5
Descriptions of High-Priority and Highlighted Pilot Programs

This chapter provides fuller descriptions of the four high-priority pilot programs that warrant priority attention and the four highlighted pilot programs that address cultural concerns. The descriptions are intended to furnish the Department of Defense with a broad understanding of the committee's approach to these pilot programs and their constituent experiments. The level of detail is designed to provide (1) enough information to convey an understanding of the purpose of the pilot program and (2) a possible starting point for implementing the pilot program. Thus, the descriptions should be regarded as plausible ways of conducting the various programs rather than hard and fast prescriptions for conducting them. In the event the Department of Defense decides to conduct any of these programs, a specific plan for implementation will have to be defined and specific responsibilities assigned for various aspects of each pilot program.

HIGH-PRIORITY PILOT PROGRAMS

Increased Training Time Through Technology

Objective. Determine how distance-learning technology for individual training at home could improve the readiness and effectiveness of reserve component units.

Problem

Limited training time and funds often make it difficult for part-time reserve personnel to complete skill training to qualify in their assigned positions. The purpose of the pilot program would be to increase training time for individual personnel enabling them to complete more of their individual skill training at home. This would free up more time for collective (unit) training of reserve component units. With distance-learning technologies, individual training could be available at home or another convenient location.

Collective training is essential to achieve and maintain unit readiness. Annual training is the best collective training for most units. Unfortunately, this is also when many unit members are sent to service schools. The absence of key team members limits the effectiveness of unit training and increases the post-mobilization training time necessary to bring the unit to full readiness. Under this system, reservists often find it difficult to qualify in skills that require lengthy courses of instruction, although these skills may be in high demand. Another problem with the present system is retraining members of the Individual Ready Reserve quickly in skills that are in short supply to support a mobilization for a major-theater war.

Distance-learning technologies, which are available now and will certainly improve substantially in the next decade, could make it possible for reservists to complete a larger part of their individual training requirements at home or another convenient place, effectively increasing the total amount of training they could receive each year and enabling them to participate more fully in collective training, especially at annual training. It may be necessary to offer some incentives to motivate reservists to undergo individual training on their own time.

Home-based training would require that the trainee have a computer. Although, many reservists own their own computers, personnel in the junior ranks, who need skill training the most, are the least likely to own their own computers. This pilot program would evaluate the costs and benefits of issuing computers to reservists



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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces 5 Descriptions of High-Priority and Highlighted Pilot Programs This chapter provides fuller descriptions of the four high-priority pilot programs that warrant priority attention and the four highlighted pilot programs that address cultural concerns. The descriptions are intended to furnish the Department of Defense with a broad understanding of the committee's approach to these pilot programs and their constituent experiments. The level of detail is designed to provide (1) enough information to convey an understanding of the purpose of the pilot program and (2) a possible starting point for implementing the pilot program. Thus, the descriptions should be regarded as plausible ways of conducting the various programs rather than hard and fast prescriptions for conducting them. In the event the Department of Defense decides to conduct any of these programs, a specific plan for implementation will have to be defined and specific responsibilities assigned for various aspects of each pilot program. HIGH-PRIORITY PILOT PROGRAMS Increased Training Time Through Technology Objective. Determine how distance-learning technology for individual training at home could improve the readiness and effectiveness of reserve component units. Problem Limited training time and funds often make it difficult for part-time reserve personnel to complete skill training to qualify in their assigned positions. The purpose of the pilot program would be to increase training time for individual personnel enabling them to complete more of their individual skill training at home. This would free up more time for collective (unit) training of reserve component units. With distance-learning technologies, individual training could be available at home or another convenient location. Collective training is essential to achieve and maintain unit readiness. Annual training is the best collective training for most units. Unfortunately, this is also when many unit members are sent to service schools. The absence of key team members limits the effectiveness of unit training and increases the post-mobilization training time necessary to bring the unit to full readiness. Under this system, reservists often find it difficult to qualify in skills that require lengthy courses of instruction, although these skills may be in high demand. Another problem with the present system is retraining members of the Individual Ready Reserve quickly in skills that are in short supply to support a mobilization for a major-theater war. Distance-learning technologies, which are available now and will certainly improve substantially in the next decade, could make it possible for reservists to complete a larger part of their individual training requirements at home or another convenient place, effectively increasing the total amount of training they could receive each year and enabling them to participate more fully in collective training, especially at annual training. It may be necessary to offer some incentives to motivate reservists to undergo individual training on their own time. Home-based training would require that the trainee have a computer. Although, many reservists own their own computers, personnel in the junior ranks, who need skill training the most, are the least likely to own their own computers. This pilot program would evaluate the costs and benefits of issuing computers to reservists

