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OCR for page 35
6
Design Criteria for a New Generation
of U.S. Embassy Buildings
In response to the challenge to unplement the massive build-
ing program recommended by the Inman Panel, the U.S. State
Department is poised to embark on the most ambitious and sig-
nificant embassy construction program in its history. To carry out
this program, the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO)
faces the prospect, over a seven-year period, of building and/or
reconstructing more embassy facilities than have been constructed
abroad by the United States since the founding of the nation. The
consequences of this building program will be profound and lasting
for the Foreign Service, for U.S. foreign relations activities, and
for the unage of the United States in the world at large. And it
is unlikely that the opportunities for improving embassy security
that are inherent in such a program will again present themselves.
Well-founded concerns about embassy vulnerability to terror-
ism and to espionage have created the support for a program of
this expense and magnitude. Yet, apart from the clear and cur-
rent need to make extraordinary efforts to protect U.S. embassies
from threats to safety and security, there are reasons why careful
scrutiny and thorough reconsideration should be given to questions
of how the United States constructs its embassies abroad.
Chapters 4 and 5 of this report identify the broad influences
and challenges, encompassing considerations that extend well be-
yond security, that this committee believes wiD shape the re-
quirements for embassies of the future. Despite this delineation,
however, the committee does not call for or condone the construc-
tion of standardized or prototype embassy buildings in order to
as
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36
satisfy such requirements as may evolve. Rather, embassy build-
ings must respond to the richness and diversity of the climates
and geographical settings in which such buildings will exist. The
design challenges posed by each embassy building are unique and
formidable: An embassy is a building whose design must respect its
context, wherever and whatever that may be; and yet it must also,
in the best sense possible, represent the character and strengths
of the United States. In addition, embassy buildings must satisfy
a great number of complicated, technically challenging functional
requirements, to which now must be added many that serve to
enhance security.
Early in its deliberations, the committee recognized that there
can be no single or uniform set of architectural and engineering
design responses to the myriad factors and requirements that are
often unique in application to individual embassy projects. For
this reason, the committee adopted two guiding principles for its
work and for its recommendations to the State Department:
The overall approach to future embassy building design,
construction, and management should be governed by a continuing
process of security impact analysis, in which the factors unique
to each particular setting and mission are clearly identified and
thereby determine the basis of design. Although this corrunittee
has considered only security-related influences and factors, it is
clear that other factors must also be considered and should be
used, in conjunction with security considerations, to determine
the final design of the facility.*
~ Design guidelines, criteria, and requirements unposed by
the State Department should be formulated and evaluated In terms
of desired performance attributes and not In terms of fixed, rigid,
standardized, or uniform design solutions.
.
This chapter and the two that follow present the recommenda-
tions that have evolved hom the committee's work. This chapter
details specific performance-based criteria and recommendations
for security as related to the following:
sings;
· evaluation and selection of sites for future embassy build
~ Among these other factors are a wide range of functional, cultural, and
aesthetic considerations that are already routinely investigated and identified
as part of the design professional's efforts.
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37
· planning and design of sites;
~ desired functional layouts and adjacencies that should serve
as the basis for the design of future embassy buildings;
properties that should be required of structural, envelope,
and fenestration systems; and
~ properties and characteristics that should be required of
building service and control systems.
Chapter 7, which ~ concerned with the implementation of the
committee's recommendations, elaborates on performance-based
design criteria and recommends a generic format to be followed as
FBO develops new guidance documentation for design profession-
als in meeting security and other requirements in future buildings.
And in Chapter 8, the committee details its views on how a process
for security impact assessment could be developed and carried out.
It is important to note that the committee considers its pro-
posed recommendations and design criteria to be minimum re-
sponses. For each specific embassy building, a security impact
assessment can determine whether the nature of the potential
threats facing a given facility may warrant the implementation of
stronger security design measures.
DEFINITION OF THE DESIGN THREAT
The definition of the security threats confronting an embassy
building in turn establishes the level of performance and protection
that must be afforded by the building and the site in order to
withstand such threats. The committee believes it is essential
that the design professionals retained by FBO have a clear and
unequivocal definition of the range of potential security threats
against which embassy buildings are to be designed. Although
formulating such a definition is a difficult and inexact undertaking
at best, nevertheless, the committee is convinced that a base level
can be determined. For this purpose, it has used historical records
to characterize potential threats.
