OVERVIEW

Network-Centric Naval Forces

A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities

Committee on Network-Centric Naval Forces

Naval Studies Board

Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications

National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C.



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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities OVERVIEW Network-Centric Naval Forces A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Committee on Network-Centric Naval Forces Naval Studies Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National Research Council NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C.

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This work was performed under Department of the Navy Contract N00014-96-D-0169/0001 issued by the Office of Naval Research under contract authority NR 201-124. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license throughout the world for government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, and dispose of all or any of this work, and to authorize others so to do. Copies available from: Naval Studies Board National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418 Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, the full report from which this Overview is extracted, will be available from the Naval Studies Board at the address above. Copyright 2000 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine National Research Council The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities COMMITTEE ON NETWORK-CENTRIC NAVAL FORCES VINCENT VITTO, Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc., Chair ALAN BERMAN, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University GREGORY R. BLACKBURN, Science Applications International Corporation NORVAL L. BROOME, Mitre Corporation JOHN D. CHRISTIE, Logistics Management Institute JOHN A. CORDER, Colleyville, Texas JOHN R. DAVIS, Center for Naval Analyses PAUL K. DAVIS, RAND and RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies JOHN F. EGAN, Nashua, New Hampshire BRIG B. ELLIOTT, GTE Internetworking EDWARD A. FEIGENBAUM, Stanford University DAVID E. FROST, Frost and Associates ROBERT H. GORMLEY, Oceanus Company FRANK A. HORRIGAN, Raytheon Systems Company RICHARD J. IVANETICH, Institute for Defense Analyses WESLEY E. JORDAN, JR., Bolt, Beranek and Newman Co. DAVID V. KALBAUGH, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University ANNETTE J. KRYGIEL, National Defense University TERESA F. LUNT, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center DOUGLAS R. MOOK, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company DONALD L. NIELSON, Menlo Park, California STEWART D. PERSONICK, Drexel University JOSEPH B. REAGAN, Saratoga, California CHARLES R. SAFFELL, JR., Titan Technologies and Information Systems Corporation NILS R. SANDELL, JR., ALPHATECH, Inc. WILLIAM D. SMITH, Fayetteville, Pennsylvania MICHAEL G. SOVEREIGN, Monterey, California H. GREGORY TORNATORE, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University PAUL K. VAN RIPER, Williamsburg, Virginia BRUCE WALD, Center for Naval Analyses RAYMOND M. WALSH, Basic Commerce and Industries, Inc. MITZI M. WERTHEIM, Center for Naval Analyses GEOFFREY A. WHITING, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company DELL P. WILLIAMS III, Teledesic Corporation

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Naval Studies Board Liaison SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN, Chevy Chase, Maryland Staff RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director, Naval Studies Board CHARLES F. DRAPER, Study Director MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant JAMES E. MACIEJEWSKI, Senior Project Assistant SIDNEY G. REED, JR., Consultant JAMES G. WILSON, Consultant Navy Liaison Representatives ROBERT LeFANDE, Associate Director, Systems Directorate, Naval Research Laboratory CDR DAVID L. SPAIN, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N513J (through July 1999) CAPT(S) MARK TEMPESTILLI, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N6C3

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities NAVAL STUDIES BOARD VINCENT VITTO, Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc., Chair JOSEPH B. REAGAN, Saratoga, California, Vice Chair DAVID R. HEEBNER, McLean, Virginia, Past Chair ALBERT J. BACIOCCO, JR., The Baciocco Group, Inc. ARTHUR B. BAGGEROER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ALAN BERMAN, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University NORMAN E. BETAQUE, Logistics Management Institute JAMES P. BROOKS, Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. NORVAL L. BROOME, Mitre Corporation JOHN D. CHRISTIE, Logistics Management Institute RUTH A. DAVID, Analytic Services, Inc. PAUL K. DAVIS, RAND and RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor DANIEL E. HASTINGS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology FRANK A. HORRIGAN, Raytheon Systems Company RICHARD J. IVANETICH, Institute for Defense Analyses MIRIAM E. JOHN, Sandia National Laboratories ANNETTE J. KRYGIEL, National Defense University ROBERT B. OAKLEY, National Defense University HARRISON SHULL, Monterey, California JAMES M. SINNETT, The Boeing Company WILLIAM D. SMITH, Fayetteville, Pennsylvania PAUL K. VAN RIPER, Williamsburg, Virginia VERENA S. VOMASTIC, The Aerospace Corporation BRUCE WALD, Center for Naval Analyses MITZI M. WERTHEIM, Center for Naval Analyses Navy Liaison Representatives RADM RAYMOND C. SMITH, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 RADM PAUL G. GAFFNEY II, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N91 Marine Corps Liaison Representative LTGEN JOHN E. RHODES, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director CHARLES F. DRAPER, Senior Program Officer MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant JAMES E. MACIEJEWSKI, Senior Project Assistant