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces who pursue their studies from home. It will also explore the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of other incentives. Description This pilot program would determine the cost effectiveness of providing government computers and necessary peripheral devices to reserve enlisted personnel so they can pursue skill training at home. All military services would participate in the program. The target groups of the program would be: junior enlisted personnel who have just completed initial training and are trying to qualify in job-specific skills at the next level; reservists who have qualified in a skill at entry level but need to take lengthy courses to qualify for more advanced skill levels; and members of the Individual Ready Reserve who want to continue training in their skills or learn different skills that are in short supply in their services. Experiments There would be three experiments in this pilot program. Experiment 1 would evaluate using distance learning to speed up initial-skill qualification of recent graduates of initial training. Experiment 2 would evaluate using distance learning for reservists who have already qualified in a skill at the entry level and want to qualify in the same skill at a higher level or in a different skill. Experiment 3 would evaluate using distance learning for members of the Individual Ready Reserve who volunteer to take skill enhancement or refresher courses. The focus of Experiments 2 and 3 would be on skills that are in high demand and require lengthy courses of instruction. For each experiment, data would be gathered on actual course performance and from surveys of students and, in some cases, their immediate supervisors. Experiment 1 Objective. Determine if distance learning would make it easier for recent graduates of initial training to qualify at the entry level in their skills. The initial entry training for every new reservist consists of basic combat training and initial-skill training. Upon completion of initial entry training, reserve recruits are still not qualified for a skill code. This means that many recruits have to complete their initial-skill training after they are assigned to units. For active military personnel, this is not an undue burden because the additional training can be obtained on the job or by attendance at short courses. However, it may be difficult for reservists to complete the requirements in the limited training time available. This experiment is designed to determine if allowing reservists to complete part of their initial-skill qualification requirements at home would ease this problem. In each service, a control group and a test group of recent graduates of initial entry training would be selected at random. Each group would consist of 50 people. The control group would pursue skill training for an initial-skill code in the normal fashion for their respective services. The test group would be issued computers and appropriate peripheral materials and entered into courses that could be completed at home. Members of the test group would complete the instruction at their convenience according to the course schedule, and examinations would be conducted at armories under controlled conditions. The results of the test group and control group would be compared. Credit would be given for successful completion. All of the skills for this experiment would be selected from the Department of Defense Occupational Code Section I, Electronic Equipment, Repairers, Sub-Section 101, Communications Radio. The similarities of skills used in the experiment would provide a basis for comparing the results. Examples of the kinds of skills that would be appropriate for this experiment are listed below. Army skill code 29E, communications-electronics radio repairer Navy skill code 1415, shore communications maintenance technician Marine Corps skill code 2E41, ground radio repairer Air Force skill code 304X, ground radio communication specialist The objective of this experiment would be to determine how reservists respond to this kind of training for several incentives, ranging from faster skill qualification to cash bonuses. The principal data generated would be the qualification rates of the test and control groups. Surveys of the participants and of a sample of control group reservists would solicit reactions to the program and suggestions for improving it.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Question 1. Did distance learning shorten the time it took reservists to qualify in their skills? How many days did it take for each reservist to qualify for an entry-level skill code after leaving initial entry training? What was the average time for the group to qualify for an entry-level skill code? What was the distribution of qualification times? Question 2. How effective and efficient was the distance training? What was the examination score of each reservist? What was the relationship between the time to complete training and the examination score? Question 3. Will reservists participate in this kind of program? How many reservists did not complete the training? What were the reasons? What did the participants like about the program? What did the participants dislike? Question 4. Which incentives would be most effective? How many reservists would complete the course with no incentive but faster skill qualification? How many would complete the course with the loan of a computer? How many would complete the course with the reward of a computer? How many would complete the course with a cash bonus? How many would complete the course if paid for their time? How many would complete the course if they received retirement credit? Experiment 2 Objective. Determine how distributed distance-learning can enable reservists to qualify for specialties that currently require long courses in service schools. This experiment would test using distributed learning for reservists who need to upgrade their skill levels or be retrained in different skills. A control group and a test group selected from each service would attend a long course for a particular skill and skill level. Each group would consist of 50 reservists already scheduled to attend these courses. Members of the control group would complete the required course at resident classes in service schools. Members of the test group would receive all or part of the instruction at home. Each member of the test group would be provided with the necessary computer and peripheral materials, such as modem, Internet service provider, and instructional video tapes. The emphasis in this experiment would be on completion of the courses rather than on how long it takes to complete them. Both groups would be required to pass the same final examination or otherwise qualify for the appropriate skill code and level. This experiment would be targeted at long lead-time skills that are in heavy demand, such as information technology and intelligence. Question 1. How did the method of instruction affect time to complete the course? How many students took the course? How many students completed the course? How long did it take each student to complete the course? Question 2. How did the students perform? How well did students perform on course examinations? How did the supervisor evaluate the performance of each student upon return to duty? Question 3. Will reservists participate in this kind of program? How many reservists did not complete the training? What were the reasons? What did the participants like about the program? What did the participants dislike? Question 4. Which incentives were most effective? How many reservists would complete the course with no incentive but faster skill qualification? How many would complete the course with the loan of a computer? How many would complete the course with the reward of a computer?

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces How many would complete the course with a cash bonus? How many would complete the course if paid for their time? How many would complete the course if they received retirement credit? Experiment 3 Objective. Determine the effect of distributed distance learning on the utility of the Individual Ready Reserve. Although the total number of reservists in the Individual Ready Reserve may equal or exceed the total demand, the Individual Ready Reserve is not likely to have the required numbers of reservists with the particular skills to replace skilled personnel. Ideally, members of the Individual Ready Reserve could be retrained in peacetime to offset identified skill shortages. This experiment would use distributed distance learning to enable members of the Individual Ready Reserve to complete courses of instruction in high-demand, long lead-time skills. In this experiment, 50 volunteers from the Individual Ready Reserve of each service would be issued computers and peripheral devices to enable them to take the course at home. The courses would be designated by their respective services. Question 1. How effective was the distance learning? How many students completed the course? How did the students perform on course examinations? How long did it take each student to complete the course? Question 2. Why did the students volunteer to take this course? What were the reasons for doing the training? What were the expectations of each student? Question 3. How did students like the course? How did each student rate course content? What did the participants like about the course? What did the participants dislike? Question 4. How many reservists would complete the program if incentives were offered? How many reservists would complete the course with no incentive but faster skill qualification? How many would complete the course with the loan of a computer? How many would complete the course with the reward of a computer? How many would complete the course with a cash bonus? How many would complete the course if paid for their time? How many would complete the course if they received retirement credit? Implications Because reserve components are part time and have limited training, increasing their training time can only have a beneficial effect. If the experiments of this pilot program are successful, distance learning could be used to provide better, more timely training for reservists. Advanced Distributed-Learning Technology for Maintenance Personnel Objective. Determine how advanced distributed-learning technology could be used to improve maintenance by reserve components (and active components) in war-fighting and peacetime missions. Problem Active and reserve component maintenance personnel typically are given some formal training, acquire experience ''on the job," and then are given training updates for new and modified equipment either in formal courses or "on the job." Both active and reserve maintenance technicians are having increasing difficulty maintaining their skills to make repairs and/or make modifications to "original equipment" because of the complexity of new systems and the occurrence of failures of different components rather than repetitive failures of the same parts. The incorporation of advanced learning techniques, proven new technologies, and real-time mentoring into Department of Defense maintenance procedures could improve the effectiveness of both active and reserve component maintenance technicians with less formal training. The Department of Defense and a large automobile manufacturer are currently participating in a collaborative effort to improve the integration of available technologies and distributed-learning tools. Their

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces goal is to develop or set standards by example (i.e., the standards will evolve as industry and customers adopt the most efficient or effective alternatives). The automobile manufacturer, in conjunction with a computer firm, has developed and demonstrated a wearable computer with user-friendly software that responds to verbal commands. With this technology, repair facilities can download the latest software and diagnostic changes from Detroit overnight, or more rapidly when required, eliminating the need for mailing computer or compact discs. Repair technicians (mechanics) can diagnose problems and make repairs without entering keyboard commands. The portable display monitor (with visual aids and short film clips) can be located with or on the vehicle being repaired, and technicians can dictate notes or memos after repairs for transmittal to Detroit (with no keyboard required). No computer or communication attachments to the vehicle being repaired are required, so the system can be used with existing or "legacy" equipment. The most important aspects of advances in advanced distributed learning for reserve components are: (1) the possibility of using new tools with existing or "legacy" systems, and (2) the potential of maintenance technicians becoming more effective and productive with less formal training. With this technology, reserve component maintenance personnel could become "as good as" active maintenance personnel even though they have less time available for formal training. Description This pilot program could demonstrate that the adoption of advanced distributed-learning and mentoring tools for reserve component personnel would result in more effective and more productive (i.e., more capable and more fully qualified) maintenance technicians. The experiments would be designed to gather information on: (1) the value of advanced distributed-learning tools for the remote training of reserve component personnel; and (2) the benefits of recruiting individuals into the reserve components who use advanced learning tools routinely in their civilian occupations (e.g., maintenance technicians in automobile/truck/heavy equipment dealerships and repair facilities and in aircraft maintenance and repair facilities). Experiments This pilot program would involve three experiments. Experiment 1 would determine the effectiveness of technicians using advanced distributed-learning tools. Experiment 2 would compare the effect on performance of formal and informal training with advanced distributed-learning tools. Experiment 3 would assess the differences in performance between reserve component users and commercial users of advanced distributed-learning tools transferring from one system to a different but similar system. The data on the effectiveness of reserve technicians from Experiment 1 could be compared with data from Experiment 3 on how commercial technicians with advanced distributed-learning experience perform on military equipment. In all of the experiments, the principal measures would be (1) the ability to diagnose causes of failure and (2) the time required to find and replace failed parts. Experiment 1 Objective. Demonstrate how advanced distributed-learning tools could improve diagnoses of maintenance problems and reduce times to repair or replace faulty components. The first experiment would compare the use of advanced distributed-learning tools to traditional tools for repairing reserve component equipment. The experiment would involve Army and Marine Corps reserve component units responsible for maintenance of trucks, other wheeled vehicles, or heavy equipment and Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force reserve component units responsible for maintenance of H1 or H60 helicopters. The Navy has funds to provide the H1 maintenance data in a format that could be used with advanced distributed-learning equipment. The units being compared would have the same equipment (e.g., the family of medium tactical wheeled vehicles in the Army and Marine Corps and the H1 helicopter for reserve components in all services where reserve components have appropriate maintenance units). The objective of the experiment would be to compare the ability of reserve component technicians using advanced distributed-learning tools to detect problems and repair equipment with the ability of control reserve component technicians using traditional tools to perform the same or similar functions. The control units would be reserve component personnel with the same formal training who perform essentially the

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces same functions on the same equipment on a day-to-day basis. The data collected would include (1) how well technicians were able to diagnose the cause of a maintenance problem; and (2) how long it took to repair or replace the faulty components. Qualitative data on the maintenance technicians' opinions of the utility, ease of use, and overall benefit of the new tools would be collected for use by future decision makers. Units in all of the reserve components should participate in this program. The experiment with wheeled vehicles could be run with units in the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. If maintenance of the H1 helicopter is included, the experiment would be beneficial to the aircraft maintenance community in the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, as well as the Army and Air Force. If software data were available, or could be made available, for H60 aircraft components, other reserve units could also participate, thus increasing the range of data. Question. What was the effect of advanced distributed-learning tools on the performance of reserve component technicians? How many repairs or replacements of parts were necessary? How long did it take to diagnose the problem and determine which parts had to be repaired? How long did it take to order parts? How long did it take for parts to arrive? How long did it take to make the equipment operational? Experiment 2 Objective. Determine if formal training (compared to self-training) with advanced distributed-learning tools would improve the ability of reserve component maintenance personnel to diagnose the causes of maintenance problems and repair or replace faulty components. This second experiment would compare the results of the reserve component technicians using advanced distributed-learning tools without formal training to reserve component personnel using the same tools with formal training. This experiment would also involve a few reserve component units responsible for the maintenance of trucks, other wheeled vehicles, heavy equipment, or aircraft. All participating units would be responsible for maintaining the same equipment (e.g., the family of medium tactical wheeled vehicles in the Army and Marine Corps and the H1 helicopter). In this experiment, however, the objective would be to compare the ability of reserve component technicians who have had formal training with the ability of reserve component technicians who have had no formal training. The purpose would be to examine the "self-teaching" capability of these tools. The data to be collected would include (1) how well technicians were able to diagnose the cause of a maintenance problem; and (2) how long it took to repair or replace the faulty components. Qualitative data on the utility, ease of use, and overall benefit of the new tools would also be collected for use by future decision makers. Units in all of the reserve components should participate in this experiment. The experiment with wheeled vehicles could be run with both National Guard and Reserve units in the Army and with Marine Corps reservists. If the H1 helicopter is included, the experiment would be applicable to the aircraft maintenance community in the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves and, perhaps, the Army and Air Force as well. If software data is available, or could be made available, for H60 aircraft components, other reserve component units could participate, thus increasing the range of data. Question. What is the impact of formal training on the performance of reserve component technicians? How many repairs or replacements of parts were necessary? How long did it take to diagnose the problem and determine which parts were needed to repair the equipment? How long did it take to order parts? How long did it take for parts to arrive? How long did it take to make the equipment operational? Experiment 3 Objective. Demonstrate how diagnostic and repair skills based on advanced distributed-learning tools could be rapidly convertible to the maintenance of other equipment.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces This experiment would assess how well reserve component technicians could work on commercial systems and how well commercial technicians could work on military systems, both using distributed-learning tools. One purpose of this experiment would be to assess the ability of individuals to adapt their experience with one system to a different but similar system. A second purpose would be to determine if skilled civilian technicians who routinely use advanced distributed-learning tools would be more effective reserve or guard members than individuals with less experience. (If so, these civilian-sector employees could be targeted for recruitment into specific types of guard and reserve units.) Having commercial technicians work on military systems with no additional special training would provide some data and experience to evaluate. This experiment could be limited to land vehicles if commercial aircraft appropriate for work with advanced distributed-learning tools are not available. The data to be collected would include (1) how well technicians were able to diagnose the cause of a maintenance problem; and (2) how long it took them to repair or replace the faulty components. Qualitative data on the utility, ease of use, and overall benefit of the new tools would also be collected as subjective input for future decision. The Army and Marine Corps units participating in experiments 1 and 2 should also participate in this experiment. Civilian volunteers from the automobile manufacturer's test sites working with the Department of Defense would be contracted on a one-time basis to provide a civilian baseline for comparison. Question 1. Does the use of advanced distributed-learning tools improve reserve component and commercial technicians' ability to repair unfamiliar equipment? How many repairs were necessary? How long did it take to diagnose the problem and determine which parts were needed to repair the equipment? How long did it take to order parts? How long did it take for parts to arrive? How long did it take to make the equipment operational? Question 2. How do reserve component technicians using advanced distributed-learning tools (data from Experiment 1) compare with commercial technicians using the same tools (data from this experiment)? How many repairs were necessary? How long did it take to diagnose the problem and determine which parts were needed to repair the equipment? How long did it take to order parts? How long did it take for parts to arrive? How long did it take to make the equipment operational? Implications This pilot program would demonstrate the effect of advanced distributed learning on the capability of reserve component maintenance technicians to maintain equipment at a high level of readiness. The program would also show how formal training with advanced distributed tools would affect the ability of reserve component technicians to deal with unfamiliar equipment. The findings of this pilot program could lead to an increase in the use of advanced distributed learning in schools and in units. If the program was expanded to include active component technicians, it would also provide data on the relative performance of reserve component and active component maintenance technicians. Streamlined Administrative Processes Objective. Determine how advanced information management and administrative technology can be used to improve the readiness and integration of the reserve components. Problem The mobilization of reserve component units and individuals currently consumes more manpower and time than it should, primarily because some of the personnel management, pay, and record-keeping systems used by active forces, reserve components, and individual reserve units are incompatible. The Army reserve component units, for example, cannot use their peacetime computers and software for mobilization; hence they must transfer data via various stopgap measures and ad hoc procedures. Meanwhile, individuals are processed for active duty as if they were first-time members of their service. The soldier-readiness

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces processing takes an inordinately long time. As a result of these inefficiencies, less time can be spent on post-mobilization training, and many people must be assigned to computer terminals to transfer data. Description This pilot program would involve two experiments, one focused on mobilizing Army reserve component units and one focused on activating individual reservists. Both experiments would explore the use of new technologies to overcome hardware and software incompatibilities to accelerate the transfer of data across the reserve-active divide. The goal is to obtain systems interoperability quickly. This pilot program would focus on the Army; however, the Department of Defense could also develop experiments germane to system incompatibilities in the other services. Experiments The first experiment would focus' on using new technology to accelerate the transfer of personnel data from the reserve component unit to the mobilization station. The second experiment would focus on using new technology to accelerate the processing of reservists for active duty and qualifying them for overseas deployment. Experiment 1 Objective. Demonstrate how active and reserve component pay and personnel data systems could be linked at the time of mobilization. This experiment would help determine whether "quick fixes" could be used to link reserve and active force pay and personnel data systems, how much these "fixes" would cost, and how much time and effort they would save. The experiment would involve two different quick fixes and the status quo as a control system. The experiment could be conducted with reserve component units of any size, but the most obvious candidates would be combat brigades of the Army National Guard. Also, the Army has two relatively new integrated active-Army-and-Army-National-Guard divisions (one at Fort Riley and one at Fort Carson) that could benefit from participation in this experiment. This description is phrased in terms of brigades, parent-division headquarters, and the major Army command responsible for delivering mobilized reserve component units to regional commanders. (The most obvious Army command for this first experiment would be the U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.) The experiment would apply two different hardware and software "fixes" to a practice mobilization of Army National Guard brigades, with the third brigade of each integrated division using current processes to provide baseline data. (The experiment could be performed in both integrated divisions to increase the reliability of the results.) The technologies tested would be selected from the many emerging systems for bridging different software programs and would be purchased and installed by private contractors. The experiment would address the following questions for each method of data transfer. Question 1. Did interoperability accelerate the processing of personnel in each brigade? How long did it take to transfer personnel data from the reserve component system to the active component system at the mobilization station? How many errors were there in transmitted personnel data? What was the percentage of data errors? How many disruptions or failures were there during the transfer of data? How much time was lost during the transfer period because of system failures? Question 2. How much did the system cost? What was the investment cost for the new system? How many personnel were required to operate the system? What were the costs of installing, maintaining, and rehearsing the system in peacetime? What were the operating costs of conducting data transfer upon mobilization? Question 3. Does either of the systems tested merit service-wide adoption? How did the tested systems compare in terms of cost effectiveness? What would the cost of installing the system Army-wide be?

