4
Review of the Commercial Incineration Option

The Army conducted a preliminary survey of five commercial hazardous waste facilities to gather information on their industrial processes, experience, compliance with environmental regulations, field services offered (e.g., packaging, transportation), public relations, plant safety, costs for services, and business requirements. The technologies used at these facilities include incineration, neutralization, and gas-phase chemical reduction. Because one company asked that it not be identified, none of the five firms was identified to the committee. The Army summarized the results of this survey in its report to Congress and a supplemental technical report (U.S. Army, 1998a; Amr et al., 1998). The committee assessed both reports and the commercial disposal option for CAIS in terms of the "issues to consider" described in Chapter 3. Table 4-1 contains the committee's summary evaluation of the commercial disposal option, assuming that incineration is the technology employed.

TECHNOLOGY

Excerpts from the Army's Report to Congress

3.1 Treatment Technology

This study assessed the capabilities of five commercial facilities using three treatment technologies—incineration, neutralization, and a transportable gas phase chemical (hydrogen-based) reduction system—for CAIS treatment and disposal. Of the five commercial hazardous waste facilities investigated for this study, three would use incineration for CAIS, one would use neutralization, and one would use hydrogen reduction. Hazardous wastes treated by these facilities include agent-contaminated products (e.g., soil), industrial chemicals, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and medical nitrogen mustard (I-IN). The commercial firm that offers hydrogen reduction has industrial experience treating pure chemical agent, while all the others have treated related materials and other DOD hazardous wastes. It must be noted, however, that the firm offering hydrogen reduction currently has no such plants in operation in the United States and no firm prospects to develop a fixed facility. Their proposed approach for this application would require permitting and setup at each CAIS location, leading to a probable increase in cost over the current RRS-based process.

The ongoing development of nonincineration-based alternatives for commercial waste disposal (to include gas phase chemical reduction), under the auspices of the U.S. Army's Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) Program and elsewhere, must be closely monitored for its applicability to the destruction of CAIS, whether by commercial or government providers. Indeed, the potential for use of residual hardware from the ACWA demonstrations, now underway, appears to provide the most promising path to government-managed operations for CAIS disposal. As ACWA is just moving into the test operations phase, however, it is premature to assess the extent to which this hardware may be of use, or when. The increased public and focus group acceptability of nonincineration-based alternatives for CAIS disposal is a factor that must not be underestimated.



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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program 4 Review of the Commercial Incineration Option The Army conducted a preliminary survey of five commercial hazardous waste facilities to gather information on their industrial processes, experience, compliance with environmental regulations, field services offered (e.g., packaging, transportation), public relations, plant safety, costs for services, and business requirements. The technologies used at these facilities include incineration, neutralization, and gas-phase chemical reduction. Because one company asked that it not be identified, none of the five firms was identified to the committee. The Army summarized the results of this survey in its report to Congress and a supplemental technical report (U.S. Army, 1998a; Amr et al., 1998). The committee assessed both reports and the commercial disposal option for CAIS in terms of the "issues to consider" described in Chapter 3. Table 4-1 contains the committee's summary evaluation of the commercial disposal option, assuming that incineration is the technology employed. TECHNOLOGY Excerpts from the Army's Report to Congress 3.1 Treatment Technology This study assessed the capabilities of five commercial facilities using three treatment technologies—incineration, neutralization, and a transportable gas phase chemical (hydrogen-based) reduction system—for CAIS treatment and disposal. Of the five commercial hazardous waste facilities investigated for this study, three would use incineration for CAIS, one would use neutralization, and one would use hydrogen reduction. Hazardous wastes treated by these facilities include agent-contaminated products (e.g., soil), industrial chemicals, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and medical nitrogen mustard (I-IN). The commercial firm that offers hydrogen reduction has industrial experience treating pure chemical agent, while all the others have treated related materials and other DOD hazardous wastes. It must be noted, however, that the firm offering hydrogen reduction currently has no such plants in operation in the United States and no firm prospects to develop a fixed facility. Their proposed approach for this application would require permitting and setup at each CAIS location, leading to a probable increase in cost over the current RRS-based process. The ongoing development of nonincineration-based alternatives for commercial waste disposal (to include gas phase chemical reduction), under the auspices of the U.S. Army's Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) Program and elsewhere, must be closely monitored for its applicability to the destruction of CAIS, whether by commercial or government providers. Indeed, the potential for use of residual hardware from the ACWA demonstrations, now underway, appears to provide the most promising path to government-managed operations for CAIS disposal. As ACWA is just moving into the test operations phase, however, it is premature to assess the extent to which this hardware may be of use, or when. The increased public and focus group acceptability of nonincineration-based alternatives for CAIS disposal is a factor that must not be underestimated.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program TABLE 4-1 Summary Evaluation of the Commercial Incineration Option   Committee Evaluation Technology   Process reliability and effectiveness Well proven for mustard; arsenic-containing agents may require special treatment. Technical maturity Mature but process modifications may be required. Monitoring and disposal of process effluents Committee recommends continuous air monitoring in receive/unpack areas; public may require "hold and test" monitoring of emissions and effluents. Laws and Regulations   Consistency with present laws, regulations, and treaties Non-Army disposal requires legal/regulatory relief, clarification, or flexibility; some facility permit modifications may be required by EPA. Costs   Permitting Permit modifications, if required, may add cost; permit restrictions may affect processing costs. Indemnification A potential added cost to the Army or the facility. Facility modifications Monitoring and other modifications may increase costs. Transportation Transportation to commercial sites may increase cost; escorts may be required; not clear who pays for handling, characterization, and transport. Processing operations Dedicated processing of CAIS could be costly; CAIS packaging could be an added cost. Indirect costs Hidden indirect costs (overhead, administration, maintenance). Environmental Impacts, Worker/Public Safety, and Risks   Environmental impact Air emissions minimized by facility design. Worker safety Monitoring in receive/unpack areas needed; added training and protective equipment for handling hazardous waste is needed if not already adequate; hazards seem manageable for facilities permitted for hazardous wastes of comparable toxicity. Public safety Impacts on public safety controlled by government regulations. Risk analysisa Risks generally known and understood for commercial facilities; CAIS chemicals seem similar to other hazardous chemicals currently being incinerated; risks to workers in receive/unpack areas should be analyzed. Public/Stakeholder Involvement Perceived public health issue concerning chronic risks from incinerator emissions; transporting large numbers of CAIS, or CAIS types containing large volumes of agent, may be an issue; priority should be on allocating resources for public involvement. Programmatic Considerations   Schedule Could allow prompt disposal of small recoveries of CAIS, but public resistance and regulatory treatment may lead to significant delays. Funding Liability and contractual issues could increase costs. Organizations Corporate commitment is a significant unknown. a Risk analysis includes identifying hazards, understanding risks, identifying risk control measures, and putting risks into context. The initial discovery of CAIS items, particularly by untrained members of the public, seems to pose the greatest risks. However, the committee's analysis begins at the point of CAIS recovery.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program All commercial facilities interviewed for this study can provide field services—such as characterization, packaging, and transportation. In some cases, these services are provided directly by the facility; in other cases, the services are subcontracted or provided through teaming arrangements. Trucking is the primary mode of transportation. Each company also stated that they would be willing to change their procedures in order to support the Army in its effort to treat and dispose of CAIS. All commercial facilities have secure storage areas and the capability to track and dispose of residues. Secure storage of CAIS for a transportable hydrogen reduction system, however, would rely on Army storage at the CAIS site. For the relatively infrequent recoveries of CAIS components found packed in metal containers (''PIGs"), continued use of the current RRS system as an unpack, classification, and segregation system would appear to be appropriate from a safety and cost perspective, limiting the need to facilitize unpack areas at contractor facilities. The RRS is increasingly recognized also to have utility for response to terrorist incidents and other chemical emergencies. Costly deployment and field operations of the complex RRS system need not be required for field recoveries of small quantities of exposed glass CAIS components, which can be assessed with portable spectroscopy systems, repacked for safe transportation, and taken to a commercial facility for disposal. (U.S. Army, 1998a, pp. 7-10) [L]imited monitoring capability is a potential disadvantage associated with the use of commercial facilities for CAIS treatment. Specifically, emissions monitoring is limited, and none of the facilities interviewed for this study has any agent monitoring capabilities. Although the monitoring for destruction and removal efficiencies (DREs) is not routine, each technology appears to be capable of achieving required DREs. With Army assistance, some companies are willing to install Depot Area Air Monitoring Systems (DAAMS) or Miniature Continuous Air Monitoring System (MINICAMS), if required by Federal law or regulation. Although some process and/or facility modifications (e.g., unpack area) may be required, these issues do not appear to be technically or economically insurmountable. Ultimately, given the nature of the material involved, and in an attempt to adhere to commercial practices, this study does not recommend continuous air monitoring measures for commercial CAIS destruction. However, portable agent detection systems may be appropriate for use at the time of CAIS delivery to ensure that the containers remain intact after transportation. (U.S. Army, 1998a, p. 10) 3.2 Engineering Controls Two of the facilities (both using incineration) have three process lines that could be used for treating CAIS, while the remaining three facilities each have a single process line. All three incineration facilities indicated that they could feed lab packs (i.e., readily available, frequently used commercial containers) and/or drums in their process line. A glovebox is currently being utilized for unpacking at one facility. Most facilities would be able to feed CAIS as a "dedicated" (i.e., CAIS only) campaign or as a mixed feed with other waste. The process area of the neutralization treatment technology is located in a closed area that is vented through a scrubber system. Items could be fed individually or in "lab packs" of several vials each. In either case, they would have to be repackaged before being transported to the facility. This company is willing to investigate the possibility of removing the CAIS items from "PIG" overpacks at their facility. Finally, the hydrogen reduction equipment requires little space and could be easily accommodated in a controlled enclosure. In terms of disadvantages, limited controls were noted for transportation, unpack areas, and process areas. At present, control devices tend to be primarily targeted for liquid spills. Implementation of new controls may not be well received by industry. (U.S. Army, 1998a, p. 10) 5. Conclusions and Recommendations 1. At this time there are no known technical limitations that would prevent effective destruction of all CAIS materiel in commercial facilities, either incineration or nonincineration-based. Several commercial disposal facilities indicated a capability to destroy CAIS using procedures now in place for materials having comparable or more complex

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program chemical structure, toxicity, and packaging. These materials include certain pesticides and medical wastes. The feasibility and practicality of implementation, however, needs to be determined. This determination might be accomplished through a case study that considers hypothetical CAIS delivery schedules and a proposed contractual mechanism. (U.S. Army, 1998a, p. 13) Committee Evaluation of Technology The Army's conclusion that technical limitations would not prevent the effective destruction of CAIS materiel in commercial facilities may be correct, especially for sulfur mustard. However, many technical issues must be addressed in more depth, particularly for the arsenic-containing CAIS chemicals, lewisite and adamsite. Sulfur mustard has been destroyed by each of the three technologies surveyed (Amr et al., 1998). Similar technologies are available for the destruction of lewisite, but they are not as fully developed. The technical aspects of incinerating CAIS items are summarized below. Process Reliability and Effectiveness Incineration processes have been used extensively for the destruction of sulfur mustard and are likely to be reliable and effective for the disposal of CAIS materials. Sulfur mustard is relatively easy to bum. In the EPA's "incinerability" classification, sulfur mustard is a Class 4 material, which means it is intermediate in combustibility between the easiest (Class 7) and the most difficult (Class 1) hazardous wastes to incinerate.1 Incineration has been used extensively to destroy sulfur mustard contained in old munitions, with destruction and removal efficiencies (DREs) generally achieving 99.9999 percent, often referred to as a DRE of "six nines" (NRC, 1993). This level of destruction exceeds the level required under international treaties and generally meets state and federal standards under RCRA permit conditions. In four test bums of bulk sulfur mustard at JACADS (Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System) in 1992, DREs of 99.9996 percent or better were achieved, significantly exceeding the RCRA requirement of 99.99 percent for this facility (Mitre, 1993). The emissions of products of incomplete combustion were very low—similar to those produced by incineration of fuel oil. The stack emissions of dioxins and furans were also extremely low, 0.0-0.16 ng/m3, which is well below the current U.S. standard of 30 ng/m3 for municipal waste incinerators (NRC, 1994b). EPA has a draft reassessment of health effects of dioxins, but no new standard has been issued. Based on experience with the incineration of similar chemicals, it seems reasonable to assume that sulfur mustard can be destroyed safely and effectively in commercial incinerators, particularly high-efficiency facilities qualified to bum PCBs. A recent EPA study of the emissions from the JACADS facility detected very low levels (just above the 1    The EPA incinerability index is a semi-empirical guide to choosing appropriate conditions to minimize emissions of the compound being burned, particularly the principal organic hazardous constituent (POHC). EPA (1989) reported that the best correlation with observed destruction efficiency was the thermal stability of a POHC under oxygen-starved conditions. Class 4 on this index indicates that (limited) data on the thermal stability of mustard gas place it as intermediate between the most stable compounds (most difficult to bum completely) and the least stable (highest destruction efficiencies). Experimental data from pilot-scale or full-scale incineration tests that support the index and the POHC rankings are in EPA, 1989, and Lee et al., 1992.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program limit of detection) of chlorinated furans and PCBs in about half of the trial burns done under the direction of EPA staff (EPA, 1998a). 2 Based on laboratory-scale experiments, lewisite appears to be as easy to burn as sulfur mustard (Brooks and Parker, 1979). Although lewisite has only been burned on a modest scale in chemical weapons disposal operations (Petrov et al., 1998), similar arsenical agents such as phenyldichloroarsine are routinely burned on a large scale in the German chemical waste incinerator at Munster (Martens, 1998). However, the arsenic contained in the lewisite is oxidized to volatile arsenic oxides and chlorides (Dempsey and Oppelt, 1993). These oxidation products must be scrubbed or electrostatically precipitated from the flue gases to meet regulatory standards for emissions of heavy metals. Difficulties in meeting regulatory standards for arsenic emissions were a significant factor in the Army's decision to destroy 10 tons of lewisite stored at the Deseret Chemical Depot (DCD) at Tooele, Utah, by neutralization rather than combustion in the existing incinerator at TOCDF (Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility). Some commercial incinerators, however, are reported to have appropriate facilities and regulatory permits for burning arsenic-containing wastes (Brankowitz, 1998).3 Given the small quantity of lewisite in CAIS (see Table 1-4), it should be feasible to bum lewisite in commercial, arsenic-permitted incinerators. The permits for three commercial incinerators limit the arsenic concentrations in atmospheric emissions to 2-10 ppm, depending on the state in which the facility is located, and the EPA recommends a limit of 3 ppm (Velzy Associates, 1990). Therefore, meeting the regulatory restrictions on the concentration of arsenic in the feed to the incinerator could be a problem. In addition to the restriction on arsenic input in the feed, the EPA also has a rigorous limit of 0.03 milligram per cubic meter (mg/m 3) for even temporary exposure to airborne arsenic (EPA, 1998b). Reliability and Robustness A well maintained, PCB-qualified, commercial incinerator with well trained personnel should provide safe, reliable destruction of sulfur mustard and lewisite agents even under nonroutine conditions. Successful incineration of hazardous wastes comparable in toxicity and combustibility to the agents has provided an extensive experience base for operations with agents (Dempsey and Oppelt, 1993). Incineration technology should be adaptable to CAIS samples that are badly degraded, contaminated, or poorly characterized. 2    While this report was undergoing NRC review, a report by a separate NRC committee on the use of carbon filtration for gaseous emissions from stockpile incineration facilities was released (NRC, 1999a). The report on carbon filtration in which the EPA trial bum data for JACADS and TOCDF were reviewed, contains the following finding: Finding la. The reported emitted concentrations of SOPCs [substances of potential concern] measured during trial bums at the JACADS and TOCDF incinerators are among the lowest reported to the EPA. TOCDF emissions are the lowest, or at least one of the lowest, in dioxins, mercury, cadmium, lead, arsenic, beryllium, and chromium. The reported emissions of some SOPCs were based on the analytical detection limit for the constituent, which means the actual concentration could be much lower than the reported concentration .... 3    According to verbal information given to committee staff by EPA staff, all or most of the commercial hazardous waste incinerators listed in Table 2-1 have permits for handling arsenic-containing wastes.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Handling and Decontamination of Containers Most commercial incinerators can handle wastes packaged in a variety of ways. If the outer packing is not too large, the entire package may be fed directly to the incinerator. This procedure would reduce risks to personnel who might be exposed to agent vapor when handling leaking, fragile, or badly corroded containers. Combustible packing materials, such as wood, paper, or sawdust, would be destroyed along with any agent adsorbed on the packing. The heat of the incineration process would decontaminate noncombustible materials, including glass and metal. Technical Maturity Incineration has been used extensively to destroy sulfur mustard from both bulk containers and munitions. Experience with large-scale incineration of HD in Canada, Germany, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States (JACADS and Rocky Mountain Arsenal) was summarized in a 1993 NRC report. DREs generally exceeded 99.9999 percent. Monitoring and Disposal of Process Effluents Monitoring issues in CAIS disposal operations arise primarily at the beginning and end of the process. At the beginning, when CAIS containers arrive at a facility and are put into the disposal system, the major concern is agent vapor that may leak from damaged packages or may be released when a container is opened. These concerns are common to all destruction technologies but are of most concern in a neutralization process. With incineration, for example, packaged CAIS items may be introduced directly into the incinerator or reactor. Neutralization may require that the containers be opened in a glove box, as is planned for the RRS operation (Brankowitz, 1998). However, in all these cases, continuous air monitoring for CAIS agents should be used in the receiving/unpacking area to ensure that workers are not exposed to unsafe levels of agent vapor. The Automatic Chemical Agent Monitoring System (ACAMS) is used for monitoring workplace air in chemical stockpile disposal facilities. A limitation of the current ACAMS is that it is designed to monitor the concentration of a single agent, such as HD. The newer Miniature Continuous Air Monitoring System (MINICAMS) is designed to monitor more than one agent but may not work with lewisite. Another limitation that could cause problems at a commercial incinerator is that the monitors are subject to interference by chemicals other than the agent. In a commercial facility, which may handle hundreds of different chemicals, interference could cause false alarms that would interrupt the operation of the facility. Commercial operators may be reluctant to add air-monitoring capabilities beyond the ones already in place. Despite these issues and obstacles, which will require further consideration, the committee believes, as noted above, that continuous air monitoring for CAIS agents should be required in the receiving and unpacking area when CAIS are being handled. Monitoring at the end of a disposal process is intended to ensure that hazardous materials are not released into the environment. The form of monitoring depends on the nature of the process. For incineration processes, the major concern is gaseous effluents, although liquid or solid residues must also be disposed of safely. One problem with gaseous emissions is that retaining the gases until they have been analyzed and certified

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program safe is not practical. In fact, most commercial incinerators do not routinely monitor flue gases for the presence of the material being burned, except during trial burns when effluents are analyzed to show that the concentrations of unburned waste, products of incomplete combustion, and particulate matter do not exceed the levels specified in the facility's permit. A particular problem for burning arsenic-containing materials, such as lewisite and adamsite, is the difficulty of monitoring arsenic emissions in stack gases. In tests of the EPA's Combustion Research Facility in Arkansas, most of the arsenic emitted was not detectable by the analytical methods then in use (Lee et al., 1987). With chloride-rich feed streams, such as lewisite, the emissions will probably be a mixture of volatile oxides, chlorides, and oxychlorides of arsenic (Dempsey and Oppelt, 1993). The liquid or solid wastes produced from incineration or any of the destruction technologies surveyed for the Army (Amr et al., 1998) could be held for analysis before disposal. Solid wastes from hazardous incineration are usually sent to a hazardous waste landfill. Unless CAIS materiel is burned separately from commercial waste, the combustion residues are not likely to be monitored. LAWS AND REGULATIONS Excerpts from the Army's Report to Congress 3.6 Facility-Specific Regulatory Issues There are several regulatory issues relevant to the use of commercial facilities for CAIS treatment and disposal: (1) CAIS interstate transportation, (2) facility permitting requirements, and (3) public notification procedures. Most of these can be simplified considerably by amendment to Federal law. Others can be resolved only subsequent to changes in the Federal law through detailed negotiations with State regulators, commercial providers, and key citizens' groups. Due to time restrictions in this study, and the desire to determine first if there was enough commercial interest to warrant further progress on this subject, substantive discussions with Tribal, State, and Federal regulators have not yet occurred. The existence and conduct of this study have been briefed to and discussed with members of the public and Tribal, State, and Federal regulators in open forums, however, and venues are open for further discussions following this preliminary study. As stated above, with the exception of the hydrogen reduction system, all commercial facilities in this assessment are currently permitted (the hydrogen reduction system was permitted in a previous operation). Moreover, these same four facilities are currently permitted to process RCRA waste codes that might allow the receipt of CAIS. For example, the RCRA waste codes for nitrogen mustard on the RRS permit application for the state of Utah are D004-D011, D022, and P999. If these specific "D" waste codes were to be applied to CAIS in the states where the facilities are located, CAIS might be accepted by those facilities interviewed for this study. It is presently indeterminate as to whether permit modifications would be required for the treatment of CAIS. (U.S. Army 1998a, p. 12) 5. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . 2. The law and its interpretation are the major obstacles limiting options for the transportation and disposal of CAIS. Amendment of applicable Public Law is needed because it drives the rigorous compliance requirements governing the Army. CAIS materiel is demonstrably different from other chemical materiel: (1) CAIS contains no nerve agent; (2) CAIS containers are glass, and easily accessed; (3) CAIS were intended for training purposes and never intended for lethal purposes; (4) CAIS are not associated with explosives; (5) CAIS contents are not much different in toxicity than the industrial chemicals handled on a routine basis by industry and by commercial hazardous waste facilities; and (6) CAIS consist of relatively very small quantities of materiel (often just a few ounces). On these grounds, a

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program strong case may be made that CAIS should be exempted from the provisions that govern chemical agent stockpile demilitarization. 3. Strict application of the laws and regulations that were specifically tailored for chemical weapons storage and disposal operations may not be applicable for disposal of CAIS and in the presence of these provisions might deter commercial facilities from participating in the disposal of CAIS. Notwithstanding any changes in the legal and regulatory status of CAIS, however, CAIS should continue to be centrally managed by the Army as non-stockpile chemical materiel to ensure the application of otherwise appropriate criteria. Even if the extraordinary oversight currently provided by the Army for CAIS destruction were relaxed, the use of commercial firms does not mean Army "hands-off." RCRA hazardous waste requirements and government oversight would still apply. Acceptable Army criteria (e.g., safety, engineering controls, monitoring, security, public affairs) beyond commercial practices should be defined, and data should be collected for ensuring compliance with these criteria. The definition and execution of confidence methods which the Army could apply to ensure public health and safety and protection of the environment during commercial destruction of CAIS needs to be developed. For example, the Army could provide government supervision of the disposal action to ensure total destruction (using procedures similar to those now in use for drug contraband destruction at commercial facilities). Requirements could also be placed on commercial disposal facilities to process CAIS materiel with other wastes to ensure an optimum feed mix as further insurance for safe destruction. (U.S. Army, 1998a, pp. 13-14) Committee Evaluation of Legal and Regulatory Issues A viable commercial incineration option for CAIS disposal will require changes, clarifications, or flexibility in existing laws and regulations. A number of regulations and legal interpretations now mandate that the Army maintain control of CAIS materials during transportation and disposal. Even if the transport and disposal of CAIS can be accomplished without Army facilities or personnel, regulators may require modifications to a commercial firm's operating permit, depending on the disposal classification assigned to CAIS components. Because a case-by-case determination at every site would not be cost effective, the Army and EPA could develop a presumptive CAIS treatment and storage guideline, a permit-by-rule, a national permit, or some other method of establishing standard conditions that could be used for evaluating any site that might handle CAIS. COSTS Excerpts from the Army's Report to Congress 3.7 Cost for Services In light of the recurring costs of permitting, transportation, set-up, and closure for each site where CAIS are located, the potential for generating cost savings by treating and disposing of CAIS in commercial facilities may be considerable. Prices for commercial destruction of CAIS type material can be as low as a few dollars per pound, before the costs associated with the additional requirements identified in this report are imposed. While government equipment such as portable spectroscopy systems may be required at all burial remediation sites as appropriate due to the need to characterize and repackage CAIS components prior to shipment, the use of commercial facilities for ultimate destruction still offers substantial cost benefits. The use of commercial facilities also could lower costs by reducing the need for multiple investments in Government equipment, when capability is needed for concurrent destruction

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program activities at multiple sites. Accessibility to some of the facilities interviewed for this study may be easily acquired from existing contract mechanisms. The disadvantages identified during site visits with the commercial facilities included (1) cost-reimbursable funding for plant modifications may be required, and (2) open competition is not desirable (but may not preclude some from participating). (U.S. Army, 1998a, pp. 12-13) 5. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . 4. If current Army practices for managing the disposal of CAIS as chemical agent are changed, considerable cost savings might be realized, given that commercial facilities and technologies are available today for CAIS treatment and disposal. The magnitude of these savings has yet to be quantified definitively. However, the cost of an RRS deployment and limited operations may amount to $2 million or more, so that an RRS operation to destroy a few CAIS vials may cost up to several hundred thousand dollars per vial. While comparable toxic wastes are typically destroyed for a few dollars per vial, those costs do not include the potential costs related to additional requirements outlined in this report. It is recommended that the commercial cost component be further established. A facility pricing structure (e.g., start-up costs, per unit prices) should be developed, and a comparative cost analysis of commercial facilities with the RRS and various RRS scenarios should be conducted. Once any outstanding issues are resolved, the Army may choose to test implementation (e.g., consider an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity type of contract) before changing its programmatic strategy for destroying CAIS. (U.S. Army, 1998a, pp. 14-15) Committee Evaluation of Costs In the Army's assessment of the viability of processing CAIS materials commercially, interviews were conducted with five companies with the technical capability of processing CAIS items (Amr et al., 1998, p. 15). Many issues involving costs were not discussed. For example, the interviews with commercial firms did not address the costs of adding agent monitors and alarms for detecting agent leaks, costs of training workers to handle agent, costs of personal protective equipment and decontaminating it, costs of a public involvement program, costs of obtaining permit modifications to allow CAIS to be received and destroyed, reporting costs to state regulatory agencies, and possible costs of plant modifications, such as an unpack area for receiving CADS. The companies appeared to consider the processing of CAIS chemicals as comparable in cost to the disposal of other reactive hazardous wastes that they were permitted to process. In the 1998 report to Congress, the Army acknowledged that the general subject of costs was not fully considered in the report and concluded that "a comparative cost analysis of commercial facilities with the RRS and various P-KS scenarios should be conducted. In the Army's report, the costs of commercial facilities that handle very hazardous materials, such as PCBs, were not evaluated. Such facilities would provide a more realistic comparison with CAIS disposal and may have significantly higher costs than those surveyed by the Army. In the discussion that follows, the estimated commercial disposal costs at the surveyed facilities are compared with a 1997 Army cost estimate for a proposed use of the RRS. The committee was given an Army report estimating the costs for a proposal to dispose of recently recovered CADS materials (i.e., seven PIGs) at Fort Richardson, Alaska. In the estimate, the CAIS would be sent to DCD for disposal in the P-KS. The Army estimated the total direct and indirect capital cost to be $1,784,429 and added a

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program 30 percent contingency, which resulted in a total project cost of $2,319,758 (U.S. Army, 1997a, p. 3-34). In contrast, four of the five commercial disposal firms interviewed provided cost estimates for processing the same materiel brought from Fort Richardson to their facilities. These estimates ranged from $27,633 to $34,878, including transportation, packaging, and processing (the fifth firm gave a lump sum estimate of $1,500,000). The disparity between the commercial estimates and the Army's estimate raises a number of questions about the assumptions used to arrive at these figures and about CAIS disposal cost issues. Permitting The costs of obtaining modifications to existing permits for commercial firms considering CAIS disposal were not quantified in the Army's report to Congress. All of the interviewed firms expressed a desire that, as the waste generator, the Army classify the CAIS as a waste that they were already permitted to handle (i.e., D003 nonexplosive, reactive waste) to avoid having to modify their RCRA permits. If a modification were required, the estimated time varied from 90 days for a minor modification to a year or more for a major modification. The costs of permit modifications and associated costs arising from legal challenges to allowing the firms to dispose of CAIS were not estimated. In contrast, the Army's cost analysis assumed that a RCRA permit would cost $250,000; that compliance with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (e.g., conducting an environmental assessment) would cost another $75,000; and that the costs of other permits, fees, and taxes would be about $112,000. Although not all of these costs would be incurred by commercial firms, a realistic estimate of the costs, time, and hurdles involved in obtaining permit modifications should be included in future cost analyses of the commercial alternative. Transportation of CAIS to a Commercial Facility Assuming that the commercial transport of CAIS from a discovery site to a commercial facility is possible and that the carrier is not required by permit or law to follow unique procedures, with substantial cost implications, for transporting hazardous materials, transportation costs should not be a major component of CAIS disposal costs for a commercial firm. The issue of who would incur the cost of transporting CAIS materials from the discovery site to the commercial disposal facility (the Army, a commercial carrier, or the disposal firm) is open, although in the interviews, it was assumed that transportation costs would be borne by the commercial facility. The interviewed firms estimated the cost for picking up materials from Fort Richardson ($100 per pickup) and transportating them to the disposal facility. (Transportation costs varied from $2.00 to $2.85 per mile for truck transport of all CAIS materials in a single shipment from the storage site to the TSDF, accompanied by one field technician.) Estimated transportation costs, using military transport, were three times higher in the Army's cost estimate for the disposal of CAIS from Richardson, Alaska, to an RRS at DCD in Utah. Because these costs differ by a factor of three, the committee questions the realism in the estimates.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Packaging of CAIS Items The cost of packaging CAIS items at the discovery site was estimated by only one of the five firms interviewed. This estimate was then used for three of the other four firms (the fifth firm gave a lump sum estimate for the entire job). The packaging cost estimate ($14,828) accounts for about half of the total estimated cost of CAIS disposal for four of the five firms. It is not clear whether the packaging of CAIS items in the field would be done by the commercial firm or by Army personnel. If the CAIS items were characterized in the field, sorted into industrial chemicals and chemical agents, and then placed into "labpacks" or other overpacks by Army personnel, and if these costs were borne by the Army, this would reduce the costs of processing by commercial firms. The general question of when a commercial firm's responsibilities and costs would begin (upon CAIS discovery, at the discovery site following Army characterization and packaging, or at the plant gate) should be clarified in future cost comparisons and cost/risk trade-off studies. Commercial cost estimates that assume packaging or other cost elements will be borne by the Army should be supplemented by realistic estimates of the Army's cost for these items so that valid comparisons can be made. Processing Operations: Facility Modifications The nature of the CAIS materials received by a commercial firm will have a bearing on the processing costs. If the CAIS items have been characterized, sorted, and placed in appropriate overpacks by Army personnel in the field, the costs of characterization and materials handling at the commercial facility will be lower than if the facility is required to receive the CAIS items "as found." For example, if the facility is required to build an unpack area, perhaps including a device (e.g., portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy [PINS]) for agent identification and a glove box for opening CAIS overpacks and sorting CAIS items, the processing costs would certainly increase. If the facility receives presorted CAIS items that have already been characterized and if these items could be placed directly into the facility's processing unit (e.g., an incinerator or a neutralization chamber) with a minimum of handling or storage, the costs of materials handling would certainly be reduced. The costs of other facility modifications were not addressed directly by the commercial firms. Modifications could include adding waste handling areas for solid or liquid wastes from CAIS processing; installing and maintaining monitors to indicate the presence and quantities of any CAIS material that escapes engineering controls; and adding emissions monitoring equipment to check for products of incomplete combustion that are not otherwise monitored. Other facility-related costs could include training staff to handle CAIS items and adding plant security measures. Processing Operations: Direct Costs Estimates of disposal costs for CAIS items were made by the four commercial firms that provided itemized costs during the survey. The disposal costs for CAIS items (seven PIGs) brought from Fort Richardson, Alaska, to the commercial firms ranged from $225 to $1,428 per PIG. The bases of these estimates were not provided. Treatment/disposal

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program costs for the same CAIS items brought to an R-RS located at the Army's DCD in Tooele, Utah, were provided in Attachment F-l-10 of the Army's cost estimate (U.S. Army, 1997a). The Army's labor costs over a 13 workday period of processing operations were estimated to be $169,472, or $24,210 per PIG. This cost estimate assumed that 13 staff members would be required to operate the RRS and that additional staff would be provided by DCD. In addition to processing operations, RRS labor costs at DCD included mobilization and site preparation, set-up, operations, closure, demobilization, and site cleanup. When these costs were included, the total labor cost for disposal of the seven PIGs was $452,352, or $64,622 per PIG. The reasons for the very large difference between commercial and Army costs for processing the same quantity of material are not explained in the Army's report. Further discussions with commercial operators will be necessary to ensure that the underlying assumptions about the number of staff required are realistic. The same point applies to the Army's estimates. For example, the Army assumes a labor cost of $64 per hour for all staff, from the RRS supervisor to security guards. A more careful estimate of unit labor costs and the number of staff required may result in lower estimates. The costs of materials and equipment (e.g., laboratory supplies, decontamination supplies, forklifts, personal protective equipment, utilities, waste containers, and waste disposal), can add to the costs of CAIS disposal. Only one of the five companies interviewed provided an estimate of material and supply costs: $568 (for Vermiculite, 55-gallon drums, and protective equipment). In contrast, the Army's cost estimate for materials and equipment, not including transport and storage of CAIS and equipment usage fees, was $224,693. Although most of the RRS-associated materials costs may not apply to disposal in a commercial facility, further discussions should be held with commercial firms to determine the nature of the materials, equipment, and supplies required to dispose of CAIS items. Processing Operations: Indirect Costs The treatment and magnitude of indirect costs varied greatly between the commercial and the RRS options. Indirect costs (e.g., for commercial facility management, administration, preparation of plans, and general overhead) were not provided by any of the firms interviewed. In contrast, the Army assumed that engineering and management costs would be 20 percent of direct labor, materials, equipment, and travel costs. For CAIS disposal at DCD, these costs were estimated to be $224,528. Processing Rates Although cost is not directly proportional to the processing rare, the processing rate can affect the economic desirability of commercial processing. The commercial firms interviewed indicated that if CAIS were categorized as a hazardous waste that they were currently permitted to handle, they could commingle the CAIS items with other similar wastes; thus the cost of processing the CAIS would be negligible. It may well be, however, that the chemical agents in CAIS would have to be processed separately, which would result in a substantial underutilization of commercial incinerators or other disposal

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program equipment designed to process larger quantities of material. For example, although the RCRA permit issued by the state of Utah for RRS processing of CAIS items allows the liquid neutralization wastes (containing up to 50 ppm agent) to be disposed of in commercial incinerators, the permit requires that these wastes be disposed of separately from other hazardous wastes (i.e., commingling is not allowed). If this permit restriction is representative of permits issued in other states and is extended to the commercial processing of the CAIS chemicals themselves, the dedication of commercial facilities to CAIS items may result in higher disposal costs than were estimated. This possibility should be explored in further discussions with commercial hazardous waste disposal firms. Recovery of Overhead and Development Costs In the interviews conducted with commercial firms, the costs of the design, engineering, fabrication, and upkeep of disposal facilities were not included in the cost estimates. Compared with the quantities of commercial hazardous wastes processed by these facilities, the costs for the very small quantities of CAIS materials would be insignificant. In its cost analysis, the Army did include these costs as a ''usage fee" for the RRS itself and for an associated mobile laboratory. The usage fees, based on equipment design and fabrication costs, maintenance and replacement costs, spare parts, and operator training requirements, were $5,100 per calendar day for the RRS and $2,150 per calendar day for the mobile laboratory. For the 47 calendar day period of RRS operations at DCD, usage fees of $326,250 were listed under "Materials and Equipment" in Attachment F-l-10 in the Army's cost estimate. In future discussions with commercial firms, the issue of cost recovery should be explored. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS, WORKER/PUBLIC SAFETY, AND RISKS Excerpts from the Army's Report to Congress 3.3 Safety and Security All facilities have procedures in place for a wide variety of highly hazardous material, and each facility complies with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). These commercial facilities operate within the safety requirements continuously and daily throughout the year. OSHA Level A protective clothing is available for use at each location. Personnel at each of the facilities receive OSHA and RCRA-mandated hazardous waste operations and emergency response ("HAZWOPER") and other training. Spill response and contingency plans are also in place at each facility. For the most part, the facilities interviewed in this study tend not to be familiar with "chemical warfare agents" as such. However, some routine operations are carried out with chemicals having toxicity comparable to or greater than that of mustard and lewisite. Security measures may have to be increased in some cases. (U.S. Army, 1998a, p. 11) The report did not contain any conclusions or recommendations specifically addressing environmental impact, worker/public safety, or risk-related issues.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Committee Evaluation of Environmental Impact, Worker/Public Safety, and Risks The Army must consider the environmental impacts of the routine or accidental release of gaseous or liquid waste streams in its plans. Because commercial incineration facilities must conduct trial burns before being granted a RCRA operating permit, any air emissions should be minimal and safe by design, assuming that CAIS are adequately destroyed under the permitted operating conditions. Workers at commercial incineration facilities routinely handle hazardous materials. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates worker safety at commercial facilities. (Army regulations, which may in fact conform to OSHA rules, are used at Army disposal facilities.) Given the experience of these commercial facilities, worker safety issues seem generally manageable. However, workers would be unaccustomed to working with sulfur mustard and lewisite, which pose unique handling hazards. Therefore, unless CAIS can be fed directly into an incinerator furnace without being unpacked, special worker training or protective equipment may be required. No risk assessments of commercial facilities were included in the Army's report to Congress based on a systematic risk assessment process (see Box 3-3). However, because existing commercial facilities would be used, it is reasonable to assume that the risks of handling highly hazardous materials are already well known, well understood, and accounted for in the basic operations of these facilities. Depending on the facility, some hazards associated specifically with CAIS chemicals, such as the handling hazards mentioned above, may require additional risk analysis and facility preparation. The Army's survey, which was limited to a small number of commercial facilities, does not appear to take into account the full range of safeguards that might be available at facilities approved for wastes with high-contact hazards, such as PCBs, dioxin, or even medical waste. Facilities prepared for these hazards may already be prepared to handle CAIS hazards. The risks to commercial disposal personnel from unpacking CAIS items from their transport containers apparently were not addressed. The chance of something going wrong at any stage of the operation was not taken into account in the technical or cost evaluations—two areas where this issue might have been addressed implicitly, even if it was not discussed explicitly as a "risk." The types of things that could go wrong include accidents in transit or in the handling of CAIS items, changes in ownership of a commercial facility, changes in regulations or community opposition to continued receipt of CAIS materiel. It can be fairly assumed that most of the risks, other than for recovery, are not unique to CAIS items and that they are well understood by someone (e.g., commercial firms, the Technical Escort Unit), if not by the Army. However, one would expect that the Army would want to identify and evaluate these risks before selecting a course of action, especially if Army personnel will not be responsible for the transportation of the CAIS items (it appears that the Army would be responsible for recovery and packaging in any event). Because the Army has not specified requirements for monitoring or physical security during storage and handling, the question of how well risks at these stages would be controlled is still open. For instance, because the Army plans to send small shipments and to process them immediately upon arrival, no provisions were specified for storing CAIS items in case of regulatory or other delays. The Army has stated that CAIS materials are similar to hazardous materials that are routinely handled by commercial disposal facilities. Although some materials are as

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program hazardous as the chemicals found in CAIS, many of them are much less hazardous and occur in more benign forms (e.g., solids, dilute solutions, etc.). Thus the Army's statement could be misleading. By not addressing the issue of risks during the discovery stage, the Army may be conveying a false impression of having the entire situation under control and posing virtually no risk to the public. PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT Excerpts From the Army's Report to Congress 3.4 Public Affairs The treatment technologies in this preliminary assessment include alternatives to incineration, which are expected to be more acceptable than incineration to the public in general, and nonincineration focus groups in particular. The choice of technology ultimately selected is expected to be very sensitive regardless of the comparatively very small quantities of materiel involved in CAIS disposal. All the facilities [surveyed by the Army] claim good relationships with their local communities, a situation that they do not want to disrupt. The transportable hydrogen reduction system was permitted during past operations. All other facilities are currently permitted (RCRA Part B and others) and operating. All facilities have experience processing chemicals with toxicity similar to or greater than the chemicals in CAIS and operate 365 days per year. In general, the facilities want to limit their public outreach efforts. If public notification is required, some facilities will withdraw from consideration. If a CAIS disposal contractor is solicited using a full and open competition, one company will withdraw from this study and not participate in the solicitation. One company, however, was proactive and stated that it would notify the public even if no permit modification were needed. Another company indicated that it would discuss treating CAIS with its employees before making a commitment to the Army. It is clear that the willingness of candidate service providers to engage in meaningful public outreach and involvement to the standards desired by the [Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel] PM NSCM will be a major factor in the ultimate acceptability of commercial disposal alternatives in general, and in the source selection of individual service providers in particular. The DOD will work closely with the local community through Citizen Advisory Committees to assure them that the DOD, its agents, or contractors will dispose of CAIS in an environmentally safe and effective manner. 3.5 Corporate Commitment The initial responses from corporate officers are very favorable. Some expressed the opinion that CAIS treatment involves standard operating practices, given the types of hazardous industrial chemicals with which they already deal. A disadvantage to the Army, as the waste generator, is that government control of the residual waste streams may be limited. Furthermore, legal ramifications (particularly, liability and indemnification) may arise when contract issues are discussed. (U.S. Army, 1998a, pp. 11-12) 5. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . 4. The Army's public notification process is a potential deterrent for the commercial hazardous waste facilities that participated in this study. A public outreach strategy needs to be developed and mutually agreed upon between the Army, citizens' representatives, and the commercial hazardous waste facilities. Selection of nonincineration-based technologies could be expected to reduce the likelihood of public and/or focus group concerns with commercial CAIS disposal. (U.S. Army, 1998a, p. 15)

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Committee Evaluation of Public/Stakeholder Involvement Public acceptability will affect schedule, cost, and ultimately the viability of the Army's preferred option for CAIS disposal. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are normative, substantive, and instrumental reasons for the Army to place a priority on developing a public involvement program that engages the various public and stakeholder groups in both addressing the issues of concern to these groups and seeking solutions that are technically feasible and publicly acceptable. The Army's report is focused on projected costs, technical efficiency, and legal issues. The report includes a limited discussion of public involvement, rather than an analysis of the elements of public acceptability. It does not mention the substantial steps taken by the Army over the past two years to expedite public involvement activities for the NSCMP in general. These activities include initiation of a dialogue with citizens' groups and an analysis of issues of tribal and environmental justice. However, the report does acknowledge that public acceptance is one of the issues that must be resolved before a final determination is made to pursue the commercial disposal option. It also notes that "in general, the facilities are concerned about their public outreach efforts," and "if public notification is required, some TSDFs will withdraw from consideration." The report does not indicate how the proposed commercial disposal option is linked to broader, long-term program goals. Army staff have made considerable efforts to establish constructive relationships with several public groups, including members of the Chemical Weapons Working Group and the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition, which is the chief organization opposing incineration. A key consideration for the Army is to maintain and build on the current level of trust with these groups, as well as to develop working relationships with a broad range of groups interested in and affected by CAIS disposal. The attitudes toward specific disposal options within this diverse "public" are likely to range from varying degrees of conditional acceptance, even approval, to varying degrees of dislike, including strong, vocal opposition. The actions taken by the Army in pursuit of the CAIS commercial disposal option will certainly be evaluated by stakeholders and will affect other aspects of the program that could, in turn, affect the Army's ability to achieve its broader goals. In light of these implications for both CAIS disposal and the larger program, the Army should, first of all, accept the fact that public involvement, and not merely public notification, is a necessity whether or not it is a legal requirement. The committee recommends that the Army adopt and consistently adhere to a policy of discussing plans for using a commercial facility with the broader public in the affected community at a very early stage. Second, the committee recommends that the Army initiate a national stakeholder process to provide input for a decision on whether to dispose of CAIS by commercial incineration. Input would be solicited from stakeholders on their views of the risks in disposing of CAIS at commercial incinerators, ways to evaluate risks, and the factors to be incorporated in the substantive criteria for deciding whether the risks of a disposal option are acceptable. Third, the substantive decisions should incorporate and reflect this dialogue. A report summarizing the views of the many stakeholders (including representatives from the locations of commercial incinerators, organized groups concerned about chemical weapons disposal, the states, national environmental groups, industry, and groups near sites from which CAIS will be removed) would be part of the Army record of decision. How might such a policy be implemented, given that formal public notification may not currently be a legal requirement? At a minimum, before the first time that the Army

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program sends CAIS to a commercial incinerator, the Army should notify the public. The state and the Army should also hold a public meeting. If a permit modification is required, this public meeting could be part of the public notification procedures for modifying the incinerator's permit. Even if no modification is required and the Army's risk evaluation concludes that the incremental risk from CAIS disposal at a facility will be minimal, the public notification process should still be followed before the first shipment to a facility. The committee believes that notification of Congress and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is unnecessary for CAIS disposal. But a community notification process, as suggested above, will be essential for a public involvement program to be credible. Although it was not possible for the committee to gather original data for this study, the Army's previous experience indicates that chemical weapons disposal activities are highly visible and subject to broad media coverage. The public will certainly scrutinize any policy that is proposed, and no policy will have the immediate support of all public groups. Therefore, extensive public involvement will be necessary. Effective public involvement is based on the identification of the various "publics," or stakeholders (individuals and groups interested in and affected by a policy), the issues important to each group, and the opportunities available to them to influence policy. A public involvement program provides an indication of public acceptance, and hence the viability, of a policy, as well as ways to negotiate solutions. The Army has begun this process by establishing a mechanism for dialogue among Army staff, public interest groups, and affected communities. It should ensure that its CAIS disposal program has adequate resources for public involvement—sufficient funding and staff with the necessary skills and experience. Based on the experience of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and similar programs (see Chapter 3), none of the options for CAIS disposal is likely to be entirely acceptable to all stakeholders. Experience suggests that commercial incineration may be the least acceptable option. It may also be the most sensitive to public opposition because public opposition can affect the profits and even the continued operation of a commercial facility. Only a limited number of facilities are capable of achieving the required DREs. As noted in the Army's report to Congress, the operators of some of these facilities may be unwilling to accept the Army's business if they fear that public notification about CAIS being treated in their facilities could provoke public opposition, not just to CAIS disposal but also to the continued presence of the facility in the community. Yet, even the RRS process, which is the baseline disposal method, currently assumes that secondary wastes will be incinerated, which will probably be opposed by the same groups opposed to commercial incineration. Key Stakeholders Although a range of individuals and groups could be affected by the Army's CAIS disposal policy, not all of them will consider themselves affected or will take an active interest. Stakeholders are those who perceive themselves to be affected and are therefore likely to take an active interest in a program or policy. Stakeholders may have legal or organizational responsibilities, physical proximity, economic interest, or environmental or philosophical interests. Groups with organizational and legal responsibilities include different branches of the Army, Congress, and federal and state regulators. Commercial disposal facility owners will be interested for economic reasons. Populations near an existing commercial disposal facility, near a site where CAIS are found or currently stored, or along proposed transportation routes will see themselves as affected because of

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program their proximity. Groups with an environmental and philosophical interest include the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition and the Chemical Weapons Working Group, as well as more broadly based national and regional environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club and Greenpeace. This section reviews the commercial disposal option based on available information about stakeholders and the issues that concern them. Although this review provides a preliminary account of some key stakeholders and their likely associated issues, the committee emphasizes that here, as in any policy debate, public acceptability can only be determined by the participants themselves through a process of public involvement . Key Issues for Each Stakeholder Group Army. Key issues for the Army are schedule, cost, technical efficiency, safety, political feasibility, and the certainty and clarity of a defined path forward. Different branches of the Army are actually different internal stakeholders with different interests, which may pose difficulties for the NSCMP in implementing its preferred policy. For example, the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (which is banned by law from disposing of non-stockpile or other wastes in a stockpile disposal facility) is interested in avoiding any discussion related to non-stockpile issues that could destabilize its program. Similarly, commanders of active military bases are likely to be concerned about storing non-stockpile wastes or having their bases become a storage or disposal site, if these actions result in cost and controversy for their priority missions. Congress. Congress' desire to limit costs and reach a quick policy decision is likely to be frustrated by the public visibility and public controversy of the issue of CAIS disposal. As the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program has demonstrated, strong stakeholder concerns are likely to result in delays and even mandated changes in the program. Concerned constituents may be (1) near a commercial facility and opposed to the use of the facility for types of waste not originally included in the permit; (2) near a facility where residual wastes may be stored if incineration is not used; (3) located along transportation routes (assuming that transportation of CAIS is legally permissible) and concerned about transportation risks and local emergency response capabilities; or (4) members of interest groups opposed to the incineration of either primary or secondary wastes. State Legislators and Regulators. The states, which will be responsible for issuing modifications to existing permits for commercial disposal facilities, will have a significant effect on the viability of the commercial disposal option. Like Congress, the states will be strongly influenced by constituents' views and concerns. Because these views are likely to differ, their impact will depend on the political strength of the stakeholders and their representatives. Local and Tribal Populations. Local and tribal populations can be categorized by location: near CAIS discovery sites; adjacent to transportation routes (if transportation of CAIS by private companies is legally acceptable); and near a commercial disposal facility. In general, people located near CAIS discovery sites are likely to favor early removal and either storage or off-site disposal, regardless of facility type. This is particularly true if CAIS are found in, or close to, residential areas rather than at existing military sites. People along transportation routes may have very different views. Their concerns may include the integrity of shipping containers, notification of tribes and states

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program through which shipments are planned, and the capabilities of local emergency personnel to respond to accidents. The U.S. Department of Energy's experience with transporting radioactive wastes has shown that emergency response capabilities are a particular concern in rural and tribal jurisdictions. However, given the small number and size of CAIS items, these transportation issues may not be insurmountable. People in communities where commercial disposal facilities are located will play a central role in determining the acceptability of this disposal option. According to the Army report, facility owners are not willing to risk arousing negative public reactions for fear of adversely affecting their current business. Because the most widespread concerns are likely to be about health and safety, stakeholders must be convinced that CAIS disposal will not harm the health and welfare of the community (Walsh et al., 1997; Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Freudenberg, 1994). Other documented concerns include geographic equity,4 acceptance of wastes not originally included in the permit, local involvement in the decision process,5 and accountability and relationships with program and facility personnel (Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Bradbury et al., 1994). Research has shown that community stakeholders and program managers and their technical staffs frequently differ in their assessments of the reliability and trustworthiness of the organizations responsible for managing and overseeing hazardous waste facilities. Community stakeholders are also likely to be concerned that the technology functions as planned (Wynne, 1992; Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Bradbury, et al., 1994). Some communities where incinerators are currently located are presumably more receptive to the incineration of potentially controversial wastes, such as CAIS. However, the importance of meaningful public involvement is highlighted by a recent example of a community in Illinois that was assumed to be receptive, but in the absence of prior consultation refused to accept napalm for disposal in a nearby hazardous waste facility. As this example shows, a community may use the political process to intervene in attempts to modify permits. The chances of expanding the current operations of a facility to include CAIS disposal are likely to be improved by prior consultation, existing good relationships, and community confidence in current facility performance, as well as by the facility's economic importance to the community. Interest Groups. Opposition to incineration of primary or residual wastes is the central issue for members of some citizen groups that have been active in both the non-stockpile and chemical stockpile programs. Key issues previously raised by these groups include potentially harmful environmental and health effects from incinerator emissions, the assessment of incinerator emissions on the basis of trial bums rather than real-time monitoring, and the presence of hazardous residues in the ash. The most serious concerns raised in the past have been the negative environmental and health effects of air emissions—in particular, emissions of PCBs, dioxin, and dioxin-like compounds whose long-term effects, singly or in combination, are uncertain or unknown.6 More recently, the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition has called into question the Army's previous estimates of the human toxicity of chemical agents and requested a 4    Committee discussions with stakeholders from Pine Bluff, Arkansas and Tooele, Utah.. 5    Committee discussions with members of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition; Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Bradbury et al., 1994. 6    Recent evidence for these concerns includes "Public Health and Chemical Weapons Incineration" by the Kentucky Environmental Foundation (1998) and information supplied to the committee by the Non-Stockpile Citizens' Coalition, including a letter from the Non-Stockpile Citizens' Coalition to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, dated November 13, 1998. Published reports documenting attitudes toward incineration in the stockpile disposal program include NRC, 1996b, chapter 9; Bradbury et al. 1994; and Smithson, 1994.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program reevaluation of "all of the emission limits, exposure limits, and contingency plans for chemical warfare agent."7 In addition to these substantive issues related to the technology, these groups have long advocated dialogue between the Army and the public and emphasized the need for local involvement in selecting the preferred, site-specific approach.8 Members of these groups are committed to using technologies and disposal systems in which all effluent streams are held and tested prior to release.9 They consider these methods and systems to be less risky than incineration to human health and the environment. In general, these groups do not appear to be opposed to the commercial disposal option per se, provided the company has a sound reputation and safety record and that provisions for accountability and acceptance by the local community are in place. However, the number of nonincineration facilities for primary treatment of CAIS may be limited (only one of the five facilities in the Army study). Even if commercial neutralization is available for primary treatment, incineration is likely to be the facility operator's treatment of choice for residual wastes. In the opinion of one stakeholder group, the Non-Stockpile Citizens Coalition, residual wastes should instead be stored until an acceptable nonincineration technology is developed. During a recent public comment period, this group expressed its strong opposition to the incineration of secondary wastes from Army disposal systems. Groups that share this attitude toward CAIS disposal options are likely to take steps to prevent setting a precedent for incineration, based on their belief that delaying the disposal of CAIS or of residual CAIS wastes does not pose high risks and that it is better to wait for the development of a more acceptable technology than to choose incineration by default.10 From their perspective, the development of nonincineration technologies by the ACWA program holds out the hope that nonincineration technologies can be used for both the stockpile and non-stockpile programs, as well as for the disposal of other hazardous wastes nationwide. Commercial Disposal Facilities. The key issue for commercial facility owners is the impact of CAIS disposal on the bottom line. As highlighted in the Army's report, the potential for negative reactions, either from the local community or from outside activists, that could affect the company's current operations is a critical factor. Other concerns include the cost of permit, operational, or monitoring modifications that could outweigh the benefits of CAIS disposal. 7    Comments submitted in February 1999 to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality concerning the RCRA Research Development and Demonstration Permit for the Munitions Management Device (MMD) Version I; Letter from the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, November 13, 1998. 8    information supplied to the Committee by the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition. See also Bradbury et al., 1994. 9    As noted on pp. 159-160 of NRC, 1996a, none of the alternative technologies evaluated by that committee (nor the baseline incineration system for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal System) is "closed loop" in the technical sense that the material is completely recycled internal to the system. The authoring committee reported that its discussions with members of the public indicated that the public used the term "closed loop" in two ways: (1) as a process with few emissions, or fewer unknowns in the emissions; or (2) as a process that allowed all emissions and effluents to be held and tested before being released to the environment. That committee introduced the terminology "hold and test prior to release.'' 10    Letter from the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, November 13, 1998.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Stakeholders Influence on Policy Stakeholders may be able to influence policy through regulatory and political processes, as well as through the combined impact of these processes and public controversy on the willingness of commercial facility owners to dispose of CAIS. According to current procedures, the public would have three opportunities for review and comment. First, CAIS are classified as lethal chemical agents that are subject to 50 USC 1512 and, therefore, subject to stringent requirements for transportation, disposal, and handling. Attempts to change existing laws and regulations to reduce the complexity and cost of commercial disposal (as suggested by Amr et al., 1998) would open up many occasions for public review. Second, stakeholders would have the right to review and comment on NEPA documents (e.g., environmental impact statements) related to using commercial facilities. Third, stakeholders could comment on changes that may be required to existing state permits to allow disposal of CAIS. Stakeholders opposed to the commercial option could affect policy implementation by legal action or by requesting permit conditions that might make the option more costly and less attractive to a commercial facility. Politically, local and tribal stakeholders and regional and national interest groups may also have an impact on the final decision through their influence on decision makers in Congress, state legislatures, and federal and state regulatory agencies. At the same time, some local communities and state and federal regulators may be opposed to the long-term storage of residual wastes. Thus, the impact on policy would depend on the relative political strengths of the stakeholders and their representatives. Issues raised in public discussions, accompanied by possible media coverage, could affect commercial facility owners' willingness to expand into a controversial business area. The combination of public controversy and the increase in costs if changes in permitting conditions are required would almost certainly discourage some facilities from accepting CAIS for disposal. PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS The Army's report to Congress did not include a discussion of programmatic issues. Examples of issues included in this topic are noted at the end of Chapter 3. The following discussion presents the committee's preliminary views on some programmatic issues. Schedule The schedule for the destruction of CAIS material is not expected to be finalized until the best method, or methods, of destruction have been selected. If the RRS option is selected, it is estimated that the program for disposing of stored and recovered CAIS will be completed by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 2002. However, the chances are good that more CAIS items will be found in the future. Although these could be promptly disposed of by commercial incineration, regulatory hurdles and public resistance could lead to significant schedule delays or disruptions. Thus, although all known CAIS materials could be disposed of fairly quickly, additional materials are likely to be found, making development of a definitive schedule for RRS deployment difficult.

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Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets: Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Disposal Program Funding A "mock contract" developed by the NSCMP has been sent to selected commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities to determine their interest in CAIS disposal. In this mock contract, the Army has estimated a minimum cost of $10,000 per CAIS shipment and a maximum expenditure of $1 million to $4 million per year. Recovered CAIS could be stored temporarily to minimize the total number of shipments. The cost of $10,000 per shipment was based on interviews with these firms. However, it was unclear whether the cost of liability insurance was included in these estimates. Organizations The commercial incineration of CAIS will require the concurrence of many organizations who will be both directly and indirectly involved in programmatic decisions that could affect CAIS destruction, schedule, and costs. These organizations include the elected officials at the federal, state, and local levels; base commanders; Army organizations involved in CAIS recovery and transport; and state and federal regulatory agencies. The viability of this option will depend on the effectiveness of the Army in addressing the concerns raised by these organizations. One of the most significant parties will be the commercial firm. Given the relatively small amount of business and the potential for public controversy associated with the disposal of any chemical warfare materiel, commercial firms may not find CAIS disposal to be an attractive business option.