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7 Improving Security in the Planning, Design, Construction, and Management of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings BACKGROUND ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FBO PROCEDURES During its development of guidelines and criteria for increased security in U.S. embassies, the committee came to realize that unless the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) used a well-managed process for obtaining the services of architects, en- gineers, and construction companies, there would be difficulties in integrating the committee's security recommendations with the procedures of the State Department. It also was apparent that cer- tain aspects of these procedures, as described later in this chapter, would in themselves affect the security of the buildings that were to be constructed. Therefore, the committee directed its attention toward developing recommendations that would improve FBO's procedures for planning, designing, constructing, and managing future U.S. embassy buildings. The organization of this chapter is based on the steps nor- mally followed in the design and building process. Most of these steps are currently incorporated in the State Department's proce- dures, which the committee has explored in detail. However, as discussed in previous chapters of this report, the committee in its efforts also has taken into consideration the potential impact of the Inman Panel's recommendations for a greatly expanded building program. The comm~ttee's recommendations reflect its awareness of these issues, as well as its collective judgment and experience with the building process within both the private and government sectors. 56
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57 COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, MANAGEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION Performanc - Based Design Criteria Recommendation 25: Design criteria format. FBO should manage the development of a more cohesive, fully integrated set of design manuals and guidelines to be communicated to design teams. Where practical, these criteria should be issued with the concurrence of other embassy tenants to avoid overlap or confusion in the design process. In accordance with the concepts and format developed by the committee, the design guidelines and criteria should be stated in performance terms whenever possible. All such materiab should convey clearly the specific requirements of FBO. A comprehensive course of training and briefing on security design matters should be developed and provided to all professionals as a mandatory requirement for rendering design services to FBO. Discussion: During its deliberations, the committee con- ducted comprehensive reviews of the existing design criteria and guidelines currently in use by FBO. In addition to lacking neces- sary emphasis on security-related matters, these materials are, in general, uneven in quality, superfluous or outdated in parts, and wholly lacking an integrative framework. New design guidance, generated principally by the Office of Security, is contained in provisional memoranda that at tunes conflict with the guidelines contained in the bound FBO design manuab. As a result, design professionals can be overwhelmed and confused by the volume of these materials and their lack of clear organization. Moreover, FBO's current design criteria and guidelines represent a mixture of prescriptive statements and performance statements. The pre- scriptive statements instruct the design professionals on the pre- cise methods and materials that must be used; the performance statements present the desired performance attributes clearly and in terms against which solutions can be evaluated, leaving the choice of methods, design approaches, and materials to the design professional. The committee believes that FBO design criteria, in- cluding those that do not pertain strictly to security issues, should, wherever possible, be stated in performance terms.
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58 An Integrated Computer Data Base Recommendation 24: Integrated data base. A critical ele- ment in managing the major program of new embassy construction planned by FBO is an integrated data base (that is, one that be- g~s to collect information about each building project from its first stages of planning and programming and continues to accu- mulate needed data in a computer file during the entire life cycle of the embassy). It ~ important that FBO establish such a data base, an example of which is shown in Figure 7-1. Discussion: Although FBO currently employs some computer applications, the committee recommends that an extensive effort be made to build on the work of the Building Research Board's Committee on Advanced Technology for Building Design and En- gineering. Over the past three years, this committee has developed in some detail the conceptual framework for an integrated data base for building clients. FBO can create such a too} by capturing the data currently generated by architects, engineers, estimators, suppliers, construction firms, and others data that are essentially by-products of their activities. The progress that has been made in computer technology, the increased use of and experience in em- ploying computers by professionals of all sorts, and the lower costs of computer technology and software all contribute to making the concept of such an integrated data base feasible. The development of an integrated data base anti enhance all aspects of FBO project management, record keeping, and facility maintenance. If undertaken in an evolutionary manner, FBO's im- plementation of such technology should cause minimal disruption and provide a valuable management tool. Space Progrnmm;ng and Facility Needs Identification Recommendation 25: Space programming. FBO should in- stitute a structured procedure for space programming that will accurately reflect current and anticipated embassy needs and in- corporate the forgoing considerations unique to this building type: ~ Security. Functional adjacencies and circulation patterns that result from the required separation of secure areas from those accessible to foreign service nationals (FSNs) and the public may influence space programming. In addition, special security systems
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60 and equipment have unique space and service system requirements that should be identified concurrently with other building require- ments. . Personnel. An accurate assessment of State Department and other user agency personnel (both part-time, full-time, and contract), including FSNs, should be carried out as a first step in the programming process to determine space requirements. ~ Functional requirements. A recognition of the functions associated with FSNs and contract personnel (such as extra cafe- terias and recreational associations) should be part of the space programming process. Discussion: The existing space programming methods pre- scribed by FBO date from 1964 and consist solely of a required listing of full-time State Department personnel. As such, they provide little guidance on how to deal with the multiplicity of current embassy users in terms of current security programming requirements. The committee's collective experience with State Department embassy design, coupled with its visits to embassies during the course of its work, illurn~nated the results of an inade- quate space programming procedure: overcrowding and inappro- priate postconstruction modifications to structures to incorporate security considerations or unaccounted-for staff and others. Recommendation 26: Standardized components and large- scale procurement. FBO should explore the opportunities that may result from the standardized design and large-scale procure- ment of selected embassy components and systems that would be made possible under the Inman Pane} recommendations. These components and systems could be produced in the United States under secure conditions and then shipped and stored in a secure fashion on foreign sites. Discussion: The fabrication of standardized components and systems for future embassies could offer an opportunity for the development of a building system that would provide security improvements at controlled costs. These specialized systems could be custom designed for embassies and would include such items as the following: ~ window units that are designed against a special set of se- curity requirements-if well conceived and designed, such windows
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61 would represent an improvement ~ performance at a reasonable cost and still allow a diversity of design alternatives; and . components for other security purposes, which knight in- clude a range of products from doors to Marine Security Guard enclosures and that would lend themselves to standardized design for large-volume production. Architect and Engineer Selection Process Recommendation 27: Procurement of architectural and en- g~neering services. FBO should institute changes in its procedures for the procurement of architectural and engineering services to incorporate the following features: ~ The Architectural Advisory Pane! should be expanded to include members with expertise in such areas as structural engi- neering, building services design, and security. Strictures on their terms of service and ability to secure work from FBO should be modified. ~ Preselection criteria, to be applied by FBO staf~prior to the panel's review of qualifications submittals, should give recognition to those design teams that have a capability in security design and should not exclude teams that have previous State Department experience. Discussion: The Architectural Advisory Pane! has played, and should continue to play, a valuable role within the State De- partment's construction programs by emphasizing excellence in design and by helping to ensure that representation of an appro- priate U.S. image abroad is incorporated in embassy buildings of architectural distinction. There are shortcomings in the current advisory pane! process, however, and four issues have influenced this recommendation: ~ Three pane} members, whose service is voluntary, are too few in number for the major program anticipated. ~ Aesthetic and architectural design sensibilities must be balanced with a serious and pervasive concern for security at all levels, beginning with the selection of properly qualified design professionals.
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62 ~ To limit any proliferation of contract documents through their distribution to a wider base of noncleared persons, it is recom- mended that architects be U.S. citizens who hold an appropriate security clearance. ~ The complexity of security design requirements in future embassies dictates that experience in this field is a desirable pre- requisite of embassy design teams. Program Management Recommendation 28: Program management. The State Department should implement a project management program to ensure uniform, effective, and efficient management of the total program of new embassy construction that would result from the implementation of the Inman Pane] report. The program man- agement effort should be centralized in Washington, D.C., and should be performed by, or under, the direction and control of the State Department. The program should encompass the total building effort from inception through occupancy of all facilities throughout the world. Discussion: The program management function for the em- bassy construction planned by the State Department should in- clude the following: ~ establishment of uniform guidelines and procedures related to programming, site selection, site development, design, procure- ment of construction, and occupancy of all facilities; · development of prototypical architect/engineer and other consultant fee agreements with appropriate prequalification and selection procedures; ~ development of prototypical contract forms between con- tractors and the State Department to reflect various project requirements for example, fast-track construction, Jump sum bids, turnkey, and the like; establishment of centralized accounting functions to ensure a proper audit trail and uniform accounting procedures; ~ establishment by the State Department of permanent review and management teams to oversee the program (the teams should include representation by all sections of the State Depart- ment involved in the review and approval process);
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63 ~ development and unplementation of the integrated data base discussed in recommendation 24; . development of a procedure for the establishment of realis- tic budgets and time schedules for each project and of monitoring procedures to ensure that each project is developed on time and within budget. Budgets should include both hard costs (e.g., construction) and soft costs (e.g., land acquisition, design fees, furniture); ~ development of a quality assurance program to ensure that facilities are designed and constructed to the prescribed quality levels; ~ application of value eng~neer~ng/life-cycle costing tech- niques to ensure that the State Department obtains magnum value for its money over the life cycle of the buildings; and incorporation of guidelines to enhance the secure distribu- tion of design and construction documents and to improve security during the construction process. Project Administration Recommendation 29: Project a~m;nistration. Within the overall program management structure, the State Department should aLso develop a centralized project administration proce- dure that assigns responsibility and control for each project to one Washington-based individual for the project's duration. The function should include the following: ~ oversight of the development of a comprehensive space management program; development and maintenance of the project data base; development and review of the project timetable; ~ dissemination to the design team of new guidance and change orders; revision and updating of the design program; coordination and review with tenant agencies (if any); · coordination and administration of design review and proj- ect progress meetings; liaison and coordination with the post; and ~ identification and resolution of conflicts and issues that may from time to time arise among parties to the project.
