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9 Conclusion Consistent with events of the past decade, terrorism and particularly terrorist actions directed against U.S. citizens and facilities abroad shows signs of continuing to increase, both in the intensity and severity of attacks and in the number of incidents. One of the main targets of such actions has been and wiB probably continue to be the United States presence abroad, as embodied in its embassy buildings and in the persons of its citizens, both official and private. With the increasing awareness by the State Department of the scope of these threats has come a growing determination to provide protection, to the fullest extent possible, for U.S. embassy buildings and their occupants and contents. It is toward this challenge that the efforts of the Committee for the Security of future U.S. Embassy Buildings have been directed for the past * year. That the U.S. Department of State should seek the advice of a committee of this nature is significant and encouraging. It demon- strates, in a most concrete manner, the degree of recognition and concern that has developed around the issue of security for em- bassy buildings and the advantage the department sees in seeking outside advice and recommendations against which to assess its efforts. * Note added by the committee to report in September 1986: The committee's work was extended for an additional nine months in January 1986. 76
77 It would be unwise, however, to suppose that the efforts needed to guard against a repetition of past outrages and tragedies at U.S. Foreign Service missions will be complete with the implementation of measures and recommendations conceived at one point in time against threats that appear for the moment to be the most likely. This is a quite natural but unfortunately mistaken response. It is clear to this committee, and should be clear also to the State Department, that only constant vigilance and repeated, con- tinuing assessment of potential threats and countermeasures can provide reasonable assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place. The committee is hopeful that the findings and recommen- dations contained in this document will provide an important and useful contribution to this critical endeavor.
