Objective. Demonstrate how technology could be used to improve the effectiveness of the reserve components by reducing multiple deployments in peacekeeping operations.
Under the burden of continuous, intensive peace-keeping operations, certain units in both the active and reserve components have been assigned to multiple rotations, placing a heavy peacetime burden on those soldiers and probably creating problems for recruiting and retaining personnel for both military components.
This pilot program would select two overused categories of deployable units (e.g., military police and civil affairs) and attempt to identify a procedure acceptable to both active and reserve components for deployments and for assessing the results of experiments. The Army Reserves should probably undertake the civil affairs experiment, the Army National Guard the military police experiment, and the Army Research Laboratory the assessment of the results of the overall program. Distance learning could be used to prepare both the cadre and volunteer augmentees for their missions.
The idea of the program would be to deploy cadre units at one-fourth strength (rather than fully manned) and to supplement these units to full-strength status with volunteer active and reserve personnel who have
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Appendix B Descriptions of Other Pilot Programs This appendix contains detailed descriptions of eight of the pilot programs summarized briefly in Chapter 4. Although these programs were not highlighted in the report, the committee believes they all merit serious consideration by the Department of Defense. Each description includes a list of the issues addressed; an overview of the program content, including experiments; and a discussion of implications. The purpose of these descriptions is to clarify the objectives and general thrust of each pilot program and to provide a starting point for planning. Thus, these descriptions should be regarded as plausible ways of conducting the programs but not hard and fast prescriptions. CADRE UNITS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Some Army reserve component units (e.g., psychological operations, civil affairs, and military police) are in such high demand for peacekeeping and stability operations that they have been deployed repeatedly in recent years, raising the possibility of growing dropout rates in the years ahead. This pilot program would evaluate the adequacy of deploying cadre units at one-quarter strength and filling them at the time of mobilization with active and reserve component volunteers who had received some training through distance-learning techniques. Objective. Demonstrate how technology could be used to improve the effectiveness of the reserve components by reducing multiple deployments in peacekeeping operations. Problem Under the burden of continuous, intensive peace-keeping operations, certain units in both the active and reserve components have been assigned to multiple rotations, placing a heavy peacetime burden on those soldiers and probably creating problems for recruiting and retaining personnel for both military components. Description This pilot program would select two overused categories of deployable units (e.g., military police and civil affairs) and attempt to identify a procedure acceptable to both active and reserve components for deployments and for assessing the results of experiments. The Army Reserves should probably undertake the civil affairs experiment, the Army National Guard the military police experiment, and the Army Research Laboratory the assessment of the results of the overall program. Distance learning could be used to prepare both the cadre and volunteer augmentees for their missions. Experiments The idea of the program would be to deploy cadre units at one-fourth strength (rather than fully manned) and to supplement these units to full-strength status with volunteer active and reserve personnel who have
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces received pre-assignment training (remote or in situ) provided by the reserve components. Experiment 1 Objective 1. Determine how effectively fully augmented military police cadre units carry out their peace-keeping missions. How knowledgeable are augmented personnel about the functions necessary to accomplish their mission? Do they have the skills to carry out their missions? How willing are they to undertake their assigned missions? How determined are they to fulfill their missions? How well were the missions accomplished? Objective 2. Determine if augmentation reduced the overall tempo of operations. Objective 3. Determine if this arrangement would improve the retention and stabilization rates of otherwise overused units. Experiment 2 Objective 1. Determine how effectively fully augmented civil affairs cadre units carry out their peace-keeping mission. How knowledgeable are augmented personnel about the functions necessary to accomplish their mission? Do they have the skills to carry out their missions? How willing are they to undertake their assigned missions? How determined are they to fulfill their missions? How well were the missions accomplished? Objective 2. Determine if augmentation reduced the overall tempo of operations. Objective 3. Determine if this arrangement would improve the retention and stabilization rates of otherwise overused units. Implications The results of this pilot program could be used to evaluate using cadre units to alleviate the problem of overused active and reserve components. The results might also suggest how other inequities resulting from continuous, high-level, peacekeeping responsibilities could be redressed. RESERVE COMPONENT PARTICIPATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION One mission of the reserve components is to help manage the consequences of attacks with weapons of mass destruction in the United States. This pilot program would focus on the establishment of reserve component units in major cities comprised of technical specialists who can diagnose a situation immediately after an incident and call in appropriate experts. Locating and using these units in major cities might attract experts who, not wanting to leave their home areas, might otherwise not volunteer to serve in the reserve components. Objective. Determine if part-time Army National Guard units that are not co-located with full-time National Guard teams assigned to the weapons-of-mass-destruction defense missions could improve the efficiency of full-time teams by providing on-site assessments of incidents. Problem Under the current response plan, a network of 10 National Guard teams, each manned with 22 full-time personnel, would be quickly deployed to emergency areas in the United States in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Ten teams distributed over the entire United States constitutes, at best, a marginal quick-response force. Considering the possibility of simultaneous, multiple incidents, as well as the possibility of false alarms by a panicky local populace, on-site assessment teams would have a real advantage.
