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The Changing Global Economic and Technological Environmenl; For more than 35 years the United States and its CoCom allies have sought to deny militarily critical technology to the nations of the Warsaw Pact. Although the objective of denial still underlies U.S. policy, U.S. national security export controls (which are discussed in detail in the following chapter) are, in some respects, out of step with the rapidly changing environment in which they operate. In this regard, three major developments may be noted. First, the character of the international marketplace is evolving in such a way that global diffusion of commercial technology takes place at a rapid rate; with growing frequency the technol- ogy being diffused has military applications. Second, the growing importance of trade as a part of U.S. economic activity causes the overall U.S. economy to be increasingly sensitive to policies that affect trade. Third, U.S. domi- nance over advanced technology is declining; stiff competition from foreign companies has appeared in almost every high-technology sector. In any reconsideration of U.S. national security export control policy, the implica- tions of these developments warrant discussion and review. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE The volume of world trade has grown dramatically since World War II; in addition, the value of goods traded has increased manyfold since the l950s. More and more, Western nations are exporting large proportions of their domestic output and consuming sizable quantities of imported goods. This increased volume of trade has been accompanied by the 54

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 55 appearance of new products and by changing business strategies, all of which markedly affect the environment in which national security export controls operate. Integral to these developments is the phenomenon of information diffusion, which is occurring more and more rapidly, in ever-greater volumes, and to more destinations than ever before. This development is partially due to the improved capabilities offered by new communications technologies such as satellites, fiber optics, and digital switching systems. It is also due to the widespread use of many other technologies for example, computers- which make expanded global interaction more efficient and less expensive as well. The current competitive environment promotes information diffusion because it creates incentives for companies to pursue such global pro- duction strategies as locating research, development, and manufacturing facilities around the world and entering into joint ventures. As these companies work to coordinate their international efforts, they transfer massive amounts of information. Attempting to control these rapidly growing volumes of data transfers would be an enormous endeavor; moreover, significant interference with this vital flow would disrupt the communications essential for competitive business operations. The shift to global production has resulted in the emergence of a new type of product, such as the "world car," whose components may cross national borders a number of times during production. It has also greatly expanded the roster of countries capable of mass-producing high-tech- nology products. Even U.S. defense industries now rely on foreign- manufactured components and expertise for such sensitive items as missile guidance systems, radars, communications gear, satellites, and air navigation instruments. Some top-of-the-line U.S. supercomputers, of particular importance to the Intelligence Community, now incorporate high-performance chips made only in Japan. As can well be imagined, this situation has become a source of rising concern among defense planners.2 Some of these global products (for example, certain personal comput- ers and memory chips) are produced in large quantities in an ever-greater number of countries; as a result, they have become, essentially, "tech- nological commodities." The increased availability of such products and the rapid diffusion of the means to produce them make the effort to control high technology much more complicated an effect further inten- sified by the fact that many of the countries involved are not members of CoCom and therefore are not subject to self-imposed controls. Another important development in international trade is the expanding commercial market for dual use products, most of which embody ad- vanced technology. To compete successfully in this market and maintain their market share in the face of growing competition from Japan,

