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6 Design Criteria for a New Generation of U.S. Embassy Buildings In response to the challenge to unplement the massive build- ing program recommended by the Inman Panel, the U.S. State Department is poised to embark on the most ambitious and sig- nificant embassy construction program in its history. To carry out this program, the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) faces the prospect, over a seven-year period, of building and/or reconstructing more embassy facilities than have been constructed abroad by the United States since the founding of the nation. The consequences of this building program will be profound and lasting for the Foreign Service, for U.S. foreign relations activities, and for the unage of the United States in the world at large. And it is unlikely that the opportunities for improving embassy security that are inherent in such a program will again present themselves. Well-founded concerns about embassy vulnerability to terror- ism and to espionage have created the support for a program of this expense and magnitude. Yet, apart from the clear and cur- rent need to make extraordinary efforts to protect U.S. embassies from threats to safety and security, there are reasons why careful scrutiny and thorough reconsideration should be given to questions of how the United States constructs its embassies abroad. Chapters 4 and 5 of this report identify the broad influences and challenges, encompassing considerations that extend well be- yond security, that this committee believes wiD shape the re- quirements for embassies of the future. Despite this delineation, however, the committee does not call for or condone the construc- tion of standardized or prototype embassy buildings in order to as
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36 satisfy such requirements as may evolve. Rather, embassy build- ings must respond to the richness and diversity of the climates and geographical settings in which such buildings will exist. The design challenges posed by each embassy building are unique and formidable: An embassy is a building whose design must respect its context, wherever and whatever that may be; and yet it must also, in the best sense possible, represent the character and strengths of the United States. In addition, embassy buildings must satisfy a great number of complicated, technically challenging functional requirements, to which now must be added many that serve to enhance security. Early in its deliberations, the committee recognized that there can be no single or uniform set of architectural and engineering design responses to the myriad factors and requirements that are often unique in application to individual embassy projects. For this reason, the committee adopted two guiding principles for its work and for its recommendations to the State Department: The overall approach to future embassy building design, construction, and management should be governed by a continuing process of security impact analysis, in which the factors unique to each particular setting and mission are clearly identified and thereby determine the basis of design. Although this corrunittee has considered only security-related influences and factors, it is clear that other factors must also be considered and should be used, in conjunction with security considerations, to determine the final design of the facility.* ~ Design guidelines, criteria, and requirements unposed by the State Department should be formulated and evaluated In terms of desired performance attributes and not In terms of fixed, rigid, standardized, or uniform design solutions. . This chapter and the two that follow present the recommenda- tions that have evolved hom the committee's work. This chapter details specific performance-based criteria and recommendations for security as related to the following: sings; · evaluation and selection of sites for future embassy build ~ Among these other factors are a wide range of functional, cultural, and aesthetic considerations that are already routinely investigated and identified as part of the design professional's efforts.