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Description This pilot program would explore the efficacy of locating National Guard units in urban areas where individuals with specific skills could be called upon to respond rapidly to unlikely but potentially very dangerous incidents. These units would provide unit identities for individuals who could be called upon as individuals or in small teams to augment local police, fire, and medical officials in the event of an emergency. Each National Guard response unit might have a small number of full-time personnel, one or more of whom would always be on call and could respond immediately to a call from local authorities. The designated individuals and teams could be trained via distance-learning techniques and simulations. The on-site team would provide the larger weapons-of-mass-destruction unit with an immediate estimate of the situation, which could reduce the probability of false alarms and identify needs for special equipment and/or trained specialists, as well as for other personnel. Experiments Objective. Determine the best way for part-time units to improve the effectiveness of full-time National Guard units. Experiment The experiment would be conducted with National Guard units based in two or three cities other than the home stations of the full-time teams. After simulated incidents, the part-time teams would coordinate with local authorities, make a quick estimate of the situation, and report to the full-time team responsible for that area. Question 1. Did the local authorities find the assistance of the part-time team helpful? Question 2. Was the information provided by the on-site team to the full-time team helpful? Question 3. Did the full-time team modify its original deployment plan as a result of the information provided by the on-site team? Implications This program could provide the National Guard with data for effectively carrying out an important mission. Involving local specialists in a National Guard mission on a part-time basis could enable the National Guard to retain qualified personnel and increase public support for and confidence in the National Guard as a whole. Maintaining a high state of training and readiness with part-time personnel who use their skills in their day-to-day employment might be easier than trying to maintain the same level of readiness with full-time personnel who might use these skills only in response to a real incident. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGISTS IN THE TOTAL FORCE In the future, the Department of Defense's doctrine and tactics will rely increasingly on information dominance. However, the private sector will continue to take the lead in the application of new information technologies, and few information specialists are likely to choose active component duty given the attractiveness of civilian jobs. This pilot program would explore innovative ways of using information technologists in the reserve components to make service more attractive. A subsequent experiment could then evaluate incentives for attracting such individuals to the reserve components. Objective. Determine how reserve components and active forces could improve their readiness and effectiveness by maintaining trained, ready, militarily aware information specialists. Problem The communications revolution will enable the U.S. military to deploy a relatively small force to a combat theater and link that force to technical experts based in the continental United States-so-called remote support units for help in a wide variety of areas, such as maintenance, software modification, and medical treatment. In other words, the new technologies will enable U.S. forces to take some problems to the experts rather than taking the experts to the problem. This would enable reserve component units to participate in conflicts of all sorts more quickly than if they had to be deployed to the theater. Reservists, however, may be no more available or effective for some tasks than civilians on contract in case of emergency. The military
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces should determine the best way to organize and tap into available expertise. Description Expertise from remote sources could be organized in several ways: (1) in reserve component units of a specific kind (e.g., a maintenance unit or an information warfare cell); (2) individual reservists with specific expertise, either in the Individual Ready Reserve or the Active Reserve; (3) civilian experts organized into reserve component cells for the purpose of providing remote support when reserve component cells are deployed away from home. A pilot program to determine the best way to ensure the availability of support from information technologists would explore using all three organizations across a range of specialties (e.g., hardware, software, computer security). An experiment involving computer security is described below. Experiment One active unit would be linked to experimental volunteer units of experts in computer security organized in the three ways outlined above. Before the experiment begins, all three groups would be given training in the general duties of remote staffs. The active unit would be put through high-intensity operations, perhaps at the National Training Center, to simulate crisis or combat conditions. The performance of the remote staff units would be monitored and assessed. The baseline arrangement would be a unit operating on its own or a similar unit with attached support. The Army's Forces Command could organize this experiment, but the Atlantic Command might be the most appropriate command headquarters, given its responsibility for joint testing and experimentation. Question 1. How effectively were remote computer-security organizations able to get expertise to the active unit when it was needed? Question 2. How important was the quality and timeliness of the computer-security support to the accomplishment of the mission? Implications This pilot program could shed light on whether expert information technologists organized in different ways could support active forces engaged overseas. A subsequent experiment could evaluate incentives for attracting information experts into the reserve components or civilian organizations. UNMANNED VEHICLES Advanced unmanned aerial vehicles have great potential not only for war but also for operations other than war (e.g., reconnaissance, communications). Today they can be operated remotely within a theater of operations (e.g., Bosnia). In the future, technology will enable control of unmanned vehicles from halfway around the globe. Reserve component personnel could participate in the operation of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles. This pilot program would involve a series of graduated experiments to determine if unmanned vehicles could be operated by reserve component personnel. Objective. Determine if the use of advanced technologies for unmanned vehicles, sensors, communications, and computers would improve the effectiveness and integration of reserve components with the active components while furthering technically advanced unmanned operations in the 2010 to 2020 time frame. Problem As advanced sensor technology and advanced computing and communications improve, the use of remotely operated unmanned systems is bound to increase. These vehicles could be operated from the theater of operations or from halfway around the globe, and they could be used to carry out the full spectrum of missions. In the event that communications are disrupted into and out of an entire region of the United States, temporary emergency communications capabilities could be established by flying unmanned vehicles over the area. These communications-relay vehicles could reestablish links between local governments and national emergency-response officials, including members of the reserve components, as well as help residents and businesses reestablish normal activities. These or other aerial vehicles could be equipped with various sensors (e.g., to assess the extent of damage or identify
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces contaminated areas). Other missions could include surveillance of U.S. borders. Stability operations overseas, including peacekeeping operations, could benefit from similar temporary communications or surveillance capabilities (e.g., some surveillance for peacekeeping operations is already being done by unmanned aerial vehicles). During war-fighting, commanders-in-chief or lower-level commanders may require supplemental communications or surveillance capabilities for a region of operations. The United States is becoming increasingly concerned about even small numbers of U.S. casualties in conflicts overseas. Another serious concern is the prospect of captured U.S. military personnel being paraded through the streets of foreign cities. Unmanned aerial vehicles would eliminate the possibility of losing a pilot if the air vehicle were shot down. The military is also considering the use of unmanned combat air vehicles in regions that are heavily defended. In fact, unmanned vehicles may have some operational advantages over manned aircraft (e.g., their ability to pull very high g-loads that are beyond the limits of human endurance and their ability to operate in inhospitable environments). The Army is considering the use of unmanned ground vehicles as part of a future strike force with operators who would be out of harm's way. However, these operations are only visions at the present time. A great deal of work will have to be done to develop these technologies and their operational capabilities before they can be widely endorsed by the Department of Defense. Description Members of the reserve components would experiment with several advanced systems. The experiments would gradually increase in sophistication as they moved from homeland defense to small-scale contingencies to war-fighting operations to bringing about service-wide changes. The experiments would begin after members of the reserve components had become familiar with the operations of current unmanned aerial vehicles. The data-gathering and analysis would be performed under the supervision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by appropriate elements of the reserve component, in coordination with the military services. The assistance of contractors would also be necessary. The Office of the Secretary of Defense would make the unmanned aerial vehicles or other unmanned vehicles available for the experiments. Experiments Experiment 1 Objective. Demonstrate how the use of unmanned aerial vehicles could increase the effectiveness of homeland defense by reserve components. This experiment would involve communications relays and sensor-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles. The reserve component participants in these experiments would be chosen for their technical skills in computers, communications, and sensors, as well as their operational experience as Air Force or Navy pilots. They would work closely with the other personnel involved in homeland defense. Question 1. Can reserve components adequately control unmanned aerial vehicles as part of their homeland defense mission? How many missions were flown without navigational error? What percentage of the information available to the unmanned aerial vehicles was reported correctly? How many unmanned aerial vehicles were damaged? How many missions had to be aborted? Question 2. Can unmanned aerial vehicles improve the reserve components' defense of the homeland? How many messages were received with and without unmanned aerial vehicles in a simulated emergency? How long did it take get the unmanned aerial vehicle airborne and operational? What percentage of the simulated damage was reported correctly? What percentage of simulated illegal border crossings were effectively stopped? Experiment 2 Objective. Demonstrate how the use of unmanned aerial vehicles could improve the effectiveness and integration of reserve components with the active components in small-scale contingencies.
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces This experiment would involve unmanned aerial vehicles operated by the reserve components over regions subject to possible U.S. military operations (e.g., peace-keeping operations); however, the reserve component operators would remain in the United States (or aboard U.S. ships), and the unmanned aerial vehicles would be flown remotely. The experiment would begin with an operation close to the United States, but the goal would be to develop remote operating techniques that could be used at global distances via satellite communications. The reserve component participants in these experiments would be chosen for their technical skills in computers, communications, and sensors, as well as their operational experience as Air Force or Navy pilots. They would work closely with other personnel involved in small-scale contingencies. Question 1. Can reserve components control and operate unmanned aerial vehicles as a part of small-scale contingencies? How many missions were flown without navigational error? What percentage of the information available to the unmanned aerial vehicles was reported correctly? How many unmanned aerial vehicles were damaged? How many missions were aborted? Question 2. Can remotely operated unmanned aerial vehicles enhance peacekeeping operations? How many simulated incidents, such as unauthorized movements of armor in an exclusion zone, were detected and reported? How many of the reports were erroneous? How long did it take for unmanned vehicles to react to an emergency? Question 3. Can unmanned vehicles be operated effectively at very long distances by operators in the United States or aboard U.S. ships? What percentage of unmanned aerial vehicle missions was conducted without loss? What percentage of simulated incidents was detected and reported? What percentage of messages was relayed correctly? Experiment 3 Objective. Demonstrate how using unmanned aerial vehicles could improve the effectiveness and integration of reserve components with the active components in wartime. This experiment would require that reserve components fly unmanned aerial vehicles remotely from the United States (or U.S. ships) as part of exercises for regional war-fighting. The reserve component personnel would have superb technical skills in computers, communications, and sensors, as well as operational experience as Air Force or Navy pilots. The reserve personnel would be teamed with participants in prior experiments, as well as members of the command performing the war-fighting exercise. Question 1. Can reserve components adequately control and operate unmanned aerial vehicles as a part of war-fighting operations? How many missions were flown without navigational error? What percentage of the information available to the unmanned aerial vehicles was reported correctly? How many unmanned aerial vehicles were damaged? How many missions were aborted? Question 2. Do these operations provide the capabilities needed by commanders? By what percent was the commander's knowledge of the situation increased? What percentage of information was in time to be useful? By what percent did communications between commanders and their subordinates increase? What was the likelihood of an effective attack or defense? Question 3. Can unmanned aerial vehicles be operated effectively at very long distances by operators in the United States or aboard U.S. Ships? What percentage of unmanned aerial vehicle missions was conducted without loss?
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces What percentage of simulated incidents was detected and reported? What percentage of messages was relayed correctly? Experiment 4 Objective. Test whether reserve components could serve as agents of change in the use of unmanned vehicles in combat. In this experiment, members of the reserve components would conduct operations with remotely controlled air vehicles in simulated combat conditions. Current fighter or bomber aircraft would have to be modified for such purposes unless advanced prototypes of unmanned combat air vehicles become available from Department of Defense research and development programs. A variation of this experiment would be to conduct simulated ground operations with remotely controlled ground vehicles. The reserve component personnel would require superb technical skills in computers, communications, and sensors, as well as operational experience as Air Force or Navy pilots; if ground-based unmanned combat vehicles are included, reserve component personnel would require Army experience. Reserve personnel would be teamed with others involved in prior experiments, as well as with members of the active components and members of the research and development community who are working on advanced systems. Question 1. Are the advanced technologies suitable for unmanned vehicles being used in combat, including operations at global distances? How many targets were detected by unmanned vehicles? How many targets were engaged by unmanned vehicles? How many targets were destroyed by unmanned vehicles? How many unmanned vehicles were lost? Compare the numbers for unmanned vehicles controlled by distant operators and nearby operators. Question 2. What technical adjustments will be necessary for ongoing research and development programs? How many failures were caused by technical deficiencies, as opposed to training deficiencies? How many failures were caused by simulated enemy communications countermeasures? How many failures were caused by the simulated delivery of enemy ordnance? Implications This series of experiments would provide data for assessing the benefits of using unmanned vehicles to improve the effectiveness of integration of the reserve components across a wide range of missions. If the experiments show that remote combat operations are feasible, this would obviously lessen concerns about the loss or capture of U.S. military personnel during overseas operations. The results would also influence ongoing research and development programs on unmanned systems. The data could also be used to assess whether reserve components perform effectively in remote operations of this type; if so, the Department of Defense might decide to rely on integrated active component and reserve component units for these missions, with active components carrying out the elements of missions that require a manned presence overseas. Finally, if these experiments are carried out by reserve components, active forces could continue to perform their day-to-day functions. BIOSENSORS Injury and stress naturally: degrade an individual's performance. Personal biosensors, similar to the ones used for manned space flight, could be attached to military personnel in stressful situations (e.g., during training) to detect conditions that could affect performance and relay the information back to a command post where it could be interpreted remotely by reserve component specialists. Several experiments in this pilot program would focus on using this information effectively. Objective. Test how biosensors could contribute to the effectiveness and integration of reserve components in a spectrum of missions.
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Problem Individuals in stressful situations (e.g., training for combat) may become less effective because of changes in their physical condition caused by fatigue, injury, exposure to chemical or biological agents, fear, etc. The degree to which these changes affect performance varies with the severity of the change. If the leaders of units in stressful situations are not aware of these changes they may not make appropriate decisions. Description Biotechnology has made many recent advances. The physical condition and location of each individual can now be monitored by sensors that are swallowed, implanted, or applied externally. The data on the condition of each individual can then be sent to a central point and the results consolidated to determine the individual's condition. Some of the information could be analyzed and would be available in near-real time. This pilot program would consist of experiments to determine how long it would take a reserve component professional (1) to receive information from the field and (2) to decide whether and/or when to send information back to the commander to use in the field. Experiments Experiment 1 Objective. Determine how effectively physical information generated in the field can be displayed in a remote location. Question 1. How well do the sensors detect and report the condition of the subject? How accurately did they report the location of the subject? How accurately did they report the fatigue factor? What percentage of injuries was reported? How many false alarms were there? Question 2. Was the information properly displayed? How many remote locations could receive and display data? How accurate were the displays? How long did it take for the data to be displayed? Experiment 2 Objective. Determine the quality of the information received, and how long it took to analyze and report back to the commander. Question 1. How closely did the analysis of received data match the actual conditions? Question 2. How timely and how useful was the information given to the commander? How long did it take for the commander to receive the data? How much of the information was used by the commander? Implications Biosensors could improve the effectiveness of units, reduce casualties, and take advantage of the skills of remote, reserve component professional personnel. TOTAL FORCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY It will be difficult for large, Army National Guard units to meet rapid deployment requirements. Large units generally require more post-mobilization training, and heavy equipment requires sealift and airlift. This pilot program would explore the capability, mobilization time, and integration potential of small, elite Army National Guard combat units, such as helicopter companies and special reconnaissance units, equipped with the latest hardware. Objective. Test ways to get Army National Guard combat units to the scene of battle quickly enough to be of use to the total force. Problem At present, Army National Guard units are relatively slow in moving from their home bases to the scene of battle for two reasons: (1) they need several weeks of
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces post-mobilization training to prepare for combat, and (2) moving their heavy weapons and equipment takes time, effort, and a substantial amount of strategic airlift or sealift. Description This pilot program would try to take advantage of the shorter training time for units smaller than brigades or divisions by creating small (company-sized), elite Guard units to fill special roles early in a conflict. The program would be tailored to meet the needs of the Army's new strike force and would be in keeping with the trend outlined in Joint Vision 2010 and similar documents toward smaller combat units and a smaller theater footprint for the combat force as a whole. The experiment would prepare the Army National Guard for playing a larger role in future conflicts. The Army Forces Command should supervise the experiment. Experiment This experiment would involve small Army National Guard combat units, such as (1) elite helicopter companies and (2) special reconnaissance units, that could perform special functions early in a conflict. An elite helicopter company could serve as a link between U.S. and foreign militaries in coalition operations. The helicopters could be outfitted with communications and other bridging technologies. Special reconnaissance units would be equipped with precision target-detection and designation technologies as well as communications technology able to ''reach back" to standoff firepower from all services. Other types of units could be evaluated as Army concepts evolve. In all cases, Guard units would be configured with the latest technology and given priority in established training regimes. Experiment 1 Objective. Determine how rapidly small elite combat units could be deployed and integrated with other deployed forces. Question 1. How long would it take to mobilize elite Guard units? What was the interval between recognition of a need and an order to mobilize the unit? What was the interval between the mobilization order and readiness to deploy? How long did it take from deployment to readiness for action in conjunction with other units in the theater of operations? Question 2. How effective was the elite Guard unit? Obtain effectiveness scores for the elite Guard unit. Obtain effectiveness scores for brigades or divisions with and without the Guard unit. Implications If successful, this program could shed light on ways to get the larger, more complex Army National Guard combat units to the battle quickly. HELICOPTER UNIT INTERFACES WITH ALLIES The Army National Guard has had very few early entry combat assignments and thus has had limited opportunities to prove that it can successfully discharge these assignments. This pilot program would experiment with using Guard-operated, high-technology helicopters to provide battlefield information to allied forces. Objective. Demonstrate how technology could be used to develop an important early entry combat role for the Army National Guard. Problem The assignment of important early entry combat duties to the Army National Guard has been difficult for several reasons. The Army National Guard has insisted that its members not be used as "fillers" for primarily active forces. Active forces have been unconvinced that rapidly mobilized Guard units of substantial size can perform as well as active personnel in the critical early phases of a conflict. Successful performance cannot be proven without an appropriate assignment, which cannot be obtained without a demonstration of success. One way to resolve the issue
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces would be to assign the Army National Guard an important early entry land-force assignment that is not already assigned to active component forces, such as providing allies with information and interfaces with U.S. "digitized" forces relayed by Comanche helicopters. Comanche aircraft would be procured for designated Army National Guard units to enable them to self-deploy to a combat area and operate with our allies. In this way, accurate and timely information of enemy activity in allied combat areas would be input rapidly into the U.S. system for overall "digitized" control of the battlefield. This arrangement would not only provide U.S. allies with better information, but it would also demonstrate the capabilities of National Guard units in early entry combat. The pilot program would not have been possible without the Comanche's new technologies, including a comparatively low-observable design, enabling intelligence to be gathered in ways that were not possible before. With the Comanche's digitized interface into the U.S. control system, information can be entered into the system in near-real time. The Comanche's features would minimize deployment requirements, which now compete with other early entry requirements. Description This pilot program would be conducted in two phases: a planning phase and small-unit trials. The National Guard Bureau should have overall responsibility for conducting the program. However, since the program would require the participation of both U.S. active and allied forces, representatives of these organizations should also be included. Experiment Objective. Determine whether properly equipped National Guard personnel can self-deploy to a combat area and operate with our allies. In the first phase, a group of active and National Guard personnel would be formed to plan in detail how, from the U.S. perspective, the overall concept of Comanche support to allies could best be implemented. The team would then select one or two partners and determine the best method of meeting both U.S. and allied interests. The entire team, including allies, would then analyze the costs and benefits of the arrangement. Assuming the results of the analysis were positive, small-unit trials