Although threats to the security of embassy buildings are
constantly changing and can, in some cases, be extraordinary, a
standard, minimum base level of security must be provided at all
posts.
The corrunittee recognizes that, by establishing a particular
level of resistance in future embassy buildings, the State Depart-
ment is also accepting a certain level of risk. These minimum
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38
standards cannot defeat or deter Al possible threats, and in some
cases the gravity of the known or potential threats may warrant
security measures that are more stringent than the m~nnnum stan-
dards. The committee further recognizes that there Is a Extinction
between the "maxonum potential events (as threats are sometunes
defined in design criteria for military facilities) and practical design
assumptions. The committee believes that, in making its recom-
mendations and developing design criteria, it has made practical
design assumptions that are based on an analysis of past incidents.
It has not, however, attempted to predict or determine the greatest
or most severe threat that could be posed for an embassy building.
PERFORMANCE-BASED CRITERIA AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Site Evaluation and Selection
The proper location and design of sites is crucial not only
to ensuring the security of future U.S. embassies but to virtually
aD aspects of the effective performance of embassy activities. In
addition, as increasing urbanization throughout the world brings
concomitant increases in the cost and scarcity of land, locational
and site Sections wait assume increasing budgetary and political
importance.
Current State Department site selection procedures cannot
respond adequately to the demands of any program, let alone
those that will be imposed by implementation of the large con-
struction effort recommended by the Inman Panel. The commit-
tee's recommendations call for improvements in these procedures;
and although such improvements are directed primarily toward
enhanced embassy security, they should also produce returns in
overall embassy effecti~rene - .
Recommendation 1: Site selection criteria and procedures.
The State Department should adopt a comprehensive and system-
atic approach to identifying and synthesizing the various factors
that are important to the siting of future embassy buildings, in-
cluding criteria related to site developability, security, communi-
cations, and costs. The procedures in such an approach should
constitute three sequential phases:
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39
~ project definition, in which the proposed new building's lo-
cational and programmatic requirements- with consideration also
given to future needs are accurately established;
~ site generation, In which candidate sites are identified,
based on programmatic requirements; and
~ site evaluation, in which a team of professionals, assigned
permanently to this responsibility and representing a balance of
disciplines, applies the criteria and procedures to select the pre-
ferred site.
The committee has developed a structured site selection pro-
cess and methodology for the evaluation of site suitability, a pro-
cess that takes into account a full range of security and other
considerations. For the present, this document should be used to
instruct State Department personnel who are or will be involved in
site selection; but because the document in its present form ~ not
suitable for field use, it should be used as the basis for developing
a field manual for site selection. In fact, the committee urges FBO
to begin immediately to develop such a manual.
Discussion: Existing site selection guidelines and procedures,
to the degree that they exist, are not formalized and do not inte-
grate the full range of concerns that must enter into this important
and sensitive process. And although security-related site evalua-
tion criteria do exist, they are not complete and are unevenly
administered in practice. Moreover, existing security-related site
evaluation criteria are not in balance with other important con-
siderations: costs; appropriateness of the site to the building
program; special and often overriding requirements related to the
communications system's access and security; and suitability of
the site with respect to representational and other goals.
In response to these issues, the committee has recommended
a site selection process and site evaluation criteria that are flexible
and that allow the integration of the special or unique require-
ments that invariably arise in each embassy building case. As
is appropriate, however, the committee's recommendations pro-
vide a framework for, but do not and should not supplant, the
professional judgment of the members of the site selection team.
Recornrnendation 2: Site size and perimeter standoff dis-
tances. For site selection purposes, area requirements should as-
sume a minimum setback distance (from the site perimeter) for all
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40
embassy buildings, and such a requirement should be mandatory
for all new embassy sites. Given the clear importance of site char-
acteristics to the security of an embassy and its occupants, the
committee believes that the State Department should use the full
extent of its negotiating abilities, including the authorities of the
Foreign Missions Act, to secure sites that meet this requirement.
