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OCR for page 67
Nuclear War. However, ~ do not know of any Soviet member of that
organization who has publicly criticized the nuclear arms policies of
his government.
~ believe many of the Soviet members are silent because, lacking
information, they believe that the United States is the sole source of
the arms race. Others are silent, knowing that the Soviet government
wouIc] consider any criticism an intolerable attack on its image. So
the Soviet participation in the physicians' organization has made no
demonstrable contribution to international peace. The only effect of
Soviet participation has been on the Soviet government's image in
the West (as the government intended), not on its military policies.
But do Soviet military policies, in fact, deserve criticism? Of
course, the Soviet government does not want a new world war. Yet
it has grabbed and continues to grab and keep one country after
another by military force-which, by itself, is dangerous for the
future of the world. Before Afghanistan, there was Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and before that, Hungary in 1956. Before that, there was
the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states and the division of Poland
with Nazi Germany that marked the beginning of World War IT.
There was also the Winter War with Finland in 1940. No, the Soviet
government cannot be called peaceloving. The world will therefore
benefit when the Soviet Union grants its citizens the human rights
to criticize their government's military policies.
In conclusion, ~ want to stress that, as a first approximation, the
issue of human rights is independent of the issue of disarmament.
Both issues are important for the cause of peace and international
security. But to me it is plain that the democratization of the USSR
in the sense that ~ have discussed earlier the inclusion of the USSR
in the Western system of democracies" is a necessary condition for
real peace ant] security in the world. Scientists can help achieve it.
It is difficult, but possible, and it is important. A peace based
on fear cannot be stable. Thank you.
COMMENTS
Victor We~8kopfi3
There are two obvious facts. One, human survival depends on
avoiding a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR.
i3At the last minute Dr. Weisskopf was unable to travel to Washington to
present his comments at the symposium. They were read by Francis Low.
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Two, human rights are severely curtailed in the USSR in spite of
some recent improvements under Gorbachev, including the liberation
of some well-known dissidents. There are two extreme positions that
can be taken in response to these facts.
The first states that in order to avoid the nuclear holocaust,
we need much better cultural, commercial, and political relations
between the superpowers. To raise the human rights issue obstructs
the attainment of a better understanding and should be avoided.
The second assumes that arms control or reduction of nuclear
or other weapons is impossible as long as the USSR curtails human
rights, since a country that does not trust its own citizens to be free
is not a country that can be trusted on the international level to
abide by its commitments.
~ believe both positions go too far. The first one is, to some
extent, clisproved by recent events. The insistence of the West on
criticizing violations of human rights has not diminished the ea-
gerness of the Soviets to go on with arms control negotiations and
improve relations with the West. On the contrary, it may have con-
tributed to Gorbachev's recent release of a relatively large number of,
but by far not all, dissidents. Probably part of the reason for these
releases was the recognition that some progress in human rights may
make the West more welling to improve relations.
The second extreme position is based on the wrong assumption
that a regime wiD change the foundations of its stability when put
under pressure by other countries. Freedom to dissent, free immigra-
tion, and the like are believed by the Soviet leadership to seriously
weaken the power of the present regime. External military pressure
can only reinforce this view. The policy "If you don't change your
system, we will go on with the arms race" cannot be successful and
would make nuclear war more probable in the future.
Some proponents of the second extreme position also argue that
a totalitarian regime cannot be trusted to abide by international
agreements. This is not borne out by experience. The Soviets,
by and large, did abide by past treaties, apart from a few Moor
infringements, without much military significance.
The right position must be a compromise between the two ex-
tremes. In order to avoid war, the United States must arrive at
better relations with the USSR through a mutual understanding of
our problems. The security and stability of the Soviet regime is nec-
essary for our own security. A regune that feels threatened is more
dangerous than one that feels secure.
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v"
This is why we need a detente between the superpowers together
with verifiable treaties preventing both sides from arriving at a sig-
nificant military or political superiority. It is the right moment for
detente because we have reached military parity and because both
powers should be interested in a political stabilization of their rela-
tions with foreign countries where they have run into considerable
difficulties.
The search for political understanding with the USSR should not
prevent the West from publicizing and protesting human rights in-
fringements. Those protests have contributed to Gorbachev's recent
actions. The United States should be known all over the world as a
defender of human rights. However, this is only possible if we attack
with equal force the infringements of human rights in countries with
totalitarian anticommunist regimes, which our government has not
done so far.
Criticism and protest need not exclude collaboration in other
areas such as arms control, political stabilization, environmental
problems, or scientific and commercial exchanges. Such colIabora-
tions reduce the danger of military conflicts. Preventing war between
the superpowers must have the highest priority, for there will be few
victims to liberate after a nuclear war.
Moreover, as Sakharov has often stressed, when U.S.-Soviet re-
lations turn from collaboration to increased confrontation, the result
is always an increase in human rights violations within the Soviet
Union. Our present military policy, such as the deployment of MX,
the placing of missiles in Europe, and the eagerness to employ SD!
as early as possible must arouse fear in the USSR of a first strike and
distrust in regard to our intentions of peaceful coexistence.
An improvement of human rights in the Soviet Union may be
possible, but only if fear and distrust can be dispelled. Then per-
haps new leaders may come to power for whom thought control and
oppression would be of less importance. But such a development
takes much time and can only happen after a reasonably successful
period of increasing collaboration between East and West, leading to
an avoidance of crisis situations, to effective arms control, and to a
common effort to counter other important threats to mankind in the
environmental field.
In short, we should uncover and protest infringements of human
rights in the USSR and elsewhere. At the same time, we should negm
tiate arms reductions and controls and avoid measures that increase
fear on the other side. We must improve contacts and collaborative
Representative terms from entire chapter:
arms control