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces What remaining problems would still have to be addressed? Experiment 2 Objective. Investigate how the entry of reservists into active duty can be accelerated. New technologies, or existing systems used in new ways, might accelerate the entry of reservists into active duty, including soldier-readiness processing for overseas deployment. This processing involves ascertaining the condition of reservists and screening them to ensure that they meet statutory and regulatory requirements to be placed on active duty and deployed. For example, reservists are required to have family support plans that make adequate provisions for the support of their dependents. This experiment could be conducted with four company-sized units. The participating units should have the same organization and mission structure to eliminate differences in reporting requirements. Members of a control company would be processed for mobilization using current systems. Members of one test company would be equipped with a "smart card" containing all necessary soldier-readiness processing data. The mobilization station for the test company would be equipped with smart card readers. A second test company would use an expanded version of the existing Reserve Component Automation System. The mobilization station for this company would have to also be equipped with Reserve Component Automation System computers or compatible equipment and software. A third test company would be mobilized with the help of a centralized mobilization assistance unit assigned to its mobilization station. The assistance unit would be linked electronically to the mobilizing company as soon as the mobilization order was received. Equipped with compatible existing or purchased computers, the mobilization assistance unit would be able to transfer the data early. At the same time, the assistance unit would work with the mobilization station to resolve issues relating to different interpretations of mobilization requirements. In effect, the assistance unit would provide authoritative help to the company as it moves through the mobilization process. Question 1. How long did it take to process each company? How long did it take to complete processing for all unit members? How long did it take to complete processing for 80 percent of the unit members? How long did it take to complete processing for 50 percent of the unit members? What was the average time to complete processing for an individual? Question 2. How long did the processing for each unit delay the start of post-mobilization training? How many hours after M-Day1 did post-mobilization training begin? How many soldiers were processed and available for training at the end of each day after M-Day? What proportion of company strength was processed and available for training at the end of each day after M-Day? Question 3. How much effort did processing require on the part of the mobilization station?. How many total staff hours were required to complete processing of the company? How many personnel were required for processing company members? What was the cost of installing various technologies for the different test companies? What was the peacetime cost of the mobilization assistance unit for the third test company? Question 4. What was the quality of processing results? What was the error rate for processing? How many processed personnel were qualified for active duty and deployment? What proportion of processed personnel were qualified for active duty and deployment? How many complaints, reassessments, and reversals of initial disqualifications were there? What was the proportion of complaints, reassessments, and reversals of initial disqualifications? Question 5. Should any of the new processing methods be adopted Army-wide? 1    M-Day is the day mobilization officially begins.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces What are the estimated benefits in terms of earlier availability of reserve component units? What is the estimated cost of adopting the processing system Army-wide? Implications The goal of both experiments would be to overcome differences in computer and software systems among active and reserve component units through "bridging" technologies and other quick fixes. Time saved in processing could translate directly into an earlier start for post-mobilization training. Hence, mobilization would be faster and reserve component units would be available earlier for integration with or in support of active components. Telesupport and Remote Staffing Objective. Demonstrate how information and communications technologies could be used to provide remote support and expertise to improve the readiness, effectiveness, and integration of the reserve components in war-fighting and peacekeeping missions. Problem A major constraint on using reserve components is that their members serve part time and are geographically dispersed. In the past this constraint could only be overcome by converting individuals and units to full-time status and physically relocating them to the site of an active unit or area of need. Revolutionary changes in warfare and in information and communications technologies will ease this constraint. Providing specialized skills in overseas deployment areas is expensive and difficult, both logistically and politically. This problem is parallel to the problem of providing medical care in rural areas. With tele-medicine, key information (e.g., x-rays, cardiac data) can be transmitted to specialists at medical centers who can provide diagnoses and recommendations in real time. The tele-medicine concept is already being used in the military community (e.g., in naval intelligence), where it is called virtual staffing, and in the commercial world, where it is called telecommuting. Technological advances in the coming years will make remote staffing much more effective and easier to implement. In an increasingly sophisticated technological world, competition with the commercial community for skilled personnel has become a serious problem. With remote staffing, specialized expertise could be accessible on an as-needed basis (perhaps in the home or workplace, as well as in the traditional armory). For example, the director of public utilities for a major city could play a similar role in a reserve component civil affairs unit. Another approach would be to combine electronically a group of part-time reservists to provide full-time support. Remote staffing could also ease the problem of retaining reservists with expertise who are now lost when they move to a new area. Remote staffing offers many benefits for the Department of Defense, such as (1) providing support while reducing the size and vulnerability of units deployed overseas; (2) allowing active component forces to concentrate on mission-essential tasks; (3) providing access to a wide range of individuals with special expertise and training; (4) increasing the integration of reserve and active components; and (5) helping to retain members of reserve components. However, remote staffing will have to be demonstrated and publicized to promote its acceptance in the total force. Description Remote staffing is a proven concept that does not require a program to prove its general efficacy. This pilot program could be categorized as a "catalyst" for increasing the acceptance of the concept by the U.S. military. Acceptance is a subtle process that can best be approached from the bottom up rather than the top down. Thus, the committee believes the Department of Defense should ask each of the military services and their corresponding reserve components to suggest areas of application for remote staffing. Pilot programs could then be structured around the suggested applications. One aspect of remote staffing that should be considered is the potential vulnerability of communications and information technologies to enemy disruptions using information warfare techniques. Enemy actions could include, for example, jamming or spoofing transmissions between U.S. forces overseas and their U.S.-based remote staffs. These kinds of risks, and hedges against them, are topics that should be addressed by active components as well as reserve components. The Department of Defense might or might not choose to address them as part of the experiments in this pilot program.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Experiments Whatever pilot program (or programs) the Department of Defense decides to pursue should include experiments structured to answer the following types of questions. Question 1. Which functions (e.g., command, personnel, information [including intelligence], operations, communications, civil-military operations, logistics [including supply, transportation, maintenance, health care], and research and development) could benefit from remote staffing? Identify military-conflict functions for which remote staffing could be useful. Specify applications within the military-conflict functions to which remote staffing can be applied. Develop concepts of operations for each application of remote staffing. Clarify the benefits of remote staffing for conducting military operations. Estimate the costs of each remote staffing application and the cost-avoidance of each application. Question 2. What would the appropriate role for reservists be in remote staffing for each function selected for an experiment? Identify the attributes of military personnel relevant to their participation in remote staffing. Indicate the availability of reservists with skills and experience that would be useful for remote staffing of the function in question. Question 3. What would the effect of using remote staffing for specific functions be on reserve components? Estimate the effectiveness of using reserve components as members of remote staffs. Estimate the effect of using remote staffs on reserve component recruiting and retention. Indicate possible personnel policies for reserve component personnel assigned to remote staffs. Question 4. What effect would remote staffing for the function in the experiment have on the effectiveness of deployed forces? Assess the effect of remote staffing on in-theater performance. Determine if actions by remote staffs are timely. Identify the skills and experience made available by the use of remote staffing. Indicate the reduction in deployed manpower (in the theater of operations) made possible by the use of remote staffing. Identify ways to ensure that remote staffs are responsive to the theater commander and do not become an additional layer of bureaucracy. The pilot program should have an overall sponsor; subsponsors should be selected for experiments in specific functions. Some examples of applications that could be considered for experimentation are listed below. Additional applications can be developed. Intelligence. Remote staffs could provide (1) expert interpretations of imagery and sensor signals, including photographs, infrared, radar, and sonar signals; and (2) detailed, specific information on the physical and human geography of the area of operations. Maintenance. Remote staffs could provide specialized knowledge of specific, low-density items of equipment (analogous to on-line help for computer users). Legal Support. Remote staffs could provide legal counsel and assistance. Supply. Remote staffs could receive requisitions for supplies, relay them to the appropriate national inventory control center, and monitor the filling of orders and shipment of goods in response to requisitions. Civil Affairs. Remote staffs could include personnel with experience in similar civilian jobs (e.g., the director of public utilities mentioned above). Implications The concept of remote staffing has many obvious benefits for the Department of Defense, including improved integration and effectiveness (e.g., access, use, and retention) of the reserve components. The Department of Defense would most certainly benefit from experimenting with the ramifications of the widespread use of remote staffing.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces HIGHLIGHTED PILOT PROGRAMS Reserve Component Battle-Staff Officer Performance Objective. Demonstrate how interactive distributed-simulation technology could be used to improve the readiness and effectiveness of reserve component battle staffs for war-fighting missions. Problem A major point of contention between the Army and the Army National Guard is the level of training of the battle staffs (commander and staff) of the Guard's combat maneuver units. The activities of battle staffs are extremely complex and require high skill levels, which can only be achieved by frequent repetition. Because of the part-time status of the Guard and the geographical dispersal of component elements of a unit, the Guard battle staffs have few opportunities to exercise their skills. Thus, relatively long post-mobilization training times have been necessary. Computer-based courses (distributed via compact disk or the Internet) are now available to train individuals in the skills necessary to a battle-staff officer. The Army is exploring improved methods to conduct effective battle command and staff training (DA, 1999a); these methods could be used for the Army's reserve components as well as its active components. Simulations (e.g., JANUS)2 are being distributed to Guard units to enable them to exercise these skills collectively. Currently, these simulations require that members of the battle staff be in the same physical location. As technology advances in the next decade, members of the battle staff will no longer have to be collocated during exercises. Because full battle-staff exercises require so many resources, each battle officer should be as highly skilled as possible before the start of the exercise. This might be achieved by enabling small groups of two or three officers to refine their interactions first, and then moving to full simulations, such as JANUS, that involve the battalion commander and staff. Once the physical limitations have been removed, officers will be able to able to train together, for example, in groups of two or three, from their homes. Description This pilot program would involve an experiment to compare the performance of the battle staffs of two battalions of the same brigade of an Army National Guard combat maneuver unit in a JANUS-assisted command-post exercise. The officers in the baseline battalion would train in the normal command-post exercise manner. The officers in the experimental battalion would be given the appropriate simulation software and hardware to use the simulation in a distributed mode. A schedule of simulation exercises would be established and implemented, enabling the officers in the experimental battalion to train in groups of two and three. A JANUS command-post exercise would then be conducted to compare the performance of the baseline and experimental battalions. The exercise would encompass terrain and a scenario that are not familiar to either battalion. Experiments The experiments would compare the performances of the two differently trained battle staffs in attack and defend scenarios. Experiment 1 Objective. Determine if the experimental battle staff performs better than the baseline battle staff. Question 1. How do the scores on the Army's test-and-evaluation program differ for the control and experimental groups? What is the percentage of correct responses for the entire baseline staff? What is the percentage of correct responses for each staff position on the baseline staff? What is the percentage of correct responses for the entire experimental staff? What is the percentage of correct responses for each staff position on the experimental staff? Experiment 2 Objective. Determine how (and how much) the experimental battalion battle staff used the fully distributed simulation. 2    JANUS is a series of land-combat models with limited air and naval operations, primarily sponsored by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces What were the total training times for each complete battalion battle staff? What were the total training times for each position on the battle staff? Implications Improving the training of Army National Guard battle staffs could ease the apparent or real friction between Guard units and active Army units. Best-of-Type Competitions Objective. Determine if the readiness and wartime effectiveness of reserve component units could be improved by initiating Army-wide competitions for reserve and active attack-helicopter (and potentially other) units. Problem For years the Air Force has conducted competitions, such as Gunsmoke and William Tell.3 These competitions, which have included both active and reserve component units and individuals, have frequently been won by reserve component units. More important, these competitions have brought active and reserve components together and have built respect for reserve component capabilities. They have also been useful in the development of new tactics and employment concepts. The drawback to these competitions is that they are costly to conduct and involve only a very small percentage of either force. As the range, lethality, and capability of weapons increases, fewer physical facilities and ranges will be able to accommodate these competitions. With rapid improvements in information technology, including high-fidelity virtual and constructive simulations, the scope and frequency of competitions could be increased. The proliferation of simulations, as well as simulation and training devices, could make expanded competitions between active and reserve component units possible. These competitions could be used to improve the readiness and effectiveness of Army reserve component units. In addition, they could be useful in determining if other beneficial effects of competitions, such as those in the Air Force, might apply to the Army (e.g., bringing active and reserve units together and helping to develop new tactics). Finally, the competitions may furnish data that could help to correlate readiness ratings or implement new readiness indicators. Description Information and simulation technology could be used to create a pilot program for active Army units and Army National Guard units to establish unit competitions based on missions, mission-essential task lists, or specified types of units. The competitions would probably be most useful in areas where combat crews (e.g., attack-helicopter crews) can compete. If the results of these competitions are promising, competitions with other types of units could be considered. The reserve components would be the agents of change in the design and application of the competitions. As the competition process was developed and tested by the reserve components, active units could be brought into the program to compete with them. Throughout the pilot program, unit-readiness ratings and performance in live exercises could be monitored to corroborate readiness ratings and subsequent performances in competitions. This experiment, would involve a range of competitions between active component and reserve component Army units (e.g., attack helicopters first, followed potentially by artillery, tank gunnery, infantry squad performance, battle staffs, and possibly computer networked "virtual" units). With the growth and fidelity of distributed simulations, these competitions could include a wide range of geographically separated units. The committee notes that the process of getting ready for the competitions offers many benefits even before the competitions begin, and the sharing of experiences after the competitions offers more benefits. Experiments There would be five experiments in this pilot program. The specific questions addressed in each experiment would be developed by the active Army and Army National Guard components after a review and discussion of the competitions conducted by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. 