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37 · planning and design of sites; ~ desired functional layouts and adjacencies that should serve as the basis for the design of future embassy buildings; properties that should be required of structural, envelope, and fenestration systems; and ~ properties and characteristics that should be required of building service and control systems. Chapter 7, which ~ concerned with the implementation of the committee's recommendations, elaborates on performance-based design criteria and recommends a generic format to be followed as FBO develops new guidance documentation for design profession- als in meeting security and other requirements in future buildings. And in Chapter 8, the committee details its views on how a process for security impact assessment could be developed and carried out. It is important to note that the committee considers its pro- posed recommendations and design criteria to be minimum re- sponses. For each specific embassy building, a security impact assessment can determine whether the nature of the potential threats facing a given facility may warrant the implementation of stronger security design measures. DEFINITION OF THE DESIGN THREAT The definition of the security threats confronting an embassy building in turn establishes the level of performance and protection that must be afforded by the building and the site in order to withstand such threats. The committee believes it is essential that the design professionals retained by FBO have a clear and unequivocal definition of the range of potential security threats against which embassy buildings are to be designed. Although formulating such a definition is a difficult and inexact undertaking at best, nevertheless, the committee is convinced that a base level can be determined. For this purpose, it has used historical records to characterize potential threats. Although threats to the security of embassy buildings are constantly changing and can, in some cases, be extraordinary, a standard, minimum base level of security must be provided at all posts. The corrunittee recognizes that, by establishing a particular level of resistance in future embassy buildings, the State Depart- ment is also accepting a certain level of risk. These minimum
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38 standards cannot defeat or deter Al possible threats, and in some cases the gravity of the known or potential threats may warrant security measures that are more stringent than the m~nnnum stan- dards. The committee further recognizes that there Is a Extinction between the "maxonum potential events (as threats are sometunes defined in design criteria for military facilities) and practical design assumptions. The committee believes that, in making its recom- mendations and developing design criteria, it has made practical design assumptions that are based on an analysis of past incidents. It has not, however, attempted to predict or determine the greatest or most severe threat that could be posed for an embassy building. PERFORMANCE-BASED CRITERIA AND RECOMMENDATIONS Site Evaluation and Selection The proper location and design of sites is crucial not only to ensuring the security of future U.S. embassies but to virtually aD aspects of the effective performance of embassy activities. In addition, as increasing urbanization throughout the world brings concomitant increases in the cost and scarcity of land, locational and site Sections wait assume increasing budgetary and political importance. Current State Department site selection procedures cannot respond adequately to the demands of any program, let alone those that will be imposed by implementation of the large con- struction effort recommended by the Inman Panel. The commit- tee's recommendations call for improvements in these procedures; and although such improvements are directed primarily toward enhanced embassy security, they should also produce returns in overall embassy effecti~rene - . Recommendation 1: Site selection criteria and procedures. The State Department should adopt a comprehensive and system- atic approach to identifying and synthesizing the various factors that are important to the siting of future embassy buildings, in- cluding criteria related to site developability, security, communi- cations, and costs. The procedures in such an approach should constitute three sequential phases:
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39 ~ project definition, in which the proposed new building's lo- cational and programmatic requirements- with consideration also given to future needs are accurately established; ~ site generation, In which candidate sites are identified, based on programmatic requirements; and ~ site evaluation, in which a team of professionals, assigned permanently to this responsibility and representing a balance of disciplines, applies the criteria and procedures to select the pre- ferred site. The committee has developed a structured site selection pro- cess and methodology for the evaluation of site suitability, a pro- cess that takes into account a full range of security and other considerations. For the present, this document should be used to instruct State Department personnel who are or will be involved in site selection; but because the document in its present form ~ not suitable for field use, it should be used as the basis for developing a field manual for site selection. In fact, the committee urges FBO to begin immediately to develop such a manual. Discussion: Existing site selection guidelines and procedures, to the degree that they exist, are not formalized and do not inte- grate the full range of concerns that must enter into this important and sensitive process. And although security-related site evalua- tion criteria do exist, they are not complete