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64 Discussion: FBO currently has no consistent system for the administration of embassy design projects from the predesign stage through postoccupancy evaluation. Yet, because of the wide geo- graphical distribution of FBO projects and the variety of tenants or potential users of each planned facility, crucial project deci- sions are often difficult to make and may be delayed or changed during (or even after) the building process. The resulting delays and reductions in building quality point to the need for more cen- tralized control of the process and more feedback regarding past design decisions. Such centralized control can be achieved by as- signing project administration responsibility to one individual for the duration of the project. The project administrator should be based in Washington and should be the point of contact and the central manager for Al aspects of a given project, receiving whatever support is nec- essary to carry out these duties. Support technical staff should also be based in Washington and should communicate with the architect/engineer and post primarily through the project admin- istrator. In addition to these individuals, each project should have a team of FBO technical advisers/reviewers that consists of an architect, mechanical engineer, electrical engineer, civil/structural engineer, interiors specialist, and physical security specialist. Other technical specialists should also be part of the Washing- ton staff, to be caned upon as needed by the project administrator. These include specialists in communications, information manage- ment, cost control, agency technical liaison, fire protection, and construction management. One administrator could handle several projects on a staggered basis but should not be burdened with duties related to ongoing improvement programs at a number of existing posts (and the associated requirements for Sequent travel). Support technical personnel probably can handle more than one project at a time as long as key review events do not occur sunultaneously. Recommendation 30: Security aspects of procurement. To enhance the security of future embassy facilities to the maximum extent possible, the circulation of drawings and related documenta- tion during the bidding, award, and construction processes should be restricted, and consideration should be given to using, whenever possible, U.S. contractors and subcontractors who hold appropri- ate security clearances. , ,
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65 Discussion: Documents on U.S. embassy facilities currently are available to any contractor who wishes to bid, as well as to subcontractors and suppliers. Often, these categories will include firms from countries that are not friendly to the United States. It may be possible, by judicious prequalification of contractors and by the use of controlled bidding and procurement procedures, to reduce significantly the circulation of construction documents. Given the volume of construction being contemplated by the State Department, it should be possible to obtain successful competitive bids from cleared U.S. construction firms. Recommendation 31: Cost considerations. Steps should be taken immediately to gather raw cost data for review, refinement, and assembly into a format suitable for budgeting and subsequent financial management. The data should be drawn from known bid results for similar work or from estimates of costs computed from preliminary designs for new embassy facilities. From these cost data, cost models should be developed for various embassy types that can be used for budgeting and financial management purposes. To ensure maximum value for its expenditures, the State Department should make value management studies an integral part of the overall design process. Additionally, value incentive clauses should be included in contracts between the contractor and the State Department. Discussion: The cost/benefit implications of designing em- bassies to meet new criteria for enhanced security will be signif- icantly different than for earlier FBO projects. Therefore, direct cost comparisons with previous work wall not always be appropri- ate. For example, the requirement for magnum setbacks immure diately increases the size and cost of new sites. And the mandate for increased security that dictates a "hardened" building, phyla ical security measures around and within the building, and in- creased security for information and communications devices will contribute to increased costs as well as improved performance. Standby power generation, increased fire protection, and a self- sufficient water supply also bring higher costs. In addition, if bidding on projects is restricted to U.S. firms (as opposed to bids from foreign firms), this may result in further expenditures. As research continues, improved and probably more costly security- related guidelines will be introduced to combat both terrorist at- tacks and electronic sur~reilIance. The successful unplementation
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66 of the proposed Inman Panel construction program will depend in part on reliable cost models coupled with an understanding of the security benefits these increases in costs are likely to produce. Operation and Maintenance Procedures Recommendation 32: Building operation ~dmaintennnce. Operating and maintenance manuals for building and security systems should be project deliverables that are required of em- bassy system and building designers, contractors, and suppliers. Regional maintenance stabs consisting of U.S. personnel holding appropriate security clearances should be established to maintain security and emergency systems and ensure that building systems do not need to be serviced by FSNs. In addition, manuals should be provided by the architects/engineers or other appropriate de- sign professionals detailing the intended use of the building under emergency conditions. These manuals should also address routine building servicing, operating, and maintenance requirements. Discussion: The operating and maintenance manuals pro- vided with buildings should be explicit with regard to the intended use of the building under emergency conditions, including plans for evacuation, hiding, and other actions that are likely to take place in times of attack or other threatening contingencies. These manuals shollId also address routine building servicing, operating, and maintenance requirements. Currently, FBO has no standard operating or maintenance procedures for embassy buildings. In most cases, maintenance is performed by local nationals, a cir- cumstance that necessarily limits the technical complexities of the various systems ~ the building. Because of such limitations, the FBO building inventory cannot take advantage of emerging sys- tems that, although performing more efficiently and with a longer life, may require maintenance beyond the technical capabilities of local nationals. This committee is not in a position to evaluate the costs and potential administrative difficulties that might be associated with the establishment of a technical maintenance staff of U.S.-cleared citizens, but it beli;e~res this proposal warrants careful and serious consideration. In addition, the committee has attempted in its design criteria development efforts to call for design approaches
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67 that will minimize the need for access to secure work areas for routine building maintenance functions. Postoccupancy Evaluation Procedures Recommendation 83: Postoccupancy evaluation. All new embassies, after at least one year of occupancy, should be evaluated for a series of factors that are designed to measure aspects of the building's performance. In addition, there should be a system for obtaining feedback from these evaluations in a manner that will allow the knowledge gained to be used in unproving design criteria. The committee believes that such evaluations wid lead to the improved quality of both the building that is thus evaluated and subsequent building projects. Discussion: Postoccupancy evaluation should take place at least one year after occupancy and should examine the following: functional factors, comparing the building's initial func- tional and space programming to actual facility use and evaluating the overall suitability of the site; · technical factors, measuring the operational effectiveness of installed materials and systems; . economic factors, measuring the efficiency of the design and construction process, staff operating costs, maintenance costs, and actual versus intended life-cycle costs; · behavioral factors, measuring the occupants' use of build- ing spaces and equipment as they are affected by the performance of the completed building; and . cost-time factors, comparing the building's initial construc- tion budget and schedule with the final construction costs and completion time. This information serves several purposes. An evaluation can be made about how well the building design decisions have ful- fi~led program objectives (such as operational needs, user needs, occupant satisfaction, system performance, and security require- ments). It can also provide unportant feedback to new embassy designs on the successes and failures of previous building perfor- mance. And an evaluation of this type can aid as well in the identification of new assumptions and relationships between cer- tain design decisions and building or occupant performance and behavior.
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68 Postoccupancy evaluation holds great promise for improving the design process ant! its outcome as long as an effective feed- back procedure is implemented. As a larger evaluation data base on embassy performance is compiled, designers can begin to find some answers to questions regarcling optimum space allocations, traffic patterns, adjacencies, security performance, and other im- portant design and building considerations for which the only present guidelines are experience, tradition, and the use of out- dated standards. Facilities Management Recommendation 34: Building information management system. FBO should develop a building information system that tracks the flow of important construction data throughout the design and construction process. All proposed construction or alterations should be examined thoroughly with respect to their possible effects on the security of the building in question. After construction is completed, record drawings of the embassy should be prepared and updated as changes occur during the life of the building. Discussion: An adequate record must be maintained at all times of the "as built" condition of the embassy. Such a record is needed both in the interest of good facilities-management prac- tices and in the event the embassy is taken over by hostile persons. Under ideal conditions, this information will be in the integrated project data base (see recommendation 24) and would be avail- able to rescue forces, if necessary, at any location in the world. Wherever such information resides, however, it is Report ant that any changes made to the embassy building and systems are fully documented and assessed from a security standpoint.
Representative terms from entire chapter: