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Summary During the course of its deliberations from January 1985 until the present, the Committee on Research for the Security of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings identified a number of factors, in addition to growing threats from terrorism and espionage, that will affect the design of embassies of the future. These factors include the increased use by the Foreign Service of computer-aided office sys- tems and telecommunications capabilities, and increased pressure from other agencies of the U.S. government to be located in or on the same compound as embassy buildings. The delineation by the committee of these key areas of concern gave rise to a series of recommendations for the State Department's overseas construction programs. The committee urges that the State Department integrate these recommendations with a new set of comprehensive design guidance documents to be used by the architects, engineers, and others who wall design new embassy buildings. Table 1-1, which appears on page 3, summarizes the recom- mendations developed by the committee during its deliberations. Briefly, the committee recommends that the State Depart- ment adopt a process of thorough and regular security impact assessments. Such a process would begin at the earliest stages of project conception and run throughout the life cycle of the embassy building, serving as the basis for designed responses to actual and perceived security threats. The committee also recommends: ~ rigorous new procedures, guidelines, and criteria for the identification and evaluation of sites for future embassy buildings, 1

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2 taking into account a full range of security considerations and integrating them with other aspects of site development; ~ security-conscious site planning and design guidelines to ensure that maximum advantage is taken of the protection that can be afforded by site size, perimeter access controls, and landscape planning; ~ revised guidelines for the location and arrangement of func- tional areas within embassy buildings to ensure that the most vital and sensitive aspects of foreign operations are afforded maxonum protection from threats of takeover and espionage; ~ new guidelines and criteria for the protection of electrical, mechanical? and communications systems within buildings and for the use of state-othe-art security and acce~contro! systems as complements to security-conscious building design; ~ changes in current State Department practices and proce- dures in such areas as capital construction program management, the selection and management of architects, engineers, and con- struction contractors, and the management of information about foreign buildings; and ~ an ongoing building research and development program within the State Department, directed in part toward the im- provement of physical and technical security in embassy buildings. The committee has continued its efforts on behalf of the State Department through the middle of September 1986, focusing on aspects of the implementation of its recommendations and on research into several areas of special technical concern.

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3 TABLE 1-1 Summary of Committee Recommendations No. Subject Page Site Evaluation and Selection 1 Site selection criteria and procedures A comprehensive, systematic approach should be de- veloped to identify and synthesize the factors impor- tant to embassy citings, including site developability, security, communications, and cost criteria. The ap- proach should entail three phases: project definition, site generation, and site evaluation. The committee's site selection process and methodology should be used as the basis for development of a site selection field manual for the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) siting teams. 2 Site size and perimeter standoff distances The State Department should use the fuB extent of its negotiating abilities (including the authorities of the Foreign Missions Act) to secure sites large enough to implement a mandatory setback distance for all em- bassy buildings. For those few sites on which this re- quirement cannot be achieved but that are otherwise desirable, a written waiver of the requirement can be issued by the Under Secretary for Management. 3 Prescreening of sites Before formal site selection begins, FBO should work with the post staff if necessary, by temporarily as- signing personnel there to ensure that sufficient in- formation on potential sites has been assembled for the site selection team. 4 Advance preparation for site selection After final candidate sites have been identified, the post (under the direction of the FBO professional temporarily assigned to it) should assemble detailed information on each site. This information should be available to and should be reviewed by the site selection team prior to its visit. 38 39 40 41

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4 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) 5 Site selection team One or more permanent site selection teams should be formed with expertise in architecture, landscape planning and engineering, physical and technical secu- rity, communications, cost engineering, local foreign language negotiations, and political and diplomatic relations. 6 Adjacent lane} purchase The State Department should consider purchasing the land adjacent to a proposed U.S. embassy site when the type of future development planned for that land cannot currently be determined but might potentially be unsatisfactory. Site Planning and Design 7 Site security analysis guidelines FBO should immediately adopt and implement a site security analysis, to be conducted directly after site selection, as the basis for site planning and design . ~ cteclslons. Site security planning guidelines FBO should immediately adopt and implement a site planning process that emphasizes security and that is conducted concurrently with the functional analysis of the building program. 9 Site security design guidelines FBO should immediately adopt and implement secu- rity design guidelines for all major site elements on the peruneter or within the embassy grounds. 10 Site perimeter The site perimeter should be designed to protect embassy facilities from standoff or drive-by attacks and from thrown explosives; it should also detect (through the use of detection devices) and delay in- truders and/or vehicles attempting forcible entry. 41 42 43 43 44 44

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5 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) 11 Site access points An embassy site should have only two vehicular access points: ceremonial and service. Vehicular and pedes- trian, as well as employee and visitor, access points should be separate. Site access points also should be designed to provide inspection capabilities. 12 Onsite circulation and parking Onsite vehicular circulation and parking should be restricted to the greatest degree possible. Any ve- hicle that does enter the site should be thoroughly searched. Architectural Programming any Planning 13 Chancery building program modifications FBO should revise the existing chancery building pro- gra~n guidance in accordance with the committee's detailed recommendations and with accepted princi- ples of functional zoning, adjacencies, and separation. 14 Designation of blast and arson risk areas and contain- ment of ejects Those embassy areas designated as areas of risk with respect to bombings and deliberately set fires should be designed to resist and contain the effects of such incidents. 15 Secure areas and safe havens Two separate, distinct protective areas should be des- ~gnated in different locations of future embassy build- ~ngs. 16 Separation of hazardous occupancies All hazardous occupancies or materials, such as heavy building maintenance activities, furniture storage, au- tomobile repair facilities, fuel storage, and paint shops and storage, should be housed in separate fire-rated compartments. 44 45 46 49 49 49

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6 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) Architectural and Structural Systems 17 Protection of exterior walls and openings 18 Protection of exterior walls and openings Building Service and Security Systems 19 Protection of systems and equipment All building service equipment and distribution net- works should be contained in areas that are secured from unauthorized access and that provide clear sepa- rations between those elements to be accessed only by cleared U.S. citizens and those that can be accessible to foreign nationals or others without clearances. 20 Protection of power, waste, water supply, and communi- cations lines 21 Site self-su~ciency Sites should be self-sufficient with respect to essential building services such as emergency power and water, including that for fire suppression. 22 Monitoring and control Embassy services and security control and monitoring' systems should be integrated and simplified, with par- ticular consideration given to their human resources requirements (including ergonomic design of com- mand and control stations). Program Implementation, Management, and Administration 23 Design criteria format FBO should develop a more cohesive, fully integrated set of design manuals and guidelines that are stated in performance terms whenever possible and that con- vey clearly the specific requirements of FBO. Manda- tory training in these guidelines and security brief 50 50 51 52 53 53 57

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7 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) ings should also be developed and provided to all professionals rendering design services to FBO. 24 Integrated data base To manage its major program of new embassy con- struction as effectively as possible, FBO should estab- lish an integrated data base (that is, one that collects information during the entire life cycle of an embassy building). 25 Space programming FBO should institute a structured procedure for space programming that wiD accurately reflect current and anticipated embassy needs and that will incorporate the security and personnel considerations and the functional requirements unique to this building type. 58 58 26 Standardized components and large-scale procurement 60 FBO should explore the opportunities that may result from the standardized design and large-scale procure- ment of selected embassy building components and systems, which are made possible by the scope of the Inman Pane! recommendations. 27 Procurement of architectural and engineering services FBO should institute changes in its procedures for the procurement of architectural and engineering services to incorporate an expanded Architectural Advisory Pane! and modifications to the preselection criteria to recognize security design capability and previous State Department experience. 28 Program management The State Department, to ensure uniform, effective, and efficient management of the total new embassy construction program recornrnended by the Inman 61 62

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8 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) Panel, should implement a project management pro- gram centralized in Washington, D.C., that will direct a building project from inception through occupancy of all facilities. 29 Project administration Within the overall program management structure, the State Department should develop a centralized project administration procedure that assigns respon- sibility and control for the duration of each project to one Washington-based individual. 30 Security aspects of procurement Drawings and documentation related to the bidding, award, and construction processes should be circu- lated on a restricted basis, and consideration should be given to using, whenever possible, U.S. contrac- tors and subcontractors who hold appropriate secu- rity clearances. 31 Cost considerations Steps should be taken immediately to gather raw cost data for review, refinement, and assembly into a for- mat suitable for budgeting and subsequent financial management. Also, cost models should be developed for various embassy types, value management studies should be an integral part of the overall design pro- cess, and value incentive clauses should be included in embassy construction contracts. 32 Building operation and maintenance Operating and maintenance manuals for building and security systems should be required project deliver- ables, as should manuals detailing the intended use of the building under emergency conditions. Service for building and security systems should be provided by regional maintenance staffs (consisting of U.S. cleared personnel) that have been established for that pur- pose. 63 64 65 66

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9 TABLE 1-1 (Continued) 33 Postoccupancy evaluation All new embassies, after at least one year of occu- pancy, should be evaluated for a series of factors that are designed to measure aspects of a building's per- formance. Feedback from these evaluations should be used to improve design criteria. 34 Building information management systems FBO should develop a building information system that tracks the flow of important construction data throughout the design and construction process. After construction is completed, record drawings of the embassy should be prepared and updated as changes occur during the life of the building. Future Research and Development 35 Ongoing research program FBO should fund and administer ongoing research and development activities directed toward the im- provement of existing security-related design meth- ods and criteria. An outgrowth of such activities should be integrated technical design requirements, translated into performance criteria that can be im- plemented in practical terms by design professionals. 36 Security impact assessment development The State Department's research aunt development activities should concentrate in part on the develop- ment and implementation of formal techniques and methods for evaluating and reporting on the security- related aspects of future embassy buildings through- out the facility life cycle. 37 Physical elements for site security FBO should sponsor or conduct an ongoing research and development program specifically directed to- ward testing the effectiveness of site design elements 67 68 70 72 74

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10 TABLE 1-1 tCont~uedj against the security three of greatest concern to eyes. 38 Development of new enclosure system 39 Development of door and windy systems 7S 75