3    Gunsmoke and William Tell are gunnery competitions for tactical fighters. Gunsmoke takes place at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. William Tell takes place at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Both competitions measure the ability of pilots to drop bombs accurately and shoot rockets and precision-guided weapons against ground targets.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Experiment 1 Objective. Determine how information technology and simulations could be used to develop a standardized system of unit competitions between geographically separated active and reserve component units. Experiment 2 Objective. Determine how constructive simulation technology could be used to create realistic operational environments for competitions, reduce the cost of competitions, and make competitions available to more active and reserve component units. Experiment 3 Objective. Determine if the results of competitions could be used to establish a correlation between readiness ratings and success in competitions. Experiment 4 Objective. Determine if and how the results of simulation-based competitions and unit performance in live exercises could be correlated. Experiment 5 Objective. Determine if the results of competitions could be used to establish predictive readiness indicators. Implications The data produced from this pilot program could indicate how technology could be used to conduct competitions between reserve and active units. The technology might also be used to enhance and verify the readiness and effectiveness of reserve component and active force units. Ultimately, the readiness and effectiveness of both reserve and active components could be improved by competitions. Reserve Peacekeeping Battle Laboratory Objective. Determine how reserve component units now being used extensively for ''operations other than war" can be better trained and better integrated with the active components. Problem The Army may not have an adequate process for developing applications of new technologies to enhance the function of peacekeeping. Any pilot program designed to address this issue would have to be closely aligned with the Army's overall process of defining its next-generation war-fighting needs, especially the "Strike Force" concept and the associated research, development, and training strategies.4 In the last six years, the United States has deployed its forces in a wide range of operations other than war-in Bosnia, Macedonia, Haiti, and Somalia, for example. Reserve component units have been essential participants in these operations by providing skills in civil affairs, psychological operations, military policing, and logistics. In the near future, elements of the 49th Armor Division (Texas Army National Guard) are scheduled to deploy in Bosnia. Yet the Army does not have a battle laboratory dedicated to studying the special challenges of operations other than war. Furthermore, no systematic research has been done into the problems of recruiting and retaining reserve component soldiers when they are used almost as frequently as active-unit soldiers in these operations. Description An excellent way for the reserve components and active components to work together more effectively would be for reserve components to become more active in the Army Training and Doctrine Command Battle Laboratory. The reserve components could become a major focus of the element of the battle laboratory dedicated to improving the effectiveness of land-force peacekeeping operations. As a part of the existing battle laboratory process, whatever was found to be important for peacekeeping would be cost-effectively integrated into equivalent war-fighting recommendations. The basic concept involves a small core of full-time members of the reserve components who would 4   The strike force will have five missions: "high-end" decisive operations, early entry operations, "peace enforcement," deter-contain crisis, and humanitarian assistance (DA, 1999b). Initial training products being developed by the Army will support training for the strike force headquarters and staff on the last three missions.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces screen candidate technology-based proposals and then arrange for unit-level reserve component elements to perform field evaluations. Individuals who had participated in peacekeeping tours would be especially well qualified to participate in this program. The comparatively short field evaluations could be well within the capabilities of part-time reserve component units. In addition, the extensive reserve component optical cable hookup (connected to the Army commercial satellite network) could be used for discussions with active and reserve units deployed for peacekeeping around the world. Before implementing this concept, a pilot program should be undertaken to establish its feasibility and effectiveness. The pilot program would involve two stages: (1) the development of organizational, operational, and facilities requirements; and (2) a six-month miniprogram operated with a skeleton staff. Both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve components should be offered the opportunity of sharing responsibility with active components for the pilot program. The responsible parties and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Battle Laboratory would develop the details of how the peacekeeping group would interface with the war-fighting battle laboratory group. Representatives of both groups would then work out the details of the pilot program, including the establishment of specific criteria and objectives for judging the results. Experiments The experimental battle laboratory would focus exclusively on the demands of operations other than war, especially the effectiveness of reserve component personnel and their integration with active components. Like other battle laboratories, this one would be part of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, however, the National Guard Bureau or the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (or both) under a joint arrangement, would be responsible for creating and staffing the laboratory. The laboratory could be linked to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, perhaps even located near it, where conceptual and operational testing could be conducted. The laboratory would be staffed by reserve component and active component personnel, both full time and part time. Implications Even though the most demanding future military contingency will be a major-theater war, the most prevalent use of the Army in the next decades will probably be for peacekeeping and other nonwar operations. These operations also entail personal danger. Integrating the needs of peacekeeping forces with the needs of war-fighting forces is especially important to ensure that focusing on one task does not cripple the Army's ability to perform other tasks. Continuous Land Warfare Objective. Determine how reserve component personnel can augment active units to enhance their ability to operate continuously. Problem Sensors, night vision aids, and precision weapons have enabled U.S. forces to "own the night" (i.e., operate effectively and aggressively against enemy forces around the clock and in adverse weather). With advanced technology, weapons systems are becoming increasingly reliable and maintainable, enabling continuous combat operations. Many weapons systems and their supporting elements can now function for extended periods of time without maintenance. Technological superiority, however, has also created a dilemma. Not surprisingly, these new equipment capabilities can strain the physical abilities of both combat and support personnel. This limitation could be critical in the first days of a conflict when the United States has only early entry forces and their equipment in the area. The early days of a combat operation are often characterized by a rush to get manpower and equipment on site as soon as possible. Because available airlift capability is finite it is usually faster and easier to transport personnel than it is to move in heavy equipment. Early entry forces, especially equipment-intensive units, could be augmented with trained personnel to increase their early war-fighting capability. Augmentation could include (1) combat support elements, such as artillery, attack helicopters, and intelligence gathering by unmanned aerial vehicles; or (2) combat service support elements like transportation (to move ammunition and other supplies forward), engineers (who can create barriers, for example), and teams who can repair battle-damaged equipment. Augmentation of personnel could also be valuable during sustained combat operations. This would seem to be a natural way to exploit the inherent value of the reserve components, particularly those who could be