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56 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST Western Europe, and the newly industrializing countries, U.S. firms are experiencing added pressure to export their most technologically sophis- ticated commercial products. An important related development in this period has been a growing disparity between the pace of technological progress from privately sponsored (commercial) R&D and that sponsored by the Department of Defense. Early in the postwar era, DoD recognized that technology would be more and more vital to the defense of the NATO alliance and consequently supported research and development in a number of impor- tant fields. Defense-funded programs in aeronautics, propulsion, and electronics were particularly successful and ultimately had major impacts on the civilian economy as these new technologies were commercialized. As long as DoD-funded programs remained at the leading edge of technology development, subsequent commercial exploitation presented little threat to U.S. security. New weapon systems could be fully operational in the U.S. military well before commercialization began, thus ensuring a continuing Western lead. Although overall technological progress in the United States continued throughout the postwar era, a number of factors combined to undermine DoD's early leadership role in the development of militarily significant technologies. For a variety of reasons, the cost of developing new weapon systems incorporating state-of-the-art technology rose dramatically after the late 1960s. Military R&D and procurement expenditures subsequently declined, but the civilian market for high-technology products such as aircraft and consumer electronics experienced explosive growth. Thus, by the late 1970s there were a number of dual use high technologies, such as advanced microelectronics, that were introduced into the commercial sector well before they found application in military systems. As a result the U.S. government was in some cases left in the difficult position of trying to restrict the dissemination of technologies already available in the world marketplace. This dilemma is central to the debate over national security export controls. As discussed in Chapter 1, control of advanced dual use technology and products is vital to the maintenance of the West's qualitative military advantage. EEective control is growing more difficult, however, because of the increasing rate of information diffusion and the rise of global production capabilities. A further complication is the United States' increasing participation in and reliance on the global economy. GROWING U.S. INTERACTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY The United States is the single largest international trader, reporting exports of $360 billion in 1985. Exports thus have assumed growing

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57 28 24 20 Z 16 12 CL 8 4 o 2 Exports 5] Imports ..,, .', .,. .,. ., _ l ~ ,J i 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 YEAR *1976, 1978, and 1980 imports are custom value. FIGURE 3-1 Manufacturing trade as a percent of gross domestic product per manufac- turing (domestic and foreign exports, f.a.s.; general imports, f.a.s.*). importance to the U.S. economy and in particular to U.S. producers of manufactured goods. Manufactured exports as a percentage of gross domestic product for manufacturing were 9 percent in 1960 and grew to 25 percent in 1980 before declining to 18 percent in 1985.* Imports of manufactured products as a percentage of gross domestic product for manufacturing exhibit an even more dramatic trend, rising from 5 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1985 as shown in Figure 3-1. The size and importance of the manufactured goods component of U.S. exports have also grown steadily; manufactured goods constituted 76 percent of total U.S. merchandise exports in 1985. Because export controls bear most heavily on manufactured goods, such controls can have a serious impact on the overall economic well-being of the United States. It is also important to keep in mind the character and global distribution *Most European and Asian countries trade a much higher proportion of their total economic output than does the United States. With such high levels of interaction in world markets, it is not surprising that European and Asian countries are sensitive to the negative effects on trade caused by export controls.

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58 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 28 24 g 20 o lo at - o - m 16 12 8 ....... . , ............ ........... ............ ...... ....... ..... ,...... _ . A, r ~ ~e2~2~ ,,,.""2 ~2~2e~ ~e22~ 2e~2~ 2,, ,2 ~ e2 ."-2-"". ', ,2, ,', :::::: :~:~:~:~:~: 1 .::::: 1 ........... 1 ....... 1 .""""2t ',, '~22,2 ., 222 .""""". ~ ~ 2~ ~ 222 22 i,, .e ,e, l -.. ' ' ' ' ' ' 22 2222 ,, ,e'., ,2 222 2.~.2.~ 22~e2 [~e2e~e2e am,. , ,,", ' 2~2e~2~ ~ ,,,~2."' .-2.".'.~.' .~.'B2.~2. ,, ""'., ~ 2222 *2',,,, ~ -.. ' 2~ .2.~ .2. ~ en .'~2~2~'."' ".2~'''e22B2.".'' , ,,, ,2, 22 ' ' ' ' ' ::::::::::::: -4 1 1 1965 1 970 1975 1 980 YEAR *U.S. Department of Commerce DOC-3 definition. t1986 figure is estimated. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. l ~ ........... 1 986e FIGURE 3-2 U.S. high-tech* trade balance, 1965-1986et (domestic and foreign exports, f.a.s.; general imports, c.i.f.). Note: 1978-1980 data exclude trade between U.S. Virgin Islands and foreign count es. of U.S. exports.3 For instance, exports to CoCom countries are substan- tial, representing over 60 percent of total U.S. exports in 1985. By contrast, exports to the Soviet bloc in 1985 represented only 1 percent of U.S. exports. Therefore, trade policies that might diminish West-West trade have greater potential to damage the U.S. economy than do those that might reduce exports to the Eastern bloc. The high-technology sectors is an important component of U.S. ex- ports. It accounted for 30 percent of all U.S. goods exported and 42 percent of manufactured exports in 1985, and contributed to a steadily growing trade surplus from 1965 through 1981 as shown in Figure 3-2. This surplus helped to offset the trade deficit produced by other sectors. But for the past 5 years, the high-technology trade balance has worsened in parallel with the overall U.S. trade balance. Based on trends estab- lished in the first three quarters of 1986, the United States will register its first full-year trade deficit in high-technology goods since this category

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 59 was established. Export controls are not a leading cause of this recent decline in high-technology export performance, but they may tend to exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit by contributing to an environment that discourages export activities by U.S. firms. THE CHALLENGE TO U.S HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP The promotion of high-technology industries is an attractive policy option for many countries because these industries promise high growth, limited degradation of the environment, low natural resource require- ments, and international prestige. The promotion of high-technology industries also encourages modernization of a nation's economy and society. Consequently, a number of countries are devoting a great deal of attention to developing and improving their indigenous technical capabilities. CoCom Countries Many of the CoCom countries have a long history of advanced technological development. In the post-World War II period, these nations did not offer significant competition to the United States as they worked to rebuild their economies. But several of these countries- notably West Germany, France, and Japan are now providing signifi- cant competition to the United States. The ability to compete is in part the result of long-term efforts to enhance their indigenous technical capabil- ity. Rising R&D expenditures in West Germany, France, and Japan are one indication of this effort. In the early 1960s, the proportion of GNP the United States spent on R&D was more than twice that spent by West Germany, France, or Japan; by 1983, however, the expenditures of these countries had reached approximately the same level (2.5 percent) as that of the United States (see Figure 3-31. It is important to note that, although Japan, West Germany, and the United States all devote an equivalent proportion of GNP to R&D, Japan and West Germany may derive a commercial advantage from these expenditures because they devote a much smaller proportion of their R&D to military development (see Figure 3-41. In 1981 the United States devoted more than half its total government RED funding to defense- related research; West Germany and Japan, on the other hand, devoted 9 percent and 2 percent, respectively. In 1986 the United States allocated over 70 percent of government R&D funding to defense projects. A1- though defense-related research can have commercial benefits, some have questioned its efficiency in generating commercially viable prod- ucts in comparison to resources targeted specifically for commercial research purposes.

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60 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 4.0 02 e - - - 3.0 2.0 fir a 1.5 1.0 .5 _ O 1 1 1 1961 1965 1969 1973 _ United States United Kingdom West Germany _ . Japan Frances - - 1977 1981 1985 YEAR *Gross expenditures for performance of research and develop- ment including associated capital expenditures (except for the United States, where total capital expenditure data are not available). Estimates for the period 1972-80 show that the inclusion of capital expenditures for the United States would have an impact of less than one-tenth of one percent for each year. tGross domestic product. SOURCE: Science Indicators--1985. FIGURE 3-3 National expenditures for performance of R&D* as a percent of GNP by country. Another indication of the long-term commitment by these countries to enhance their technical capability is their increasing employment of scientists and engineers. Although the United States still employs the highest proportion of technical professionals in the Western labor force, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have all moved to close this gap as shown in Figure 3-5.

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 6 ~ 2.50 2.00 '~ 1.50 At . Cat LL 1.00 .50 lo West Germany United Kingdom Japan United States FranceT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1973 1977 1981 1985 YEAR *Gross expenditures for performance of research and develop- ment including associated capital expenditures (except for the United States, where total capital expenditure data are not available). Estimates for the period 1972-80 show that the inclusion of capital expenditures for the United States would have an impact of less than one-tenth of one percent for each year. "National expenditure excluding government funds for defense R&D. tGross domestic product. SOURCE: Science Indicators--1985. FIGURE 3-4 Estimated ratios of nondefense R&D* expenditures" to GNP for selected countries. One indirect measure of the growing technical competence of the Europeans and the Japanese can be found in patent applications. (Although patent applications are not an exact proxy for a nation's technical capability and inventiveness, they do provide a measure of

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62 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST F 100 80 60 40 20 o United States United Kingdom _. ~ West Germanv France 1967 1971 1975 YEAR *Includes all scientists and engineers on a full-time equivalent basis (except for Japan whose data include persons primarily employed in R&D). SOURCE: Science Indicators--1985. 1979 1 983 FIGURE 3-5 Scientists and engineers* engaged in research and development per 10,000 labor force population by country. relative change.) Between 1965 and 1984 the number of U.S. patents granted to U.S. inventors remained relatively constant while the number of U.S. patents granted to foreign inventors nearly tripled. As shown in Figure 3-6 there has also been a sharp decline in the number of U.S. citizens applying for patent protection from foreign govern- ments. A more concrete assessment of the growing competition faced by the United States is gained from a review of specific technologies. The following case examples help illustrate the tenuous nature of U.S. dominance in several high-technology fields.

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 63 140 120 to 8 - x 100 - 't 80 ct: 60 lo. o m 40 As 20 _ United Kingdom \ United States . . . West Germany . ~ Japan . O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1969 1971 1973 - - - France - - - 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 YEAR SOU ROE: Science I ndicators--1985. FIGURE 3-6 External patent applications by residents of selected countries. Semiconductors: The United States no longer has the lead in several important areas of semiconductor technology. Japan has an emerging leadership role in metal-oxide semiconductor (MOS) high-density com- puter memories with well over 50 percent of the world market. Japanese firms are reputed to be leading most U.S. merchant* semiconductor companies in developing reliable, low-cost, 1-megabyte dynamic random access memory (D-RAM) chips and in the early development of 4- megabyte designs. And Japanese companies now are the only source of the highest-quality fused quartz glass required for mass-producing state *Merchant refers to companies that sell their products on the open market as opposed to producing only for internal consumption (e.g., IBM).

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64 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST of-the-art chips of all types. Japan also rivals U.S. capability in semicon- ductor production equipment technology. The erosion of traditional U.S. dominance of semiconductor technology has occurred almost entirely within the last 5 to 10 years.5 Fiber optics: Japan is acknowledged to have gained a clear lead in light source technology, one of the main components of fiber optic systems. In addition, Japan is credited with a lead in fiber optic applica- tions and is competitive with the United States in other component technologies.6 Space: The U.S. lead in space relative to the European countries is decreasing. The European Space Agency (ESA) has developed civilian unmanned space launch capability, ending NASA's near monopoly. And even before the U.S. space shuttle disaster in January 1986, French economic policies and subsidies had allowed its space agency to take business from NASA. U.S. dominance of satellite production, an area that has enjoyed a long-term advantage due to the tie-in with U.S. launches, is also expected to decline.7 Aircraft: U.S. industry traditionally has dominated the world mar- ket for civilian aircraft, holding 95 percent of the world's orders for airliners through the mid-1970s. In 1975 related U.S. R&D expenditures began to decline; European expenditures, however, were growing through Airbus Industries, a European consortium designed to challenge U.S. producers. Between 1980 and 1985 Airbus captured 17 percent of the world market.8 Computer hardware and software: Although the United States re- tains broad leadership in computer hardware and software production, the Japanese now match or exceed the capabilities of U.S. producers in important subsectors such as large-scale processors and magnetic disk storage. In addition the Japanese joint government-industry R&D pro- gram is attempting to leapfrog U.S. industry with the development of the so-called "fifth generation" computer system.9 Other areas: U.S. foreign competitors also have demonstrated success in biotechnology, robotics, and machine tools and in the development of important new materials such as high-performance ceramics. is In reviewing these examples, it is important to keep in mind two important points: (1) the relative decline in U.S. dominance is an expected result of the economic recovery of countries whose industrial capability was destroyed or severely damaged in World War II; and (2) the countries making the most progress in developing or improving their capability are U.S. allies. Although their progress serves to enhance the overall strength of the Western military alliance, it also underscores the

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 65 vital need to increase the degree to which export controls are imple- mented through a multilateral system. The growing challenges to U.S. industrial dominance must be consid- ered carefully by those responsible for U.S. export control policy. If goods comparable to controlled U.S. products are available with little or no control from foreign sources, then a clear incentive exists for buyers to seek those sources. The trend toward non-U.S. sourcing or "de-Ameri- canization" is already evident in Europe. During its European study mission, the panel heard repeatedly from representatives in every country it visited that some of their companies were in the process of switching to non-U.S. sources for items controlled by the United States; in areas in which no non-U.S. source exists, many of these companies are making efforts to develop them. These actions stem not only from concerns about the additional costs and delays imposed by U.S. export controls but even more importantly from a view that the United States is not a reliable supplier a fear that was given credence by U.S. efforts to control gas and oil equipment in recent years in the face of strenuous opposition by our allies. In assessing the scope and gravity of the problem of non-U.S. sourcing, an important additional consideration is the long-term consequences of such changes in suppliers. Customers that buy equipment incompatible with U.S. systems may be locked into buying add-on items and spare parts from non-U.S. sources for years after their original purchase. Although this pattern has worked to the advantage of the United States in the past, once non-U. S. sources have been identified, it will be difficult for the United States to regain lost customers in the future. Any benefits (in terms of enhanced protection of an item from acqui- sition by the Soviet bloc) that might be derived from more stringent unilateral controls on U.S. products and technology are attainable only in the shrinking number of cases in which the United States is the sole source. In technology areas in which there are non-U.S. sources with less stringent controls, no additional protection is provided and the disadvantages imposed on U.S. goods and technology have no countervailing benefits. Non-CoCom Countries Indigenous technical expertise challenging that of the United States also comes from non-CoCom industrialized countries such as Switzer- land, Austria, and Sweden (see also Appendix B). U.S. and CoCom export control policies that do not require assurances from such countries that comparable indigenously produced products or technical data also are denied to our adversaries will weaken the CoCom countries and thereby the NATO alliance.

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Japan (39.o%) / Other \ ~(1 0.0%) - 66 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST Newly Industrializing Countries Newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil have become important world suppliers of manufactured goods in the last 20 years. (For example, the value of manufactured goods exported from South Korea rose by a factor of 200 between 1965 and 1983.) Currently, a large share of these exports are traditional manufac- tures (e.g., footwear and textiles); but the share of high-technology items, such as computer and communications equipment, is growing. In 1985, 17 percent of the high-technology products imported by the United States came from the East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) as shown in Figure 3-7. Due to the presence of foreign- owned multinational corporations, some of the NICs are now producing, in large volumes, items with technical specifications similar to those of ~. ~ - ~ \ Canada /\\ (8.0%) / Latin \ / America Em (6~ \ EC-10 (20.0%) \ / East Asian N ICs / (1 7.0%) *U.S. Department of Commerce DOC-3 definition. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. FIGURE 3-7 Suppliers of U.S. high-tech* imports, 1985 (domestic and foreign exports, f.a.s.; general imports, c.i.f.).

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 67 CoCom-controlled items (such as high-density memory chips and 16-bit microprocessors). They also are committed to developing more advanced indigenous capabilities. The ability to produce high-technology goods does not necessarily imply that a country possesses the indigenous capability to develop them. Many of the NICs are aware of this fact and are aggressively pursuing greater indigenous technological sophistication. A variety of policies are used to encourage development of indigenous capability: requiring multinational companies located in the country to train local employees; sending large numbers of students to foreign countries for technical education; hiring foreign scientists and engineers; licensing production technology with the condition that the company supplying the technology buy back a portion of the output; sponsoring domestic research centers to encourage indigenous tal- ent; and protecting infant industries. Industrializing countries vary in their willingness to comply with controls on militarily critical technology. Countries like South Korea and Taiwan with their close political and economic relationships with CoCom countries-are more likely to cooperate with CoCom's export control policies than are countries less dependent on CoCom such as Brazil and India. The U.S. government currently is negotiating bilateral export control agreements with several non-CoCom countries. Although the need for such agreements is evident, there is a clear danger associated with an exclusively bilateral approach. An agreement with a non-CoCom country that puts controls on U.S.-origin goods and technical data without controlling them from indigenous or other non-U.S. sources puts U.S. firms at a serious competitive disadvantage. Such a situation is likely to lead to the loss of U.S. sales without enhancing the protection of the technology in question. Agreements with non-CoCom countries would result in more effective control with less risk to U.S. business if they were pursued in cooperation with other CoCom countries. Moreover, to be truly effective, any such agreements should also encompass indige- nously produced goods and technology. The changing character of the global economic and technological environment discussed in this chapter has at least one clear implication: Effective control of technology must be pursued in a consistent, multilat- eral fashion. To the extent that the U.S. control system, discussed in the next chapter, fails to adjust to these changes in the global environment

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68 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST and to consider their implications, it will continue to work to the disadvantage of U.S. exporters and multinational subsidiaries with only modest offsetting national security advantages. NOTES 1. The various statistics in this chapter are drawn almost entirely from the following sources: Richard N. Cooper, "Growing American Interdependence: An Overview" (Paper prepared for a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 1985). Charles H. Ferguson, "High Technology Product Life Cycles, Export Controls, and International Markets" (Paper prepared for the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, June 1986). Lionel H. Olmer, U.S. Manufacturing at a Crossroads-Surviving and Prospering in a More Competitive Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Com- merce, International Trade Administration, 1985). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Highlights of U.S. Export- Import Trade, FT-990 series (Washington, D.C.). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C., April 1986). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness in High Technology Industries (Washington, D.C., February 1983). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, The Rising Trading Power of the East Asian NICs (Washington, D.C., October 1985). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S. High Tech- nology Trade and Competitiveness (Washington, D.C., February 1985). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, United States Trade-Performance in 1984 and Outlook (Washington, D.C., June 1985). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, United States Trade-Performance in 1985 and Outlook (forthcoming). 2. See, for example, the Committee on Electronic Components, Board on Army Science and Technology, National Research Council, Foreign Production of Electronic Com- ponents and Army Systems Vulnerabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986), which was prepared for the Department of Defense. 3. William F. Finan, Perry D. Quick, and Karen M. Sandberg (Quick, Finan & Associates, Inc.), "The U.S. Trade Position in High Technology: 1980-1986" (Report prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, October 1986). 4. High-technology trade in this report is defined by U.S. Department of Commerce definition DOC-3, which is based on R&D expenditures as a percentage of shipments. Standard industrial classification (SIC) categories included in this definition are: industrial inorganic chemicals (281); plastic materials and synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, and synthetic and other manmade fibers except glass (282); drugs (283); ordnance and accessories except vehicles and guided missiles (348); engines and turbines (351); office, computing, and accounting machines (357); radio and television receiving equipment except communication types (365); communication equipment (366); electronic components and accessories (367); aircraft and parts (372); guided

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THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 69 missiles and space vehicles and parts (3761; measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, medical, and optical goods; watches; and clocks (38 - except instruments for measuring and testing of electricity and electrical signals (3825). The trade figures shown in this chapter were calculated using the DOC-3 definition. 5. National Materials Advisory Board, National Research Council, Advanced Processing of Electronic Materials in the United States and Japan (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986); Ferguson, "High Technology Product Life Cycles"; U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness; Committee on Electronic Components, Board on Army Science and Technology, National Research Council, Foreign Production of Electronic Compo- nents. 6. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness; personal conversation with staff of the Department of Com- merce, International Trade Administration, Office of Telecommunications. . U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness. 8. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness; personal communication with staff of the Department of Com- merce, International Trade Administration, Office of Trade Development, Office of Aerospace. 9. Ferguson, "High Technology Product Life Cycles"; U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness; Commit- tee on Electronic Components, Board on Army Science and Technology, National Research Council, Foreign Production of Electronic Components. 10. Ferguson, "High Technology Product Life Cycles"; U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness; Commit- tee on Electronic Components, Board on Army Science and Technology, National Research Council, Foreign Production of Electronic Components. 11. Delegations of panel and staff members visited Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.