7
Adjusting Department of the Navy Organization and Management to Achieve Network-Centric Capabilities

7.1 KEY DECISION SUPPORT PROCESSES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS

The Navy-Marine Corps team takes pride in giving the United States the means to implement national policy unconstrained by national boundaries. The core of the naval capability is an integrated forward-deployed battle force of Navy and Marine Corps combat units. When joined by a robust network-centric command and control (C2) system, the battle force will be adaptable to a wide variety of situations across the whole spectrum of operations from peacetime presence and training to full-scale war. Unfortunately, the committee found that the integrated battle force concept is not reflected in integrated decision making for four key management processes that are basic to better implementing the concept of network-centric naval forces for more effective operations. These four key decision support processes include:

  1. Requirements generation: clearly stating operators’ mission needs;

  2. Mission analyses (assessments) and resource allocation: aligning program and budget resources to meet mission needs;

  3. Systems engineering, acquisition management, and program execution: integrating, acquiring, and deploying for interoperability; and

  4. Personnel management: acquiring personnel and managing careers to meet network-centric needs.

The first three are key for determining who has responsibility for what missions and functions both within the Department of the Navy and across the



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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 7 Adjusting Department of the Navy Organization and Management to Achieve Network-Centric Capabilities 7.1 KEY DECISION SUPPORT PROCESSES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS The Navy-Marine Corps team takes pride in giving the United States the means to implement national policy unconstrained by national boundaries. The core of the naval capability is an integrated forward-deployed battle force of Navy and Marine Corps combat units. When joined by a robust network-centric command and control (C2) system, the battle force will be adaptable to a wide variety of situations across the whole spectrum of operations from peacetime presence and training to full-scale war. Unfortunately, the committee found that the integrated battle force concept is not reflected in integrated decision making for four key management processes that are basic to better implementing the concept of network-centric naval forces for more effective operations. These four key decision support processes include: Requirements generation: clearly stating operators’ mission needs; Mission analyses (assessments) and resource allocation: aligning program and budget resources to meet mission needs; Systems engineering, acquisition management, and program execution: integrating, acquiring, and deploying for interoperability; and Personnel management: acquiring personnel and managing careers to meet network-centric needs. The first three are key for determining who has responsibility for what missions and functions both within the Department of the Navy and across the

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Department of Defense (DOD). The fourth, personnel management, concerns acquiring and retaining high-quality, trained individuals to execute all of the Navy Department’s missions. The objective in the integrated management of all of these decision support processes is to field the best mix of forces, materiel, and support to accomplish national security objectives and strategy within applicable funding constraints. This objective applies for the DOD in total as well as the Department of the Navy. The effective implementation of network-centric operations (NCO) will require the cooperative actions of all the military departments; none can reach maximum effectiveness within its own boundaries of responsibilities and resources. Jointness, interoperability (i.e., the ability for systems to work together), and the sharing of information across all boundaries within the DOD are essential. In the same vein, the actions within the three major decision support processes are interrelated and so have to be mutually supporting and well integrated. Effectiveness in the three, individually and collectively, is central to rigorous assessment of important issues and informed decision making. To provide the leadership required for a successful transition to network-centric operations, the Department of the Navy will have to adjust its thinking and key processes from a platform focus to a network-centric orientation. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, each of the three key decision support processes serves different elements of the Navy Department leadership. This differentiation is a result of the functions assigned in law to the Secretaries of the military FIGURE 7.1 Major decision support processes in the Navy. Acronyms are defined in Appendix H.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the military departments’ Assistant Secretaries for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Box 7.1 gives details regarding the division of support for requirements generation and for acquisition management. Effective integration among the processes is essential for achieving interoperability and will be even more important as the Department of the Navy shifts to a network-centric focus. This shift will require the cooperation of the combined military and civilian leadership in the Department of the Navy and the DOD to gain the full benefits of network-centric operations. Transformations from one method of operation to another, such as from a platform-centric to a network-centric naval force, do not succeed in large organizations without strong support from the top. An organization’s leaders are responsible for ensuring that those involved in change are meeting goals and objectives and that they persist in making progress. An important related aspect in transforming the forces is to develop concrete measures of output for the forces—i.e., measures of the ability to accomplish assigned military missions. The first four of the following six sections cover the key decision support processes related to implementing the network-centric concept. Each covers the process as currently implemented, some weaknesses as they relate to implementing good practices for improving network-centric operations, and findings. The fifth section addresses current organizational responsibilities (and weaknesses) for implementing more effective network-centric operations. Suggestions and specific recommendations for improving the individual processes and, more importantly, for promoting their integration to achieve the larger goal of implementing more effective network-centric capabilities are offered in the last section. 7.2 REQUIREMENTS GENERATION: CLEARLY STATING OPERATORS’ MISSION NEEDS 7.2.1 The Requirements Generation Process A requirement can be defined as “an established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions or tasks.”1 Preparing a requirement that has a reasonable chance of successful development and acquisition depends on the balancing of capability, resources, and timeliness among the operational, technical, and financial communities. An intense and continuing dialogue among the three communities is required to avoid a failed development, i.e., one leading to a system that 1   Melich, Michael, and Michael G. Sovereign. 1985. The Requirements Process in DOD, a report submitted to the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, informally known as the Packard Commission, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Box 7.1 Division of Responsibility for Requirements Generation and Acquisition Management Requirements generation supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) across the DOD and supports the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) (beginning with the operating force commanders) within the Department of the Navy. Following passage of the Gold-water-Nichols Act of 1986, which strengthened the role of the CJCS, the Services still are responsible for the functions of manning, training, and equipping the forces to be provided to the joint regional and functional commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), is responsible for reviewing and approving all requirements that have “joint interest,”1 but the Service Chiefs retain the responsibility to develop requirements for the forces that they provide to the joint CINCs, who command U.S. military operations. The joint CINCs participate in the JROC process through their advice to the CJCS and the VCJCS (and also by stating their views on needs to their Service component commanders). Acquisition management supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (AT)) across the DOD and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (and the Systems Commands (SYSCOMs)) within the Department of the Navy. Program managers for major new acquisition programs, whose primary function is managing the development and procurement of new systems, are responsible to the USD (AT) and, under law, are to report to the USD (AT) through no more than two intermediate levels in their management chain. The acquisition management process falls under the purview of the civilian (Service Secretariat) side of the military departments, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN (RDA)), is the designated Service acquisition executive. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) supports the Secretary of Defense across the DOD and both the Secretary of the Navy and the two Service Chiefs within the Department of the Navy. The Service Secretary is responsible for submitting program and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense for approval, and the individual Service Chiefs (and their staffs) retain responsibility for developing the proposed programs for their Service. The requirements generation and the acquisition management processes are event based (decision points occur based on readiness to proceed). They are intended to support the time-driven PPBS, which assists the military departments and the Secretary of Defense in preparing budgets presented to the Congress on specific dates. The fact that two of the systems are event based and the third, the most dominant, is driven by external calendar constraints (and also more recently by externally imposed funding constraints) has created tension rather than cooperation among the staffs responsible for managing the processes. Moreover, in recent years other circumstances have also proved detrimental to good integration. Some major programmatic decisions have been delayed until late in the budget preparation process; some long-term modernization plans have been destabilized during annual budget development cycles; and worldwide contingencies have required larger-than-expected operating funds. 1   The VCJCS can use the joint warfare capabilities assessment (JWCA) process to assess military capabilities and needs in different warfare areas. The JWCA process is managed by the Joint Staff and participated in by representatives from all four Services.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities will be obsolete, ineffective in the field, or too expensive. This is particularly true for developments involving rapidly changing technology. The rapid evolution of information technology, the inherent jointness of information networks, and the loss of technical leadership to the commercial market have made the generation of requirements for sensors and information systems difficult in all the Services. The implementation of the relatively new joint processes, the Service and platform orientation of the acquisition systems, and the need for Navy personnel to acquire new skills and understanding have contributed to the difficulty of the challenge. However, achieving the necessary dialogue is essential, whether by a linear or a spiral process. Currently, a formal process is not in place to produce the integrated requirements for more effective NCO. Also, there does not exist a Navy (or DOD) element whose position, longevity, and interests are adequate to control the evolution of capabilities to support NCO. Historical precedent can be found in the Navy’s General Board of the 1920s and 1930s. In that period of great uncertainty about the future, the General Board was invaluable in maintaining a map of what had been decided and why, and then in enforcing consistent, synchronized allocation of resources. However, the board may have been less innovative than what is needed today to lead the current transformation to more effective network-centric operations. A formal requirement in the Navy is the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who uses the Office of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to provide top-down guidance and oversight of what is a very diffuse and diverse requirements generation process. In this process a formal requirement is staffed by OPNAV and approved by the CNO or Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) or their designated authorities. It is then sometimes approved by others within the DOD. Upon final approval it then may become the basis for an acquisition program, to be approved by Congress (if it is large enough to require that specific attention). Generally, platform sponsors dominate the early formulation of Navy requirements, while the requirements process in the Marine Corps rests with the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) staffed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Occasionally requirements are discovered or generated by top-down analysis. Much more frequently they flow up informally from the operational community, which complains about deficiencies in existing systems, or from the technical community, which sees new opportunities in emerging technologies. Rarely is a formal requirement developed for a new system; most requirements are for modifications to existing systems. Fixing deficiencies and embedding new technologies in existing systems are most often funded through repair and modernization efforts. In most cases no formal requirement is written, and OPNAV’s visibility is limited.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 7.2.1.1 Requirements Through Analysis Over the last four decades requirements have been developed principally through operational analysis or, in the absence of such analysis, by assertion.2 This process generally has been linear, with the desired end result specified in terms of performance parameters (sometimes with technical specifications written in as part of the “requirement”). However, for areas where the technology is changing rapidly, this approach is weak if the development and procurement of a required military system cannot be achieved within a reasonable time. The committee believes that a new paradigm is needed to develop requirements for rapidly changing technology areas in the future network-centric world. 7.2.1.2 Requirements Through Experimentation Experimentation provides a means to explore alternative doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics that are enabled by new technologies or required by new situations. That is, new technologies or situations may call for different ways of conducting operations. But without actual operational experience in using new technologies or in using existing technologies in new situations, experiments are the next best thing. For making informed decisions on future doctrine and requirements, experiments provide a better basis than does reliance on analytical studies and/or simulations.3 Experimentation can be performed on different scales, in different echelons, within different mission types, and with different operational communities. Experiments should complement modeling and simulation activities. Although they can fail in their ability to find the right solution, experiments should always provide knowledge about the ramifications of new ideas and technologies, to assist those who write requirements by reducing the likelihood that they will specify requirements for too much (something that cannot be achieved within reasonable bounds) or too little (improvement insufficient to justify development). 7.2.1.3 The Spiral Process The spiral process, also called evolutionary development of requirements and systems, is an innovative method for fielding a system quickly by using 2   Operational analysis involves the determination of functions to be performed, and the order and manner in which they should be performed, to carry out military missions or operations. Systems analysis involves the further step of evaluating the relative cost-effectiveness (and other benefits and disadvantages) of alternative means of accomplishing the same military mission or operation. 3   Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council. 1999. Realizing the Potential of C4I: Fundamental Challenges. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities commercial and government off-the-shelf equipment, with maximum user involvement throughout the process. The first spiral is usually regarded as the first development cycle of a system. Subsequent spirals allow technology insertion, the addition of new mission capabilities and upgrades, and enhancement of interoperability and integration, all in an environment of continuous user feedback. The spiral process characteristically partitions the more traditional requirements generation and acquisition cycle into shorter, incremental cycles in which operators get hands-on access to the evolving system in each cycle and provide their feedback and modified requirements to a development team that is prepared to respond with adjustments. In so doing, the operators may modify their own operational processes and concepts based on use of the emerging capability. As such, the spiral process can also support reengineering of the operational concepts and doctrine. Each spiral has its own defined activities, performance objectives, schedule, and cost; and each spiral concludes with a user decision to field the system based on the requirements developed to date, continue with evolution, or stop. The spiral process is a powerful alternative to the traditional requirements generation and acquisition processes. One of its advantages is that it offers a sound replacement in areas in which technology is changing rapidly and cycle times in the commercial sector are short compared to the traditional DOD requirements and acquisition processes. A major key to success is the involvement of operators, requirement generators, and technical personnel with appropriate resource allocation support from the financial sector. The spiral process also accelerates fielding of innovative operational processes and systems. Some of the successful innovations carried out by the military services are described in Chapter 2. 7.2.2 Requirements for Interoperability in Joint Operations The DOD requirements generation process for joint operations is hampered by Title 10 language that assigns the Services the primary responsibility for equipping, manning, and training the Service component forces. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is responsible for overseeing and prioritizing DOD requirements affecting joint operations and can review any requirement proposed by a Service. In addition, the Secretary of Defense and other elements of the Executive Branch have established separate entities to procure and operate major C4ISR systems (e.g., DISA, DIA, NRO, NSA).4 Unfortunately, this ununified approach can further exacerbate the separation between users and 4   DISA, Defense Information Systems Agency; DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency; NRO, National Reconnaissance Office; NSA, National Security Agency.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities producers, hinder their dialogue, and result in “stovepipes” of communication and information. Although it specifies that the Services define operational and system architectures, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)) does not spell out the missions or any other taxonomy to guide building a comprehensive set of interlocking architectures across Services or stovepipes. As a result, responsibility for definition of systems’ architectures has fallen largely to each individual Service, and lateral connectivity on the battlefield among Services has suffered. Even the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System is implemented differently within the various Services, thus limiting interoperability. A positive action has been the recent effort by the Joint Staff Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) to identify fixes for existing problems and to anticipate problems with regard to tactical ballistic missile defense. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has begun to require a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) supportability annex for every new major platform program. This annex is supposed to define the platform’s interface requirements for information support. A great deal of effort has been spent on these annexes for the next generation surface combatant for the Navy (DD-21) and the joint strike fighter. However, refinement of the process is needed so that not every new acquisition program is forced to create its own similar infrastructure and architecture, which may not be consistent with those already developed. Commanders-in-chief (CINCs), who provide input to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) through the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, often focus on their immediate needs rather than on longer-term systems. However, the CINC’s specification of the Navy’s numbered fleets as potential joint task force commanders is a positive step that has increased the numbered fleets’ sensitivity to the requirements for interoperability and to the need for development of updated capabilities—for example, those aboard the USS Coronado. All requirements for potential acquisitions with “joint interest” as defined by the Joint Staff are subject to JROC review, which provides for some examination of joint interoperability and commonality. However, the Joint Staff lacks the significant technical capability required to ensure meaningful scrutiny of each system. Smaller acquisition programs not designated as having joint interest are not reviewed. The JROC does use the C4ISR Decision Support Center, which is staffed almost entirely by contractors, to identify potentially important interface and connectivity requirements. A recent joint event of some portent is the emergence of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), which has begun to have an impact on the requirements generation process. USJFCOM, with its recently acquired Joint Battle Center and others, now has a significant operational experience base and an intense if not always friendly training relationship with the other regional CINCs. It may

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities become an important agent for generation of joint interoperability requirements including hardware, software, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). USJFCOM is currently preparing the Capstone Requirement for Joint Tactical Communications, Command, Control, and Computers. This draft document identifies generic deficiencies and establishes top-down requirements, such as, “Survival information must be delivered within a threshold of 6 seconds and planning information within 30 seconds from when the information is initially processed and ready for transmission within the Joint area of operation.” The effort is an interesting first step toward a top-down approach to specifying architectural constraints on all C4ISR systems, but the connection to specific Service system contract specifications has not yet been made, nor is the relationship to the Joint Interoperability Testing Center clear. Capstone requirements for NCO also may be a useful concept within the Navy, the leader in NCO among the Services. A first step in this direction is the Capstone Battle Force Requirements Document being developed under the NAVSEA Battle Group Systems Interoperability Testing. The objective is to solve problems with regard to common time reference, data registration, combat identification, navigation, correlation algorithms, and metrics identified repeatedly in the All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team exercises. The capstone document has a decidedly joint focus—Joint Integrated Air Defense System’s Interoperability Working Group and the joint interface control officer are participating in its development. USJFCOM is also the executive agent for the DOD experimentation program to support the evolution of Joint Vision 2010. This effort, which is just beginning, could become an important step in the spiral development of the NCO concept and of requirements for C4ISR systems. In summary, the OSD, the Joint Staff, and defense agencies provide sporadic, conflicting, and sometimes onerous guidance with regard to C4ISR requirements rather than a well-structured, consistent, and testable process for elicitation and validation of cross-Services information needs. Promising exceptions are emerging, but a stronger mechanism for ensuring joint interoperability is required within the Services, even if only to supply points of contact for the joint efforts. 7.2.3 Tools for Developing Interoperability and Related Requirements Rapidly evolving information technologies present serious challenges to but also opportunities for dealing with the evolution to NCO. New, commercially driven technologies are becoming available to the Department of the Navy far faster than would be possible with military research and development (R&D) only. The refreshment of existing information systems at 2- to 3-year intervals may be possible and economically feasible because of reduced costs for procurement and operation. The new joint Global Command and Control System (GCCS)

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities was built at a significantly lower cost than had been budgeted for continuation of its predecessor, the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. If the military systems incorporating commercial building blocks can adjust to a stepped-up pace for embedding new components in operational platforms as well as addressing related training, supportability, and security and other concerns, it should be possible to break out of the traditional 15-year acquisition cycle. Commercial communications services may take over large parts of the Joint Planning Network, for example, relieving the Navy of operating its own extensive communications utilities and applications. Accomplishing a rapid evolution will place demands for change on all Navy Department processes, including the requirements generation process. Synchronization of the changing requirements across a battle force is a primary concern. Merely keeping track of the changes and ensuring interoperability on deployment have already become difficult.5 New communications technology has made it possible to realistically link hardware-in-the-loop simulators of the major sensor, communications, and combat systems of the battle group. This distributed simulation capability, called the distributed engineering plan, can serve as a testbed for interoperability across the battle force. In addition, distributed simulations less expensive than the DEP can drive experiments leading to the development of new operational concepts, subsequent new or revised doctrine, and requirements for system modifications and new systems and components. The combination of operational analysis capabilities and distributed simulation tools, the war gaming and fleet battle experiment capabilities at the Naval War College, and the doctrine development and experimentation program of the NWC’s Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) could be extremely useful in defining future mission interdependencies and requirements. Inclusion of the U.S. Marine Corps in such an effort could be an excellent step toward closer synchronization of littoral requirements. An example of such a combined effort is that of the Air Forces’ joint expeditionary force experiments (JEFXs) conducted under the auspices of the Air Combat Command’s Aerospace Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center (AC2ISRC). As a related effort, the AC2ISRC is procuring the software to support the aerospace expeditionary force (AEF), the new form of the deployed U.S. Air Force. The Electronic Systems Command at Hanscom Air Force Base has a new system program office for all command and control systems that is handling the acquisition for the AC2ISRC. These agencies are working closely together to iterate the development of the software through the EFXs and intermediate testing with users at intervals of about 1 year. The Navy’s requirements generation process should change to include interactive participation. Use of the spiral process for evolutionary acquisition has 5   In one case, the result was the loss of the services of two cruisers for a considerable time. The NAVSEA BGSIT group has been designated to take on this problem.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities been mandated for Air Force C2 systems, and the process is being used by the Air Force to develop the C2 system for its AEF. In general, the initial requirement in the spiral process should be a statement of functional performance at an easily accomplishable level, in order to provide a prototype rapidly and give the operational community a testable item with limited financial risk. After testing, the requirement may become tighter, evolve in another direction, or disappear entirely. In the spiral process, the operational community and the requirements writers are continually involved in an integrated products team (IPT)-like setting with the acquisition team. New distributed simulation technology has given the Department of the Navy tools for improving the requirements generation process to respond to rapid technological change. The Department of the Navy should capitalize on the technology to reap the benefits of NCO. 7.2.4 Requirements for Synchronization Among Cross-Platform Capabilities In addition to shortfalls in the requirements generation process, the committee believes that there are deficiencies in the resource prioritization and acquisition processes for support of NCO by the Navy (addressed in subsequent sections). In all three areas, the lack of focus, inflexibility, and lack of a capability to plan and deliver across platforms, and in conjunction with other Services, are key deficiencies. Because the platform communities place higher priority on the number and performance of their platforms than on the performance of the total networked system, cross-platform interoperability, including networking requirements, cannot be defended well and is often sacrificed when funding is scarce. To put it another way, the Navy provides resources for its platforms, not its battle forces. Consensus is needed on operational architectures and synchronization of migration away from legacy systems as systems change. Furthermore, all parties must stick to the schedule if the transition to network-centric operations is to be accomplished as rapidly as is technically and economically possible. One hold-out can delay the transition for the whole fleet. The requirements generation process must have a firm basis in the operational community, which provides expertise for new ideas on how existing systems can be improved in terms of readiness, efficiency, and effectiveness for current missions; how existing systems can be adapted to emerging missions; and when such systems are no longer suitable or supportable. Some organization in, or with strong ties to, the operational community will have to be in charge of developing the requirements for the interfaces that join various different platforms and operational organizations. Priorities for changes should also come from the operational community. Because the NCII will become a matter of life and death to the operational forces, it is imperative to have a single commander

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities fleet’s priority list for network-centric information operations POM submissions and for short-term resource reallocation. Be responsible in the Navy for integration of Marine Corps fleet Marine force requirements with fleet NCO requirements and fleet experimentation support. Be the community personnel manager for all IT personnel in the Navy—officers, civilians, and enlisted personnel—including career field planning, rotation assignments, and training requirements. Serve as the Navy component commander to CINC Space, which has been assigned responsibility for DOD network assurance. Provide operational support to the fleet experimentation program. This functional type commander should report only to the three fleet commanders and represent them in the POM and budget process for information operations issues. When this role is combined with the committee’s two other recommendations that provide a mechanism to reallocate resources during a given budget cycle, this functional type commander should be able to respond to emerging fleet requirements, to maintain cutting-edge technology, and to support the development and fielding of new systems. This commander’s role in providing operational advice and support to the fleet experimentation program should enhance the quality of experiments and add value to battle group and battle force operations. The recommended Commander, Operations Information and Space Command, should be supported by the Commander, Naval Security Group Command, the Commander, Navy Space Command, and the Commander, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command in their entirety and by the fleet operational support function of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The new commander should assume command of a major portion of the DCNO for Space and Electronic Warfare (N6), except for the policy function. An organizational view of the recommended command is provided in Appendix F. Recommendation 2. Create a requirements board. The current requirements generation process is not sufficiently responsive to the demands of information technology development. Computer technology and related processes can become outmoded before the POM process can even react to the fielding of the results of the prior requirements generation process. In addition, multiple organizations have uncoordinated responsibilities for operations and fleet support, requirements generation, manpower planning, and budgeting. These disparate, and sometimes overlapping, activities are not effective and clearly do not optimize the Navy’s efforts in future systems development. With the Navy on the threshold of conducting warfare in the information age, bold new initiatives are necessary.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities A requirements board should be established to deal with information operations and to integrate the various competing requirements as presented by the fleets for rapid improvement of complex at-sea operations. This board should be responsible for the following areas: Coordinate and rank requirements for the NCO decisions across all naval platforms with a view to the future. The board would control the evolution of connectivity and capacity requirements to mesh with platform networking capabilities. Through the VCNO, it would ensure that the Navy speaks with one voice at the joint level. Encourage the full requirements dialogue among the communities and ensure that requirements trade-offs have been examined and validated by the best possible means, including use of the battle group engineering plan. The requirements board would make sure that the requirements remain flexible within the spiral development process in acquisition and improve the visibility into the repair and modernization programs. Validate the requirements for all NCO systems. The requirements board members would have four broad functions: Develop policy and implement strategy for conducting information operations; Advise the CNO on the strategy and doctrine, personnel, education, training, technology, and resource requirements for moving the Navy from platform-centric to network-centric warfare; Establish the linkage to the Navy After Next21 from this new level of warfare operations; and Rank emerging NCO requirements based on fleet commanders’ recommendations and the results of fleet experimentation. The requirements board should be chaired by the VCNO and have the N6 as the executive director (until the recommended Information Operations and Space Command is established). The membership of the board should consist of the deputy fleet commanders, the president of the Naval War College, the DCNO for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/5), and the DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8). The Board should specifically address four broad areas of information operations: (1) battle force operations, (2) NCO requirements, (3) IT manpower, and (4) NCO budgets. The area of operations should be much broader than current 21   The Navy After Next is the Navy beyond that defined by the time horizon (5+ years) of the program objective memorandum (POM) process.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities forums and should focus on the warfighting impact of new and emerging developments. Since the fleets will all be properly represented, progress should be possible in areas such as sensor-to-shooter priorities, long-range land-attack targeting, mobile targeting, and friendly fire. In all of these areas the board should seek solutions for the Navy After Next. The board’s responsibilities should cut across the current stovepipes, both by platform and by mission. It would be small enough and senior enough to make the necessary trade-off decisions and implement priorities in the requirements area, with concurrent fleet input. This forum for the prioritization of requirements could be a forceful lever to compel attention and achieve progress in the cross-platform areas. The board should also approve a general education program for all officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians with continuity throughout each career path to ensure familiarity with the basic language, thought processes, and skills required to perform at a high level in their specialty. The budget is an important area for this group, which should provide recommendations on priorities for funding, particularly across platforms and stovepiped areas. Again, since the fleets and the requirements leadership are adequately represented, this could be a very effective forum to ensure that information operations and its specific programs receive the visibility and priority they require. Recommendation 3. Create a board of directors. The above two organizational changes are designed to focus the operational development of network-centric naval operations and to integrate the many priorities within the requirements sphere. There is also a need to provide focus for the acquisition and program execution portions of information operations. This review, oversight, and prioritization of the acquisition, installation, integration, and program execution portions of network-centric operations should be conducted by a new board of directors consisting of individuals with the authority to make adjustments in different areas. The recommended board of directors should have the Under Secretary of the Navy as the chairman, and the VCNO and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) as members. Other members should be the three Navy system commanders of NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and SPAWAR, and the Marine Corps Systems Command, along with the ASN (RDA) (who should serve as the executive director). The DCNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5) and the DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8), as well as the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) for Plans, Policy, and Operations and the ACOS for Programs and Resources of the Marine Corps staffs, should also be members. Requirements sponsors (N2, N4, N6, N85, N86, N87, and N88) should be advisory members to be consulted concerning the operational impact of potential program adjustments.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities The 12-member board of directors should replace or augment the informal arrangements that now exist between the systems commanders and could oversee the coordination of the scheduling and funding of all cross-platform systems. The board should also ensure that the technical standards and components for interoperability being developed for new systems will be installed in an integrated manner to provide the necessary battle group and battle force compatibility, including that with units of the fleet Marine force. The board should be responsible for establishing battle group and battle force system response times. It also should recommend priorities among fleet modernization efforts and new system developments from a technical and operational standpoint. Emergent and in-year funding requirements for deploying critical systems should also be dealt with by this group, through reprogramming, if necessary. This board of directors should function as a Navy Department resource board for information operations and for the supporting systems and R&D programs. In turn, this establishment would provide a network-centric operational focus, at the appropriate level, for the entire acquisition and program execution effort (including installations in battle groups) for both new systems and upgrades to existing systems. The results should include improved judgments regarding priorities and trade-offs among new systems and fixes to legacy systems that are more responsive to integrated fleet needs. 7.7.2.2 Requirements Generation Recommendations The committee’s recommendations for the requirements generation area are as follows: Provide the resources for and expand the role of the Navy Warfare Development Command in generating concepts of operations and operational architectures, and designing and analyzing the results of operational experiments. NWDC and MCCDC should coordinate Navy and Marine Corps experimentation efforts. Also, involve the NWDC in the IWAR process. Create a requirements board. This board of Navy senior leadership headed by the VCNO should act as the institutional memory and keeper of the integrity of the requirements generation process. (Details are described above.) Create an Information Operations and Space Command, a functional type command, to provide a focal point for NCO activities, consolidate responsibility for information support, and prepare requirements for NCO systems. (Details are described above.) Propose the establishment of a joint office, similar in scope to JTAMDO, for joint fire and land attack. JTAMDO has expertise from all the Services and the major agencies. It is defining the operational architecture and the inter-

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities operability requirements for air and missile defense. Thus, an analogous effort for joint fire could be a step toward jointly identifying the operational architecture and information requirements for land-attack, strike, and time-critical targets. A continuing joint fire testbed would be a step forward from the biannual Roving Sands exercises,22 which have demonstrated continuing difficulty in integrating intelligence and command and control systems to pinpoint time-critical targets. 7.7.2.3 Mission Analyses and Resource Allocation Recommendations The committee’s recommendations for the mission analysis area are the following: Staff and provide resources for the IWAR process to enable continuous assessments from requirements generation through programming, budgeting, and execution. Make developing of output-oriented MOEs and MOPs for network-centric operations a high priority. Put more emphasis on and provide sufficient resources for developing a comprehensive set of DRMs across all mission areas and keep them current. Up-do-date DRMs are the single biggest improvement that can be made to mission analysis. Make more use of the distributed engineering plan in testing potential life extensions of and improvements to legacy systems. Develop a methodology that everyone agrees to for assessing the risk of failure of a military operation. Recognizing that it will be a subjective assessment, strive to achieve a methodology that consistently arrives at the same answer for a given set of circumstances. The committee’s recommendations in the resource allocation area are as follows: Create a board of directors to add comprehensive oversight of network-centric operations as a whole to all three major decision support processes (requirements generation, resource allocation, and acquisition and program execution). The oversight should also ensure that network-centric operations are always considered in the joint context. In addition, the CNO/CMC should review 22   Roving Sands is a field training exercise that is the world’s largest joint theater air and missile defense activity sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Information is available online at <http://www.af.mil/news/May1996/n19960523_960496.html>.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities how system trade-offs and resource allocation balances are addressed in the Navy/Marine Corps staffs to assist them in achieving maximum mission effectiveness for all naval force missions. This is particularly important for the power projection mission, which may be the most stressful to the Navy/Marine Corps team in terms of achieving the full benefits of network-centric operations. (Also see details on the recommended board of directors as described above in Section 7.7.2.1.) Strengthen the assessment process along the lines discussed in the mission analysis section (e.g., develop better measures of effectiveness and measures of performance) and expand assessments so that they continue through budgeting and program execution. Put more emphasis on and resources toward phased implementation of spiral acquisition in homogeneous product lines. Include resources for backfit where appropriate. Therefore, the committee recommends that The organization of the Navy’s N8 office should be reviewed and adjusted as appropriate and necessary to increase emphasis on all aspects of the power projection mission, including strike and countermine warfare, amphibious and airborne assault, and fire support and logistics support of Marine Corps forces from the sea. 7.7.2.4 Acquisition and Systems Engineering Recommendations The committee’s recommendations in the acquisition and systems area are as follows: Create a board of directors for NCO integration, acquisition, and program execution. (Details are described above.) Establish a three-star deputy for Navy NCO integration to the ASN (RDA). This deputy should be a designated Navy SYSCOM commander and be double-hatted into this role. The deputy should oversee all aspects of battle force system interoperability and integration and coordinate program execution across the SYSCOMs to ensure synchronism in development, production, and installation of systems that implement network centricity. This responsibility specifically includes these same functions for the NCII. The deputy should be the executive agent of the board of directors for NCO integration, acquisition, and program execution for Navy systems. The deputy also should oversee the activities of the Navy Chief Engineer and the NAVSEA battle force interoperability engineering function.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Institutionalize system engineering in the acquisition of Navy systems and in the execution of programs. Under the recommended deputy for NCO integration, strengthen the role of the Navy Chief Engineer in institutionalizing system engineering as a methodology for achieving the integration and interoperability of cross-platform and cross-SYSCOM systems. The Navy Chief Engineer should oversee a system engineering cadre drawn from the three Navy SYSCOMs for this purpose. The SYSCOMs should receive the resources and staff to support this activity. In addition, the ASN (RDA) should look at the best means to address system engineering for the entire system and not just the functional parts. (This latter portion of the recommendation applies to all naval missions and particularly to the power projection mission, which affects so many elements of the Navy/Marine Corps team. All elements of the combined joint team must work as an integrated whole to achieve maximum NCO effectiveness. This result cannot be achieved if system trade-offs and system engineering efforts are addressed at the component level.) Assign the Navy Chief Engineer the responsibility and authority to develop and maintain the system and technical architectures (consistent with the Chief Information Officer standards and policies) and the interface, interoperability, and other standards required for compatibility of network-centric systems. This responsibility should include coverage of the same functions for the development of the NCII. Institutionalize a process of spiral acquisition for network-centric systems, focusing on domain-specific applications that serve individual mission domains. Network-centric systems should be funded and planned for continual technology refreshment and functional evolution both during development and throughout the full life cycle. Provision should be made for continuous operator involvement in the development and evolutionary cycle, preferably by assignment of operational user representatives from the operating forces to the program management offices. Budgetary allocations should be included in these programs for technology refreshment and functional evolution. The recommended Commander, Operations Information and Space Command, should assist the fleet in providing user feedback and choosing priorities for system upgrades overseen by the general board. The board of directors (for NCO integration, acquisition, and program execution) should recommend program adjustments necessary for expediting the spiral acquisition process. In keeping with the committee’s findings above regarding mission balance in the management of requirements generation review and system acquisition, the ASN (RDA) should seek the best means to address the design and engineering of NCO systems to eliminate as nearly as possible any distortion of the overall NCO perspective through undue emphasis on any single naval force mission or any one platform. In particular, the Navy Department PEO structure

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities should be reviewed and provision made, as is found appropriate and necessary, for management of the acquisition and the oversight of mission-oriented, networked major subsystems of the overall NCO system. In doing this, special attention should be given to end-to-end (surveillance and targeting through effectiveness assessment), fleet-based, land-attack (strike and fire support) subsystems for Navy, joint, and coalition missions. Institutionalize the fleet experimentation process with increased rigor, and establish a mechanism for injecting its products into acquisition. Designate the Navy Warfare Development Command as the Navy Fleet Experiment Commander and provide resources to NWDC for this role. Charter the Navy Chief Engineer to provide system engineering support for the design of experiments and for the definition of MOPs and success criteria, and provide resources to the SYSCOMs for this role. Charter the recommended Commander, Operations Information and Space Command, to represent the fleet in providing operator insight in the design and evaluation of experiments. The recommended Navy requirements board should rank the requirements of successful products for acquisition. The recommended board of directors for NCO integration, acquisition, and program execution should recommend budgetary adjustments for the transition to network-centric operations. Propose the establishment of a joint office, similar in scope to JTAMDO, for joint fire and land attack. Until such an office is set up, the Navy and Marine Corps should participate more actively in the “Attack Operations” pillar (one of four) in JTAMDO in which a working integrated process team is looking at the targeting of time-critical targets, such as mobile missile launchers. 7.7.2.5 Personnel Management Recommendations The committee’s recommendations in the personnel and career management area are as follows: Institute network-centric operations education and training for all naval personnel at all levels within the Navy and Marine Corps. All elements of the Navy need to be more appreciative of the principles, benefits, and risks associated with network-centric operations. Develop career paths for both military and civil service employees with significant information technology expertise. Provide opportunities for those personnel with significant NCO critical IT expertise who wish to make a career in the Navy/Marine Corps military or civilian team to achieve very high (if not the highest) positions in the Department of the Navy. Ensure that all Navy/Marine Corps line and field-grade officers have expertise in IT and are capable of effectively using operational information in network-centric operations. Train mili-

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities tary personnel and civilians together when the IT learning requirements are shore based to better integrate the military and civilian parts of the combined team. Analyze the current and projected IT work so that more informed decisions can be made about who should do the work—active duty personnel, reserve military personnel, civil service employees, or contractors. Assess how functions can be expected to be performed in 5 years and 10 years. Evaluate manning, technology, training, and resource alternatives for those periods. Update military and civilian IT job codes to match the desired IT specialty work. Analyze present job skills to assess current functions and how they are carried out (present job skill codes are not adequate to provide the detail needed to understand the existing work structure and manning skills). Distribute IT education and training opportunities well within the Department of the Navy workforce and make them readily accessible. 7.7.3 Recommendations Summary This chapter sets forth the collective judgment of the committee on the keys to implementing improved network-centric capabilities. The chapter shows how to modify the decision support and personnel management processes to achieve network-centric capabilities as major enablers in the conduct of naval operations. The key management processes (i.e., defining what is needed, allocating resources, acquiring systems, staffing critical billets, and operating a global information infrastructure) are described. In Figure 7.10, the committee’s major recommendations that affect the processes necessary for effective NCO integration are shown below the functions that would be most affected by the specific recommendations. The committee believes that the changes recommended could be implemented by the Navy, without revisions to law or DOD directives, and that their implementation will make a significant improvement in the success of future naval operations.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities FIGURE 7.10 Functions for effective integration of network-centric operations shown in relation to major recommendations made in this report. CHENG, Chief Engineer of the Navy; DRM, design reference mission; IWAR, integrated warfare architecture; MOE, measure of effectiveness; MOP, measure of performance; NAVSEA, Naval Sea Systems Command; NWDC, Navy Warfare Development Command; SYSCOM, Systems Command; TYPE CDR, functional type commander.

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