Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 218
7
Conclusions and Recommendations
OVERVIEW
The Committee to Study International Developments in Com-
puter Science and Technology found that CoCom countries are
maintaining a substantial qualitative and quantitative lead over the
CMEA countries in computer science and technology. The range
of computer technologies involved makes any single measure of that
lead meaningless, but in many areas the CoCom lead is on the order
of five to ten years or more. Leadership across all or most fronts
is important because almost any computer technology can be use-
fuT to the military, although only some computer technologies have
compelling military importance.
Because the committee focused its inquiry on computer technolo-
gies and not on the control process, per se, it based its conclusions on
the assumption that exports of computer technology would continue
to be controlled. The committee's conclusions and recommendations
derive from the implications of technical trends for the structure and
enforceability of the control effort. While analyses conducted by the
defense and intelligence communities focus on CMEA demand for
computer technologies to improve CMEA military systems, the com-
mittee's analysis provides complementary insights into the supply of
computer technologies in CoCom, CMEA, and other countries.
The committee conclu(let1 overall that technical trends make
218
OCR for page 219
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
219
computer technology increasingly difficult to control, and this in
turn increases the risk of unintended side effects of controls on the
U.S. computer industry's vitality. The situation makes it important
that the Department of State and other parties involved in the ex-
port control process develop and administer a control regime that is
more focused and more flexible than it is at present. To accomplish
that, federal agencies must have more input from experts on global
technical and market developments in computers on an ongoing basis.
DIFFICULTIES IN C ONTRO[[ING TECHNICAL TREND S
As Chapters 2 through 5 made abundantly clear, computer tech-
nologies continue to be developed rapidly, and this is the most salient
overarching technical trend. An important consequence is that com-
puter technologies advance much faster than most bureaucratic pro-
cesses. The latest round of revisions to the CoCom regulations on
computer exports, for example, took several months of preparation
within the United States, several months to negotiate with other
countries participating in CoCom, and additional time to translate
into the U.S. version of the regulations. Yet performance for many
classes of affected computer systems continued to--expand during the
same period. The committee's technical analyses suggest a mismatch
between the rates of change (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2 and Table 7.1~.
Some discrepancy is to be expected because there is a thirst rate
of change to consider, that is, the change in the computer technologies
of CMEA countries. Since CMEA computer technology lags behind
the rate of advance of computer technology in CoCom and other
non-CMEA countries, old technology outside of CMEA may be new
technology within.
One aspect of rapid development, the continuing reduction in
the size of powerful computers and computer-related devices, means
that increasingly sophisticated computer hardware is increasingly
portable, easy both to hicle and to transport. It will also become
increasingly widespread among both CoCom and non-CoCom, non-
CMEA countries. These phenomena have been evident for some time
in the realm of chips and micro- or personal computers (PCs). What
is less well appreciated is the fact that other small machines, includ-
ing professional workstations and minicomputer-sized machines, wiB
soon be offering performance capabilities for some applications that
were previously available only in conventional large supercomput-
ers (see Figure 7.3~. The availability of small, high-power machines
OCR for page 220
OCR for page 222
OCR for page 223
OCR for page 224
OCR for page 225
OCR for page 226
OCR for page 227
OCR for page 228
OCR for page 234
OCR for page 235
OCR for page 236
OCR for page 237
OCR for page 238
OCR for page 240
OCR for page 241
OCR for page 242
OCR for page 243
OCR for page 244
Representative terms from entire chapter:
cocom countries
220
M
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2 50
P ~ on
S
1.50
1.00
GL OBA L TR ENDS IN COMP UTER TE CHNOL O G Y
)-
, ~ ,
Hi/
0.00 L] U US V V V V V— 1 1 · ~
1977 1978 1979 1980 198 1 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
| .- Microprocessors ·O- Decontrolled .~ Note 9 I Note 12 l
FIGURE 7.1 Microprocessor performance trend versus performance trends implied
by export controls, in MIPS. The top curve represents performance growth for high-
end microprocessors. The bottom group of curves shows performance growth implied
by
CONCL USIONS A ND RE COMMENDATIONS
TABLE 7.1 Changes Over Time in Threshold Performance Levels with Respect to Federal Regulations
221
Decontrol/No License National Discretion Favorable Consideration
Date PDR Examples PDR Examples PDR Examples
8/1/88 6.5 IBM PC 43 IBM PC/AT 78 IBM PC/AT
Intel 8088 4.77 MHz 80286, up to 10 MHz 80286, >10 MHz
Mac Plus, SE 80386, up to 16 Mhz
1/29/88 6.5 28 68000, up to 12.5 MHz 48 80286, 8 and 10 MHz
80286, 6 MHz only CDC Cyber 730
DEC POP 11/73
IBM PC clones at 8 MHz
1/1/85
12/10/80 no PDR
2 Apple IIe, c 28
48
8 POP 11/03 32 IBM 370/138
DEC LSI 11 IBM 370/148
HP 2100 CD C Cyber 171
1978 no PDR 8 no PDR
1976 no PDR no PDR no PDR
NOTES: Performance is measured in PDRs (processing data rates), a theoretical measure that was
introduced in the mid-1970. PDRs through 12/10/80 were floating-point based only; subsequently, they
applied to a maximum of fixed or floating-point operations. The governing regulation is 15 CFR 399 of
the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987). Notes within the
regulation describe and apply to different types of computers. These notes state that licenses for
export to satisfactory users in CMEA countries are likely to be approved for computers that satisfy
conditions specified in each note. The microprocessors and PCa listed are merely examples of machines
affected by the regulation. The national discretion columns refer to items covered under Note 9 in the
regulation and its equivalent in 1978, and the favorable consideration columns refer to items covered
under Note 12 in the regulation (a note that did not exist in any form in 1978 or earlier). In 1976
computers of every performance level were embargoed for export to CMEA countries.
SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Commerce.
has already increased the overall scientific computing gap between
CMEA and CoCom countries.
A great deal of computational power wiD be available in a great
many places as more powerful smaller computers become dispersed
through the scientific and industrial communities. While there are,
by current standards, perhaps 1~000 large supercomputers (including
vectorized mainframes) dispersed among CoCom and other non-
CMEA countries today, at least 10,000 of these new, powerful smaller
machines will be in use within the next five years. In some cases,
clustered, networked applications of relatively small computers will
222
1 000.00
1 00.00
M 1 MOO
p
S 1.00
0.10
0.01
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOL OGY
",C - ~~"C rev - X N l~;~il I
~,,f"~ ray - 1
CDC-6600
, ~~~~~~ · ' ~
~3 6 o /6 5
I,_
:~-
f,////~//~
,3 o 3 ////' 3 0 8 ~ 11111' .~: 6 8 o 3 o
to ~ ~
my 8 ~ ~ ~ 8 o 2 8
PDP-1 1 .'8088
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
I'll Supers ""at Mainframes ~ Minis ~ >~ Micros Ilililill RlSCs
FIGURE 7.3 Computer performance growth. The RISC curve shows the fastest
growth possible for this technology, including improvements in implementation tech-
nology. Both microprocessor-based and mirucomputers are expected to move to RISC
architectures, a development that will cause their performance levels to grow at annual
rates of 50 to 70 percent.
yield very high performance. Even though some of these machines or
systems may have military importance, their anticipated affordabltity
and proliferation will vitiate control efforts.
Software is intrinsically difficult to control because it is easy to
copy and it is supplied in media that make it highly transportable. In
many cases, scientific and technical software is more or less publicly
available and widely distributed throughout the scientific community.
In addition, commercial software for PCs, in particular, is available
through a wide variety of retail channels. Meanwhile, software is
attaining growing importance as an element of computer systems.
Systems for the design and manufacture of sophisticated computer
hardware require sophisticated software. The increasing accessibility
of PCs and other computers to nonexperts depends on easy-to-use
software, and realizing the potential of advanced architectures, espe-
cially for parallel processing, calls for a(lvanced software. The recent
incident involving the illegal attempt to transfer to the USSR stolen
Saxpy high-performance computer technology in the form of soft-
ware and related technical data illustrates both the importance of
software to computer systems and its transportability. CoCom has a
significant lead in the areas of systems and commercial applications
software in particular, and within CoCom the combination of a rich
CONCL USIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
223
infrastructure and an entrepreneurial culture has contributed to a
significant lead for the United States.
Recommendation 1: Definitions for computer technologies
on the list of controlled products and their use in administering
controlprograms should be made morefJexible to accountfor tech-
nology change, market developments, and variations among tech-
nologies that might be colloquially labeled in the same way. Fur-
ther, the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce should
review definitions or categorizations of controlled technologies
and their administration in a manner that is more timely and
rapid, as well as more expert. The committee recognizes that
advisory committees are already in use; but it is concerned that
review of control decisions is neither timely nor rapid, and evi-
dence suggests that more expertise may be needed to reach the
best decisions and put them into eject.
A key example of the need for flexibility involves super-
computers, which are subject to case-by-case export restrictions.
Defining supercomputers is so controversial that recent trade
legislation caned for an official definition of supercomputers for
purposes of export control. At issue is the capability—the phys-
ical representation may vary and will change relatively quickly.
The committee believes that a relative approach to categorizing
these machines (e.g., the n percent most powerful as measured
by generally accepted benchmark tests and/or as used in solving
critical classes of problems) wiD work better than any abso-
lute definition or label. Although technical progress will alter
decisions about which machines fall into such a category, any
decontrol decisions must take into account both the advancing
level of CMEA technology and, as (liscussed below, whether the
technology has become a commodity. On the other hand, the
committee recommends relaxing controls on trade and access
among CoCom (anc! other non-CMEA) countries for obsolescing
high-performance computers.
Many of the developments discussed above reflect a broader,
fundamental trend: the proliferation of hardware and software that
can be considered commodities. While the export regulations use the
term "commodities" to refer generically to goods or products, the
committee chose the term to draw on its economic implications.
Commodity products are available in high volume and at low
cost, they may be available in multiple and substitutable forms (e.g.,
224
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
original models and their clones), and they tend to be small and
easy to transport. Commodities are also frequently available from
multiple sources, often through a retail distribution channel. It is
now possible, for example, to buy sophisticated chips and the most
advanced PCs at discount retail chains and sophisticated PC software
by mail order, inclucling mail-order rental (see Figure 7.4~. These
characteristics make commodity technologies hard to control. They
also help to explain why they are fundamental to the economic health
of the computer industry. The committee concluded that more and
increasingly powerful computer products will become commodities
and therefore will be effectively uncontrollable.
Recommendation 2: The U.S. government should establish
and publish a list of computer technologies that are commodities,
and it should promulgate a policy that exempts such commodities
from controls for trade at least among CoCom nations. A com-
puter technology should be identified and treater! in export control
regimes as a commodity if the technology is readily available from
foreign sources outside CoCom control (a condition that currently
is cause for reducing export restrictions, although this is often not
done in a timely manner), or if other factors (e.g., high vol-
ume, low price, small size, ready availability of substitutes) make
the technology effectively uncontrollable. To implement this rec-
ommendation the government must establish a mechanism to
identify the point at which a technology becomes a commodity.
Another trend that may vitiate control efforts is the growth in
computer networking. International data communications is flour-
ishing among business and research entities. In particular, it is inte-
gral to the operation of multinational companies in computer-related
businesses, linking research, development, and production activities
dispersed among several countries. Not only are individual compa-
nies and organizations involved, but even individual states, acting
on behalf of local industry, are exploring data communications links
between local and foreign research and commercial entities. Soft-
ware is probably the technology most vulnerable to covert access via
computer networks (or their equivalent, the use of a modem and a
phone line), although databases that describe hardware technology
(such as an TC chip database) are also vulnerable. International com-
puter networks probably represent the fastest growing gap between
development and decision in export control strategy.
CONCL USIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Ik~meofFasI, Conve~ent, CourteovsSer.,ice
ELEc ~ KOnICS
~r~,s
SUNNYVALE ~ FREMONT
541 L`KESeE D'. 440 I'b$SION C~.
<~8)733-1770 <415)770-~YS
OP~ MO - AY-F12DAY 8AM-9PM
SATURDAY ~ S~AY 9AM-~~
S V/SA d~ MAS TE/>CAI?D A CCEP TED ~
_ . . . _ . ~ . _ _ ~ .. ~ , ~ ~ ~ o o
MAXX
~'Ca~dYato'~
Ca7p - Pb8.
$7gss
_~
~MOReX ~ Te120
TAPE 1
ANe, t4 mlo. r~ w11h pUreho" of HS T 120 4 poek at
'11.S2 r ~ore cost.
~N
TRIMLINE ~ 14 -~ _
TELEPHONE ~
Lost Nurr~rRed~ ·Muto Modell,~210
. voice Volurnc · Ton. or Pulse ~ ~ ItR
Control Diolino ~ l~rwr .
S.mphonic HQ VHS CR
WIRELESS REMOTE · CABLE READY
|— 1 1 — |1 | - 'RI; l$~}lEl
~_=J
.~'ven' 14Doviim.. ~ ~ : :~. t030O
· ~ '0 ChaAne! cot\le R-ody ~ _ _ _
D'o'ta' luner _ A
. AUtO Pow~r On 0~ ~ Y
. ^,,'0 r'ewme ~u~o t~ct ~ A
MANUfACtU~3 /N JAPAN8YfUNAI ~ _ _
Kr~u Inru o/ 1~/ 00
_
i ~ FUJI
5~4"~ -
~T ~SKETUS
1~'4 59!
~ Box of 10
.
1 !S?SNP~ ST22S
1 201 - H~2D D~K
IC~c~8 $249
r~ST~.
152~
128v - Acc.~' $599
r M7M-Ust-
1 ~ UBl ~LACe~
~ $995
~ ro~n
1 My ~I Moker
I Custom Labol Makor
1 L.=t $995
1 tObom .
.
1 ~
~/ORLD OF
~OMPUIERS
HIMS 10MHz 286
MONO SYSTEM
512K RAM Expandable to 1MB on Molherboord
S4/." 1.2MB Floppy Disk
CloCk/ColanOor ~ Mono Monitor
H'Q.s MonoGrophics Printer Cord
s895
~;_
~_
- ~ C,_
~D - ~
_
~1 -
12 CPS L~r Ouo~
Ob*lo 630 Compot.
~ _
SPRINT
Waa
"O~ocmsor
~$~8
5~ 1~,
.
.
CASIO- SCIENTIFIC
~ SOL~ CALCULAT
.~—, ,- Ideal tor ~h and Cornputor
___ ~ Schnce Studbe
-_____ ~ C v s MO L C 100
—- - - - ·L Cd s S ~ 888
SP~c~bns
SONY0 D;DII\arl N~ 2545- 1 5~) 1 NEG CMO'
WITH ,,iREE_ CAR E~OM 1SONS
OCAmTT.EnADAPTER 1 I'EG 100 $29.88
ody oru onYcor
Cosle — Ck SAM9JNG 27C5 12 150
lol prx~oob l?ECHARGEABLE: ~ArT(RY 1 8 8 3 7 · 8 8 1 2 8 8
homo or COr Ul.. REMOTE CoMPATIIlLE _ _ · _ _
nen FULL S'ZE.& 27C256, 250 3.88
VHS CAMCORDER ~ 1 MEGX9 256X9
· 6:1 Power Zoom _01_ ~ ^^ ~ - -
· Solid State MOS ~ '1 ~UN.s.si~ ·^ d!~~
~mooe Sensor MODULE ~U N.S..lmm
High Spee Shutter $ 7 ~ Q 4 $ ~ ~ ~
DisPlay CP2250 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~ 1 ~u
~256K~
150 N.S.
$~88 _
1 - 1 ~ ~
. ~ ~ITECH 12—SA
u...~2sL~D-w" Co~, S9.
m4noa_m~ 2400 ~U
$8995 cc~AL$ff~9' ~
. ~ 1 ~
Cheek'ov. 1 10,000 woro'ond ~ ~;= ~
~I'YOu r~ ~m ~a,-.ey . ~"
, $3995 l ~ ti~ 1
1 ~_~ 1
l MEG X8
1OONS SIMM
~ $398
80387~20 '$698 1$468
256-150 1 NEG CMOS
$8.88 EPROM 15ONS
1NEG100
SAM9JNG
$37.88
APPLE
MACINTOSH 11
1 30 ~ MONO SYS1'M
I dM8 RAM. 800K Roppy Dbk ~ Mau
I Sorld/SCS PoM~. AWh Keyboard
1 PLI 30M8 Hard Did'
I MonootaphIcs w#h Monlor
1 s4295
~ ~ .
K~GTON ':.
Mea_l~o
~CON~OL~
5~_y~._
~--~lW=F o=,.
s499a
...
,. ,4 -
.
| ~ - . WA - A~
PC/XT 6067 AT - 2U
I 88"s/6~ 317
'148 5 MIz 122
'198 .~ ~94
FIGURE 7.4 Commodity technologies, from chips to machines.
225
226
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
Computer networking is also fundamental to the use of super-
computers, which are typically accessed by regional and even national
users over wide area networks. Although there have apparently been
incidents, the committee did not find evidence of a major threat
from remote access by CMEA nationals, part of what is referred
to as diversion-in-place. As discussed in Chapter 2, the risks that
CoCom scientists and officials will detect and examine illegal use
make serious diversion-in-place of supercomputers unlikely. Never-
theless, security remains an important need for supercomputers as
for other sophisticated CoCom computer resources.
Recommendation S: The U.S. government should formulate a
policy for preventing computer networks from becoming a channel
for significant covert technology transfer and to protect the com-
putational resources of CoCom countries. While in many cases
the necessary technology exists, putting it to use may require
further study or change in existing policy. For example:
~ Transborder network access is burgeoning among indi-
viduals and multinational corporations via private and public
networks. How is export of "soft" technologies—software, al-
gorithms, specifications, and reports to be controlled on such
networks?
· The question should be resolved whether it is in the
best national security interest of the United States to permit
CMEA nationals access to commercial and university networks,
both directly while in the United States, and through remote
telecommunications. Such access can and does take place.
~ Are the existing International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions restrictions on network security products necessary, or
relevant to modern commercial (nonmilitary) security needs-
encryption and trusted systems—in such services as banking and
network-based retailing? They may retard U.S. competitiveness
as non-CoCom sources grow stronger.
One major trend, the movement toward paraDel processing, is
likely to have a profound effect on the computer field and on CoCom's
ability to prevent the CMEA countries from creating or obtaining
machines with partial supercomputer performance levels. Currently,
substantial research effort in Western Europe, Japan, and the United
States is focused on developing hardware and software for parallel
processing. As progress is made, the range of applications that wig
be handled by a parallel processor will broaden. If no breakthroughs
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
227
occur, parallel processing may remain in limited use in CoCom coun-
tries, where ongoing improvements in conventional computers will
provide an alternative.
However, in CMEA countries without the access to advanced
conventional machines, parallel processors may be a much more vi-
able alternative. ParaDel processors could be constructed from low-
technology components using large numbers of processors. Although
the machines might be inefficient and difficult to program, they
might provide capability approaching supercomputer performance
levels for certain applications. The value of those machines to both
CMEA countries en c! CoCom countries wiD depend on the develop-
ment and acquisition of paraJ1el-processing software. Regardless of
these possibilities, the committee expects the West to continue to
have a substantial lead in this area.
TECHNOLOGIES AS MORE THAN PRODUCTS
The foregoing discussion focused on computers, software, and
other products. Also of concern is the know-how needed to develop,
manufacture, and use advanced computers, an aspect that may not
be well protected by export controls. This distinction is important
because acquisition of discrete products provides only limited tech-
nology transfer.
The committee concluded that the progress of CMEA countries
in computing was severely limited by a lack of essential know-how.
The shortcomings of CMEA countries in computer manufacturing
reflect a combination of inadequate equipment and a lack of the
know-how necessary for volume production of high-quaTity products.
While scientific know-how is disseminated widely through open sci-
entific literature, technical know-how cannot be assimilated merely
by reading publicly available materials.
For example, CMEA countries are known to have developed
their own ion implanters for IC manufacturing, building on local un-
derstanding of the fundamental technology of particle acceleration
(they also obtain these machines from such countries as Liechten-
stein). While in principle any ion implanter, including the least
sophisticated, can be used to make any kind of semiconductor for
which implantation is part of the production process, in practice the
manufacture of more sophisticated semiconductors requires a high
degree of reliability and quality in implantation. The fact that top-
of-the-line implanters of Western origin offer higher reliability and
228
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
throughput than those from C MEA countries reflects the greater
know-how of Western manufacturers. Similarly, the shortcomings
of CMEA countries in scientific computing reflect a combination
of inadequate equipment and a relative lack of the know-how that
comes from experience in applying a broad and sophisticated mix of
computing technologies.
The spread of know-how associated with the development of
computer technologies will become harder to control with the increase
in standardization, another key trend. Standardization, as discussed
above, is particularly important in the area of computer networking,
but it is becoming more important in other software and computer
hardware areas. Standardization involves common understanding
of and adherence to technical goals for functionality or designs. For
standards to be effective they must be published, whereas the process
of developing standards requires open dialogue among the parties
designing a standard to which they wiB all adhere. CMEA countries
participate in international standard-setting, and they have ready
access to published international standards.
It is important to note that standard-setting is inherently a
political process. Consequently, the outcome of the process of set-
ting international computer-related standards may affect the United
States differently from other CoCom countries. For example, a major
trend in computer networking is implementation of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OST) model of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). Development of OST standards was strongly
influenced by the communications environment in West European
countries, which is significantly different from the environment in
the United States. That is one reason why European vendors have
been quicker to implement the standards and have been successful
in exporting their products to the United States, where interest in
OST has been growing. Through its influence on the competitive
advantage of vendors in the United States and other countries, stan-
dardization can affect the ease with which computer technologies can
be controlled (absent a fully effective multilateral control process).
COMMERCIAL VITALITY ESSENTIAL
FOR TECHNICAL VITALITY
Technology trends Lo not take shape in a vacuum. While the
absolute laws of science may influence computer designs and uses,
234
GL OBA L TR ENDS IN COMP UTER TE CHNOL O G Y
Recommendation 7: The U.S. government should greatly
increase its investment in the monitoring of computer technol-
ogy development and associated market trends around the world.
Although the intelligence community monitors developments in
CMEA countries, the committee recommends that more compre-
hensive attention (i.e., addressing commercial as well as mili-
tary applications) be paid on an ongoing basis to developments
around; the world, especially in non-CMEA, non-CoCom nations
(e.g., newly industrializing countries in Asia and Latin Amer-
icag. Given the rapid rate of change of computer technology, the
globalization of capabilities and markets, and the need to protect
technology of compelling military importance, the Department of
State must have a greatly expanded resource to make sound tech-
nology export decisions. Further, the Department of State should
undertake periodic reviews of technology trends along the lines
of this report. The rapid change in computer technology makes
trend presentations perishable, and thus this type of review should
be conducted at least every three years.
Although the Department of Commerce monitors foreign
availability and performs competitive assessments, its limited
resources appear to be stretched quite thin. Moreover, at this
writing it had lost funding (and was seeking funds) for one of
its more active information-gathering mechanisms, a computer
technology watcher based in Europe. To monitor global tech-
nology trends well, the government must invest in perhaps 100
or more additional, highly skilled people who are knowledge-
able not only in computer technologies and their applications
but also in international market trends and foreign languages.
Alternatively, such talent could be tapped through a federally
contracted research center or other independent source. The nec-
essary monitoring would not only facilitate a focusing of export
controls, but would also benefit U.S. industry and researchers.
To best use technology watchers scattered among agencies, co-
ordination and planning for this effort should be provided by a
lead entity with a suitably broad mission.
PROSPECTS FOR CMEA
The premise for policy is that the United States and its allies
should maintain the computer science and technology gap between
themselves and potential military adversaries. But questions as to
CONCL USI ONS A ND RE COMMENDA TI ONS
235
how wide the gap should be and just how it should be maintained
are open to debate.
The existing East-West gap reflects several factors, of which three
in particular have long retarded the computer-related technology
transfer from the West to the CMEA countries. They are:
1. Export controls. For example, controls on the sale of manu-
facturing know-how and facilities have contributed to the inability of
CMEA countries to produce certain microelectronic and disk-storage
products in large volumes and at high levels of quality.
2. Limited opportunities as seen by Western companies. For
example, restrictions on direct access to CMEA markets and bureau-
cratic constraints on the conduct of business, the forms of payment,
and the removal of hard-currency profits from the CMEA bloc have
discouraged CoCom firms from pursuing business in CMEA countries
on a Tong-term and profitable basis.
3. Self-imposed constraints. For example, extreme protection-
ism for CMEA firms in the forms of national security and currency
controls, travel) restrictions on CMEA citizens, and poor mechanisms
for internal technology transfer. The latter extend to constraints on
information flow both within and between organizations and enter-
pr~ses.
As a result of these and other factors discussed in Chapter 6,
CMEA countries have largely pursued the transfer of computer tech-
nology from CoCom countries through means that are more covert
than overt and more passive (e.g., reading the open scientific liter-
ature) than active (e.g., by apprenticeships). Compared to a more
overt en c! active strategy, CMEA efforts have had limited effective-
ness. It is not difficult to imagine possibilities for significant progress
if one or more constraining factors were to be removed or greatly
relaxed.
How might CoCom expect the continued globalization and com-
moditization of computing and developments under perestroIka to
combine to affect the future of East-West technology transfer in com-
puting? The committee briefly considers each of the main factors in
turn.
1. Export control. As discussed above, technical developments
will make export controls less effective at limiting computer tech-
nology transfer. New systems architectures, sustained rates of mi-
croelectronic miniaturization, and the variety and rate of emergence
of new products that incorporate sophisticated technologies are just
236
GL OBA L TRENDS IN COMP UTER TECHNOL O G Y
some of the developments that will weaken control efforts. The
globalization and commoditization of computing that have been dis-
cussed throughout this report wig compound the problem; sheer
physical availability of computing products and the rapid increase
in the number of capable non-U.S. (including non-CoCom) suppliers
are making it easier for the Soviets and other CMEA countries to
find alternative technical solutions and suppliers, and to acquire and
transport products.
2. Limited opportunities as seen by Western companies. The
Soviets are once again touting opportunities for Western businesses.
Technology transfer is clearly a major factor motivating Soviet over-
tures to form joint enterprises and other activities discussed in Chap-
ter 6. The Soviets would like their Western partners to transfer a
great deal of technology, to train Soviet computer people, and to
have the Western partners agree to arrangements that do not cost
the Soviets hard currency (but, on the contrary, show them how
to export and make hard currency) or other hard goods. Presum-
ably, Western companies would prefer to sell products directly into
the large Soviet economy while retaining the flexibility to take their
earnings in hard currency as they do elsewhere. Regardless of any
discrepancies in preferences, history has shown that there are always
Western companies and academics willing to try to work with the
Soviets under almost any conditions, and the Soviets are not unaware
of this history.
Right now there is anecdotal evidence of a relatively large number
of Western companies and academics engaged in computer-related
ventures with the Soviets. A consequence is a record amount of free
or Tow-cost computer-related technology transfer. Although much
of the activity focuses on transfer of fairly Tow-level technology, it
is broad-based transfer, something that has been notably absent in
the past. The committee also notes that because rapid technology
change can limit the market life and sales volume of a new computer
product, some producers of high-price, high-end products might be
motivated to achieve any sale they can get.
3. Self-imposed constraints. Much of the perestroika program is
designed to improve the environment for more effective development
and use of technology in general, and there is a special focus on
computer technology. Two important uncertainties with regard to
the current reform are the extent to which the Soviets will remove
or modify their self-imposed constraints, and the extent to which
any such changes will make a difference. It is now harder for CMEA
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
237
countries to keep up because there is so much more for them to keep
up with.
Meanwhile, the military and military-industrial entities have
been priority receivers of advanced technology in CMEA countries,
and there is no evidence as of this writing of any major change in
their privileged position. Also, while public attention to perestrolka
reforms focuses on improvements sought for the general economy,
military modernization must also be recognized as one of the driving
forces.
In summary, Al three principal factors are now in a period
of unusually rapid modification as a result of trends in computer
technology and markets on the one hand and changes in the Soviet
system and in CMEA behavior toward foreign contacts on the other.
Other things being equal, the result will be an increase in both the
quality and the quantity of technology transfer. While this situation
leads to more pressure on export controls than ever before to "hold
the line," as the committee has shown there are other pressures to
modify export controls to be more in keeping with the technological
and international "facts of life." The two need not be inconsistent.
In this environment, controls can be important in maintaining
the East-West gap by raising technology acquisition costs for CMEA
countries. In so doing they may moderate the diffusion of computer
technologies out of the military and into other CMEA communities
where they could be used to cultivate greater self-sufficiency. But
controls can be counterproductive when they are insufficiently fo-
cused in terms of the scope of technologies affected and when they
fail to take into account the truly global dynamics of computer tech-
nology development and diffusion.
SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS ON
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS
The following specific conclusions were developed through the
committee's technology assessments. They are also presented in the
corresponding chapters.
Hardware
Advances in hardware from semiconductor devices through ma-
chines of varying sizes and levels of performance continue to be rapid,
with significant improvements in performance taking place in periods
238
GL OBA L TRENDS IN COMP UTER TECHNOL O G Y
from one to three years. This phenomenon accelerates the movement
downwar
CONCL USIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
239
Software is less amenable to breakthroughs than hardware, but
major advances are needed in software for paraded architectures.
Software development is becoming more systematized and more
like hardware development with components, standardization of in-
terfaces, and improvements in tools that partially automate the de-
velopment process.
The United States is the world leader in software. One reason
appears to be the favorable environment for the small-scale, creative,
and entrepreneurial efforts that most often lead to software innova-
tion. The United States should do everything possible to further the
export of U.S. software to friendly nations to protect U.S. commercial
leadership in this arena.
Software is intrinsically difficult to protect because it is easy
to carry and to copy. However, large packages for large systems, in
particular, may be less valuable to a thief than to a purchaser because
of the lack of reliable access to vendor support, maintenance, and
upgrades.
In some cases the usefulness of stolen software may be limited
through restrictions on the distribution of source code, which is
necessary for modifying software, and through encryption.
The committee divided software into three principal classes for
purposes of control efforts. The first is software with a compelling
and direct military importance to CMEA countries, for which exports
should be tightly controlled. The second is software tools that could
be used to build software of compelling military importance, for
which some degree of control appears necessary. The third includes
ah other software, which should be freely traded within the West.
Manufacturing
State-of-the-art manufacturing equipment and electronic com-
puter-aided design systems are the key to manufacturing state-of-
the-art integrated circuits. Major changes in IC technology cause
changes to cascade throughout the manufacturing process.
Because of their role as enabling technologies, high-end manufac-
turing technologies are especially importer to control. These tools
are the key to technology leadership. This has been proven within
CoCom, where Japanese gains have been associated with manufac-
turing mastery. Overall CoCom advantage depends on a concerted
effort to protect enabling technology developed by CoCom countries.
240
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
The United States is increasingly dependent on Japan for semi
conductor manufacturing equipment.
.
Both Japan and West European countries are leaders in certain
aspects of packaging.
Computer Networks
Networking epitomizes thee dual-use nature of computer technol-
ogy. It serves as the backbone of modern military command and
control systems as well as commercial office and factory automation
systems and other civilian applications.
Standards, particularly international standards, increasingly
drive the development of network products. In the United States,
product development is affected by a split between DOD-favored
standards and international, commercial standards. This split has
adversely affected U.S. companies' positions in network markets.
The United States is a leader in design, manufacturing, and
testing of protocols because of its longer experience and its widely
available computer network testbeds. But this is a perishable lead
that can only be maintained by continued support from government
and industry and by resolution of export licensing difficulties for such
noncritical technologies as DOD protocol stacks, Tow-grade encryp-
tion, and computer network commodities.
Security and control of access to U.S. and international research
(and commercial) networks are keys to protecting CoCom computa-
tional resources, but they may be inadequate. In particular, current
network usage trends suggest that transborder flows of computer and
communications technologies via networks are growing; transborder
network access is rampant among individuals and multinational cor-
porations via private and public networks. Networks provide means
to export "soft" technologies—software, algorithms, specifications,
and reports—that may be outside the reach of current control mech-
amsms.
Special trade regulations (ITAR) constrain export of modern
(nonmilitary) security products encryption and trusted systems-
useful in such services as banking and network-based retailing. They
may retard U.S. competitiveness as Cocom and non-CoCom sources
grow stronger.
The CMEA Countries
Shortcomings of the CMEA computer technology base begin
with base technologies. Design of advanced circuitry is hampered
CONCL USIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
241
by inadequate computer equipment, while production of sophisti-
cated microelectronics suffers additionally from quality and reliabil-
ity problems. As a result, certain computers are reported to rely on
Western components (chips and boards). These shortcomings pre-
vent CMEA countries from implementing major advances in com-
puter architecture, at least in terms of volume production.
High-performance computing is an area of great weakness in
CMEA countries. Soviet high-speed computers are slower and gener-
aLy less capable and available than those in CoCom countries. The
number of machines and R&D projects in conventional supercom-
puters, minisupercomputers, and massively parallel architectures is
far below that in the West. This situation reflects shortcomings in
the area of computer technology development, and it results in short-
comings in scientific applications of computers to research in a wide
variety of areas.
One of the greatest contrasts between CMEA and CoCom coun-
tries in general, and between the USSR and the United States in
particular, is the scarcity of personal computers. Both the limited
availability and the often poor quality of personal computers combine
to prevent the growth of a computer-oriented culture. The current
drive to add computing to educational curricula wiB change this situ-
ation over time, but it is itself hampered by the scarcity of equipment
and weaknesses in the overall support environment.
Software has been most vulnerable to the negative effects of
Soviet/CMEA economic and political systems. With only spotty ex-
ceptions, none of the CMEA countries has developed strong software
industries or specific areas of worId-ciass capabilities.
The CMEA pattern of copying popular Western computer ar-
chitectures should enable ready assimilation of associated Western
software, but the inability to provide adequate computer memory
and differences in end-user needs limit the value of commercial ap-
plications software. Scientific and technical applications, however,
are more transferable because the functions they provide are more
universal.
CMEA weaknesses in systems software stem from the strategy of
copying from IBM and other CoCom computer manufacturers plus
a scarcity of newer, more sophisticated hardware. That situation
results in a lag of five to ten years or more.
CMEA countries are at about the same level as CoCom in terms
of the theory of programming languages, and they are also strong
in the area of database management systems, although not in their
242
GLOBAL TRENDS IN COMPUTER TECHNOL OGY
implementation. However, CMEA countries have not been able to
develop sophisticated programming environments. The CoCom lead
is widening as development tools proliferate to a rapidly increasing
number of end-users.
Poor telecommunications systems undermine the development
and use of computer networking in CMEA countries. On one hand,
Soviet research may lead the West in certain aspects of fiber opti-
cal media, such as frost resistance and radiation hardness for fiber
cables as well as lasers for fiber-optic transmission. On the other
hand, support for high-speed computer networking is negligible, as
is the quality of available service. The combination of these physical
problems with cultural and political impediments to communication
means that CMEA countries lack both the opportunities to test data
communications advances on a large scale and the opportunities for
resource sharing and collaboration that have marked use of computer
networking in CoCom countries, especially among CoCom scientists.
The CMEA computing industry has been marked by Tong prod-
uct cycles and marginal incremental progress. The committee has
not seen evidence to suggest that, even with current initiatives
under perestrolka, CMEA will (lo dramatically better at meeting
widespread needs and demand anytime soon, although substantial
progress might be expected, partially because there is so much room
for improvement. Under perestroika, the Soviets and East Europeans
are pursuing a number of programs to improve indigenous capabil-
ities. However, the committee also sees and expects to continue to
see an intensification in the pursuit of technology transfer from the
West.
APPENDIXES
243