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces shipped into the theater of operations well ahead of their equipment. Reserve component personnel may be coming from units that do not use the same equipment as the active units they will augment. This may necessitate simulation training on the types of equipment used by the active units. To enable reserve component individuals, teams, and staffs to work closely with their active component counterparts, they will have to train together and participate in distributed simulations. Description Determining the viability of individual, team, or small-unit augmentation concepts and whether reserve component units and personnel can function in this capacity will require a carefully constructed pilot program. The program would determine what type of units (or functions) would benefit the most from augmentation, at what level (e.g., individual, team, or unit), when augmentation would be most effective, and what type of additional training, if any, would be needed. Augmentating personnel to maintain the continuous operation would be most effective where there is an accumulation of highly effective equipment that is difficult to transport into theater, such as artillery and attack helicopters. Operating this equipment around the clock would provide critical war-fighting capability to early entry forces. Active component personnel who operate equipment in combat service support units, such as transportation, logistics, engineers, medical, and communications, could be augmented by reserves to furnish around-the-clock support. The level of augmentation will depend on the equipment and the degree of coordination and synchronization required. In some situations, the augmentation of a small number of key individuals will provide the necessary depth without creating a burden. In other situations, a larger functional team or crew will be required. In some other situations, entire units that can take over the operation of equipment may be advantageous. Maintaining high-tempo operations on a near-continuous basis is a complex challenge at all echelons. Combat support and combat service support units must be as mobile as the combat units they support. Augmenting personnel in units that are continually on the move is extremely difficult. Given the fluid environment of land warfare, augmentation may be more practical for units that operate beyond the line-of-sight of forward units. The first phase of this pilot program would develop and test concepts for augmenting some elements of combat support and combat service support units to facilitate near-continuous, high-tempo operations. The second phase of this pilot program would address alternative times for augmentation and their relation to critical events. If the first two phases are successful, a third phase would experiment with applications of distributed learning, exercises, and simulations to determine how reserve component personnel, teams, and units might be used to augment their active component counterparts effectively. Experiments Before the experiments begin, the Department of Defense should assess what types of combat support or combat service support units or functions would be most amenable to augmentation. The experiments described below would proceed with these types of units. Experiment 1 Objective. Determine the most effective level of augmentation (i.e., individual, team, unit). Question 1. How do the following factors affect different types of units? How long does it take to achieve full assimilation of augmented personnel? What is a reasonable cycle-time for augmentation? What is the logistical and operational impact of each kind of augmentation? What are the overall effects of augmentation by individuals compared to augmentation by teams or units? Question 2. How much improvement in mission effectiveness can be achieved through augmentation at the individual, team, and unit levels? Experiment 2 Objective. Determine reasonable times or critical events requiring the assignment of augmentation personnel.

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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Question 1. Should personnel be augmented prior to deployment, immediately upon entry into a theater of operations, or subsequently based on anticipated use? How much augmentation is reasonable early in an operation? Does the timing of the augmentation enhance or inhibit unit cohesion? Should added training, if needed, take place prior to deployment or in-theater? Question 2. Would personnel augmentation be more effective if coordinated with critical events, such as the commencement of an operation or a pull-back for reconstitution? Would augmentation be effective for operational units, or should it be limited to units held in reserve? What level of added training or orientation would be required for augmentation in an operational unit? Experiment 3 Objective. Show how distributed-learning exercises and simulations could be used to facilitate augmentations. (This experiment would only be developed further and carried out if the results of the first two experiments were encouraging.) Implications This pilot program could provide the Army with a viable means of extending continuous operation to preserve critical initial momentum. This pilot program could produce a template for a range of augmentation possibilities, as well as the types of preparation, training, and theater-orientation necessary for augmentation personnel.