police
these students to ensure that they do not have access to selected
technologies.
If the Soviets decide to allow significant connections between
Soviet and Western computer networks and if the West also agrees,
it would be trivial for ah the nodes in networks such as BITNET,
ARPANET, and others to become accessible to the Soviets. As noted
above, there are already 3 minion regular users of electronic mail in
the United States, and having access to these users would make
for more active means of communication for Soviet scientists and
engineers.
What was formerly a fairly easy category to control extende(l,
direct, professional contacts of a training or apprenticeship nature—
may now be more difficult or impossible to control. In retrospect this
category of control may have been feasible only because the Soviets
permitted it so infrequently, but now they are actively promoting
joint ventures, which are an ideal vehicle for extended apprenticeship
relationships.
More potent passive mechanisms are also becoming available.
The continuing development of on-line bibliographic databases in
the USSR along with an increased access to ah Western publications
that may be evolving as a part of glasnost wiD give Soviet developers
better access to the Western literature. More and more databases
are going on-line in the West, so that potential Soviet access to large
amounts of information is increasing. Control of foreign access to
such databases does not make much sense, because internal "front"
operations can simply collect from within the United States and then
send the information back to Moscow. As noted above, it is unlikely
that efforts to control access will succeed in the Western democracies,
although there may be successful regulations for keeping militarily
related documents out of such databases in the first place.
The Soviets have always used requests for proposals as a means
of collecting technical data. Now that the improved economic climate
has made agreements more possible, if not likely, there will be much
greater use of this mechanism for collecting information about state-
of-the-art Western commercial products.
Increased use of overt mechanisms may increase or decrease use
of covert mechanisms. On the one hand, if the Soviets can get what
they want directly, they will not need to use less effective transfer
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COMP UTING TECHNOL O G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
213
mechanisms. On the other hand, increased contacts make greater
covert collection possible. The more people sent, the harder it wit
be to screen them and keep an eye on them, but those involved
must also be wiring to be collectors. Rather than people who are
trusted by the GRU or KGB, it is possible that leading scientists
and engineers wiD be sent to the West and such people may reject
specific collection targets. The increasing independence of the East
European countries may also make it more Circuit for the Soviets to
prevail upon individuals in those countries to serve as conduits for
technology transfer.
The preponderance of the information technologies in the West
gives the Soviet new covert opportunities for obtaining information.
The more information transmitted across phone lines in digital form,
the more risk there is of sophisticated listening operations that can
scan the traffic and pick out interesting sections on the basis of
strings. Most users of electronic mail, for example, think of it as being
as private as regular mail, when in fact multiple copies of messages
may be automatically created. Since these messages identify the
sealer and the receiver, it would be easier for the Soviets to associate
intercepted information with its context than it is in traditional
eavesdropping operations.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that there are few, if any, substantial areas in com-
puting in which the Soviets have achieved parity or are ahead of
the West. First and foremost, the Soviet computing industry has
failed to provide a microelectronics base sufficient to match Western
developments and provide for mass production of everything from
personal computers to large mainframes. The resulting limitations
affect every part of the computing industry, including the use of
computer-aided design for developing new computers. The shortage
of high-speed computing capabilities is particularly acute, hindering
scientific work across the board. The Soviets also have far, far fewer
personal computers than the United States, where the huge number
of PCs is serving as a catalyst for all sorts of rapid developments.
Weaknesses in the systems software of CMEA countries stem
from a strategy of copying Western companies, like IBM, plus a
scarcity of newer, more sophisticated hardware. Software engineering
environments are weak. The applications software industry has been
hampered by the absence of strong demand for its products, by the
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214
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOL OG Y
difficulties imposed on it by the centralized distribution system, and
by the hardware itself.
The telecommunications infrastructure is inadequate to support
large-scale data transmission. Few wide area networks can be found,
although a number of institutes have developed local area networks.
Legal and political barriers and the lack of incentives for organiza-
tions to talk to one another have also contributed to the Tow level of
networking activity.
The Soviet computing industry has been marked by long produc-
tion cycles and highly incremental progress. There is little reason to
believe that the industry wiB do markedly better at meeting demand
anytime soon. Even if the perestrolka reforms are fully implemented,
substantial investment and rebuilding are needed. Although many
joint ventures are being investigated, it is unclear whether they wid
play a major role in improving the Soviet computer industry.
Although few unclassified sources are available that characterize
Soviet military computing, it is useful to consider the bigger picture
of export controls, perestroika, and the Soviet military. The commit-
tee has seen no evidence that there is a comprehensive and separate
military industry for general-purpose computing that is technolog-
icaBy far ahead of the industry described in this report. Instead,
the military has made use of the civilian computer industry, sup-
plementing it as necesssary for specific products such as avionics
systems.
The Soviet military and military-industrial and other national
security organizations have traditionally enjoyed considerable privi-
leges and priorities in the Soviet computing community (Goodman,
l9SS). Three of the four principal computing and communications
ministries, as noted above, come under the control of the military-
industrial commission (VPK). Many of the computer production fa-
cilities in the USSR have had an office of inspectors for the military—
often active duty officers with technical training to do testing and
ensure quality control on the spot. They can enforce higher testing
standards for units to go to the military, and to preempt produced
units from prospective civilian customers and redirect them to mili-
tary or other national security end-users. Special benefits have been
used (e.g., housing and Moscow residence permits) to recruit the
best people from the Soviet university system. The military has also
enjoyed priority in getting equipment ahead of the general economy.
The national security organizations also have priority and priv-
ilege with respect to foreign technology. For example, they control
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COMP UTING TE CHNOL G G Y IN CMEA CO UNTRIES
215
the sizable covert collection process and the collectors themselves;
they have positions within the overt trade organizations; and they
have priorities with respect to resources such as hard currency. Also,
overt and innocuous purchasers and users of Western technology
are in no position to refuse "requests" from the KGB or important
VPK or Academy organizations to inspect or borrow technology or
products purchased from the West. The comrruttee has no reason
to believe that this structure of technology-related privilege and pri-
ority for Soviet national security purposes has changed significantly
under Gorbachev and perestrolka. In fact, many regard military
modernization as one of the driving forces behind perestrolka.
Western acquisitions can still significantly aid Soviet efforts in
at least three ways. First is the use of Western-made manufacturing
equipment and technology, particularly for microelectronics produc-
tion. Microelectronics is fundamental to progress in other technolo-
gies, and it has a vast spectrum of military applications. In some
ways, transfers of equipment and technology in this area may be
more effective than for other computer-related technologies. Trans-
fers are focused on a fairly small number of high-priority receivers,
and assimilation tends to be primarily a technical matter; that is, the
interface with the "general Soviet system" presents less of a problem
than is the case with other areas like software, personal computing,
and telecommunications.
Second are the direct operational capabilities provided to the
end-users. Reliability and raw computing power of Western devices
far outpace their Eastern counterparts, and high-clout users in the
military or KGB opt for these systems more often than one might
think given the difficulties in acquiring service, spare parts, and
upgrades.
Third, specimens of computing systems have great value for
copying and testing the (legree of compatibility of the duplicated
hardware or software with the originals. The fraction of Western-
made equipment in the total Soviet inventory may be tiny, but the
fraction of Soviet and East European-made computer systems that
were copied from U.S. designs is large and growing.
These three
categories can be abstracted as acquisition/diversion for direct pro-
duction, acquisition/diversion for dual use, and acquisition/(liversion
for reproduction.
Two examples illustrate how Western acquisitions can have di-
rect impact on a Soviet military program (Goodman et al., 1984~.
The first, an example of acquisition/diversion for dual use, is the use
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
computing industry
216
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
of Western samples as "place holders" for the design, development,
and testing of a larger system. This permits them to move along on
the larger system's life cycle before a Soviet-made substitute with
the same functional characteristics is available. For example, they
might use covertly acquired U.S. microprocessor and memory chips
in the prefielding stages of the development of a military system.
When comparable Soviet-made chips become available, they would
be substituted for the U.S. circuits in the serially produced version.
The second, an example of acquisition/diversion for reproduc-
tion, is the use of a Western unit as the foundation and initial "host"
for a Sovietized prototype. A complete copy is produced through the
substitution of Soviet-made components and subsystem copies that
are tested in situ on the operational Western unit. In this way, the
original is rebuilt, piece-by-piece, until an entire made-in-the-USSR
prototype exists. The process is more suitable for copying large
electromechanical systems than for microelectronics.
In addition, what the Soviets can gain from computer-related
technology transfer is becoming increasingly valuable to them. The
lag between East and West is now large enough that the acquisi-
tion/diversion of certain Western technologies for direct production
will help the Soviets tremendously. For example, if a few years ago
the Soviets had acquired the production facilities for a 16-kbit DRAM
chip production line, they could have supplied their computers with
a newfoun
COMPUTING TECHNOL OGY IN CMEA COUNTRIES
217
specialized information from them. Suddenly what was formerly a
passive transfer becomes quite active.
The value of transferred technology is also increasing because
Soviet internal ability to exploit it is improving. The more the
Soviets know, the more they are able to use what they can get from
the West. A corollary is that the better the hardware they have, the
more use they can make of software from the West. For example,
a disk swapping algorithm was of little use when the only storage
media available was magnetic or paper tape. Similarly the Soviets
can make little use right now of programs distributed on CD-ROM
disks or programs that require several megabytes of memory on a
personal computer.
Thus it is clear that advanced Western computing technologies
are still quite valuable to the Soviets and that they wiD continue
to be targets of acquisition. If perestrolka actually fails to bring
about fundamental changes in the Soviet economy, collection efforts
will surely increase. On the other hand, if perestrolka succeeds,
the Soviet computing industry may finally find itself in a position to
fully meet demand, and the Soviet military may find itself getting the
same kind of support from its own computing industry that it now
must get by using the Western computing industry as a surrogate.
However, the full effects of perestroika wiB be a long time coming,
and transformation of the Soviet computer industry cannot happen
overnight.
In the meantime, the acquisition of Western technology would
seem to appear even more attractive to the Soviet computer industry
as it tries to close the gap. The large Soviet investments in IBM,
DEC, and HP architectures wiD ensure that they stay wedded to
these designs in the future. This wiB not prevent them from jumping
to their own, new technology, but it win mean that they have to
be able to provide emulation capabilities for thousands of programs
written for the IBM 360 and 370 operating systems, for the entire
range of PDP-ll operating systems, and for at least one HP operating
system. Demand for the acquisition/diversion of direct production
equipment is likely to remain strong. Further, it is difficult to imagine
that the Soviets will not continue to make their systems compatible
with Western architectures so that they can continue to tap into the
huge software market here. l:t is unlikely, therefore, that demand
for acquiring prototypes to use in the reproduction process will be
reducecI.