In those few instances of sites on which the minimum setback
cannot be achieved, the department should require that a formal,
written waiver of the requirement be issued by the Under Secretary
for Management before site acquisition can proceed.
Recommendation 3: Preacreen~ng of sites. As the State
Department office responsible for site selection, FBO should work
with assigned members of the post staff before beginning formal
site selection procedures to ensure that sufficient information on
potential sites has been assembled for use by the site selection
team in advance of its visits. Wherever necessary, FBO should
temporarily assign personnel to the post for this purpose.
Discussion: Under the current site selection process, the post
identifies possible sites based on program information (which Is
sometimes scanty) that has been provided by FBO. In some cases,
a site prescreening team is sent to the host country by FBO,
followed by a final site selection team; in other cases, only one
visit is made, during which site prescreening and final selection
are combined. With this type of system, post personnel report
on one hand that they do not have sufficient tune or resources to
identify sites and to gather needed information; on the other hand,
members of the site selection teams often remark that their efforts
are hampered by the lack of such basic background materials as
plot plans, surveys, aerial photographs, and maps.
The temporary amignment to the post of an FBO professional
would alleviate such problems. This individual should hold the
appropriate security clearances, possess a general knowledge of
the building program, and understand site developability Issues.
He or she could then proceed to assemble the information and
background materials required for prescreening of the sites that
had been identified as possible candidates for development. Ideally,
between 10 and 15 possible sites should be identified, depending
on local conditions; following the prescreening process, between 5
and 7 sites should be presented for consideration by the selection
team.
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41
Recommendation 4: Advice preparation for site selection.
After prescreening has been carried out and final candidate sites
have been identified, detailed information on each site should be
assembled by the post under the direction of the FBO professional
temporarily assigned for that purpose. This information should be
made available to the site selection team prior to its visit. Also, the
team should hold at least one meeting before the visit to become
familiar with the information.
Discussion: The arrival of the site selection team in the host
country without adequate preparation seriously jeopardizes its
chances of selecting the most suitable site. Admittedly, it Is diffi-
cult to assemble in advance all of the information needed to make
an informed decision; yet, certain basic information requirements
must be met:
.
the proposed building program must be defined clearly;
~ plot plans, photographs, and site maps with topographical
contours should be available;
~ green field lots should be staked or otherwise clearly de-
marcated;
locally available utility information should be developed;
information should be assembled on local zoning and build
ing regulations;
the cost of the site, its present ownership, and the condition
of any existing facilities should be known;
documented city and area maps should be available to show
the relationship of the site to government offices and other points
of likely frequent contact, to major transportation facilities, and
to surrounding patterns of development and
_ ~ ~ 7 ~
in cases in which future adjacent development may occur
research should be conducted to determine likely future uses.*
Recommendation 5: Site selection team. The State Dee
partment, under FBO, should form one or more permanent site
selection teams that would include professional with expertise
in architecture, landscape planning and engineering, physical and
technical security, communications, cost engineering, local foreign
Iangu age negotiations, and political and diplomatic relations.
* This research should prevent the kind of situation that occurred recently
in Lisbon, Portugal; there, a mid-rise hotel was later constructed that
overlooked the newly completed U.S. embassy complex.
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42
Discussion: Currently, State Department site selection teams
are essentially formed on the basis of which personnel are avail-
able at the time. They generally include an FBO area operations
officer, an FBO architect, and specialists in communications and
security. There may also be other members of the team, including
representatives of tenant agencies. Because these teams are often
formed with little advance notice, they are rarely able to prepare
for their task prior to the trip. Even in instances in which some
advance notice is given, team members may have little extra time
or incentive for preparation. (Indeed, such assignments are often
seen as an intrusion on a government employee's normal work re-
sponsibilities and as offering no potential for career enhancement.)
The formation of permanent site selection teams would over-
come these problems and focus appropriate attention on the im-
portance of a careful siting decision. To produce such a decision,
the site selection team would review the candidate site informa-
tion assembled by the assigned FBO professional at the post and
administer the procedures and evaluation criteria developed by
this committee.
Recommendation 6: Adjacent land purchase. In certain
cases, the type of future development planned for land adjacent
to a U.S. embassy site cannot be determined. In those instances
in which the land potentially could be used for purposes that
would be unsatisfactory, the State Department should consider
purchasing the parcel. The land can be leased or sold later for
uses that, from the standpoint of security, are deemed appropriate
or acceptable.
Discussion: The larger sites that wild be required to imple-
ment increased embassy setback criteria suggest that many em-
bassy buildings wall be located outside of denser, central urban
areas; in many cities of the world, this will mean siting embassies
in areas in which relatively little development has yet occurred.
On the basis of past experience, the presence of the embassy itself
will attract adjacent new development, which can be cause for
considerable concern. Inappropriate or unacceptable development
can threaten the security of the embassy and damage its image.
To prevent such circumstances, the committee has formulated the
above recommendation.
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43
Site Planing and Design
Currently, there are very few guidelines in FBO literature re-
lating to site planning, landscape design, and perimeter protection
of embassy buildings. Because aspects of site design and perimeter
protection frequently constitute the first line of defense against
most threats, the committee believes that guidelines in these
areas are an absolute necessity; consequently, it has developed
the recommendations that follow.
The committee has addressed these moues only from the stand-
point of security, although site planning and design for embassies in
general Is inadequately dealt with by current FBO procedures and
guidelines. Moreover, with the promulgation of a setback require-
ment for all embassy buildings, site design and protection take on
added significance. The committee recommends that FBO under-
take the preparation of a comprehensive set of guidelines for.site
planning and design, integrating the security recommendations
made by this committee. Recognizing, however, that additional
research is necessary in many technical areas of site security, the
committee further recommends that studies be conducted in these
areas. Some of the possible directions for fruitful research are
identified in Chapter B.
Recommendation 7: Site security analysis guidelines. FBO
should immediately adopt and implement a site security analy-
sis, which should be conducted immediately after site selection
and subsequently used as the basis for site planning and design
· e
c .eclslons.
Discussion: The careful collection and analysis of site-related
data are essential to informed design decision making concerning
security issues. Therefore, the committee presents procedures for
conducting a site security analysis. The analysis deals with to-
pography, vegetation, adjacent land use, circulation, visual access,
lighting, utilities, and fire, police, and medical services. It should
be undertaken In conjunction with a security threat analysis or
impact statement.
Recommendation 8: Site security planning guidelines. FBO
should immediately adopt and implement a site planning process
that emphasizes security and that is conducted concurrently with
the functional analysis of the building program.
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44
Discussion: Site planning for effective security establishes
the relationships between the site and the accompanying offsite
and onsite uses. Often, such careful attention can minimize any
problems that may arise before the site design process begins.
The committee recommends site security planning guidelines that
address circulation, access points, parking, the site perimeter,
site-to-building and support facility relationships, and offsite rela-
tionships.
Recommendation 9: Site security design guidelines. FBO
should immediately adopt and implement security design guide-
lines for all major site elements on the perimeter or within the
embassy grounds.
Discussion: The committee recognizes that many site security
design decisions will vary from site to site and will depend on such
factors as the physical characteristics of the site, the prevalent
offisite conditions, the design intent, and the nature and level of
security threats. However, certain site elements or combinations
of elements have performance characteristics that should be the
basis for a minimum standard, including barriers, walls and fences,
guardhouses, sally ports, lighting, plantings, and earth berms.
Recommendation 10: Site perimeter. The site peruneter
should be designed to protect onsite facilities from ground-level
standoff or drive-by attacks, and from thrown explosives. In addi-
tion, it should be designed to delay intruders attempting to enter
the facility by climb-over or penetration methods and to stop vehi-
cles that are intent on forcible entry. Furthermore, through the use
of detection devices, the perimeter should be designed to detect
and promote the identification of intruders, whether vehicular or
pedestrian.
Discussion: The perimeter may be composed of walls, fences,
earth berms, natural topographic separations, or any combination
thereof that is capable of fulfilling security objectives and that
will enhance the architectural image and style of the embassy
buildings.
Recommendation 11: Site access points. An embassy site
should have only two vehicular access points (ceremonial and ser-
vice), and pedestrian access points should always be separated
from vehicular access points. On those sites where chanceries and
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45
consular sections are colocated, visitor and employee entrances
should be separate. Site access points should be designed to pro-
vide inspection capabilities, through the use of a sally port ar-
rangement, and the same level of protection (or greater) as that
of the adjoining perimeter barrier treatment.
Discussion: Site access points can be the weak link in the
perimeter defense system if they are not properly located, de-
signed, and protected. Under certain circumstances, vehicular
approach routes to the site may make site entrances the points
most vulnerable to attack. For these reasons, and because of the
problems inherent in entry control, the number of site entrances
should be kept to an absolute minimum. Additionally, vehicular
and pedestrian site accesses, as well as employee and visitor en-
trances, should be separated to minimize the potential threat to
each from a breach of the other.
Sally port arrangements are necessary at all site entrances
to control access and ensure that each entrant ~ individually
inspected. Both vehicular and pedestrian sally ports should be
designed so that no two sides may be opened at the same time
except in an emergency. Sally ports should also be so designed
and located that in the event of a vehicular forced entry attempt,
the deflection of the vehicle by any gate or barrier will not allow
such a vehicle to approach any occupied building.
The location of site access points should be analyzed carefully
to ensure that vehicular approach speeds are or can be controlled.
Such control is crucial to providing enough response time for
the deployment of necessary security measures. Appropriate site
access points can be provided using gates, barriers, fences, walls,
or other devices, or a combination of these methods.
Recommendation 12: Onsite circulation and parking. On-
site vehicular circulation and parking should be restricted to
the greatest degree possible. Although vehicular access may be
granted to high-ranking U.S. and foreign officials and dignitaries,
any onsite parking for these vehicles should be placed at the great-
est practical distance from any building within the perimeter. No
vehicular site access should be granted to other employees and
visitors. Instead, offsite parking in controlled and protected ar-
eas may be provided. Vehicular site access should be granted to
service and emergency vehicles only when absolutely necessary.
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46
In addition, all vehicles accessing the site should be thoroughly
searched.
Discussion: Onsite vehicular access drives should be lirn~ted
and controlled to reduce potential threats from vehicles that have
penetrated the site entry or gone undetected and that may pose
a danger to the facility. Interior access roads should be equipped
with a secondary system of barriers that, depending on the nature
of the entering vehicle, can selectively permit or deny access to a
given area of the site. (For example, barriers preventing access to
a particular area may be left deployed until such time as access is
warrar~ted.)
Architectural Progr~mn~g Ad planning
Currently, FBO guidelines instruct design professionals on
the size of and preferred relationships among the functional areas
normally found within chancery (embassy office) buildings. This
documentation serves as the basm for the earliest embassy planning
and design efforts in which basic functional areas with assigned
space allocations are arrayed in relation to one another and in
relation to major circulation and building service facilities. This
process is known as functional zoning, and using it to provide
the first and most fundamental levels of physical security Is an
established, time-testecl, and proven design approach. Current
FBO chancery building program documentation embodies this
principle, but it IS in need of extensive modifications.
Recommendation 13: Chancery building program
modifications. FBO should revise the existing chancery building
program guidance in accordance with the committee's detailed
recommendations and the principles of functional zoning, adja-
cencies, and separation that are represented In Figure ~1.
Discussion: The committee recommends comprehensive
changes in the basic planning and design guidance given to pro-
fessionals engaged in chancery building design. The approach Is
encapsulated in Figure ~1 and embodies the following concepts:
completely separating secure areas, which are accessible
only to cleared U.S. citizens (and others under appropriate escort),
from areas that are accessible to foreign nationals and others
without necessary clearances who are employed by the embassy;
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47
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OCR for page 48
48
~ in all embassy building work areas, providing staff circu-
lation that is separate from public circulation and that Is behind
the so-called hardline (a line of protection separating secure areas
from more public ones and providing resistance to forced entry
attempts and ballistic weapons);
~ limiting access points to buildings, with provisions for per-
sonnel and vehicle access controls and inspection at all points of
entry;
providing interior and exterior controlled circulation routes
that without proper access protocols cannot be deviated from
without alerting guard forces;
~ clustering and removing functional areas that generate the
greatest public traffic from proximity to the more sensitive por-
tions of the embassy compound (public traffic is greatest for im-
m~grant and nonimmigrant visa services, other aspects of consular
operations, U.S. Information Service and commercial libraries,
nonsecure conference areas and meeting rooms, post community
service operations, and associated informational and representa-
tional functions);
~ separating service or industrial-type functional areas from
sensitive areas and areas requiring special protective treatments
(service functional areas include those that require the use or
storage of hazardous materials and equipment, that otherwise
represent risks of accidental fires, or that make it extremely diffi-
cult to prevent the introduction and conceahnent of incendiary or
explosive, electronic, or other dangerous devices);
~ using concentric rings of circulation barriers and control
points to provide ever more secure areas, moving from the outside
toward the innermost reaches of the compound;
separating building service equipment and distribution
areas into areas authorized for unescorted access only by cleared
U.S. citizens and those allowing limited access to foreign national
personnel under escort; and
~ designating and designing an area for the placement of sus-
picious articles and explosive devices until they can be examined
by experts.
Acquiring larger sites for future U.S. embassy buildings, which
is desirable for the reasons previously d~cu~ed, will also facilitate
the segregation of the most sensitive facilities and work areas
from those requiring less extensive treatment. Thus, the larger
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49
building sites that were recommended earlier in this report will
also accommodate the functional zoning principles and separations
discussed above.
Reco~n~nendation 14: Designation of blast and arson risk
areas and containment of elects. Certain embassy areas should
be designated as areas of risk with respect to bombings and delib-
erately set fires and should be designed to resist and contain the
effects of such incidents. Also, a temporary disposal area should
be provided for known or suspected explosive devices.
Discussion: A majority of ad attacks against U.S. embassy
buildings since 1968 have involved either bombings or arson-
and often both, because fire generally accompanies bomb blasts.
Although the records available to the committee provide only
limited detail with respect to where bombs or incendiary devices
were placed in these incidents, it is clear that the more public
areas of the embassy essentially, those outside the hardlinc are
most vulnerable.
The committee believes that all reasonable steps must be taken
to prevent injury from explosions and/or fires and that compart-
mentalization of risk areas offers the most promising approach. To
achieve these objectives, embassy security system design should
minimize the possibility (absolute assurance can never be prm
vided) that bombs or incendiary devices will be brought into the
building. In addition, the building should be compartmentalized
to prevent the spread or spillover of arson fires or bomb blasts
from these more accessible areas to those areas with more re-
stricted access. This can be accomplished both through more
careful functional zoning and by the proper design of walls and
other separations.
Recommendation 15: Secure areas and safe havens. Two
separate and distinct protective areas should be designated in
different locations of future embassy buildings.
Recomrr~endationl6: Separation ofhazardousoccup~ncies.
All hazardous occupancies, such as heavy building maintenance
activities, furniture storage, automobile repair facilities, fuel stor-
age, and paint shops and storage, should be housed in separate
fire-rated compartments. Any hazardous materials or occupancies
in classified or sensitive building areas should be similarly treated.
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so
Discussion: In current embassy designs, multiple occupancy
types are often housed ~ one structure (for example, one building
may contain Al of the following: office space, building maintenance
activities, storage, kitchens, cafeterias, libraries, Marine Guard
residences, automobile repair facilities, fuel storage, paint shops
and storage, and warehouses). These areas may or may not be
separated into fire-rated compartments by fire-rated construction
and exits. To increase embassy security and protect structures and
occupants, program planning should group functions according to
their relative security risk rather than their relative fire hazard.
Architectural Ad Structural Systems
The committee recognizes that treatment of the embassy
building's exterior envelope represents one of the most challenging
aspects of security design because so many factors and potential
threats are involved. FBO and the State Department's Office of
Security have been working in this area for at least five years,
beginning with the development of measures designed to thwart
mob actions and unauthorized entry and more recently moving to
other considerations.
Recommendations 17 Ad 18: Protection of exterior walls
and openings.
Building Service and Security Systems.
As part of its scope of interest, the committee examined in
detail a range of threats posed to building service systems, which
it has defined to include all electrical, mechanical, and commu-
nications networks and equipment. The committee believes that,
in general, insufficient attention has been paid in the past by the
State Department to security protection for these systems. With
the increase in terrorist attacks at U.S. embassies, it would appear
that a reconsideration of security measures for these systems Is in
order. Indeed, the committee's studies indicate that substantial
threats would be posed to the security of personnel and informa-
tion by the compromise of these systems and equipment, all of
which provide embassy builclings with vital services.
Consequently, the committee recommends that these systems
be protected from deliberate or accidental damage that would
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51
result in the interruption of vital services. Emergency backup sys-
tems and equipment to be used when such events do occur are
also needed. In essence, embassy buildings should be designed to
function as sel£sufficiently as possible, using self-contained, U.S.-
controlled systems and equipment wherever practical and relying
on locally available utilities only insofar as they are satisfactory.
Furthermore, networks and equipment for plumbing, heating, ven-
tilating, electrical, and communications functions should be de-
signed in such a way that they cannot be used by hostile interests
to gain intelligence or to otherwise compromise embassy security.
Turning to security systems (including status-monitoring de-
vices, public access controls, fire annunciation systems, and
others), the committee's studies indicate that they shout be as
simple as possible and designed to function reliably and appro-
priately in the specific environmental conditions they will face.
Due to the wide variety of local conditions at embassies in which
these systems will be used, no single set of systems and equipment
will be appropriate for all locations. The committee has exam-
ined a large number of the security systems and equipment that
are presently available and, presents detailed design and instalIa-
tion considerations that should guide their application for embassy
buildings. The recommendations below summarize these criteria
and describe the principles that guided their development.
Recommendation 19: Protection of systems and equips
meet. Future embassy buildings should be so designed and con-
structed that all building service equipment and distribution net-
works are contained in areas that are secure and that provide clear
separations between those elements that are to be accessed and
serviced only by cleared U.S. citizens and those that can be ac-
cessible to foreign nationals or others without suitable clearances.
All such systems should be secured from unauthorized access and
provided with alarms to indicate intrusion or tampering.
Discussion: The type of building service equipment and dis-
tribution area referred to above can be achieved by a wide variety
of technical solutions, many of which would not necessarily employ
a central service core. There are certain benefits to that solution,
however. A physically distinct service equipment and distribution
area would ease problems related to maintenance, repair, and ser-
vicing. In addition, this type of solution could provide a degree of
uniformity in the design and layout of these systems in embassies
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52
.
around the world, once again enabling easier maintenance and
repair.
The issue of servicing these systems is an important factor
in maintaining their security. Because the nonsensitive portions
of building service systems are likely at some point to require
servicing by foreign nationals and others without security clear-
ances, every effort should be made in building design to ensure the
following:
. Those building service system components that are likely to
need routine servicing and maintenance should be placed outside
classified and sensitive work areas and well away from classified
and essential equipment that should be handled only by cleared
U.S. citizens (essential equipment includes that equipment used to
provide basic building services).
~ Those components that cannot be physically separated
should be installed in such a way that they can be easily inspected,
removed (for servicing off the premises), and replaced without
interruption to critical services within the building.
.
Distribution networks and equipment areas should be read-
ily secured from vandalism or tampering, yet they should be easy
to inspect and should allow relatively simple modification.
To ensure the installation of only those raceways, conduits,
and other elements that are part of the building design, future
embassy design and construction should permit easy and positive
inspection during the building process. The connections between
the building service equipment and distribution network areas,
which are described above, and the embassy's general office areas
are most critical. Construction drawings and specifications should
clearly indicate the intended and permitted connections; construc-
tion techniques and procedures should afford easy verification in
the field that only those connections are installed.
Any drawings and specifications that are needed for routine
servicing of these systems should be controlled; they should not be
removed from embassy premises. Any changes that are made to
these systems should be fully documented and thoroughly reviewed
to ensure that security objectives are not compromised.
Recommendation 20: Protection of power, waste, water
supply, and communications lines.
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Recommendation 21: Site self-~fficiency. Embassy sites
should be self-sufficient with respect to essential building services
such as emergency power and water, including that for fire suppres-
sion. Embassy buildings and sites should be designed to function
effectively without exclusive reliance on utilities and services sup-
plied from offsite so that, in the event such services are interrupted
or become so eroded in quality or availability as to render them
unsatisfactory, the embassy may continue operations.
Discussion: I,ocal utility supply sources for embassies are not
always reliable or of satisfactory quality; they are also vulnerable
to sabotage. Because the disruption of these sources may coincide
with terrorist attacks, embassies require reliable onsite emergency
backups for these systems. The committee is not suggesting that
embassies should not use locally available utilities and services,
such as electrical power and water, where such services are avail-
able in satisfactory quality and form; but it is recommending that
steps be taken to reduce the extent of the embassy's reliance on
these local resources.
Of particular concern in the event of utility service disruptions
are electronic information handling systems, computers, and other
such devices. Given their requirements for an uninterruptible
supply of high-quality electrical power, special efforts must be
made to protect embassy buildings from voltage spikes and other
spurious signals that are characteristic of power systems in many
areas of the world.
Because of the considerable variation in the availability and
quality of local services throughout the world (there can be vari-
ations in service between different sites in the same country or
locale), an evaluation of these aspects of local utility services
should be a part of initial and ongoing security analyses under-
taken for each project. The committee has incorporated such
considerations in its recommendations on site evaluation and se-
lection.
Recommendation 22: Monitoring and control. Embassy
services and security control and monitoring systems should be
integrated and simplified, with particular consideration given to
their human resources requirements. Also, the State Department
should undertake special efforts to upgrade the ergonomic design
of command and control stations for both routine and emergency
· -
or crisis uses.
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Discussion: Increasingly, future U.S. embassy buildings will
rely on a wide variety of complex control, monitoring, annuncia-
tion, and management systems for such diverse purposes as secu-
rity, communications, access control, environmental conditioning,
and equipment status monitoring. A wide range of automated
systems is now commercially available for management and mon-
itoring of building service systems and equipment; and these sys-
tems can be integrated with others that are used for monitoring
and control of security equipment and networks. It is especially
likely that these automated monitoring and control systems will
be required for large embassy buildings, in which mechanical and
electrical systems are larger and more complex. But they have
application to and should be used for smaller buildings as well.
As discussed in Chapter 5, these control and management
systems will, if they are integrated with the existing command
and control facilities associated with Marine Security Guard Post
1, impose additional burdens and responsibilities on persons whose
capabilities are already taxed.
Regardless of where they are located and who operates and
monitors them, these systems should, to the maximum degree
possible:
~ rely mainly on principles of alarm and annunciation, rather
than on regular or continuous monitoring by a guard or attendant;
. be provided with redundant features throughout, so that,
for example, a closed-circuit television camera and monitor could
be used to assess conditions in an area where a door alarm has
been triggered; similarly, light alarms showing on a console or
screen should be coupled with a sound alarm;
~ be designed, as fully as possible, for integration with other
systems in order to eliminate multiple panels and screens and to
ensure that only those items requiring attention are given promi-
nence (for example, rather than crowding a console with devices
for continuous monitoring of central equipment, it should be possi-
ble to display information only when and where conditions warrant
attention); and
. be designed to indicate the recommended or required
courses of action to be taken in the event of an emergency, in-
cluding information about the nature and sequence of steps to be
taken and persons to be alerted.
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on
Fatly] the co~lttee bebeves that the State Department
must undertake specls1 efforts to upgrade the ergonomics and
Talc human Motors englneerlug ad design of these control and
coned workstatlons. Such efforts would take into account the
~11 range ~ tasks, actions and rout~e dl~culdes that are
encountered ~ the monltorlug of these systems. Conslderatlon
should be glven also to the development ~ a faculty far ~srlne
Security Quad training in the tasks and actions noted Move.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
site selection