could be conducted using the Guard-operated Comanche's in conjunction with an allied combat unit. Implications Because the Army will almost always be fighting as part of a joint or combined force, our allies must be integrated into the concepts of the new "digitized" force. Allied forces are unlikely to field compatible capabilities. Therefore, the United States will probably have to compensate for this difference in some way, perhaps through a series of pilot programs. At the same time, providing Comanche support to allied forces could be a way of testing using the National Guard to meet the readiness requirements of early entry forces. TEST-BED FOR ACTIVE FORCE TRANSFORMATION Future military operations, as described in Joint Vision 2010, will be strikingly different from current military operations. The development of, and transformation to, future doctrine will take years. As the military (particularly the Army) changes, it will have to decide when to deploy and fight using the former (abandoned) doctrine and/or when to change to the new (not yet mastered) doctrine. This pilot program would explore ways for evaluating new doctrine by reserve components. Objective. Use the reserve components to accelerate the transition of the active forces to the new doctrine. Problem The anticipated transformation of U.S. military forces is based largely on the premise that advances in sensors, computers, and communications will provide them with superior knowledge of the battle space. Documents such as Joint Vision 2010 hypothesize that these technological advances will lead to significant changes in the structures and operations of active military forces. At this point, however, the U.S. military has undertaken little experimentation on how differences in situational awareness would alter current military structures, organizations, and operations. The lack of experimentation is attributable to several factors,
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces including a reluctance to commit significant active duty forces to testing different organizations and operations. As a result, the United States could miss the opportunity to assess the effects of new information technologies during this period of relative strategic calm. Description This pilot program would use the reserve components, working jointly and often in a distributed manner, to experiment with and test different organizational and operational approaches to using information technologies. The program would, in effect, use a portion of the reserve components-the equivalent of a ground-force division and an air wing-as a test-bed. The participants would not test or evaluate advanced technologies for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, but would experiment with and evaluate how current military organizations and operational styles could be changed to take advantage of new technologies. A pilot program would be undertaken in stages in conjunction with the Joint Experimentation Master Plan recently drafted by the Atlantic Command. The initial stages would focus on defining organizational and operational options using distributed interactive simulations rather than field exercises. Subsequent phases would increasingly involve field exercises with a mix of reserve and active components. The later phases of the program would require integrating advanced platforms and command-and-control systems into reserve component elements. Experiments The pilot program involves two experiments. The first explores the extent to which distributed interactive simulations can support collaborative development by geographically separated reserve components. The second involves field exercises to test the concepts generated by the distributed interactive simulations. Experiment 1 Objective. Determine how technology can be used to develop new organizational and operational concepts associated with dominant battle-space knowledge. Current personal computers have the capacity to support war games based on differential situational awareness. The pilot program would enlist reserve component units to play and analyze these games to determine which kinds of deviations from standard operating procedures tended to have the highest payoff in combat success. This experiment would involve designating several reserve component combat units as a test-bed group. These units would be released from the normal training cycle and from mobilization plans for a period of two years. During that time, they would participate in an experimental cycle in which they would initially identify new operational schemes through the iteration of interactive games that differentiate the players in terms of battle-space awareness. In the addendum to this pilot program, a potential interactive vehicle is described. This vehicle and others would provide the opportunity to play through a number of military contingencies, virtually and competitively. The Atlantic Command could provide the contingency scenarios and set the levels of battle-space awareness for the players, who could be either battle staffs or entire reserve component units. The focus and challenge to the players would be to develop different ways of conducting military operations, given the level of awareness U.S. military forces derived from the advanced systems for command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that will enter the inventory in the next five years. The insights and hypotheses generated from these games would be tested and demonstrated during annual active duty training. The details of the experiment design could be developed by the J-9 element of the Atlantic Command in connection with the Joint Experimentation Master Plan. Data generation, collection, and analysis could be provided by private contractors or, alternatively, by the J-7 unit on the Joint Staff. The reserve component units involved in the experiment would be designated by the commander of the Atlantic Command under his authority for joint experimentation. Question 1. How well can the reserve components serve as a test-bed for the development of alternative organizational and operational templates? How many ways were found to improve organizational and operational concepts? How stable were the reserve component units testing the new concepts? How well were the new concepts accepted by the active component?