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS PETER M. BANKS, Veridian ERIM International, Inc., Co-Chair W. CARL LINEBERGER, University of Colorado, Co-Chair WILLIAM F. BALLHAUS, JR., Lockheed Martin Corporation SHIRLEY CHIANG, University of California at Davis MARSHALL H. COHEN, California Institute of Technology RONALD G. DOUGLAS, Texas A&M University SAMUEL H. FULLER, Analog Devices, Inc. JERRY P. GOLLUB, Haverford College MICHAEL F. GOODCHILD, University of California at Santa Barbara MARTHA P. HAYNES, Cornell University WESLEY T. HUNTRESS, JR., Carnegie Institution CAROL M. JANTZEN, Westinghouse Savannah River Company PAUL G. KAMINSKI, Technovation, Inc. KENNETH H. KELLER, University of Minnesota JOHN R. KREICK, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company (retired) MARSHA I. LESTER, University of Pennsylvania DUSA M. McDUFF, State University of New York at Stony Brook JANET L. NORWOOD, Former U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics M. ELISABETH PATÉ-CORNELL, Stanford University NICHOLAS P. SAMIOS, Brookhaven National Laboratory ROBERT J. SPINRAD, Xerox PARC (retired) NORMAN METZGER, Executive Director (through July 1999) MYRON F. UMAN, Acting Executive Director

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Preface The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recently declared that the Navy would be shifting its operational concept from one based on platform-centric warfare concepts to one based on network-centric warfare concepts. This new operational concept can be described as a model of warfare, called network-centric warfare, that derives its power from a geographically dispersed naval force embedded within an information network that links sensors, shooters, and command and control nodes to provide enhanced speed of decision making, rapid synchronization of the force as a whole to meet its desired objectives, and great economy of force. Realization of a network-centric warfighting capability will depend on a number of factors: development of warfare concepts (and supporting doctrine) that determine how weapons, sensors, and information systems will interact to carry out specific missions; experimentation to test the viability of the new concepts; application of both military and commercial technology, particularly information technology, with essential attention to information and communications security and robustness; timely and effective acquisition of information technology assets; and education, training, and utilization of naval personnel to meet the demands of a network-centric force. This change of operational concept is also part of the Department of Defense (DOD) thrust toward Joint Vision 2010,1 which encompasses efforts by the four Services to achieve similar objectives DOD-wide. 1   Shalikashvili, GEN John M., USA. 1997. Joint Vision 2010. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Several initial steps have been taken by the Navy and Marine Corps toward achieving network-centric warfare capabilities. These include (1) promulgating the Navy Information Technology 21 (IT-21) initiative, which aims to bring the fleet up to date in information technology and related skills; (2) developing the Navy-Marine Corps intranet, to do the same for the shore establishment; (3) setting up the Navy Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, to develop concepts and doctrine; (4) testing these concepts and doctrines in fleet battle experiments and the Marine Corps “Warrior Series” experiments; and (5) making efforts toward interoperability of battle-group air defense and related command and control systems. In a larger perspective, network-centric-type concepts have been applied by the Navy in the past, in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) since World War II, in approaches to air defense in the outer air battle in the 1980s, and more recently in the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) now under evaluation. TERMS OF REFERENCE At the request of Admiral Jay L. Johnson, USN, CNO (see Appendix A), the National Research Council (NRC), under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board (NSB), conducted a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. The terms of reference for the study call for an evaluation of the following: What are the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to network-centric forces and capabilities? Particular emphasis should be placed on assessing the means, the systems, and the feasibility of achieving and delivering data via links with the necessary bandwidth, capacity, and timeliness capabilities. Emphasis also should be placed on establishing and maintaining network security, emissions control when needed, and links with submarines, and on integrating information which may arrive intermittently and with different timescales. What near-term program actions need to be taken to begin the transition? What impact will these program actions have on the present platform-centric acquisition strategy? What impact will these program actions have on maintaining a robust industrial base to support the naval forces? Recognizing that many areas of technology are evolving faster than the naval forces can develop concepts for their use: What experimental programs need to be put in place to help the forces select needed technologies and systems, develop doctrine, and develop operational concepts that together can support the transition to a network-centric naval force? What organizational adaptations might facilitate rapid progress? What are the implications for both the business practices of the Department of the Navy and naval operations of moving away from a platform-centric

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities naval force to network-centric warfare? Implications for the following should be considered especially: resource priorities; force structure; personnel, education, career systems; warfighting doctrine; and coalition building and training with allies. Over what period of time can a transition strategy be implemented and in what details will the naval forces be different from today 's forces when the strategy is finally implemented? What trends, if any, suggest that potential adversaries might move toward a network-centric military capability or exploit its vulnerabilities? What are the implications for U.S. naval forces? How will the move toward network-centric forces, if embraced by the Department of the Navy, be accomplished within the joint environment and subject to the likelihood of constrained future budgets? What are the implications of network-centric warfare for naval doctrine and for joint operations? COMMITTEE'S APPROACH In responding to the CNO's request, the committee organized itself into four ad hoc panels: (1) Panel 1—Concepts, Doctrine, Missions, and Operations; (2) Panel 2—System Architecture, Information Management, Dissemination, Protection, Assurance, and Command and Control; (3) Panel 3—Tactical Networks, Sensor-to-Shooter, Security, Protection, Targeting, Sensor Coordination, and Emission Control; and (4) Panel 4—Resources, Policy, Acquisition, Industrial Base, Career Issues, Education, and Training. In an effort to integrate the work of these four panels, an integration panel was formed with a lead representative from each panel, as well as the committee chair and NSB liaison. The committee considered network-centric warfare, or better, network-centric operations (NCO), in the context of the Navy's principal missions —strategic deterrence, sea and air control, forward presence, and power projection. Because of its unique characteristics, strategic deterrence was not included in the study. Further, taking a mission-specific approach, the committee decided to focus on NCO in the power projection mission, since power projection must also encompass sea and air control (as well as a degree of forward presence), and, in anticipated littoral operations, the land-attack aspect of power projection was considered to be less developed with respect to NCO than sea and air control, with which the Navy has considerable experience. The following report attempts to treat in as much detail as was feasible the issues raised in the terms of reference listed above. As often happens, once the study's directions of inquiry developed and results began to emerge, the committee found that its discussions of the issues raised in the terms of reference tended to group in a contextual and logical order different from the order initially antici-

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities pated. The next few paragraphs therefore sketch briefly where in the report discussions of the issues may be found. The technical underpinnings needed for the transition to network-centric forces, capabilities, and operations are treated in detail throughout the report. Implications for naval force doctrine and joint operations are reviewed, directly and indirectly, in Chapters 1 and 2, while implications for joint operations in designing and creating NCO systems, in designing and creating a common information infrastructure (i.e., the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure, the NCII), and in undertaking network-centric combat operations are treated in detail at many points in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 in connection with the overall topics of those chapters. Presented in the Executive Summary is a short list of recommended near-term program, management process, and organizational actions that must be undertaken to begin the transition from platform-centric to network-centric naval forces. The list was developed from the more detailed sets of recommendations given in Chapter 1, which were, in turn, taken from the fully developed findings and recommendations in the body of the report. The implications for Department of the Navy business practices and organizational responsibilities needed to better transition to network-centric operations are considered in detail in Chapter 7. Management and technical aspects of some business practices and acquisition strategy are covered further in parts of Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 in discussions of the need for a new approach to thinking about the naval forces under the NCO concept and in descriptions of the many aspects of NCII design, operation, and information assurance. Needed experimental programs are described as part of these discussions, in Chapter 2 and also in Chapter 3, in connection with the technical details of subsystems and components needed to complete the NCO orientation of the naval force systems. The committee believes that NCO will rely on a dual industrial base. The purely military aspects of such systems will draw on the base that currently furnishes the platforms and the specialized sensors and weapons that will enter NCO subsystems and components. Much commercial off-the-shelf technology will also support these subsystems and components. The NCII will draw largely from the huge commercial technology base that is developing to support civilian communication and computer-based information networks (e.g., the Internet) and the exponentially increasing commercial activity that their presence is fostering. This commercial base is as much a driver of the U.S. military's movement to network-centric forces and warfare as it is an enabler for that movement. The committee did not fully examine the capability of allies and potential coalition partners in the information and networking technology and systems areas relevant to network-centric operations. Similarly, it was not possible to investigate in depth, from the intelligence viewpoint, the possibility that potential adversaries could engage in network-centric conflict as defined in this report. The United States is so rapidly outpacing every other significant power in the

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities world in the area of linking military forces in large, computer-based information networks that it is difficult for intelligence to estimate where the rest of the world stands relative to the United States in this area. This does not mean that U.S. network-centric operations capability is now or will in the future be safe from attack or interference. As detailed in Chapter 5, U.S. information and combat networks and the NCII have, because of their inherent design and by virtue of their reliance on the commercial technology base, many vulnerabilities. Anyone with modern computing and communications capability can wage information war or cyber war against the United States, often in ways that have no easy counter. Approaches to mitigating this risk are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Overall, the committee believes that it has assembled a relatively complete picture of the significance of the movement toward NCO for the naval forces in the joint environment. The menu of needed actions to achieve the capability is large and will require a dedicated and extended effort throughout the Department of the Navy, building on and greatly extending actions currently under way. COMMITTEE MEETINGS The committee first convened early in 1999 and met for approximately 8 months. During that time, it held the following committee and panel meetings: January 26-28, 1999, in Washington, D.C (Plenary). Organizational meeting. Navy, Marine Corps, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) briefings on network-centric warfare. February 16-17, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 and 3). Office of the Chief of Naval Operations concepts of operations and tactical data links briefings. February 18, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). March 4-5, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2). Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DARPA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense information infrastructure and interoperability briefings. March 9 and 11, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4). Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Navy, and Marine Corps assessment and requirements briefings. March 23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Plenary). Air Force Battlespace Infosphere, Army Digital Battlefield, Defense Science Board Integrated Information Infrastructure, and DARPA Discover II briefings. March 24, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 through 4). DARPA, DISA, Military Satellite Communications Joint Program Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency information dissemination and management briefings. Naval Air Systems Command weapons, Navy Warfare Devel-

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities opment Command concepts of operations, and Office of the Secretary of Defense acquisition and technology briefings. March 25, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). April 15-16, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2). CitiGroup, DARPA, Naval Research Laboratory, and Office of Naval Research information assurance and security briefings. April 19, 1999, in Alexandria, Virginia (Representatives, Panels 2 and 3). National Reconnaissance Office briefings. April 20-21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1, 3, and 4). Office of the Secretary of Defense and Marine Corps C4ISR requirements briefings. Air Force Rivet Joint and U2 briefings. April 27-29, 1999, in San Diego, California (Panel 2). Site visit to Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. Briefings on information assurance and infrastructure programs, as well as related network-centric topics. May 19-20, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 through 4). Air Force Expeditionary Force Experiment, DARPA information assurance, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization single integrated air picture, naval intelligence threat, and Naval Sea Systems Command battle force interoperability requirements briefings. May 21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). June 8-9, 1999, in Crystal City, Virginia (Panel 4). Navy and Air Force briefings on DD-21 and Joint Strike Fighter, respectively. June 16-17, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2). June 21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4). June 23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 1). June 22-23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 3). June 24, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Plenary). Status from panels. June 25, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). July 13-14, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4). July 19-23, 1999, in Woods Hole, Massachusetts (Plenary). August 31 to September 1, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). September 29 to October 1, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). November 8-10, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel). January 11-12, 2000, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Acknowledgments The Committee on Network-Centric Naval Forces extends its gratitude to the many individuals who provided valuable information and support during the course of this study. Special acknowledgment goes to VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, president, Naval War Colleges, who formulated the concept of network-centric warfare. His knowledge and insights made an invaluable contribution to the success of the study. The committee extends a special thanks to the Navy liaisons to the committee, CAPT(S) Mark Tempestilli, USN, CDR David Spain, USN, and Dr. Robert LeFande, who responded to the committee's numerous requests for information throughout the stages of the study. The committee also thanks Mr. Kin Searcy, who helped arrange a visit to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. He and his staff were gracious in hosting members of the committee on its 4-day site visit to learn more about ongoing Navy information technology investments. In addition, the committee wishes to thank Mr. Paul Blatch, who serves as the Navy's action officer for Naval Studies Board activities and assisted with this study from its inception to completion. The committee is grateful to the staff of the Naval Studies Board for its assistance, support, and guidance throughout the course of the study and especially to Ms. Susan Maurizi for editing the manuscript. Finally, the committee thanks the many men and women throughout the Armed Services, as well as government, academic, and industry leaders who provided the committee with insightful discussions throughout the course of this study. Without their combined efforts, the committee 's report would not have been possible.

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Acknowledgment of Reviewers This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council's (NRC's) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the NRC in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The contents of the review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. The committee wishes to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report: William F. Ballhaus, Jr., Lockheed Martin Corporation, Ruth M. Davis, Pymatuning Group, Incorporated, John S. Foster, Jr., TRW, Incorporated, Robert A. Frosch, Harvard University, Charles M. Herzfeld, Silver Spring, Maryland, Anita K. Jones, University of Virginia, David A. Richwine, Fairfax, Virginia, John P. Stenbit, TRW, Incorporated, Jerry O. Tuttle, ManTech Systems Engineering Corporation, Andrew J. Viterbi, QUALCOMM, Incorporated, and Larry Welch, Institute for Defense Analyses. Although the individuals listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the final content of this report rests solely with the authoring committee and the NRC.

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Contents     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   1  1   OVERVIEW OF STUDY RESULTS   11     1.1  Mission Effectiveness: What Is Required,   11     1.2  Leading the Transformation to Network-Centric Operations,   17     1.3  Integrating Force Elements: A Mission-Specific Study of Power Projection,   23     1.4  Designing a Common Command and Information Infrastructure,   31     1.5  Adjusting the Department of the Navy Organization and Management,   41 The contents of succeeding chapters in the full report, from which this Overview is extracted, are listed below.  2   NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS—PROMISE AND CHALLENGES       2.1 Introduction       2.2 Basic Capabilities Required in a Common Command and Information Infrastructure       2.3 The Need for System Engineering       2.4 The Critical Role of Leadership in Network-Centric Operations  

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities     2.5 A Proposed Process for Developing CONOPS for Network-Centric Operations       2.6 Summary of Findings and Recommendations       2.7 Bibliography    3   INTEGRATING NAVAL FORCE ELEMENTS FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS—A MISSION-SPECIFIC STUDY       3.1 Introduction       3.2 Weapons       3.3 Sensors       3.4 Navigation       3.5 Tactical Information Processing       3.6 System Engineering       3.7 Summary and Recommendations    4   DESIGNING A COMMON COMMAND AND INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE       4.1 The Naval Command and Information Infrastructure Concept       4.2 Tactical Networks       4.3 Architectural Guidance and Development Processes       4.4 Recommendations    5   INFORMATION ASSURANCE—SECURING THE NAVAL COMMAND AND INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE       5.1 Introduction       5.2 Threats to the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure       5.3 Vulnerabilities of the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure       5.4Defense in Depth        5.5 Assessment of Current Information Assurance Activities       5.6 Research Products Suitable for Near-term Application       5.7 Information Assurance Research       5.8 Recommendations    6   REALIZING NAVAL COMMAND AND INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE CAPABILITIES       6.1Baseline Naval Systems     6.2   Functional Capabilities Assessment    6.3   Recommendations  

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OVERVIEW: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities  7   ADJUSTING DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT TO ACHIEVE NETWORK-CENTRIC CAPABILITIES       7.1 Key Decision Support Processes and Their Interrelationships       7.2 Requirements Generation: Clearly Stating Operators' Mission Needs       7.3 Mission Analyses and Resource Allocation: Aligning Program and Budget Resources to Meet Mission Needs       7.4 System Engineering, Acquisition Management, and Program Execution: Integrating, Acquiring, and Deploying for Interoperability       7.5 Personnel Management: Acquiring Personnel and Managing Careers to Meet Network-Centric Needs       7.6 Organizational Responsibilities for Effective Network-Centric Operations Integration       7.7 Recommendations       APPENDIXES    A   Admiral Johnson's Letter of Request    B   Current Sensor Capabilities and Future Potential    C   System Requirements to Hit Moving Targets    D   Weapons    E   Tactical Information Networks    F   The Organizational View of the Recommended Information Operations and Space Command    G   Committee Biographies    H   Acronyms and Abbreviations  

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