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1 ~ Introduction THE CALL FOR DISPOSAL The United States has maintained a stockpile of highly toxic chemical warfare agents for more than half a century. These chemical agents are lethal and, as com- ponents of obsolete munitions in storage, they present an unnecessary risk to surrounding communities. Destruction of the U.S. chemical stockpile has been a concern for more than a decade. In 1985, Public Law 99-145 mandated an "expedited" effort to dispose of one particular type of chemical munition, the M55 rocket, because this munition could self-ignite during storage if the stabilizer were depleted. This mandate soon expanded into the U.S. Army's Chemical Stock- pile Disposal Program (CSDP), whose mission is to eliminate the entire stockpile of unitary chemical weapons. The CSDP developed the current "baseline" system, which uses incineration to destroy agents, en- ergetic materials, and packing materials known as dun- nage. The baseline system also uses incineration to de- contaminate the residual metal parts. In 1997, after having set several intermediate goals and dates for completing the destruction of the U.S. chemical weap- ons stockpile, Congress ratified the President's signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which mandates that destruction be completed by April 29, 2007. iThe term unitary indicates a single chemical loaded in munitions or stored as a lethal material. More recently, binary munitions have been pro- duced in which two relatively safe chemicals are loaded into separate com- partments to be mixed to form a lethal agent after the munition is fired or released. The components of binary munitions are stockpiled in separate states. They are not included in the present CSDP, but they are being de- stroyed in a separate program. THE CALL FOR ALTERNATIVES TO INCINERATION The CSDP currently has two operating baseline in- cineration systems one on Johnston Atoll in the Pa- cific Ocean and one at the Deseret Chemical Depot near Tooele, Utah. Together, these chemical agent disposal facilities are expected to destroy approximately one- half of the total U.S. stockpile, the remainder of which is dispersed among seven other storage sites in the con- tinental United States. Because federal law prohibits the cross-country shipment of these weapons for dis- posal, the Army planned to construct similar incinera- tion systems at the other sites. However, the choice of incineration as the disposal technology has met with strong public and political opposition. In response to this opposition, "neutralization" processes (based on the hydrolysis2 of chemical agent in water or in sodium hydroxide solution) have been developed to destroy the chemical agents stored in bulk containers at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. The design of these 2Hydrolysis is a reaction of a target compound with water, an acid, or a _ base in which a chemical bond is broken in the target and OH- or H is inserted into the bond cleavage. The destruction of chemical agent via hy- drolysis is often referred to as chemical neutralization. This term is derived from the military definition of neutralize: to render something unusable or nonfunctional. Technically, neutralization is a chemical reaction between an acid and a base to form a salt and water. Chemical agents are neither acids nor bases, however, and the use of the term neutralization for two very different processes is somewhat confusing. Nevertheless, in the literature on chemical demilitarization in aqueous systems, the terms neutralization and hydrolysis have been used interchangeably. Therefore, unless other- wise specified, neutralization will be used to refer to the destruction of chemical agent via hydrolysis. The word decontamination is used to indi- cate the destruction of chemical agents that are impregnated into a matrix or adsorbed onto surfaces. 9
10 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS facilities is well under way. For the remaining sites, where explosively configured, "assembled" chemical weapons are stored, incineration is the planned ap- proach for disposal. However, in late 1996, Congress enacted Public Law 104-201, which instructed the De- partment of Defense (DOD) to "conduct an assessment of the chemical demilitarization program for destruc- tion of assembled chemical munitions and of the alter- native demilitarization technologies and processes (other than incineration) that could be used for the de- struction of the lethal chemical agents that are associ- ated with these munitions." The law required that the assessment be conducted by a program manager not associated with the Army's CSDP. Through Public Law 104-208, $40 million was ap- propriated by Congress for the program manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) to "identify and demonstrate not less than two alterna- tives to the baseline incineration process for the de- militarization of assembled chemical munitions." In addition, this law prohibited any obligation of funds for the construction of incineration facilities at two stor- age sites Richmond, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colo- rado until the demonstrations had been completed and an assessment of the results submitted by DOD to Congress. Public Law 104-201 also required that the program manager for ACWA conduct the assessment "in coor- dination with the National Research Council." The National Research Council (NRC) currently has a standing committee charged with oversight of the CSDP, including the proposed neutralization facilities in Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. This standing committee, referred to as the Stockpile Com- mittee,3 could have been assigned to oversee the ACWA program, as well. However, in the spirit of PL 104-201, the program manager requested that the NRC establish a separate study committee to conduct an independent evaluation of the alternative technolo- gies. In response, the NRC formed the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (ACW Committee). This report provides the results of the study performed by the ACW Committee. 3More formally, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. DESCRIPTION OF THE STOCKPILE Agents The principal unitary chemical agents in the U.S. stockpile are two nerve agents (GB and VXi4 and three re~atecr forms ot blister, or mustarc`, agent (H. HD, and HT). All of the agents are stored under ambient condi- tions primarily as liquids. Nerve agent VX is a non- volatile, high boiling-point liquid that adheres to sur- faces for days or weeks. Nerve agent GB (sarin) is a liquid that has a volatility similar to water and, there- fore, evaporates relatively quickly. Blister agent (mus- tard) is a skin vesicant that evaporates very slowly, although somewhat faster than VX. The original stock- pile contained 30,600 tons of unitary agents (U.S. Army, 1996) stored in a variety of munitions and con- tainers. The stockpiles at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and at Deseret Depot in Utah are in the process of be- ing destroyed by incineration, so the amount currently in storage has been reduced somewhat. The nerve agents GB and VX, which are highly toxic and lethal in both liquid and vapor forms, can kill in a matter of minutes by interfering with respiratory and nervous system functions. In pure form, these nerve agents are practically colorless and odorless. GB is rela- tively nonpersistent in the environment, whereas VX can persist for a long time under average weather conditions. Bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide is the proper chemical name of the blister agent mustard.5 Mustard has a gar- lic-like odor and is hazardous both on contact and as a vapor. Because it is practically insoluble in water, mus- tard is very persistent in the environment. Table 1-1 lists some of the physical properties of GB, VX, and HD; Figure 1-1 shows the structural formulas of these chemical agents. Containers and Munitions Unitary chemical agents are .~torer1 in .snrav tanks bulb storage (ton) containers, and a variety of mumtlons, fir- He . . 4Nerve agents are organophosphonate compounds. GB is O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate; VX is O-ethyl-S[2-(diisopropyl amino) ethyl]- methylphosphonothiolate. 5Names such as mustard gas, sulfur mustard, and yperite have also been applied to this agent. The term mustard "gas" is often used, but the chemical is a liquid at ambient temperature.
INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1 Physical Properties of Chemical Warfare Agents 11 Agent Characteristic Nerve GB Nerve VX Blister H/HD Chemical formula C4H~oFO2P C~H26NO2PS C4H~C12S Molecular weight 140.10 267.38 159.08 Boiling point, °C 158 298 217 Freezing point, °C -56 <-51 14.45 Vapor pressure, torr (mm Hg) Volatility, mg/m3 Surface tension, dynes/cm Viscosity, cS Liquid density g/cm3 at 20°C 1.0887 Solubility, g/100 g of distilled water 2.9 @ 5°C 22,000 @ 25°C 26.5 @ 20°C 1.28 @ 25°C 100; soluble in organic solvents 0.0007 @ 25°C 10.5 @ 25°C 32.0 @ 20°C 12.256 @ 20°C 1.0083 5 @ 25°C; best solvents are dilute mineral acids Heat of vaporization, Btu/lb (call") 144 (80) 141 (78.2) 190 (94) Heat of combustion, Btu/lb (call") 10,000 (5,600) 15,000 (8,300) 8,100 (4,500) 0.072 @ 20°C 75 @ 0°C (solid), 610 @ 20°C (liquid) 43.2 @ 20°C 3.95 @ 20°C 1.2685 0.92 @ 22°C; soluble in acetone, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloride, tetrachloroethane, ethyl benzoate, ether Source: Adapted from NRC, 1993; U.S. Army, 1988. including land mines, rockets, bombs, and artillery and mortar projectiles. Some munitions contain fuzes, boosters, bursters, and/or propellants. These compo- nents, referred to collectively as energetic materials, or energetics, incorporate a variety of chemical com- pounds that must also be eliminated as part of the CSDP. The term assembled chemical weapon is used to describe munitions that contain both chemical agent fH3 GB: H3C P O CH F CH CH3` VX: CH 3CH 20 3 \ . . P S CH2 CH2 N / HD: Cl CH2 CH2 S CH2CH2CI FIGURE 1-1 Structural formulas for GB, VX, and HD. and energetic materials in an assembled configuration. Rockets, mortars, and land mines are typically stored with their energetic components in place; projectiles may or may not contain bursters or fuzes. Alternative means for disposing of these four types of munitions are the focus of the ACWA program (and this NRC evaluation). Additional details on assembled chemical weapons are provided in Appendix A. Geographical Distribution The chemical stockpile is located at eight continen- tal U.S. storage sites (see Figure 1-2) and at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, about 700 miles southwest of Hawaii. Table 1-2 identifies the composition of the stockpile at each continental U.S. site by type of con- tainer or munition and by type of agent. All sites except Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana, contain assembled chemical weapons. CH (CH3 )2 ' CH (CH3 )2 HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NRC IN CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION As the CSDP has evolved over the past 15 years, the NRC has provided extensive independent oversight and technical advice to the U.S. Army. This section pro- vides a brief history of NRC activities related to this
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS Original stockpile: 31,495 tons Current stockpile: 27,435 tons Tons destroyed: 4,060 tons Percent destroyed 12.89% Newport, ~As of: 3 January 1999 VX -TC U mati I la, Oregon ~= ~ ~ ~ ~ ; Abercleen, VX - P. Rat M, ST ;\ ~ - ]/' MHaDYlaTnC~ in, ~ ~; ~1,625 tons Tooele, Utah2_ \ ~ ~ ~ Blue Grass GB - C, P. R. B TC~_: | | ~ Be stocky VX - P. R. M, ST, TC~ ~ ~ l . )- ~ GB - P. R 11 113 tons -\ ~ ~ ~ VX - P. R *13 616 tons hi-<,, Hawaii ~ ~ ~ \\` 523 tons - 3\ ~ ~ , Pueblo Colorado ~ ~Anniston, Alabama HT/HD - C, P Johnston Atoll H 2,611 tons ( ADCACDSp) P'ne Bluff, T/HD C, P. TC VX - P. M, TC HT/HD - TC VX P. , M 473 tons GB - R *2,030 tons VX - R. M 3,850 tons GB, VX, H. HE, AT= Chemical agent TC = Ton container B = Bombs R = Rockets C = Cartridges - M = Mines P = Projectiles ST = Spray Tanks * Original inventory FIGURE 1-2 Types of agent, quantities of agent, types of munitions, and percentage of total agent stockpile at each storage site. Source: Pecoraro, 1999. program, including previous evaluations of alternatives to incineration. In August 1983, the NRC Committee on Demilita- rizing Chemical Munitions and Agents was formed to review the status of the stockpile and technologies for disposal. The committee examined a range of technolo- gies and, in its final report in 1984, endorsed incinera- tion as an "adequate" technology for the safe disposal of chemical agents and munitions (NRC, 1984~. The committee also concluded that the stockpile was well maintained and posed no imminent danger, but it ex pressed concern about future risk from stockpile deterioration. In 1987, at the request of the Undersecretary of the Army, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal (Stockpile Com- mittee) was established under the aegis of the NRC Board on Army Science and Technology to provide the Army with technical advice and counsel on specific aspects of the disposal program. Under this charter, the Army has to date received 18 reports from the Stock- pile Committee evaluating progress and assessing spe- cific aspects of the program. In March 1991, growing public concerns and oppo- sition to the baseline incineration system, as well as the rising cost of the CSDP, led the Stockpile Committee to suggest, with the Army's agreement, that a new study of alternatives to incineration for the destruction of the stockpile be undertaken. In January 1992, the NRC, at the request of the Army, established the Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies (Alternatives Committee) to develop a comprehensive list of alternative technologies and to review their po- tential as agent and munitions disposal technologies. In June 1993, this committee published its report, Alter- native Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions (NRC, 1993). In February 1994, the Stockpile Committee, based on the report of the Alternatives Committee and on its own knowledge of the baseline system and disposal require- ments, formulated recommendations regarding the destruction of munitions and the further investigation of potential alternatives to incineration in Recommenda- tions for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions (NRC, 1994~. The Stockpile Committee concluded that the baseline system was adequate for disposal of the stockpile and that the storage risk would persist until disposal of all stockpile materials is complete. The re- port recommended that the CSDP proceed expedi- tiously to minimize total risk to the public at each site.
INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-2 Chemical Munitions Stored in the Continental United States 13 Chemical Munitions (Agent) APG ANAD BGAD NECA PEA PCD TEAD UMDA Mustard agent (H. HD or HI) 105-mmprojectiles (HD) X X 155-mmprojectiles (H. HD) X X X X Agent GB 8-in. projectiles MSS rockets 500-lb bombs X X X X X X X Agent VX 155-mm projectiles 8-in projectiles MSS rockets X X X X X X X X X X X Miscellaneous Ton containers (L) Ton containers (GA) X NOTE: APG, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; ANAD, Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; BGAD, Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky; NECA, Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana; PEA, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; PUDA, Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; TEAD, Tooele Army Depot, Utah; UMDA, Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon Source: NRC, 1996a. The Stockpile Committee also found, after exami- nation of all the technologies brought to its attention by the Alternatives Committee and others, that four neu- tralization-based systems showed the most promise for agent destruction (NRC, 1994~. In view of the increas- ing risk associated with delays in the disposal program, and recognizing that public opposition to incineration technology might further delay the program, the Stock- pile Committee recommended that alternative tech- nologies be developed promptly. The committee also recommended that the Army continue to monitor re- search programs and developments that could lead to possible alternatives. By the summer of 1995, the Army had decided that a reexamination was warranted of specific alternatives for use at two sites the Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana, sites where only bulk agent was stored. In August 1995, the Army advertised in the Commerce Business Daily for alternative disposal tech- nologies other than the two already being evaluated by the Army. The purpose of this announcement was to determine if any other technologies were capable, within the CSDP schedule, of meeting chemical de- militarization requirements for the two sites where bulk agent was stored. The announcement requested pro- posals from industry on nonincineration technologies that were sufficiently developed to meet the needs of the CSDP. In November 1995, the Army selected three technologies for review and evaluation by the NRC- gas-phase reduction with molecular hydrogen, molten metal catalytic extraction, and electrochemical oxidation with silver(II) in addition to the two processes, neutral- ization and neutralization followed by biodegradation, that were already being developed by the Army.
14 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS At the request of the Congress and the Army, the NRC formed the Panel on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies (AltTech Panel) to evaluate the five technologies. The results of the study were published in Review and Evaluation of Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies (NRC, 1996a). The panel recommended that aqueous neutral- ization of HD followed by biodegradation of the result- ing hydrolysate be used at Aberdeen. The panel further recommended that neutralization of VX with sodium hydroxide followed by off-site treatment of the result- ing hydrolysate be used at Newport. The Army is now developing hydrolysis processes to destroy the agents at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. How- ever, the Army will not treat the VX hydrolysate off site as recommended by the NRC AltTech Panel. In- stead, it is developing supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) technology to treat the hv~rol~sate on site prior to disposal. More recently, the Stockpile Committee issued a report on SCWO technology entitled, Using Super- critical Water Oxidation to Treat Hydrolysate from V7( Neutralization (NRC, 1998~. The findings and recom- mendations in that report are pertinent to the ACWA program because two of the proposed ACWA technol- ogy packages include the use of SCWO. EVOLUTION OF THE ACWA PROGRAM Congress created the ACWA program (separate from the CSDP) to investigate alternatives for dispos- ing of assembled chemical weapons (i.e., rockets, pro- jectiles, and mines) in the face of continuing opposi- tion to the baseline incineration system. The program manager for ACWA implemented two initiatives for identifying and demonstrating candidate alternative technologies. In the primary initiative, a request for proposal (RFP) for "a total system solution" was placed in the Commerce Business Daily (U.S. Army, 1997a). Proposals submitted in response to this REP described technology packages that could replace the baseline system in its entirety for at least one munition/agent combination. The other initiative involved publication of a broad agency announcement (BAA) in the Com- merce Business Daily (U.S. Army, 1997b). The BAA is seeking technologies that do not represent a total re- placement of the baseline system but that accomplish one or more portions of the total process (e.g., the dis- posal of energetic material). By using this dual ap- proach, DOD hoped to identify total solutions as rap- idly as possible while still providing an avenue for furthering the development of promising component technologies. However, funding constraints have so far prevented the program manager from investigating any of the proposals submitted under the BAA. ACWA Program Organization The program manager for ACWA established a three-phase program to bring at least two technologies to demonstration as mandated by the Congress. Phase 1. Evaluation criteria for assessing the tech- nologies were developed and an REP issued soliciting industry proposals for technologies to destroy the ACWs without using incineration. Phase 2. The proposed technologies were assessed, and the most promising ones selected. This phase was performed in four steps with three sequential contrac- tual awards, labeled Contract Line-Item Numbers (CLINs) 0001, 0002 and 0003. The program manager's policy was to bring as many technologies that met the criteria to demonstration as possible with the available resources. Phase 3. The selected technologies had to demon- strate that they could destroy assembled chemical mu- nitions by means other than incineration. However, the word demonstration was not specifically defined by the Congress. Because the total program had to be com- pleted in approximately two years,6 the time available for the demonstrations was severely limited. Eventu- ally, the program manager for ACWA defined demon- stration as "a series of tests conducted to prove Ethat] each critical process step meets the Program Evalua- tion Criteria; the results are repeatable; and each pro- cess step can be incorporated into an overall system [i.e., a] 'total system solution' " (Richmond, 1998~. The demonstrations would characterize the major feeds, intermediate materials, and final products and effluents of the processes, including any hazardous and/ 6This deadline was eventually extended, but the schedule was still challenging.
