What would the effect of the changes be? For example, would there be a substantial improvement in readiness (e.g., improved training, improved capability to mobilize the reserve components), a significant reduction in resources or costs (e.g., fewer personnel required to perform a function, improved active/reserve component integration), less turnover, greater retention, or better administration?

Would credible results lead to changes? For example, would laws or executive branch policies have to be changed? Would there be political resistance or inertia to overcome (e.g., by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the active components, the reserve component establishments, Congress, state governors, the public)? Would the changes require large investments in dollars, equipment, people, or time?

Would this program produce believable results? For example, would the results be difficult to measure or not measurable at all (e.g., not demonstrable statistically)? Would the results be representative (e.g., is the situation realistic militarily)?

Would the pilot program be technically difficult to conduct? Would the experiment required for meaningful results take too long? Would the costs or other resources required be within reasonable bounds?

Is the pilot program likely to be conducted? Would conducting the pilot program have an adverse impact on personnel or readiness? Would there be legal or policy impediments? Would political difficulties arise (e.g., from the active components, the reserve component establishments, Congress, state governors, the public)?

The members of the committee evaluated each candidate pilot program by each criterion. The committee then reviewed the prioritized list for reasonableness, discussed the viewpoints of individual members, and revised some of the programs. This process enabled the committee to balance the views of various members and select pilot programs informed by the wisdom and judgment of the committee as a whole. Several pilot programs were eliminated because they were considered to be infeasible, impractical, or intended to resolve issues of limited importance. The shortcomings identified in some early pilot programs led committee members to seek input from defense and industry experts and to improve experimental designs. Thus, the committee was able to evaluate the programs on a systematic and rational basis.

Figure 4-1 shows that there was considerable consensus among the committee members about four of

Front Matter (R1-R12)

Executive Summary (1-7)

1 Introduction (8-10)

2 Reserve Forces Today (11-16)

3 National Security and Technological Environments and Their Effects (17-26)

4 Pilot Programs (27-42)

5 Descriptions of High Priority and Highlighted Pilot Programs (43-59)

6 Conclusions and Recommendations (60-62)

References (63-64)

Appendix A Committee Meetings (65-69)

Appendix B Descriptions of Other Pilot Programs (70-82)