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Question 2. How can distributed interactive simulations be used to help in the development of operational concepts? To what degree was interactive simulation technology used? How much was the Internet used to support operational concept development? What was the fidelity level of the simulations? How well did interactive simulations correlate with actual field experiences? Question 3. How well can the reserve component, working jointly across service specialties, collaborate in the development of operational concepts? How well was reserve component input accepted by the joint services? What percentage of reserve component-developed concepts was adopted? The experiment would generate both individual game records and a one-year history of the reserve components' participation in the experiment. The game records would provide a basis for analyzing decisions and game moves. This, in turn, would provide an empirical basis for determining the willingness and ability of reserve components to adopt innovative operational and organizational behavior. The one-year history could be used as a basis for determining how well reserve components learned new ways of doing things. Experiment 2 Objective. Determine how reserve components could test new organizational and operational concepts. These experiments would be based on the results of Experiment 1 or on the new concepts from the Atlantic Command's Joint Experimentation Plan. In the first case, the units involved in concept development would be the logical ones to extend the concepts into actual field experiments. In the second case, either the same reserve components or others could serve as a test-bed. The units designated for the experiment would be released from their current mobilization and training commitments to allow them to focus on this experiment. They would adjust their training cycle to prepare for the exercise, which would actually take place during their annual two-week active duty training period. The experiment would provide insights into: (1) the ability of reserve components to test alternative organizational and operational templates, and (2) the ability of the reserve components, working jointly across service specialties, to collaborate in joint operational tests. The details of the experiment design could be developed by the J-9 of the Atlantic Command in connection with the Joint Experimentation Master Plan. The data generation, collection, and analysis would be provided by private contractors or the J-7 unit on the Joint Staff. The reserve component units involved in the experiment would be designated by the commander of the Atlantic Command under his authority for joint experimentation. An outside analytic institution should probably be brought in to analyze the experiment as a case study of the innovative capabilities of the reserve components. Implications The costs associated with this pilot program would be that some reserve components would systematically deviate from the training and readiness standards set by and for the active duty forces. In the event of a national mobilization and a reserve component call up, units involved in the pilot program would probably start from a lower readiness status and face a more severe challenge than other reserve components in meeting active force combat-readiness standards. The pay-off of these experiments however, could, more than offset the potential risks. The basic benefit would be the accelerated transformation of the U.S. military to the higher level of military effectiveness predicted in documents such as Joint Vision 2010. If changes to the active components are delayed because of increased operational tempo and high-readiness requirements, then reserve components would be a useful test-bed for innovation. The general implication of this pilot program would be to determine whether reserve components could be used as a test-bed for changes in the U.S. military. The program could establish a new and useful function for the reserve components in developing and testing new ways of organizing and operating. If the pilot program works, it may suggest that reserve components could, in fact, become agents of change, thus becoming the vanguard rather than the rear guard.
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Technology-Based Pilot Programs: Improving Future U.S. Military Reserve Forces Addendum: Distributed Interactive Simulation, the Internet, and Personal Computers In the last three years, the power and speed of personal computers has reached levels that could be met, as late as 1996, only by large, expensive computer systems similar to workstations. Thus, personal computers, in conjunction with the Internet, now offer a low-cost, accessible means of distributed collaboration in the development of military concepts. One (of several) recent efforts to exploit these emerging capabilities is the so-called "Node Game" developed under the sponsorship of the director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon. Node Game is an interactive, personal-computer-based war game designed to explore the implications of dominant battle-space knowledge. It provides an easy-to-use, highly flexible, and widely distributed means of portraying, testing, and generating hypotheses for the operational effects of disparities in situational awareness in armed conflicts. The game focuses on the effects of differences in battle-space awareness, concentrating on how players react to those differences. Players can test operations and organizations to find the ones that enable them to take most advantage of a significant edge in battle-space awareness or to counter an opponent's edge. Battle-space awareness is a relative, not an absolute, condition. Some elements of information will not be detected or, if detected, will not be accurately identified, or will not be accurately identified in sufficient time to react. In the Clauswitzian cliché, there will always be some "fog of war." What seems to count militarily is the difference in awareness between opponents. This relationship can be expressed, compared, and measured in three categories: comprehensiveness (how complete is the detected information), fidelity (how accurately was the detected information classified and identified), and timeliness (was the detected information provided in time to be of value). Based on empirical work by the Joint Staff and others, Node Game provides fairly accurate measurements of these dimensions for U.S. forces and reasonable estimates for other forces (including paramilitary forces).
Representative terms from entire chapter: