dures and tactical information processing. Continue experimenting; emphasize experimental design and measurement.
Finding: To achieve NCO, research and technology development, experimentation, and development and deployment of tactical information processing capabilities are required. (See Section 3.5.4.)
Recommendation: Maintain Navy Department technology programs underlying tactical information processing.
Finding: The Navy needs to position itself to exploit the fruits of DARPA investment in technology that can provide tactical information processing capabilities. (See Section 3.5.4.)
Recommendation: Interact more strongly with DARPA and offer strong candidates for leadership of appropriate DARPA program offices.
Finding: To project power at long ranges ashore, the Navy must be able to use nonorganic sensors and so should pursue connectivity to some of these sensors as vigorously as possible. (See Section 3.5.4.)
Recommendation: Establish a continuing 6.3 nonacquisition program for prototyping and experimentation.
Recommendation: Move smartly to ensure connectivity from nonorganic sensors to Navy control and firing platforms and to ensure the ability to process data from these sensors.
Finding: Hitting ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets is a vital capability that will require improvements in sensors (e.g., platforms for surveillance in high-threat areas), processing (identifying targets and maintaining tracks on targets moving through high-density traffic), command systems (capability for frequent and rapid decisions on weapon-target pairings), and launch platforms and weapons (e.g., affordable communication links and simple seekers). Many trade-offs can be made among system components, and many network concepts can be brought to bear to improve performance and reduce overall system cost. (See Section 3.6.1.)
Recommendation: The Department of the Navy should engineer the capability to hit ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets as an end-to-end system.