INTRODUCTION or toxic compounds formed during the process. This would enable the evaluation of proposed environmen- tal control systems and lay the groundwork for future permitting. During the demonstrations, the analytical methods proposed by the technology providers would also be validated. The program manager established four teams to carry out the program. The technical team performed a detailed assessment of the proposed technologies based on the evaluation criteria. The environmental team identified the applicable environmental regulations and assessed the impact of these regulations on the tech- nologies and on the demonstration schedule. The busi- ness team was responsible for procurement and legal activities. The public outreach team provided tools and information for communicating and interacting with the public. To ensure public involvement in the program, DOD enlisted the Keystone Center, a nonprofit, neutral fa- cilitation organization, to convene a diverse group of interested stakeholders, called the Dialogue on ACWA (or simply the Dialogue), who would be intimately in- volved in all phases of the program. The 35 members of the Dialogue included representatives of the affected communities, national citizen groups, state regulators, tribal representatives, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the DOD staff, including the pro- gram manager for ACWA, his deputy, and the deputy assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Chemical Demilitarization. All non-DOD members of the Dia- logue were volunteers and received no remuneration from DOD (except for travel expenses). Ground rules were developed for the involvement of the Dialogue which met regularly and participated in all phases of the assessment (Keystone Center, 1997~. However, all decisions remained the responsibility of DOD. In response to a request from the Dialogue for inde- pendent advice on technical issues throughout the pro- gram, the program manager for ACWA agreed to fund a consulting firm, SBR Technologies from South Bend, Indiana, to meet with a four-member liaison team. To- gether with representatives of SBR, these four Dialogue members formed the Citizen's Advisory Technical Team (CATT) to represent the Dialogue in procure- ment-sensitive matters. Once the members of CATT had signed nondisclosure agreements with all technol- ogy providers, they were given access to all proprietary 15 information, and they participated as nonvoting mem- bers in DOD's procurement, evaluation, and selection processes. Phases of the ACWA Program Phase 1. The Development of Criteria and Preparation of the Request for Proposals Prior to completing the REP, the evaluation criteria for selecting the technologies at each of the three award steps and for evaluating them at the conclusion of the program had to be established and prioritized. The Dia- logue was asked to help DOD develop and rank three sets of criteria: 1. Threshold (go/no-go) criteria established whether a technology package met the most basic require- ments for supporting test data and could be accu- rately characterized as a nonincineration process. The threshold criteria were applied by DOD to determine the awarding of CLIN 0001 contracts. 2. Demonstration selection criteria focused on the potential of the proposed technology package for successful demonstration. Major factors included process efficacy, safety, human health and the en- vironment, and business considerations. The cri- teria were applied by DOD prior to the award of CLIN 0002 contracts (with business factors omit- ted) and again before the award of CLIN 0003 contracts (with business factors included). 3. Implementation evaluation criteria focused on the potential of the proposed technology package to move into pilot-scale and full-scale implementa- tion. These criteria were similar to the demon- stration selection criteria but included more de- tailed process efficacy, safety, and human health and environment factors. The business factors were replaced by factors more relevant to imple- mentation (e.g., life-cycle cost). DOD will use these criteria in its evaluations of the results of the demonstrations (CLIN 0003) and as a basis for recommendations to Congress at the end of the program. All of these criteria were adopted with consensus from the Dialogue in July 1997. After three Dialogue meet- ings, DOD also held two technical workshops and a
16 = \~ received Jig ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS Proposals ' eliminated Step 2: Initial Assessment/Data- Gap Resolution · Demonstration selection criteria - process efficacy - human health and environment - safety Initial assessment to identify data gaps Data gaps Contractors prepare data-gap resolution work plan Contractors resolve data gaps 10 Dec '97 Contractors prepare technical report on data-gap resolution 1 7 Feb'98 r Technologies eliminated A....... Step 4: Development/Review of Demonstration Work Plan · Demonstration selection criteria - process efficacy - human health and environment - safety - business factors Contractors I / Award of ~ ~ \ CLIN 0003 prepare Evaluation of ~ demonstration demonstration~ demonstration work plan\ work plan / \ / Work plans \ / selected for ' demonstration . testing ^;^ ( plans not ) 29 May '98 29 Jul '98 ... .. . ~ . testing FIGURE 1-3 Schedule for the assessment and evaluation phase of DOD's ACWA Program. Source: Denved from U.S. Army, 1997a. presolicitation conference for industry. Phase 1 culm~- nated on July 28, 1997, when DOD issued the REP. Twelve firms submitted proposals by the deadline, Sep- tember 15, 1997. Phase 2. Assessment and Evaluation The ACWA assessment and evaluation phase was divided into a complicated four-step process during which technology providers would be selected and pro- vided with funds at three stages, labeled CLIN 0001, CLIN 0002 and CLIN 0003. The steps in this process are summarized, with schedules, in Figure 1-3. In Step 1, the go/no-go evaluation, the proposals were evaluated against the threshold criteria established by DOD and the Dialogue. On October 6, 1997, DOD announced that seven technology providers had passed the go/no-go evaluation. These technology providers and their teaming partners are listed in Table 1-3, and brief descriptions of their technology packages are listed in Table 1-4. During Step 2, initial assessment/data-gap resolu- tion, the technical team, together with the CATT, iden- tified data gaps in the seven proposals and categorized them as mandatory, program, or demonstration gaps. Mandatory gaps had to be resolved in the data-gap reso- lution step (this step) before the provider could pro- ceed to Step 3. Program gaps could be resolved at this time or during the demonstration phase, at the discretion TABLE 1-3 Seven Technology Providers Selected in the ACWA Go/No-Go Evaluation Step Team Lead Partner(s) AEA Technology ARCTECH Burns and Roe General Atomics Lockheed Martin Parsons Teledyne Commodore CH2M HILL ICE Kaiser, Inc. Foster-Miller Startech none SAIC Kvaerner John Brown Foster Wheeler Corporation Eli Eco Logic International E1 Dorado Engineering, Inc. Aerojet General Corporation Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute AlliedSignal Mason & Hanger Stone & Webster Southwest Research Institute University of Kentucky
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18 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS of the technology provider. Demonstration gaps were not expected to be resolved until the demonstration phase. Each technology provider was awarded $60,000 on November 3,1997, to prepare a data-gap resolution report to be submitted to the program manager by Feb- ruary 17, 1998 (CLIN 0001~. During Step 2, the techni- cal team, with participation from the CATT, made site visits to all seven technology providers. In Step 3, final assessment/technology ranking, the data-gap resolution reports submitted by the technol- ogy providers were reviewed in detail. Using the first three categories of the demonstration-selection criteria (process efficacy, safety, and human health and envi- ronment), DOD, with the help of the CATT, ranked the seven technology packages. DOD announced on April 28,1998, that six of the seven had passed this step, and the six technology providers were awarded $150,000 each to prepare demonstration work plans and purchase items for demonstration that required long lead times. During Step 4, development of the demonstration work plan, DOD met informally with the six providers to finalize the portions of the technology packages that required demonstration and to clarify the information that would be provided in the demonstration work plans. The work plans had to be submitted to DOD by May 29, 1998, at which time they were evaluated ac- cording to all of the demonstration-selection criteria, including business factors. The business factors in- cluded the demonstration schedule, past performance of the technology provider, socioeconomic factors, and technical and management approach. All six technol- ogy packages were found to be technically acceptable. Final selection for CLIN 0003 contracts was made on the basis of a technology provider offering the "best value" to the government within the available program resources. The announcement of the demonstration awards was delayed while the ACWA program man- ager attempted to obtain sufficient funds to award more than two contracts. On July 29, 1998, Burns & Roe, General Atomics, and Parsons-AlliedSignal were se- lected7 to proceed to the demonstration phase. The 7 The Army originally scheduled CLIN003 to be awarded on July 6, 1998. However, award announcements were delayed until July 29, 1998, while the program manager attempted to obtain additional funds to award more demonstration contracts. After the three contracts were awarded, one technology provider filed a protest with the General Accounting Office (GAO), and a stop-work order was announced. The protest was dismissed on September 15, 1998, and the stop-work order was rescinded two days program manager stated that if additional funds became available in fiscal year (FY) 99, more demonstrations might be funded. The awards were based on the require- ments of the demonstrations and available funding. Phase 3. Demonstrations For demonstration, DOD identified the unit opera- tions in each technology package that were the least mature and the most likely to be problematic. Detailed characterization of both major and trace constituents of the effluent streams was given high priority. The unit operations to be demonstrated and the quantities of agent and energetics involved are given in Tables 1-5 through 1-7. The deadline for completion of the dem- onstrations was May 7,1999, and the deadline for sub- mitting the reports describing and analyzing the results was June 21, 1999. The program manager for ACWA will submit his recommendations to Congress on Sep- tember 30, 1999. ROLE OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL The Congress instructed DOD to conduct its assess- ment of these alternative technologies "in coordination with the National Research Council." At the request of DOD, the NRC ACW Committee conducted an inde- pendent evaluation of the technology packages that had passed the go/no-go criteria. Statement of Task The NRC reached agreement with DOD on the ACW Committee's Statement of Task in March 1997, and the study officially commenced on May 27, 1997. The Statement of Task is reprinted below: The National Research Council (NRC) will provide an independent scientific and technical assessment to the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (PMACWA) of alternative disposal tech- nologies, identified through the Department of Defense (DOD) screening process, for assembled chemical weap- ons located at U.S. weapon storage sites. The NRC study will address the alternative technology research and later. The protest was subsequently reinstated on December 1, 1998, but no new stop-work order was issued. On March 5, 1999, after a detailed evalu- ation, the GAO again dismissed the protest. These events delayed the completion of the program from April 1, 1999, to September 30, 1999.
INTRODUCTION 19 TABLE 1-5 Technology Demonstrations Performed by Burns and Roe Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity APGa Energetic- deactivation chamber APG Plasma-waste converter Energetics Composition B (Comp B) Tetrytol Energetics Comp B Tetrytol M28 propellant Simulated mortar with 10% GB heel Agent HD GB VX Dunnage Wood pallets (spiked with PCP) Carbon DPEb Fiberglass firing tubes Decontamination solution 0.2 lb 0.2 lb 2.1 lb 2.1 lb 20 lb 60 mortars 400 lb 400 lb 136 lb 600 lb 600 lb 800 lb 600 lb 600 lb aAPG = Aberdeen Proving Ground bDPE = demilitarization protective ensemble Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999. TABLE 1-6 Technology Demonstrations Performed by General Atomics Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity CAMDSa Energetics rotary hydrolyzer Energetics Fuzes Comp B. tetrytol, and tetryl bursters M28 propellant 7 fuzes 7 bursters each 7 sections DPGb Shredder/hydropulper Dunnage DPE, wood, carbon 5,000 lb shredded 4,600 lb hydropulped DPG Supercritical water oxidation Agent HydrolysatesC HD hydrolysate VX hydrolysate GB hydrolysate VX simulant Energetic/Dunnage Hydrolysates Comp B/M28 propellant hydrolysate and dunnage slurry Tetrytol hydrolysate and Dunnage slurry 1,760 lb 1,760 lb 1,760 lb 4,400 lb 1,760 1n 1,760 lb aCAMDS = Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System bDPG = Dugway Proving Ground CHydrolysate = by-product of the agent or energetics neutralization reaction Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999.
20 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABLE 1-7 Technology Demonstrations Performed by Parsons-AlliedSignal Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity DPGa Rocket cutting and fluid mining M60 1 lSmm rockets (inert) 10 rockets M61 1 lSmm rockets with agent simulant 10 rockets APGb Immobilized cell bioreactor Agent/energetic hydrolysates HD hydrolysate and tetrytol hydrolysate 20,100 lb CAMDSC Immobilized cell bioreactor Agent/energetic hydrolysates VX hydrolysate, Comp B hydrolysate, 22,400 lb and M28 hydrolysate GB hydrolysate and Comp B Hydrolysate 13,000 lb CAMDS Metal parts treater Metal Parts M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with HD M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with VX M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with GB Dunnage DPE with butyl (spiked with HD) Wood pallets (spiked with HD and PCP) Carbon (spiked with HD) Fiberglass firing tubes 64 lb 64 lb 64 lb 64 lb 64 lb 64 lb 64 lb aDPG = Dugway Proving Ground bAPG = Aberdeen Proving Ground CCAMDS = Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999. development program for assembled chemical weapons, looking especially at ensuring maximum protection for the general public, the environment, and the personnel involved in the demilitarization program. The specific tasks to be performed are to: · Gather data and analyze information on stakeholder interests at the assembled chemical weapons stor- age site locations through site visits (U.S. and for- eign) and meetings with residents and concerned citizens, state and federal regulators, and advocacy groups, in addition to necessary briefings by DOD officials and managers; Identify critical technology factors that should be considered in the selection criteria for advanced de- velopment and demonstration of selected alterna- tive technologies; · Perform in-depth, technical assessments of a set of technologies that are chosen by DOD and provided to the NRC by the PMACWA. These technical assess- ments will include: (1) conducting industrial site visits, as appropriate, to evaluate the status and maturity of the technologies; (2) assessing technical aspects, strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvan- tages of each technology; and (3) ensuring that all as- pects of chemical demilitarization and disposal are con- sidered, e.g., disposal of all waste products; and . . Provide to the PMACWA the results of the assessment in the form of an NRC approved report. This publicly released report will contain an evaluation of the cur- rent status of each technology (including advantages, disadvantages, knowns, unknowns, and potential for implementation). Information and data generated as part of DOD's ACWA efforts will be used to the fullest extent possible. Scope and Approach of the Study At the initial meeting, August 25-27, 1997, the com- mittee found itself confronted with a unique task. A1- though previous NRC studies had focused on destruc- tion technologies for chemical agents, the ACW committee had been asked to evaluate complete de- struction systems, including the disassembly of a vari- ety of munitions, the nonincineration destruction of energetic materials, and the decontamination of metal parts, dunnage, and other wastes. Moreover, the tech- nologies were still evolving as technology providers were filling data gaps and improving their systems. In addition, four of the technology providers the commit- tee evaluated did not proceed to the demonstration phase in 1999.
INTRODUCTION The committee, therefore, decided to evaluate the seven technology packages separately and not to com- pare them directly. The committee also agreed to develop criteria (see Chapter 2), identify gaps in the technologies, and comment on the maturity of the tech- nologies and their potential for implementation. The committee decided not to rank technologies. recom ~. . ~ O-- - 7 - - - - - __ menct a nest technology, or compare technologies to the baseline incineration system. There are two primary reasons for this approach: . . The Statement of Task called for the NRC to con- duct an independent assessment of the technolo- gies identified through the DOD screening process. To ensure independence, the committee decided that all seven technology packages that passed the basic threshold criteria should be evaluated, re- gardless of subsequent eliminations by DOD. The ACWA program was conceived in Public Law 104-201 as separate from the baseline incin- eration program. The goal of the ACWA was to demonstrate alternative technologies, not to com- pare those technologies with each other or with incineration. In keeping with the intent of the law, the committee decided to evaluate each technol- ogy package on its own merits and not to compare them with incineration. A freeze date for accumulating data (March 15, 1999) was set so the report could be submitted to exter- nal review by May 1, 1999, and published by Septem- ber 1, 1999. Although this meant the committee did not have the benefit of the final demonstration results, in- terim demonstration progress reports were available. The committee established seven working groups, one for each technology provider, to perform in-depth evaluations of each technology package. The composi- tion of the working groups was based on the expertise required for each technology package and included two technical experts, one expert on risk and one expert on energetic materials. Site visits by the groups proved to be very helpful in assessing the maturity of the tech- nologies and the technical foundations of the designs. The committee also made site visits to the Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Dugway Proving Ground, and the Deseret Chemical Depot during the demonstration phase. (Dates and locations of these visits and of other committee meetings are given in Appendix B.) 21 Sources of Information Because of the evolving nature of the ACWA pro- gram and the technologies, the committee had to be flexible about accepting information as it became avail- able. The wide variety of information sources used in this evaluation can be grouped into the following 11 general categories: Materials Submitted in Response to the REP. The committee reviewed, in detail, the documents sub- mitted by the technology providers in response to DOD's REP. These documents included propos- als, data-gap reports, and demonstration work plans. Briefings by DOD. Representatives of the ACWA program provided briefings at each committee meeting. The briefings included general updates of the program, as well as detailed descriptions of certain aspects of the program (e.g., specifics of the demonstration plans, sampling and analysis methods for residual energetic material, etc.~. · Briefings by Technology Providers. The technol- ogy providers came to three committee meetings to give briefings and answer questions about their technology packages. These meetings took place in October 1997, December 1997, and March 1999. (See Appendix B for more information about these meetings.) Other Briefings. The committee also received briefings by individuals not directly associated with DOD or with the technology providers. Ex- amples include briefings by the Dialogue CATT and a briefing by Dr. David Kosson, the chair of the NRC Stockpile Committee, on that com- mittee's recent SCWO report (NRC, 1998~. Visits to Technology Providers. Representatives of the working groups visited each technology pro- vider to speak directly with experts about the tech- nology packages and to examine existing equip- ment or systems. (See Appendix B for the dates and locations of these visits.) Questionnaires for Technology Providers. On sev- eral occasions, the committee sent written ques- tions to the technology providers requesting addi- tional information. A list of questions was sent before each site visit, and other questions were transmitted as they arose.
22 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS . . · Visits to Storage Sites and Public Meetings. The committee visited the Blue Grass Army Depot in Richmond, Kentucky, and the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Pueblo, Colorado, to meet with the per- sonnel responsible for the storage of munitions and with local citizens to discuss the proposed alterna- tive technologies. In Richmond, Kentucky, the com- mittee attended a Citizens' Advisory Commission meeting; in Pueblo, members of the committee manned an information booth at the depot summer festival (part of their public outreach activities). · Discussions with Regulators. The committee re- viewed the existing federal regulations and con- ducted informal telephone discussions with state regulators in Colorado, Kentucky, and Utah. The purpose of these discussions was to identify major issues regulators thought might affect the permit- ting of each technology. The discussions were held with the full knowledge that these individuals were expressing personal opinions and could not render formal judgments. Demonstration Visits. Representatives of the com- mittee visited each demonstration site to discuss the tests and to examine the equipment firsthand. Dialogue Meetings. Representatives of the com- mittee attended all of the Dialogue meetings, and the committee chair updated the Dialogue mem- bers on the committee's activities. Committee members solicited the views of Dialogue mem- bers on the proposed alternatives and their inter- pretations of the public response to them. The ACW Committee and the Dialogue also held a joint meeting early in the process (October, 1997) to establish lines of communication. · Review of the Open Literature. NRC staff and committee members reviewed the open literature on topics relevant to the evaluations (e.g., hydroly- sis of agent and energetic materials, plasma tech- nology, public response to waste-disposal tech- nologies, etc.~. Previous NRC reports on the chemical demilitarization program and alterna- tives to incineration were included in this review. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT This report has been organized in the following fashion. Chapter 1 provided background on the CSDP, the ACWA process, and the NRC's role in that pro- cess. Chapter 2 describes the criteria the committee used to evaluate each technology package. Chapters 3 through 9 are devoted to the seven technology pack- ages. Each chapter includes a description (without proprietary information); an evaluation in terms of the criteria described in Chapter 2; identification of information gaps; and a discussion of the requirements for implementing the package. Chapter 10 is a discus- sion of issues that affect public perceptions and ac- ceptance of the technologies. Finally, Chapter 11 in- cludes a summary of the technology packages in tabular form, as well as general findings and recom- mendations. For the benefit of readers who may not be familiar with chemical weapons and the technologies used in demilitarization, the report includes eight appendices. The assembled chemical weapons are described in some detail in Appendix A. Appendix B lists the com- mittee meetings and site visits. Because several tech- nology providers proposed using (1) the baseline dis- assembly method, (2) hydrolysis to destroy chemical agents, and (3) hydrolysis to destroy energetic materi- als, a general description of these three technologies is given in appendices C, D, and E, respectively. Because two technology packages included SCWO, Appendix F contains a short description of SCWO, as well as the findings and recommendations from the recent NRC report on SCWO. Two technology packages also in- volve the use of fluidjet cutting, so Appendix G pro- vides a description of the fundamentals of jet cutting and a brief review of its use in the demilitarization of ordnance. Potential environmental permitting issues identified during informal discussions between the committee and state regulators are described in Appen- dix H. Biographical sketches of the committee mem- bers are provided in Appendix I.
