Balancing Scientific Openness and National Security Controls at the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories (1999)

The following documents describe or make recommendations for security policy at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). This list was designed to be concise rather than comprehensive. These documents provide an overview of policy and recommendations as well as context, but should not be considered a complete review of relevant literature.

U.S. Public Law 106-65. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. 106th Cong., 1st session, 1999.

This public law establishes the National Nuclear Security Administration within DOE. It also implements several recommendations from the Select Committee on National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China.

U.S. Congress. House. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. 106th Cong., 1st session, 1999. HR.1555.

This bill contributed to the debate regarding the reorganization of DOE by outlining the organization and responsibilities of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Policy on hosting a foreign visitor (UCRL-MI-133770), May 13, 1999.

This document describes the requirements for compliance with the laboratory's policy regarding export controls and foreign travel and protection of technical data.

Richardson, W., Secretary of Energy. Memorandum to heads of departmental elements and contractor organizations on unclassified foreign visits and assignments, July 14, 1999.

These directives formalize the changes to DOE policy and procedures, provide additional clarification, and extend their applicability to other facilities. This document specifically exempts facilities that do not perform classified work and are therefore not subject to the requirements of DOE N 142.1.

Richardson, W., Secretary of Energy. Memorandum to heads of departmental elements and contractor organizations on DOE export control guidelines, July 28, 1999.

This memorandum describes DOE policy on reviews for Export Controlled Information—a category of information defined as unclassified technical information whose export is subject to export control and whose unrestricted public dissemination could help proliferants or potential adversaries of the United States.

U.S. Department of Energy. List of sensitive subjects, July 1999.

This is a list of areas of technical subject matter or technologies containing sensitive information. The list identifies subjects related to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and their delivery systems (including missiles), conventional weapons, and other technologies deemed significant to the national security of the United States.

U.S. Department of Energy. Policy on unclassified foreign visits and assignments (DOE P 142.1), July 13, 1999.

This policy outlines the responsibilities of those hosting a foreign visitor and the steps required, such as obtaining approval, checking the visitor's background, and protecting sensitive information.

U.S. Department of Energy. Notice on unclassified foreign visits and assignments (DOE N 142.1), July 13, 1999.

This document supplements DOE Policy P 142.1 by defining terms and describing the requirements for background and indices checks for all unclassified

foreign visits and assignments at DOE field and contractor site (including DOE laboratories), among other security measures.

U.S. Department of Energy. Richardson unveils security reform package. News bulletin R-99-111, May 11, 1999.

This news release describes the Office of Security and Emergency Operations and the Office of Foreign Visits and Assignments Policy and their responsibilities. Supporting documents include: the DOE security reform package, the status of DOE counterintelligence measures and counterintelligence plan implementation, and further enhancements to DOE cybersecurity.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Special Investigative Panel. 1999. Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (the “Rudman Report”). Washington, D.C.: White House.

This report is an analysis of the structural and managerial problems in DOE security and counterintelligence operations that makes recommendations for reform in policy and organization.

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Openness Advisory Panel. 1997. Responsible Openness: An Imperative for the Department of Energy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

This report examined the status and strategic direction for DOE's classification and declassification policies and programs, as well as other aspects of its efforts to enhance openness.

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Working Group on Foreign Visits and Assignments. 1999. Report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Working Group on Foreign Visits and Assignments. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

This report reviewed the policies and practices related to foreign visitors and assignees at DOE's laboratories and assessed the balance between security and science.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Review Panel. 1999. The Intelligence Community's Damage Assessment on the Implications of China's Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development of Future Chinese Weapons (the “Jeremiah Report”). Langley, Va.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

This panel examined the extent to which the People's Republic of China was able to obtain classified information and the contribution this made to China's nuclear program.

U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. A Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (the “Cox Report”). 105th Cong., 2nd session, 1998. H.Report 105-851.

This report describes lapses in security policy and export control that the People's Republic of China could have used to improve its nuclear weapons program. Please note that the committee reviewed the unclassified version of the Cox Report as released in 1999.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1997. DOE Needs to Improve Controls over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1998. DOE Needs to Improve Controls over Foreign Visitors to its Weapons Laboratories. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1998. Problems in DOE's Foreign Visitor Program Persist. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

These reports describe the DOE security policies in regard to foreign visitors and assignees and the extent to which the DOE laboratories enforce them.