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5 Committee Findings: Issues and Challenges in the Design, Construction, and Management of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings The broad trends and general influences identified in Chapter 4 indicate that future U.S. embassy buildings must be designed to satisfy a variety of requirements and fulfill a number of objectives. These requirements and objectives are presented below in the form of committee findings. A brief d~scumion of each finding follows, in which the reader may be directed for more detail to other chapters in this report. CHANGES IN CURRE:NT PBO PROCESSES AND PRACTICES Finding: Enhancing the security of U.S. embassy buildings overseas will require changes in certain practices within the State Department that relate to the planning of new buildings and to the management of building design, construction, and maintenance. Discussion: The committee has concluded that a number of security concerns and opportunities for improvement relate di- rectly to State Department practices in managing and adminis- tering the planning, design, construction, and maintenance of its buildings. The subjects encompassed by this finding include the following: . the manger in which space needs are identified and recorded; 29

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30 criteria; ~ identification and evaluation of the qualifications of pros fessional design firms to render embassy design and construction services; formulation and implementation of security-related design evaluation of contractors and procurement procedures; and ~ inspection and evaluation of buildings during construction and after occupancy. Existing State Department concerns in these areas were inten- sified by the release of the Inman Pane} report and the prospect of a greatly increased construction program within FBO. A subsequent letter to the committee chairman from the Deputy Assistant Sec- retary of Foreign Buildings Operations encouraged the committee to consider and recommend organizational changes. The com- mittee took up this challenge and developed detailed and specific recommendations concerning changes that should be implemented in current and planned FBO procedures. TEE PRIME IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING SITES F=ding: The commuttee recognizes that building site size and site design measures alone cannot provide all the security necessary for an embassy and should not be treated in isolation of building design; neverthele - , site considerations represent the single most important physical design aspect of protecting an embassy from security threats. Sites for future U.S. embassy buildings should be identified, evaluated, selected, and designed with adequate and systematic consideration of security implications. In addition, the State Department must seek larger sites for the several reasons discussed in this report. Discussion: The importance to security of sites for U.S. em- bassy buildings that are correctly chosen, planned, and designed cannot be overstated. The consequences of choosing a particu- lar site for a future embassy building will be far-reaching and long-lasting; where buildings can be and usually are changed over time and can even be replaced or relocated on a site if necessary the site itself is not easily changed, and its security shortcomings, if severe and/or extensive, may be difficult to over- come. In nearly every respect, then, against virtually every secu- rity threat, proper selection and treatment of the site are the first,

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31 the most effective, and often the least expensive of the steps that can be taken to enhance security and to counter a wide range of threats. This suggests that the site selection process should be carried out with the greatest of care. Current State Department guidelines indicate that the ben- efits of increased site size and greater Setback or `'standoff" distances between embassy buildings and surrounding areas are recognized but are not fully exploited. Some discussions with the State Department have centered on the present requirement, which has been Unposed by the Office of Security. The require- ment calls for a minimum standoff distance between occupied buildings and a secure site perimeter (that is, a continuous line beyond which unauthorized vehicles, even when set on a course of destructive ra~rurung, cannot progress without being arrested or disabled). The committee considers this setback requirement to be an acceptable minimum for a number of reasons. Greater setback distances over clear advantages in enhancing aspects of security, improving opportunities for desirable functional zoning, and maximizing surveillance and control of visitors and intruders. However, the committee also recognizes that the minimum setback will not be achievable in some cases, and it has recommended a waiver procedure. The primary importance of site characteristics to the security of an embassy building led this committee to identify substantial and systematic improvements that are needed in the means and methods by which candidate sites for future embassy buildings are identified, evaluated, and selected. The committtee has also rec- ommended much closer links among the processes of building pro- gramming, site selection, and site design. Chapter 6 recommends new criteria for site selection and design and outlines procedures that should be introduced to improve the State Department's site acquisition efforts. CLEAR PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF SENSITIVE AND LESS SENSITIVE CHANCERY BUILDING AREAS Finding: Future embassy buildings will be required to provide distinct, highly secure, and easily respected physical separations between the following work areas: those that are used for the conduct of classified and sensitive functions and, therefore, the

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32 handling and storage of sensitive and classified information, ac- cessible only to U.S. citizens with appropriate security clearances; and those areas in which the public business of the embassy is conducted and that therefore are accessible to foreign national employees and the public. Discussion: The information handled by U.S. government officials working abroad within the State Department ~ often sensitive and frequently bears security cIassificatione. The amount of information that is designated as sensitive ~ growing and is likely to continue to grow. For this reason, and because such treatment will both ease and reduce the expense of implementing other security-related measures, the committee considers it necessary for future U.S. embassy buildings to provide clear and inviolable lines of physical demarcation between areas accessible only to cleared U.S. citizens (and, on occasion, to others under appropriate escort) and those areas accessible to other personnel and visitors. For the same reason, the committee has concluded that stron- ger efforts must be made to zone and create dedicated physical compartments for distinct functions withm embassy buildings and compounds. Such efforts may include functional zoffing and phys- ical compartmentalization of building areas (and, In some cases, separate buildings on a single compound or even at a separate lo- cation). Whatever method is used, the objective remains the same: to separate the functions that generate large amounts of visitor traffic from those that require the greatest security and generate the least visitor traffic. This security-conecious zoning should also be extended to all building services and circulation systems. (For specific recommendations on the functions adjacencies and zoning relationships that should guide basic planning and design efforts, see Chapter 6 of this report.) TlIE NEED FOR BUILDING FLEXIBILITY AND EASE OF EXPANSION FiIIding: Future U.S. embassy building design must take into consideration the fact that the functions performed within them will be continually required to grow, shrink, and change in ways and at times that are not and cannot be anticipated during the original design and construction period.

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33 Discussion: World affairs and the corresponding shifts that must occur in U.S. foreign policy can be and often are volatile and unpredictable. These shifts place great pressure on basic State Department post missions and on the embassy buildings that must accommodate them. There are many cases, some of them recent, in which the U.S. diplomatic posture toward a given country, or vice versa, has changed almost overnight. Such changes often mandate a greatly increased (or, in some cases, greatly decreased) official U.S. presence abroad and dramatic alternations in the size and character of the buildings required to carry out a revised foreign . . . po Icy mission. Even in those instances in which shifts in foreign relations and the U.S. foreign policy mission abroad are not dramatic or abrupt, there is a pervasive tendency within U.S. embassies toward almost continuous change, generally in the direction of expansion. This basic volatility directly affects building design and usually has an effect on security; the need for greater amounts of work space than originally anticipated leads to additions, expansions, extensions, remodelings, and other modifications whose security implications may not have been anticipated in the original design. Apart from asking necessary improvements in the processes of obtaining, communicating, and updating programmatic informa- tion for design, the State Department must also design facilities that are as flexible as possible and help ensure that designs and construction techniques are as amenable as is practical to possible future changes. BUILDING CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Finding: Future U.S. embassy buildings will rely increasingly on a wide variety of complex control, monitoring, annunciation, and management systems for such diverse purposes as security, communications, surveillance, personnel access control, environ- mental conditioning, equipment status monitoring and mainte- nance, fire safety, and other functions. These systems have poten- tial security advantages, but they also carry some risks. Discussion: In most cases these systems will involve electronic computer-based devices and componentry. Although such complex systems make a clear contribution to security by extending human

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34 capabilities, building designers should seek to avoid overreliance on such systems and should limit the use of complicated, delicate equipment. The committee's advice in this matter is based on the body of knowledge and experience accumulated by the professional dis- ciplines that are concerned with the design of facilities involving continual surveillance and high security. The literature suggests that line-osight and direct visual and auditory surveillance are nearly always more effective than, and are generally preferable to, indirect or highly mediated forms of observation and status monitoring. To the extent that indirect system are used, efforts should be made to integrate and simplify the apparatus required for their effective use. The committee recognizes the dedication of Marines who vol- unteer for embassy security duty and perform their duties even at the risk of danger to their lives. Without question, they constitute a valued and important element in the provision of security for U.S. embassies. The committee believes that the State Department should address those issues that are related to the roles of all security personnel, including the Marine Security Guards. A reconsidera- tion or redefinition of the Marine Guard's role and responsibilities may be warranted.