and are unevenly administered in practice. Moreover, existing security-related site evaluation criteria are not in balance with other important con- siderations: costs; appropriateness of the site to the building program; special and often overriding requirements related to the communications system's access and security; and suitability of the site with respect to representational and other goals. In response to these issues, the committee has recommended a site selection process and site evaluation criteria that are flexible and that allow the integration of the special or unique require- ments that invariably arise in each embassy building case. As is appropriate, however, the committee's recommendations pro- vide a framework for, but do not and should not supplant, the professional judgment of the members of the site selection team. Recornrnendation 2: Site size and perimeter standoff dis- tances. For site selection purposes, area requirements should as- sume a minimum setback distance (from the site perimeter) for all
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40 embassy buildings, and such a requirement should be mandatory for all new embassy sites. Given the clear importance of site char- acteristics to the security of an embassy and its occupants, the committee believes that the State Department should use the full extent of its negotiating abilities, including the authorities of the Foreign Missions Act, to secure sites that meet this requirement. In those few instances of sites on which the minimum setback cannot be achieved, the department should require that a formal, written waiver of the requirement be issued by the Under Secretary for Management before site acquisition can proceed. Recommendation 3: Preacreen~ng of sites. As the State Department office responsible for site selection, FBO should work with assigned members of the post staff before beginning formal site selection procedures to ensure that sufficient information on potential sites has been assembled for use by the site selection team in advance of its visits. Wherever necessary, FBO should temporarily assign personnel to the post for this purpose. Discussion: Under the current site selection process, the post identifies possible sites based on program information (which Is sometimes scanty) that has been provided by FBO. In some cases, a site prescreening team is sent to the host country by FBO, followed by a final site selection team; in other cases, only one visit is made, during which site prescreening and final selection are combined. With this type of system, post personnel report on one hand that they do not have sufficient tune or resources to identify sites and to gather needed information; on the other hand, members of the site selection teams often remark that their efforts are hampered by the lack of such basic background materials as plot plans, surveys, aerial photographs, and maps. The temporary amignment to the post of an FBO professional would alleviate such problems. This individual should hold the appropriate security clearances, possess a general knowledge of the building program, and understand site developability Issues. He or she could then proceed to assemble the information and background materials required for prescreening of the sites that had been identified as possible candidates for development. Ideally, between 10 and 15 possible sites should be identified, depending on local conditions; following the prescreening process, between 5 and 7 sites should be presented for consideration by the selection team.
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41 Recommendation 4: Advice preparation for site selection. After prescreening has been carried out and final candidate sites have been identified, detailed information on each site should be assembled by the post under the direction of the FBO professional temporarily assigned for that purpose. This information should be made available to the site selection team prior to its visit. Also, the team should hold at least one meeting before the visit to become familiar with the information. Discussion: The arrival of the site selection team in the host country without adequate preparation seriously jeopardizes its chances of selecting the most suitable site. Admittedly, it Is diffi- cult to assemble in advance all of the information needed to make an informed decision; yet, certain basic information requirements must be met: . the proposed building program must be defined clearly; ~ plot plans, photographs, and site maps with topographical contours should be available; ~ green field lots should be staked or otherwise clearly de- marcated; locally available utility information should be developed; information should be assembled on local zoning and build ing regulations; the cost of the site, its present ownership, and the condition of any existing facilities should be known; documented city and area maps should be available to show the relationship of the site to government offices and other points of likely frequent contact, to major transportation facilities, and to surrounding patterns of development and _ ~ ~ 7 ~ in cases in which future adjacent development may occur research should be conducted to determine likely future uses.* Recommendation 5: Site selection team. The State Dee partment, under FBO, should form one or more permanent site selection teams that would include professional with expertise in architecture, landscape planning and engineering, physical and technical security, communications, cost engineering, local foreign Iangu age negotiations, and political and diplomatic relations. * This research should prevent the kind of situation that occurred recently in Lisbon, Portugal; there, a mid-rise hotel was later constructed that overlooked the newly completed U.S. embassy complex.
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42 Discussion: Currently, State Department site selection teams are essentially formed on the basis of which personnel are avail- able at the time. They generally include an FBO area operations officer, an FBO architect, and specialists in communications and security. There may also be other members of the team, including representatives of tenant agencies. Because these teams are often formed with little advance notice, they are rarely able to prepare for their task prior to the trip. Even in instances in which some advance notice is given, team members may have little extra time or incentive for preparation. (Indeed, such assignments are often seen as an intrusion on a government employee's normal work re- sponsibilities and as offering no potential for career enhancement.) The formation of permanent site selection teams would over- come these problems and focus appropriate attention on the im- portance of a careful siting decision. To produce such a decision, the site selection team would review the candidate site informa- tion assembled by the assigned FBO professional at the post and administer the procedures and evaluation criteria developed by this committee. Recommendation 6: Adjacent land purchase. In certain cases, the type of future development planned for land adjacent to a U.S. embassy site cannot be determined. In those instances in which the land potentially could be used for purposes that would be unsatisfactory, the State Department should consider purchasing the parcel. The land can be leased or sold later for uses that, from the standpoint of security, are deemed appropriate or acceptable. Discussion: The larger sites that wild be required to imple- ment increased embassy setback criteria suggest that many em- bassy buildings wall be located outside of denser, central urban areas; in many cities of the world, this will mean siting embassies in areas in which relatively little development has yet occurred. On the basis of past experience, the presence of the embassy itself will attract adjacent new development, which can be cause for considerable concern. Inappropriate or unacceptable development can threaten the security of the embassy and damage its image. To prevent such circumstances, the committee has formulated the above recommendation.
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43 Site Planing and Design Currently, there are very few guidelines in FBO literature re- lating to site planning, landscape design, and perimeter protection of embassy buildings. Because aspects of site design and perimeter protection frequently constitute the first line of defense against most threats, the committee believes that guidelines in these areas are an absolute necessity; consequently, it has developed the recommendations that follow. The committee has addressed these moues only from the stand- point of security, although site planning and design for embassies in general Is inadequately dealt with by current FBO procedures and guidelines. Moreover, with the promulgation of a setback require- ment for all embassy buildings, site design and protection take on added significance. The committee recommends that FBO under- take the preparation of a comprehensive set of guidelines for.site planning and design, integrating the security recommendations made by this committee. Recognizing, however, that additional research is necessary in many technical areas of site security, the committee further recommends that studies be conducted in these areas. Some of the possible directions for fruitful research are identified in Chapter B. Recommendation 7: Site security analysis guidelines. FBO should immediately adopt and implement a site security analy- sis, which should be conducted immediately after site selection and subsequently used as the basis for site planning and design · e c .eclslons. Discussion: The careful collection and analysis of site-related data are essential to informed design decision making concerning security issues. Therefore, the committee presents procedures for conducting a site security analysis. The analysis deals with to- pography, vegetation, adjacent land use, circulation, visual access, lighting, utilities, and fire, police, and medical services. It should be undertaken In conjunction with a security threat analysis or impact statement. Recommendation 8: Site security planning guidelines. FBO should immediately adopt and implement a site planning process that emphasizes security and that is conducted concurrently with the functional analysis of the building program.
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44 Discussion: Site planning for effective security establishes the relationships between the site and the accompanying offsite and onsite uses. Often, such careful attention can minimize any problems that may arise before the site design process begins. The committee recommends site security planning guidelines that address circulation, access points, parking, the site perimeter, site-to-building and support facility relationships, and offsite rela- tionships. Recommendation 9: Site security design guidelines. FBO should immediately adopt and implement security design guide- lines for all major site elements on the perimeter or within the embassy grounds. Discussion: The committee recognizes that many site security design decisions will vary from site to site and will depend on such factors as the physical characteristics of the site, the prevalent offisite conditions, the design intent, and the nature and level of security threats. However, certain site elements or combinations of elements have performance characteristics that should be the basis for a minimum standard, including barriers, walls and fences, guardhouses, sally ports, lighting, plantings, and earth berms. Recommendation 10: Site perimeter. The site peruneter should be designed to protect onsite facilities from ground-level standoff or drive-by attacks, and from thrown explosives. In addi- tion, it should be designed to delay intruders attempting to enter the facility by climb-over or penetration methods and to stop vehi- cles that are intent on forcible entry. Furthermore, through the use of detection devices, the perimeter should be designed to detect and promote the identification of intruders, whether vehicular or pedestrian. Discussion: The perimeter may be composed of walls, fences, earth berms, natural topographic separations, or any combination thereof that is capable of fulfilling security objectives and that will enhance the architectural image and style of the embassy buildings. Recommendation 11: Site access points. An embassy site should have only two vehicular access points (ceremonial and ser- vice), and pedestrian access points should always be separated from vehicular access points. On those sites where chanceries and
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45 consular sections are colocated, visitor and employee entrances should be separate. Site access points should be designed to pro- vide inspection capabilities, through the use of a sally port ar- rangement, and the same level of protection (or greater) as that of the adjoining perimeter barrier treatment. Discussion: Site access points can be the weak link in the perimeter defense system if they are not properly located, de- signed, and protected. Under certain circumstances, vehicular approach routes to the site may make site entrances the points most vulnerable to attack. For these reasons, and because of the problems inherent in entry control, the number of site entrances should be kept to an absolute minimum. Additionally, vehicular and pedestrian site accesses, as well as employee and visitor en- trances, should be separated to minimize the potential threat to each from a breach of the other. Sally port arrangements are necessary at all site entrances to control access and ensure that each entrant ~ individually inspected. Both vehicular and pedestrian sally ports should be designed so that no two sides may be opened at the same time except in an emergency. Sally ports should also be so designed and located that in the event of a vehicular forced entry attempt, the deflection of the vehicle by any gate or barrier will not allow such a vehicle to approach any occupied building. The location of site access points should be analyzed carefully to ensure that vehicular approach speeds are or can be controlled. Such control is crucial to providing enough response time for the deployment of necessary security measures. Appropriate site access points can be provided using gates, barriers, fences, walls, or other devices, or a combination of these methods. Recommendation 12: Onsite circulation and parking. On- site vehicular circulation and parking should be restricted to the greatest degree possible. Although vehicular access may be granted to high-ranking U.S. and foreign officials and dignitaries, any onsite parking for these vehicles should be placed at the great- est practical distance from any building within the perimeter. No vehicular site access should be granted to other employees and visitors. Instead, offsite parking in controlled and protected ar- eas may be provided. Vehicular site access should be granted to service and emergency vehicles only when absolutely necessary.
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46 In addition, all vehicles accessing the site should be thoroughly searched. Discussion: Onsite vehicular access drives should be lirn~ted and controlled to reduce potential threats from vehicles that have penetrated the site entry or gone undetected and that may pose a danger to the facility. Interior access roads should be equipped with a secondary system of barriers that, depending on the nature of the entering vehicle, can selectively permit or deny access to a given area of the site. (For example, barriers preventing access to a particular area may be left deployed until such time as access is warrar~ted.) Architectural Progr~mn~g Ad planning Currently, FBO guidelines instruct design professionals on the size of and preferred relationships among the functional areas normally found within chancery (embassy office) buildings. This documentation serves as the basm for the earliest embassy planning and design efforts in which basic functional areas with assigned space allocations are arrayed in relation to one another and in relation to major circulation and building service facilities. This process is known as functional zoning, and using it to provide the first and most fundamental levels of physical security Is an established, time-testecl, and proven design approach. Current FBO chancery building program documentation embodies this principle, but it IS in need of extensive modifications. Recommendation 13: Chancery building program modifications. FBO should revise the existing chancery building program guidance in accordance with the committee's detailed recommendations and the principles of functional zoning, adja- cencies, and separation that are represented In Figure ~1. Discussion: The committee recommends comprehensive changes in the basic planning and design guidance given to pro- fessionals engaged in chancery building design. The approach Is encapsulated in Figure ~1 and embodies the following concepts: completely separating secure areas, which are accessible only to cleared U.S. citizens (and others under appropriate escort), from areas that are accessible to foreign nationals and others without necessary clearances who are employed by the embassy;
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48 ~ in all embassy building work areas, providing staff circu- lation that is separate from public circulation and that Is behind the so-called hardline (a line of protection separating secure areas from more public ones and providing resistance to forced entry attempts and ballistic weapons); ~ limiting access points to buildings, with provisions for per- sonnel and vehicle access controls and inspection at all points of entry; providing interior and exterior controlled circulation routes that without proper access protocols cannot be deviated from without alerting guard forces; ~ clustering and removing functional areas that generate the greatest public traffic from proximity to the more sensitive por- tions of the embassy compound (public traffic is greatest for im- m~grant and nonimmigrant visa services, other aspects of consular operations, U.S. Information Service and commercial libraries, nonsecure conference areas and meeting rooms, post community service operations, and associated informational and representa- tional functions); ~ separating service or industrial-type functional areas from sensitive areas and areas requiring special protective treatments (service functional areas include those that require the use or storage of hazardous materials and equipment, that otherwise represent risks of accidental fires, or that make it extremely diffi- cult to prevent the introduction and conceahnent of incendiary or explosive, electronic, or other dangerous devices); ~ using concentric rings of circulation barriers and control points to provide ever more secure areas, moving from the outside toward the innermost reaches of the compound; separating building service equipment and distribution areas into areas authorized for unescorted access only by cleared U.S. citizens and those allowing limited access to foreign national personnel under escort; and ~ designating and designing an area for the placement of sus- picious articles and explosive devices until they can be examined by experts. Acquiring larger sites for future U.S. embassy buildings, which is desirable for the reasons previously d~cu~ed, will also facilitate the segregation of the most sensitive facilities and work areas from those requiring less extensive treatment. Thus, the larger
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49 building sites that were recommended earlier in this report will also accommodate the functional zoning principles and separations discussed above. Reco~n~nendation 14: Designation of blast and arson risk areas and containment of elects. Certain embassy areas should be designated as areas of risk with respect to bombings and delib- erately set fires and should be designed to resist and contain the effects of such incidents. Also, a temporary disposal area should be provided for known or suspected explosive devices. Discussion: A majority of ad attacks against U.S. embassy buildings since 1968 have involved either bombings or arson- and often both, because fire generally accompanies bomb blasts. Although the records available to the committee provide only limited detail with respect to where bombs or incendiary devices were placed in these incidents, it is clear that the more public areas of the embassy essentially, those outside the hardlinc are most vulnerable. The committee believes that all reasonable steps must be taken to prevent injury from explosions and/or fires and that compart- mentalization of risk areas offers the most promising approach. To achieve these objectives, embassy security system design should minimize the possibility (absolute assurance can never be prm vided) that bombs or incendiary devices will be brought into the building. In addition, the building should be compartmentalized to prevent the spread or spillover of arson fires or bomb blasts from these more accessible areas to those areas with more re- stricted access. This can be accomplished both through more careful functional zoning and by the proper design of walls and other separations. Recommendation 15: Secure areas and safe havens. Two separate and distinct protective areas should be designated in different locations of future embassy buildings. Recomrr~endationl6: Separation ofhazardousoccup~ncies. All hazardous occupancies, such as heavy building maintenance activities, furniture storage, automobile repair facilities, fuel stor- age, and paint shops and storage, should be housed in separate fire-rated compartments. Any hazardous materials or occupancies in classified or sensitive building areas should be similarly treated.
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so Discussion: In current embassy designs, multiple occupancy types are often housed ~ one structure (for example, one building may contain Al of the following: office space, building maintenance activities, storage, kitchens, cafeterias, libraries, Marine Guard residences, automobile repair facilities, fuel storage, paint shops and storage, and warehouses). These areas may or may not be separated into fire-rated compartments by fire-rated construction and exits. To increase embassy security and protect structures and occupants, program planning should group functions according to their relative security risk rather than their relative fire hazard. Architectural Ad Structural Systems The committee recognizes that treatment of the embassy building's exterior envelope represents one of the most challenging aspects of security design because so many factors and potential threats are involved. FBO and the State Department's Office of Security have been working in this area for at least five years, beginning with the development of measures designed to thwart mob actions and unauthorized entry and more recently moving to other considerations. Recommendations 17 Ad 18: Protection of exterior walls and openings. Building Service and Security Systems. As part of its scope of interest, the committee examined in detail a range of threats posed to building service systems, which it has defined to include all electrical, mechanical, and commu- nications networks and equipment. The committee believes that, in general, insufficient attention has been paid in the past by the State Department to security protection for these systems. With the increase in terrorist attacks at U.S. embassies, it would appear that a reconsideration of security measures for these systems Is in order. Indeed, the committee's studies indicate that substantial threats would be posed to the security of personnel and informa- tion by the compromise of these systems and equipment, all of which provide embassy builclings with vital services. Consequently, the committee recommends that these systems be protected from deliberate or accidental damage that would
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51 result in the interruption of vital services. Emergency backup sys- tems and equipment to be used when such events do occur are also needed. In essence, embassy buildings should be designed to function as sel£sufficiently as possible, using self-contained, U.S.- controlled systems and equipment wherever practical and relying on locally available utilities only insofar as they are satisfactory. Furthermore, networks and equipment for plumbing, heating, ven- tilating, electrical, and communications functions should be de- signed in such a way that they cannot be used by hostile interests to gain intelligence or to otherwise compromise embassy security. Turning to security systems (including status-monitoring de- vices, public access controls, fire annunciation systems, and others), the committee's studies indicate that they shout be as simple as possible and designed to function reliably and appro- priately in the specific environmental conditions they will face. Due to the wide variety of local conditions at embassies in which these systems will be used, no single set of systems and equipment will be appropriate for all locations. The committee has exam- ined a large number of the security systems and equipment that are presently available and, presents detailed design and instalIa- tion considerations that should guide their application for embassy buildings. The recommendations below summarize these criteria and describe the principles that guided their development. Recommendation 19: Protection of systems and equips meet. Future embassy buildings should be so designed and con- structed that all building service equipment and distribution net- works are contained in areas that are secure and that provide clear separations between those elements that are to be accessed and serviced only by cleared U.S. citizens and those that can be ac- cessible to foreign nationals or others without suitable clearances. All such systems should be secured from unauthorized access and provided with alarms to indicate intrusion or tampering. Discussion: The type of building service equipment and dis- tribution area referred to above can be achieved by a wide variety of technical solutions, many of which would not necessarily employ a central service core. There are certain benefits to that solution, however. A physically distinct service equipment and distribution area would ease problems related to maintenance, repair, and ser- vicing. In addition, this type of solution could provide a degree of uniformity in the design and layout of these systems in embassies
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52 . around the world, once again enabling easier maintenance and repair. The issue of servicing these systems is an important factor in maintaining their security. Because the nonsensitive portions of building service systems are likely at some point to require servicing by foreign nationals and others without security clear- ances, every effort should be made in building design to ensure the following: . Those building service system components that are likely to need routine servicing and maintenance should be placed outside classified and sensitive work areas and well away from classified and essential equipment that should be handled only by cleared U.S. citizens (essential equipment includes that equipment used to provide basic building services). ~ Those components that cannot be physically separated should be installed in such a way that they can be easily inspected, removed (for servicing off the premises), and replaced without interruption to critical services within the building. . Distribution networks and equipment areas should be read- ily secured from vandalism or tampering, yet they should be easy to inspect and should allow relatively simple modification. To ensure the installation of only those raceways, conduits, and other elements that are part of the building design, future embassy design and construction should permit easy and positive inspection during the building process. The connections between the building service equipment and distribution network areas, which are described above, and the embassy's general office areas are most critical. Construction drawings and specifications should clearly indicate the intended and permitted connections; construc- tion techniques and procedures should afford easy verification in the field that only those connections are installed. Any drawings and specifications that are needed for routine servicing of these systems should be controlled; they should not be removed from embassy premises. Any changes that are made to these systems should be fully documented and thoroughly reviewed to ensure that security objectives are not compromised. Recommendation 20: Protection of power, waste, water supply, and communications lines.
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53 Recommendation 21: Site self-~fficiency. Embassy sites should be self-sufficient with respect to essential building services such as emergency power and water, including that for fire suppres- sion. Embassy buildings and sites should be designed to function effectively without exclusive reliance on utilities and services sup- plied from offsite so that, in the event such services are interrupted or become so eroded in quality or availability as to render them unsatisfactory, the embassy may continue operations. Discussion: I,ocal utility supply sources for embassies are not always reliable or of satisfactory quality; they are also vulnerable to sabotage. Because the disruption of these sources may coincide with terrorist attacks, embassies require reliable onsite emergency backups for these systems. The committee is not suggesting that embassies should not use locally available utilities and services, such as electrical power and water, where such services are avail- able in satisfactory quality and form; but it is recommending that steps be taken to reduce the extent of the embassy's reliance on these local resources. Of particular concern in the event of utility service disruptions are electronic information handling systems, computers, and other such devices. Given their requirements for an uninterruptible supply of high-quality electrical power, special efforts must be made to protect embassy buildings from voltage spikes and other spurious signals that are characteristic of power systems in many areas of the world. Because of the considerable variation in the availability and quality of local services throughout the world (there can be vari- ations in service between different sites in the same country or locale), an evaluation of these aspects of local utility services should be a part of initial and ongoing security analyses under- taken for each project. The committee has incorporated such considerations in its recommendations on site evaluation and se- lection. Recommendation 22: Monitoring and control. Embassy services and security control and monitoring systems should be integrated and simplified, with particular consideration given to their human resources requirements. Also, the State Department should undertake special efforts to upgrade the ergonomic design of command and control stations for both routine and emergency · - or crisis uses.
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54 Discussion: Increasingly, future U.S. embassy buildings will rely on a wide variety of complex control, monitoring, annuncia- tion, and management systems for such diverse purposes as secu- rity, communications, access control, environmental conditioning, and equipment status monitoring. A wide range of automated systems is now commercially available for management and mon- itoring of building service systems and equipment; and these sys- tems can be integrated with others that are used for monitoring and control of security equipment and networks. It is especially likely that these automated monitoring and control systems will be required for large embassy buildings, in which mechanical and electrical systems are larger and more complex. But they have application to and should be used for smaller buildings as well. As discussed in Chapter 5, these control and management systems will, if they are integrated with the existing command and control facilities associated with Marine Security Guard Post 1, impose additional burdens and responsibilities on persons whose capabilities are already taxed. Regardless of where they are located and who operates and monitors them, these systems should, to the maximum degree possible: ~ rely mainly on principles of alarm and annunciation, rather than on regular or continuous monitoring by a guard or attendant; . be provided with redundant features throughout, so that, for example, a closed-circuit television camera and monitor could be used to assess conditions in an area where a door alarm has been triggered; similarly, light alarms showing on a console or screen should be coupled with a sound alarm; ~ be designed, as fully as possible, for integration with other systems in order to eliminate multiple panels and screens and to ensure that only those items requiring attention are given promi- nence (for example, rather than crowding a console with devices for continuous monitoring of central equipment, it should be possi- ble to display information only when and where conditions warrant attention); and . be designed to indicate the recommended or required courses of action to be taken in the event of an emergency, in- cluding information about the nature and sequence of steps to be taken and persons to be alerted.
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on Fatly] the co~lttee bebeves that the State Department must undertake specls1 efforts to upgrade the ergonomics and Talc human Motors englneerlug ad design of these control and coned workstatlons. Such efforts would take into account the ~11 range ~ tasks, actions and rout~e dl~culdes that are encountered ~ the monltorlug of these systems. Conslderatlon should be glven also to the development ~ a faculty far ~srlne Security Quad training in the tasks and actions noted Move.
Representative terms from entire chapter: