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8 Future Research and Development As part of its charge, the committee agreed to consider and provide advice to the State Department on security-related re- search questions and areas that warrant further investigation and development. The recommendations that appear later in this chapter were developed because these questions and issues extend beyond the scope of what could be accomplished using the resources available to the committee. It should be noted that these are the first of the committee's recommendations in this area. A subsequent report to be issued in April 1986* will elaborate on the points presented here and will raise new issues to be confronted as part of continuing research and development activities within and for the State Department. THE NEED FOR A SUSTAINED BUILDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT The committee believes that the State Department needs to establish and maintain a strong, carefully directed} building re- search and development activity, a substantial part of which should be related to design for security. This chapter provides the ratios nale for this view, describes especially challenging or promising areas on which such studies could initially be concentrated, and * Note added by the committee to report in September 1986: This subsequent report was actually transmitted in September 1986. 69

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70 defines the subjects that the Building Research Board will con- tinue to pursue through the term of its present efforts on behalf of the State Department. Recommendation 35: Ongoing research program. The Of- fice of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) should fund and ad- m~nister ongoing research and development activities directed to- ward the improvement of existing security-related design methods and criteria. These research and development activities should be planned and carried out in cooperation with, but independently of, related programs and activities within the State Department's Office of Security and Office of Communications. An outgrowth of the FBO research and development programs should be inte- grated technical design requirements, translated into performance criteria that can be implemented in practical terms by design professionals. Discussion: There are at least three reasons why an ongoing research and development program is a necessary and appropriate aspect of FBO's activities: 1. There remain significant technical challenges that must be met if security is to be enhanced in future U.S. embassy buildings to the fullest extent of current abilities. 2. The security-related research and development activities carried out by other federal agencies, although capable of providing valuable information to FBO, are not directed toward the unique needs and circumstances of foreign embassy buildings. 3. FBO, in the State Department's current organizational context, has the encompassing responsibilities and concerns that will allow security considerations to be factored in with the full range of other considerations and issues that are invariably a part of building diplomatic facilities abroad. The challenge of designing secure facilities can hardly be called new; much of architecture and building through the ages have been at least in part for defensive purposes. In many cases throughout history, security considerations were primary. Certain well-establ~shed principles of security-conscious design and plan- ning that remain in use today (for example, concentric rings of formidable barriers to control access and define physical zones of security) have their origins in historic town planning and building patterns used the world over.

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71 Ancient principles of defensive building design and planning, and much of the technical knowledge that has since accumulated in this field, are concerned with how to build defensively against what at any given tune is considered an assault by conventional military means. To the significant degree that terrorism and ter- ror~st attacks depart from these military Conventions (because terrorism is characterized by the element of surprise Ed the use of unconventional, generally unanticipated means of assault), they represent design challenges of a different order. These factors are recognized today by many of the organiza- tions, including the State Department, that must protect people, information, and buildings from threats of terrorism, espionage, and sabotage. The design requirements for contemporary defense installations, water treatment stations, pipelines, refineries, power plants, and a wide range of other sensitive public and private industrial facilities aD address problems of security and access control. And they explicitly identify measures that are intended to counteract threats of terrorism and industrial or national se- curity espionage. Yet there remain substantial technical problems and challenges that are unique to the State Department and that require sustained attention and technical endeavor to overcome. Although several agencies of the federal government now have active research programs related to physical security and even to counterterrorist design, these programs are concerned with a range of facilities and circumstances that are quite different from those of interest to the State Department. These other federally sponsored research and development programs have provided and will continue to provide valuable information to FBO. However, they are directed toward the design of facilities whose purposes are essentially military or industrial in nature and not toward the design of buildings that have public use purposes. Even within the State Department itself, the vigorous and productive programs of research and technical development being carried out through- the Office of Security and Office of Communications do not and prom ably cannot-take into account the full range of engineering and architectural design issues that confront actual projects. Rather, it is FBO, as the agency that oversees and carries out building pro- grams, that is responsible for ensuring that the narrower concerns of these other offices are integrated and applied.

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72 The committee believes that a number of the national labo- ratories and other research facilities operated at federal govern- ment expense offer a potentially excellent research resource to the State Department. This has been an area of interest and con- cern to the committee but one that lay outside the scope of its charge. The committee believes, however, that in implementing this recommendation the State Department could profitably seek additional direct advice from the National Research Council as to the capabilities and appropriateness of particular laboratories for the performance of specific research activities. In addition, FBO should continue close consultation with the Offices of Security and Communication in regard to future research and development ini- tiatives. Currently, these offices remain informed of each other's activities, and there is some consultation among them in the plan- ning of research projects, but their efforts lack the overall sense of direction and guidance that would come Dom a more formal and rigorous approach. The Bureau of Administration should consider the formalization of a research planning structure and procedure within the State Department, headed by FBO, that would ensure a coordinated, comprehensive, and well-integrated approach to these initiatives. TECHNIQUES AND METHODS FOR SECURITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS Recommendation SO: Security impact assessment develop- ment. The State Department's research and development activ- ities should concentrate in part on the development and imple- mentation of formal techniques and methods for evaluating and reporting on the security-related aspects of future embassy build- ings throughout the facility life cycle. Discussion: Elsewhere, this report recommends that the State Department conduct detailed and highly tailored security assess- ments on a project-by-project basis, beginning at the earliest stages of project planning and design and carrying through the entire fa- cility life cycle. However, the department's current technical capa- bility to carry out this task Is rudimentary. A properly conceived and fully developed security impact assessment capability would encompass at least the following stages and concerns:

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73 ~ Site acquisition and funding. This earliest stage of pro- grarnming and planning includes an analysm of the host country context in security terms, taking into account military and in- telligence forecasts; an identification of the post mission and the associated agencies likely to be on the embassy building compound and the resulting security unpacts; and a delineation of the security contingencies that may arise, including options for response. ~ Preliminary programming and planning. Explicit site con- ditions and appropriate general design responses are identified, in addition to specific requirements for power, emergency backups, basic functional relationships, and vehicle access. ~ Architectural and engineering design review. Schematic and design development documents are reviewed and evaluated in light of applicable performance criteria and any subsequent host country developments. ~ Bidding and construction document security. In this stage, assessments are carried out to identify specific security require- ments for handling and distributing project documents. Also, por- tions of the design are identified for construction and/or inspection only by U.S. citizens. ~ Pre- and postoccupancy security evaluations. Rebuilt fa- cilities, both prior to and after initial occupancy, are evaluated by a variety of means, including unobtrusive observation and in- terviews, to determine the effectiveness of design measures and the validity of design assumptions. Findings from these efforts are used to correct any deficiencies that are noted and to revise future planning and design criteria. ~ Operation and maintenance security evaluations. VuInera- bility assessments are carried out as an element of routine facility caretaking activities to identify the readiness and adequacy of basic emergency and backup systems and to assess the facility's ability to perform in light of recent suspected or known security threats. ~ Postevent evaluations. Assessments of the performance of the physical facility are made following any event in which security was actually threatened or breached. The results of these assessments are integrated with design criteria and are used to guide facility modifications and adjustments. Decommissioning security evaluation. In the event of the abandonment of an embassy building, a security assessment is made to determine what items must be removed and/or destroyed,

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74 and to identify parts of the building that should be disguised or otherwise treated so as not to reveal vital information about building patterns that could be used to comprorrfise the security of other facilities. These descriptions are illustrative and are only intended to suggest the range of considerations and steps that should be ad- dressed by the State Department as part of a comprehensive am preach to building security impact assessments. Some elements of this approach currently exist in various forms within the Offices of Security and Communications. In addition, as noted by the Inman Panel, the State Department now has a successful program of post emergency action drills. The results of these drills could become even more beneficial if the driDs are integrated with more for- malized, comprehensive, and continuous building security impact assessments. SITE DESIGN ELEMENTS Recommendation 37: Physical elements for site security. FBO should sponsor or conduct an ongoing research and develop ment program specifically directed toward testing the effectiveness of site design elements against the security threats of greatest con- cern to embassies. Discussion: The committee ~ aware of and has reviewed the results of research and testing programs sponsored by the government, its laboratories, private industry, and universities, programs that are concerned with the design and operation of security-related site elements. Although there ~ a great deal of activity in this area, particularly with regard to vehicle barriers and antiramming devices, the appropriateness of this work to em- bassy site planning and design is questionable. Much of it has focused on military or industrial applications that are not suit- able for embassy buildings. And, although many of the principles and some of the techniques are applicable to embassy sites, more research is needed on the following: . the effectiveness of combining fences, walls, earth berms, and other landscape and site elements as perimeter barriers; . the use of new materials and techniques, or the refinement of exiting ones, for the construction of peruneter wails;

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75 . innovative techniques for arresting vehicles without the use of physical barriers such as walls (a number of these techniques are now being proposed for investigation at Los Alamos National Laboratory; such studies should be supported); efficient, restrikeable security lighting systems that are ca- pable of functioning after being fired upon; and . new site elements that will respond to technical security threats and attack scenarios and that may not have been consid- ered by the committee. A research program that encompasses these topics could be undertaken in cooperation with other federal agencies facing sim- ilar challenges In new public buildings. Such a program, however, must emphasize requirements for technical sunplicity and ease of maintenance, and its results must be suited to locations where skilled labor and relatively sophisticated equipment or materials are unavailable. teme. Recommendation 38: Development of new enclosure sys Recommendation 39: Development of door and window systems.