5
Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes

Stephen John Stedman

Peace making in civil war is a risky business.1 The biggest source of risk comes from spoilers—leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.2 By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may exploit a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or destroy it. By implementing a peace agreement, peace makers are vulnerable to attack from those who oppose their efforts. And most important, the risks of peace making increase the insecurity and uncertainty of average citizens who have the most to lose if war is renewed.

When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of United Nations (UN)-monitored elections in 1992 and plunged Angola back into civil war, approximately 300,000 people died. When Hutu extremists in Rwanda rejected the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 and launched a genocide, over 800,000 Rwandans died in less than three months.

If all spoilers succeeded, the quest for peace in civil wars would be dangerously counterproductive. But not all spoilers succeed. In Mozambique the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a party known as the “Khmer Rouge of Africa,” stalled in meeting its commitments to peace and threatened to boycott elections and return to war. In the end, however, RENAMO joined parliamentary politics, accepted losing an elec-



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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 5 Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes Stephen John Stedman Peace making in civil war is a risky business.1 The biggest source of risk comes from spoilers—leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.2 By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may exploit a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or destroy it. By implementing a peace agreement, peace makers are vulnerable to attack from those who oppose their efforts. And most important, the risks of peace making increase the insecurity and uncertainty of average citizens who have the most to lose if war is renewed. When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of United Nations (UN)-monitored elections in 1992 and plunged Angola back into civil war, approximately 300,000 people died. When Hutu extremists in Rwanda rejected the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 and launched a genocide, over 800,000 Rwandans died in less than three months. If all spoilers succeeded, the quest for peace in civil wars would be dangerously counterproductive. But not all spoilers succeed. In Mozambique the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a party known as the “Khmer Rouge of Africa,” stalled in meeting its commitments to peace and threatened to boycott elections and return to war. In the end, however, RENAMO joined parliamentary politics, accepted losing an elec-

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War tion, and disarmed, thus ending a civil war that had taken 800,000 lives. In Cambodia the peace process was able to overcome the resistance from the real Khmer Rouge, the party that has provided the sobriquet for fanatic parties elsewhere. The crucial difference between the success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace. Where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has triumphed. Where international custodians have failed to develop and implement such strategies, spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. This study begins to develop a typological theory of spoiler management and pursues the following research objectives: (1) to create a typology of spoilers that can help custodians choose robust strategies for implementing peace, (2) to describe various strategies that custodians have used to manage spoilers, (3) to propose which strategies will be most effective for particular spoiler types, (4) to sensitize policy makers to the complexities and uncertainties of correctly diagnosing the type of spoiler, and (5) to compare several successful and failed cases of spoiler management in order to refine and elaborate my initial propositions about strategies. This research is a first step toward understanding spoiler problems in peace processes and evaluating the effectiveness of different strategies of spoiler management. The findings of this study are provisional. As more case studies of spoiler management emerge, as new research develops on the case studies examined below, and as more theoretical attention is trained on the problem, some of the findings will need to be reconsidered and revised. Moreover, this study addresses only the strategies and actions of external actors who oversee peace processes; the topic of spoiler management from the perspective of domestic parties committed to peace is beyond the scope of this study. This paper argues that spoilers differ by the goals they seek and their commitment to achieving those goals. Some spoilers have limited goals; others see the world in all-or-nothing terms and pursue total power. Furthermore, some spoilers are willing to make reasoned judgments concerning the costs and benefits of their actions, whereas others show high insensitivity to costs and risks and may hold immutable preferences. Custodians have a range of strategies to deal with spoilers, from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones that depend greatly on the use of coercion. The case studies discussed below suggest three major findings. First, the choice of an appropriate strategy requires correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler and thoughtful consideration of constraints posed by other parties in the peace process. Second, to make good diagnoses, policy

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War makers must overcome organizational blinders that lead them to misread intentions and motivations. Third, implementation of a successful strategy depends on the custodian’s ability to create an external coalition for peace, the resources that the coalition brings to its responsibility, and the consensus that the coalition forms about the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of spoiler demands and behavior. SPOILERS: A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY Peace processes create spoilers. This is a statement about definition and causality. In war there are combatants, who can be identified in myriad ways—for example, rebels, bandits, pariahs, rogues, or terrorists—but not as spoilers. Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement.3 Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A negotiated peace often has losers: leaders and factions that do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. For example, the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does not want to share power.4 Even the best-designed settlements may be attacked by leaders and parties who decide that the kind of peace in question is not in their interest. Custodians of peace processes confront several different spoiler problems, which differ on the dimensions of the position of the spoiler (inside or outside an agreement); the number of spoilers; the type of spoiler (limited, greedy, or total); and the locus of the spoiler problem (leader, followers, or both). Position of the Spoiler Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler signs a peace agreement and signals a willingness to implement a settlement, yet fails to fulfill key obligations to the agreement. Examples include President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, who failed to implement the Arusha Accords to end his country’s internal war; the Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambodia, which signed the Paris Peace Accords and then refused to demobilize its soldiers and chose to boycott elections; and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991 but returned to war in 1992 when it lost the

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War election. Outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process—for example, the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) in Rwanda, which committed genocide to prevent implementation of the Arusha Accords. Inside spoilers tend to use strategies of stealth; outside spoilers often use strategies of overt violence. Spoilers who have signed peace agreements for tactical reasons have an incentive to keep their threat hidden and to minimize the amount of violence they use; they want the peace process to continue as long as it promises to strengthen them against their adversary. Inside spoilers need to comply enough to convince others of their goodwill but not so much that it weakens their offensive military capability. Outside spoilers, on the other hand, tend to use overt violence as a strategy toward undermining peace. Favorite tactics include the assassination of moderates who stand for a negotiated peace, massacres that coincide with any progress in reaching a negotiated settlement, and the creation of alliances with conservative members in the armed forces and police to sabotage any agreement. Number of Spoilers The presence of more than one spoiler creates a compound challenge for custodians. Any strategy a custodian chooses to deal with one spoiler has implications for the strategy selected to deal with other spoilers. Actions taken to marginalize one spoiler may inadvertently strengthen another. To give an example from the case studies, in Rwanda the stability of the peace process was endangered because Habyarimana refused to fulfill his obligations to the peace agreement he had signed. The UN threatened to withdraw its peacekeeping operation in order to coerce Habyarimana into implementing the agreement. Yet Habyarimana was only one of two spoilers. The CDR, former members of Habyarimana’s regime, rejected the peace agreement and conspired against the peace process from outside. The UN strategy succeeded in pressuring Habyarimana but emboldened the CDR to attack the peace process. Types of Spoilers Recent work on civil war termination suffers from a flawed attenuated portrayal of combatants and their aims. At one extreme are analyses that posit that parties are solely motivated by insecurity and only seek party survival.5 According to this view, the only reason for parties in civil wars to fight is their fear that, if they make peace and disarm, their adversary will take advantage and eliminate them. The lack of an overarching

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War authority that can enforce a political settlement in civil war means that warring parties cannot credibly commit to making peace, either in the short term (through disarmament) or the long term (through a constitution). Thus, any party that violates or opposes a peace agreement does so out of fear, not some other motivation. Scholars who embrace this view believe that spoiler behavior can be addressed only by reducing the spoiler’s fears through international guarantees. Like those international relations theorists steeped in the security dilemma, these writers believe that the central theme of civil war termination “is not evil but tragedy.”6 At another extreme are those who assert that all parties in civil war seek total power.7 This, however, is too facile; all parties in civil war seek power, but not all parties seek total power. Some parties desire exclusive power and recognition of authority; some want dominant power; some seek a significant share of power; and some desire to exercise power subject to democratic controls. This should not be surprising: power is a means or resource to realize other goals. Some goals—for instance, the permanent subjugation or elimination of an ethnic group, race, or socio-economic class—need more power than the goals of creating a democratic political regime or gaining recognition of political equality among races or ethnic groups. That parties differ in their goals and commitment to total power can be seen by all of the parties that have accepted and lived with compromise solutions to civil wars (in Colombia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, El Salvador, South Africa, and Mozambique). Similarly, not every winner of a civil war creates a totalitarian regime or slaughters its opponents.8 A thought experiment makes the point: if you had to be on the losing side of a civil war, would you rather surrender to Abraham Lincoln or Hafez al-Assad, to Nelson Mandela or Mao Zedong? Successful management of spoiler problems requires the recognition that parties in civil wars differ in their intentions, motivations, and commitment—dimensions that are crucial for understanding why some parties undermine peace agreements. Spoilers vary by type: limited, greedy, and total. These types differ primarily on the goals that the spoiler pursues and secondarily on the spoiler’s commitment to achieving its goals. At one end of the spectrum are limited spoilers, who have limited goals— for example, recognition and redress of a grievance, a share of power or the exercise of power constrained by a constitution and opposition, and basic security of followers. Limited goals do not imply limited commitment to achieving those goals, however. Limited goals can be nonnegotiable and hence subject to heavy sacrifice. At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers, who pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms, who often suf-

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War fer from pathological tendencies contrary to the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means for achieving the radical transformation of society. The greedy spoiler lies between the limited spoiler and the total spoiler. The greedy spoiler holds goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk. A greedy spoiler may have limited goals that expand when faced with low costs and risks; alternatively, it may have total goals that contract when faced with high costs and risks. The spoiler type poses different problems for peace processes. Total spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise peace; any commitment to peace by a total spoiler is tactical—a move to gain advantage in a struggle to the death. Limited spoilers can conceivably be included in peace processes, if their limited nonnegotiable demands can be accommodated by other parties to the conflict. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated in peace processes if their limited goals are met and they are constrained from making added demands.9 Locus of the Spoiler Problem A key issue concerns the possibility of change in type. For example, can a total spoiler become a limited spoiler? The answer depends on the locus of spoiler behavior—that is, whether it is the leader or the followers. If the impetus for spoiler behavior comes from the leader, the parties can change type if their leadership changes. This seems particularly relevant for total spoilers because their total goals and commitment are so extreme. A change in leadership may be enough to alter a party from a total spoiler to a limited spoiler. For instance, a negotiated settlement to Zimbabwe’s civil war became possible only when Abel Muzorewa replaced Ian Smith as leader of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Likewise, the willingness of the South African government to implement the Namibian peace process was aided by the incapacitation and replacement of President P.W.Botha. Long-time observers of Cambodia argued that the KR would never accept a negotiated peace as long as Pol Pot was in power. Other cases, however, suggest that there are times when followers are the locus of spoiler behavior. As one of the cases below suggests, in Rwanda in 1994, Habyarimana was reluctant to fulfill his commitments to the Arusha Accords for fear that his followers would attack him. STRATEGIES OF SPOILER MANAGEMENT Custodians of peace processes are defined here as international actors whose task is to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. Im-

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War plicit in their role is the cultivation and protection of peace and the management of spoilers. International custodians can be international organizations, individual states, or formal or ad hoc groups of concerned third parties. Custodians can be tightly organized or loosely coordinated. With the exception of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia and implementation of the South African peace settlement, the chief custodian of peace processes in the 1990s was the United Nations. Custodians of peace processes in the 1990s pursued three major strategies to manage spoilers. In order of conciliation to coercion, the strategies were (1) inducement, or giving the spoiler what it wants; (2) socialization, or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms; and (3) coercion, or punishing spoiler behavior or reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process. These strategies are general conceptual types; in practice each takes on a specific configuration likely to be more complex than the general version of it identified here. It should also be noted, as will be evident in some of the cases to be examined, that international actors can employ more than one strategy—either simultaneously (with different priority and emphasis) or in sequence. Inducement as a strategy for managing spoilers entails taking positive measures to address grievances of factions that obstruct peace. Custodians attempt to induce the spoiler into joining a peace process or fulfilling its obligations to an existing agreement by meeting the spoiler’s demands, which can be of several types. Spoilers may insist that their behavior is based on (1) fear, and demand greater protection; (2) fairness, and demand greater benefits; or (3) justice, and demand legitimation or recognition of their position. The custodian must assess the veracity and significance of such claims. Inducement can be rigorously applied by meeting costly demands made by spoilers, as the UN did in Mozambique in 1993–1994. Or it can be something as lax and questionable as offering a spoiler a continued role in negotiations, even when the spoiler has returned to war, as in the case of Angola in 1992, or when the spoiler has committed genocide, as in Rwanda in 1994. Indeed, the frequency of inducement attempts in peace processes suggests that it is a “default mode”—that is, a convenient strategy that is applied without adequate consideration of whether it is an appropriate strategy for the type of spoiler in question. The strategy of socialization requires custodians to establish a set of norms for acceptable behavior by parties that commit to peace or seek to join a peace process. These norms then become the basis for judging the demands of the parties (are they legitimate or not?) and the behaviors of the parties (are they acceptable in the normative framework?). In turn this strategy relies on two components to elicit normatively acceptable behav-

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War ior: the material and the intellectual. The material component involves custodians carefully calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks to reward and punish the spoiler. The intellectual component emphasizes regular persuasion by custodians of the value of the desired normative behavior. Normative standards can include commitment to the rules of democratic competition and adherence to the protection of human rights. The intellectual component can be aimed at both elites (the attempt to inculcate appropriate values) and citizens (the attempt to educate the mass of citizens into norms of good governance, democratic competition, and accountability, as a means of pressuring elites). A strategy of coercion relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or reduce a spoiler’s capability to disrupt the peace process. The strategy of coercion has several variations. The use of coercive diplomacy, or the use of threat and demand, has been used infrequently against spoilers in peace processes, the notable exception being the use of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995.10 Likewise, the use of force to defeat a spoiler has been attempted infrequently—most notably, in Somalia, when the UN decided to hold Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed responsible for an ambush by his forces against Pakistani peacekeepers, and in Sri Lanka, when an Indian peacekeeping force attempted to forcibly disarm Tamil rebels and capture their leader, Velupillai Prabakaran.11 Two more common variations of the coercion strategy are what I call the “departing-train” strategy and the “withdrawal” strategy. The departing-train strategy combines a judgment that the spoiler’s demands and behavior are illegitimate with the assertion that the peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins. In Cambodia the strategy was linked to the holding of an election, thereby setting a deadline for joining the process and promising a change in the status quo. The departing-train metaphor implies that the peace process is like a train leaving the station at a preordained time and that, once set in motion, anyone not on board will be left behind. The departing-train strategy may require active measures to protect the parties of peace and limit the ability of the spoiler to attack the peace process. The withdrawal variation of the coercive strategy assumes that the spoiler wants an international presence during the peace process. This strategy aims to punish the spoiler by threatening to withdraw international support and peacekeepers from the peace process. This was the dominant strategy pursued by the UN in Rwanda and the Implementation Force in Bosnia; it was also used in a tertiary manner in Mozambique. The strategy is a blunt instrument in that the punishment—withdrawal— promises to hurt parties that have fulfilled their obligations and reward any spoiler that opposes international engagement.

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War Matching Strategies to the Type of Spoiler A correct diagnosis of spoiler type is crucial for the choice of an appropriate strategy of spoiler management. Total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace settlement; they must be defeated or so marginalized that they can do little damage. A limited spoiler can be accommodated by meeting its nonnegotiable demands. A greedy spoiler with limited goals may be accommodated, but such accommodation may whet its appetite to demand more concessions. A total spoiler, because it defines the war in all-or-nothing terms and holds immutable preferences, cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can it be socialized; moreover, both strategies risk strengthening the spoiler by rewarding it. Two versions of the coercive strategy are also dangerously counterproductive for managing total spoilers. Coercive diplomacy is unlikely to succeed given the cost insensitivity of total spoilers; they call bluffs and test wills. If custodians fail to carry through on threats or fail to establish escalation dominance, the spoiler’s position may be strengthened. By showing the inadequacy of international force, the spoiler adds to its domestic reputation for coercive strength. The withdrawal strategy also backfires against a total spoiler, who has everything to gain if custodians abandon the peace process. Two strategies are appropriate for managing a total spoiler: the use of force to defeat the spoiler or the departing-train strategy. Because few custodians are willing to use force to defeat a total spoiler, they should strengthen the parties of peace so that they can defend themselves. The departing-train strategy can do this by legitimizing the parties of peace and delegitimizing the spoiler, by depriving the spoiler of resources— both capital and weapons—for war, and by redeploying peacekeepers to protect the parties of peace. A limited spoiler can be included in a peace process if its demands are acceptable to the conflict’s other parties. Thus, inducement may be an appropriate strategy for managing a limited spoiler, but the strategy depends on the bargaining range established by the other parties that have already committed to peace. If the demands of the limited spoiler cannot be accommodated through inclusion, the custodian may have to choose socialization or coercion. The danger is that the threat or use of force may prompt a counterescalation of violence by the limited spoiler. The greedy spoiler requires a long-term strategy of socialization. Because the spoiler is not total, there is at least a possibility of bringing it into the peace process. In the short term the greedy spoiler presents a serious dilemma. As inducements alone will serve to whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler, the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished. Moreover, depending on the cost insensitivity and

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War risk taking of the spoiler, coercion may be necessary to impose costs and create a strong sense of limits to the spoiler’s demands. On the other hand, sole reliance on a coercive strategy ignores that even the greedy spoiler has legitimate security goals that can only be met through inducements. Limitations of the Custodian Policy makers often have concerns other than a specific conflict at hand; a strategy that may be the best from a perspective of solely managing a conflict may not be the best for a policy maker considering a range of interests. This is certainly true for U.S. policy makers when it comes to conflict resolution in small, unimportant (to U.S. national interests), and faraway countries. Even the UN considers its actions in light of its organizational interests and the need to protect the reputation and institution of peacekeeping. The optimal strategy to end a conflict and manage a spoiler may be too costly or risky for external actors. The UN has special limitations as a peace custodian. Although it possesses formal authority, its agent on the ground (the special representative of the secretary-general) is constrained by the direction and will of its Security Council. Special representatives must borrow leverage through coalition building; their ability to induce or punish, even their ability to rule credibly on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of demands, depends on the support of member states. In some cases, such as the Salvadoran and Cambodian peace processes, the UN relied on groups of friends—formal associations of all member states that have an interest in the peace process and therefore bring their power, energy, and attention to implementing peace. In other cases the special representative has relied on ad hoc groupings of interested states, usually working with their diplomatic representatives on site. In managing a spoiler, member states that are patrons of the spoiler are the biggest potential liability (and source of possible leverage). On the one hand, such patrons, if they are sincerely interested in making peace, may supply the special representative with assets of leverage, credibility, and trust. On the other hand, such patrons may be slow to acknowledge that their client is acting as a spoiler and may be reluctant to declare their client’s demands illegitimate. Almost every patron of a spoiler has personal networks and domestic groups that support the spoiler. Pressures from these groups, as well as prior policy commitments to the spoiler, lead the patron to continue to support the spoiler even in the face of outrageous behavior. The Fog of Peace Making The typology of spoiler problems described so far reflects two fundamental attributes of peace processes: complexity and uncertainty. The

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War typology suggests that custodians face numerous uncertainties that require skilled diagnosis, including (1) the goal of a spoiler; (2) the intent behind acts of noncooperation or aggression; (3) the degree of commitment of the spoiler; (4) the degree of leadership command and control of followers; (5) the degree of unity within the spoiler; and (6) the likely effects of custodial action on the spoiler’s willingness to continue aggression, on the other parties to the peace process, and on interested external actors. Custodians must interpret why a particular party attacks a peace process or refuses to meet its obligations to implement a peace agreement. Several interpretations are possible. A party that has signed an agreement but refuses to fulfill its obligations may be motivated by fear. It may desire an agreement but fears putting its security into the hands of its adversary. This causes it to stall on its commitments or cheat on agreements by creating a fail-safe option. A party that has signed an agreement may cheat because it is greedy and desires a better deal; it may want a negotiated settlement to succeed but also wants to increase its chances of maximizing its return in the settlement. A failure to fulfill its obligations may be a means of seeking advantage in an election that could determine partially the division of spoils and power of the settlement; alternatively, holding back from commitments may be a way to strengthen its bargaining position in the result of losing an election. Finally, a party may cheat because it has signed a peace agreement for tactical reasons; if the agreement seems as though it will bring the party to power, the party will abide by it; however, if the agreement seems like it will not bring the party to power, the party will cheat to overturn it. In such a case the spoiler is motivated by total goals and defines the stakes as all or nothing. When external spoilers use violence to attack the peace process, a custodian must judge the intention behind the violence. Is it an attempt by the spoiler to force its way into negotiations—to alter a process so that its demands are included in a settlement? Or is it an attempt to weaken the commitment of the internal parties as a means to destroy a negotiated settlement? Again, the action must be connected to a judgment about the spoiler’s motivation. Is the spoiler motivated by limited grievances that can be incorporated into an agreement? Or is it motivated by total goals that are unalterably opposed to agreement? Custodians of peace processes must make judgments about the commitment of a spoiler to its preference. Spoilers may vary in their sensitivity to costs and risks; greedy parties may seek only limited opportunities to maximize their goals, or they may be willing to incur high costs and take large risks to improve their position. The above interpretations assume a unified party—that the leader’s behavior reflects a group consensus about its aims. But if a warring group is

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War focus on the legitimacy theme—to try to socialize Dhlakama and RENAMO into playing by the rules and transforming themselves into democratic politicians. The message was clear: Dhlakama’s newly recognized legitimacy depended on his willingness to meet his obligations. When the moment of truth came and Dhlakama’s commitment wavered, the neighboring states, the UN, and the United States delivered a strong unambiguous signal: if he returned to war, his legitimacy would be lost and there would be a high cost to pay. The Mozambican case suggests several requirements for a successful inducement strategy. First, the spoiler must be a limited type. Diagnosing Dhlakama’s type was not easy, however; the view that he sought limited goals was disputed by veteran Mozambique watchers and was at odds with RENAMO’s past brutal behavior. Second, external actors must be unified in establishing the legitimacy and illegitimacy of spoiler demands and behavior. Again, this seems deceptively simple. At the time many in the human rights community disputed the legitimacy of RENAMO as an actor. The United States, the UN, and neighboring countries all had to reverse their characterization of Dhlakama both as a puppet of the former apartheid regime in South Africa and as a leader with no domestic constituency.66 Third, inducement is aided if the custodian, by acting in coordination with others, is the sole source of rewards to the spoiler. Unlike Savimbi in Angola, Dhlakama had no independent source of capital if he chose to return to war. Fourth, in civil wars where the goal is the establishment of sustained peace, inducement is most likely best carried out in conjunction with a concerted international effort to socialize the spoiler into accepting the basic rules of good governance and democracy. Fifth, inducement must be accompanied, if necessary, by a credible threat to establish its limits and break any cycle of grievance, reward, new grievance, reward, new grievance. Even in the case of a limited spoiler like RENAMO, inducement can encourage increased obstructionist behavior in the hope of getting more rewards. If a limited spoiler continues to undermine peace, it will run the risk of prompting its opponent to view it as a total spoiler for whom no concession will gain its commitment. Organizational Blinders In addition to pointing to the crucial role of good diagnosis and choice of appropriate treatment, the case studies provide a vivid reminder of the uncertainties, complexity, and ambiguity of peace processes—what I refer to earlier as the “fog of peace making.” But the case studies also provide evidence that several organizational rules, beliefs, and frames that custodians use to cope with uncertainty can contribute to poor diagnosis

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War and in extreme cases to avoiding the spoiler problem. Such organizational blinders include (1) prior commitments of the organization to the spoiler, (2) organizational doctrine, (3) organizational Holy Grails, (4) organizational interests, and (5) organizational roles. Prior Commitments In several of the cases, prior commitments between individual states and spoilers blocked a correct interpretation of the intention and behavior of the spoiler. In the case of Angola the U.S. government had long been a patron of Savimbi, had supplied him with arms and supplies, and had cultivated his friendship. When Savimbi rejected the election results and returned to war in late 1992, the initial tendency of the United States was to believe Savimbi’s versions of events, to discount interpretations that Savimbi intended to win complete power, and to emphasize that even-handedness was still called for because the MPLA was no better than UNITA. Savimbi’s impressive network of friends, supporters, and representatives in Washington buttressed the psychological commitment to him. While this commitment led U.S. policy makers to benign interpretations of Savimbi’s actions, or at least to assertions that there were no good guys in the conflict, the personal networks served to constrain the influence of those who sought a more aggressive policy toward Savimbi. The Angolan case is similar to France’s relationship to the CDR and Presidential Guard in Rwanda. First, the French military’s prior organizational commitment to the Presidential Guard led it to demonize the RPF— to see it as the all-or-nothing party, a “Khmer Noir,” an image that reinforced and legitimized the Hutu extremist version of the conflict. Second, the prior relationship caused the French military to ignore clear signs that the CDR was planning genocide. Third, the personal network of relationships extended high into the Mitterand government, thus paralyzing conflicting policy tendencies in the French foreign ministry. Doctrine Beyond prior ties to the spoiler, the ability of organizations to interpret the intentions and behavior of spoilers and to fashion effective responses is constrained by their doctrines. The UN, for example, approaches its custodial role with several assumptions. First, its representatives assume that the parties are acting in good faith when they sign a peace agreement. This leads UN personnel to downplay violations by signatories to agreements. Second, its representatives tend to be slavish in their devotion to the troika of traditional peacekeeping values: neutrality, impartiality, and consent. Such values, when followed blindly, constrain attempts to challenge spoiler behavior, as custodians fear being seen as partial to the victim. Even when

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War spoiler behavior is recognized as such, the doctrine insists on reestablishing consent and not forcefully challenging violations. In the successful cases of spoiler management, custodians took a stand on the merits of issues under dispute. In Cambodia, UNTAC rejected KR grievances as illegitimate. UNTAC’s success stemmed from its ability to garner international consensus against KR interpretations of the Paris Peace Accords. In the case of Mozambique the regional custodians of the peace process confronted RENAMO when it attempted to withdraw from the election at the last moment and threatened to return to war. The successful cases of spoiler management, however, do not diminish the more significant point that doctrine poses constraints; they simply show that custodians had to reinterpret their actions so as not to appear to be in conflict with their principles and had to triumph in intraorganizational battles over the doctrinal implications of their actions. For instance, in Cambodia General Sanderson succeeded in employing soldiers from the warring factions to protect the election against the KR by redefining the meanings of impartiality and neutrality. Radio UNTAC, which earned universal praise for its role in combating KR propaganda, was established only over strenuous objections from UN headquarters that such a radio station would imperil UNTAC’s neutrality. Holy Grails A third organizational blinder is the tendency of custodians when faced with complexity and uncertainty to redefine their goals and standard of success to one overriding accomplishment, a Holy Grail. When implementing peace, the UN often drops its commitments to various components of the peace agreement in order to focus on holding an election. When spoilers plunge their countries into war, the UN focuses on obtaining a cease-fire. For example, when faced with KR intransigence in Cambodia, UNTAC narrowed its mission to holding an election rather than fulfilling complete implementation of the Paris Peace Accords. This redefinition of mission was an appropriate response to a spoiler’s attempt to veto the Paris agreements. Yet UNTAC became so focused on attaining the election that it ignored SOC violence and obstruction during the electoral campaign. The need to reach an election took precedence over how the parties conducted themselves during the election. When an election finally took place, UNTAC acquiesced to SOC blackmail and encouraged its quest for a coalition deal that was disproportionate to its electoral result. UNTAC feared that the SOC’s threat would nullify the achievement of the election, so it compromised the quality of the election to appease the SOC.

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War When spoilers in Rwanda and Angola attacked and plunged their countries back into civil war, the UN responded by insisting on a ceasefire and return to negotiations. In both cases, spoilers were willing to kill hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate that they did not want a negotiated settlement, yet the UN responded by pleading with them to return to negotiations. Organizational Interests An overriding sense of organizational interest can also prevent custodians from recognizing and effectively managing spoilers. In Rwanda, like Angola before it, the UN’s interpretation of the conflict and its consideration of an appropriate response were based heavily on “what the traffic would bear.” Faced with information that requires costly and risky action, the UN and many of its member states chose to ignore the information. Organizational Roles The conceptions that mediators and UN special representatives have of their roles can lead them to misinterpret evidence of spoiler intention. Both mediators and special representatives invest enormous time and energy into negotiating and implementing peace; therefore, when faced with spoiler behavior, they assume spoiler motivation and behavior to be negotiable—a judgment that confirms the continuing relevance of their role as peace maker. They tend to seek out any evidence that confirms the basic willingness of the parties to still reach agreement and ignore compelling evidence that suggests one of the parties may reject peace completely. They tend to grab at any straw that seems to hold out the promise of a settlement. Even when confronted with compelling evidence of bad faith and the preference of one or more of the parties for war, they are likely to insist that there are no alternatives to negotiation. In some cases the mediators or special representatives seem unwilling to place the responsibility for continued hostilities on the parties themselves and instead blame their own organizations for not providing the one request that would have made the difference between war and peace. Finally, there is the perverse tendency of custodians to so value an agreement that they blame the victim rather than the spoiler. The Need for International Agreement and Coordination A common denominator among the successful cases of spoiler management is unity and coordination among external parties in defining the problem, establishing legitimacy for the strategy, and applying the strat-

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War egy. Although this is not a surprising finding, it is nonetheless a robust one, and external parties to a peace process ignore it at their peril. Spoilers often exist because external patrons provide them with guns, ammunition, capital, and sanctuary. External patrons may also help internal spoilers survive by supporting their claims to legitimacy—support that can play havoc with a strategy such as the departing train, where the key to putting pressure on the spoiler is to declare its grievances illegitimate and to insist that the peace process itself embodies the best chance for resolving the conflict. In the cases of successful spoiler management, external support for the spoiler had either dried up or been severely curtailed. Inducement succeeded with RENAMO because its external patron, South Africa, wanted a peaceful settlement to the war. Unlike UNITA or the KR, RENAMO did not have easy access to illegal markets to finance a continuation of the war. International unity and cooperation require cultivation, time, resources, and pressure. It is therefore better if both are institutionalized in the peace process, as with the Core Group in Cambodia.67 The Legitimating Function of Spoiler Management Another key aspect to spoiler management is the development of an international consensus about what are legitimate and illegitimate solutions to a country’s civil war. The successful strategies of spoiler management all have in common a unified stance by external actors about which spoiler demands should be met and which should be rejected. For example, the departing-train strategy in Cambodia depended on the willingness of international actors to define limits of accommodation for the spoiler. In Cambodia even the former patrons of the KR agreed that their client’s demands were illegitimate and that the peace process could move forward without them. In Mozambique external actors agreed to legitimate RENAMO as a nationalist party, socialize it into an agreed set of rules of behavior, and establish limits on how far it would be appeased. By contrast, in the failed cases of spoiler management, no international consensus formed about legitimate and illegitimate solutions to the civil wars. In Rwanda external actors failed to create a common stance toward the Hutu extremists and wavered about the content of the Arusha Peace Accords. In Angola little attempt was made to rally international support against UNITA’s return to war. Indeed, the strategy that emerged from the United States insisted that legitimacy was irrelevant to ending the war and proceeded to pressure the party that had won the election. The finding that legitimization is an integral part of spoiler management is important in two regards. First, it counters the adage that solutions to internal conflicts must come from the participants themselves. In

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War this study successful management of internal conflict has resulted from the willingness of external actors to take sides as to which demands and grievances are legitimate and which are not. Second, it shows that when external consensus is used in conjunction with a coherent larger strategy, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool for conflict management. This last point is crucial. For all the lip service they pay to the power of norm setting, when it comes to protecting peace and managing spoilers the member states and many UN personnel seldom act like they mean it. CONCLUSION How confident can policy makers and theorists be in the conclusions presented above? Although the set of cases is small and necessarily incomplete, I believe the conclusions derived here are robust. The successful cases of spoiler management were tough cases. Few analysts in 1991 predicted that the KR would be so weakened that it would cease to exist seven years later; similarly, most experts on Southern Africa were skeptical that RENAMO could be transformed from a killing machine into a loyal democratic opposition party. While more work needs to be done on refining the strategies of spoiler management presented above, and while more cases can add to our knowledge about necessary conditions for such strategies to succeed, I believe the analysis of peace making here is sound. The period after a peace agreement is reached is a time of uncertainty and vulnerability for peace makers and citizens alike. International actors who seek to bring deadly civil wars to a close must anticipate violent challenges to peace processes. Instead of thinking generally about the possible threats to peace, they must ask, “Who are the threats to peace?” The custodians of peace must constantly probe the intentions of warring parties: they must look for evidence that parties that sign peace agreements are sincere in their commitment to peace, and they must search out and make good use of intelligence about the warring parties’ goals, strategies, and tactics. The emphasis of this paper on individual typing of leaders and attributing permanent traits to some of them raises important questions about the weight of personality and situation as motivations of spoiler behavior. But I believe that the analysis begins to correct an analytic trend that asserts that all behavior by leaders in civil war is situationally determined. The research presented here strongly suggests that international consensus about norms and coordination behind a strategy of aggressive management of spoilers can provide the difference between successful and failed implementation of peace agreements. Custodians must judge

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War what is right or wrong, just or unjust, and fair or unfair in peace processes. They can do so either explicitly by creating an international consensus about what is appropriate for the warring parties or tacitly by not taking action in the face of violent attacks and spoiler behavior. Is the post-Cold War international environment conducive to forging such consensus and coordination? The answer is mixed. A large gap currently exists between international proclamation of norms—human rights, rule of law, democracy, and good governance—and behavior in warfare that makes a mockery of such norms—wanton killing of noncombatants, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and atrocities. The establishment of international consensus about norms writ large seems disarmingly easy; in the cases presented above the establishment of consensus about norms in a specific case was much harder. States seem much more likely to proclaim norms when they view compromise on their freedom of maneuver in the abstract; in actual cases, national foreign policies still define situations differently, ascribe motivations differently, judge self-interest differently, and waver in applying universal normative standards. Likewise the present age presents difficult problems for international coordination in applying a strategy of spoiler management. Economic globalization and the weakening of state control over trade and borders weaken state control over private economic actors who trade with and profit from potential spoilers in civil wars. Cutting off spoilers from resources and capital may be more difficult in the post-Cold War era than previously. Similarly, a proliferation of nongovernmental organizations involved in the implementation of peace accords in civil wars increases the difficulty of establishing and coordinating strategies toward spoilers. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank the following people for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions: Howard Adelman, Nichole Argo, Michael Brown, Cynthia Chataway, Juergen Dedring, Michael Doyle, Daniel Druckman, William Durch, Page Fortna, Alexander L.George, Charles L.Glaser, Robert Jervis, Elizabeth Kier, Stephen Low, Dianne McCree, James Morrow, Michael O’Hanlon, Jerrold Post, Tonya Putnam, Donald Rothchild, Timothy D. Sisk, Janice Gross Stein, Paul Stern, and Saadia Touval. I also thank the current and former policy makers and diplomats who spoke with me off the record about their peace-making experiences. A slightly different version of this paper has been published in the fall 1997 issue of International Security (vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 5–53).

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War NOTES 1   For analysis of various risks in peace making, see Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 14–16, 231–232. 2   Stephen John Stedman, “Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts,” in Michael E.Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 369–371. 3   For example, in South Africa prior to 1990 there was no public agreement among the antagonists to peacefully resolve their conflict. Only after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the reaching of several public agreements that committed the African National Congress and South African government to a process of negotiation can one speak of a South African peace process. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, even though negotiations dragged on for several years, only after the parties formally committed themselves to the Paris Peace Accords can one speak of a Cambodian peace process. 4   Timothy D.Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), concludes that successful power sharing depends on “a core of moderate, integrated elites [that have] a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny” (p. 117). Most recommendations for power sharing in civil wars simply assume the parties are willing to share power. 5   Barbara F.Walter, “The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994. 6   This is a paraphrase of a quote from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66. 7   Richard K.Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20–33. 8   Roy Licklider’s estimates that 81 percent of civil wars in the twentieth century that were fought over identity issues and ended through the victory of one side did not result in genocide [Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945– 1993,” American Political Science Review, vol. 89, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681–690]. 9   The notion of intentions as combining goals and commitment comes from Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 48–54. The appellation of “greedy” comes from Charles L. Glaser but differs from his definition [Charles L.Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497–538]. Glaser substitutes motivation of players for intentions of players, the difference being the internal source of aggressive behavior—greed or insecurity. In my use of the term, “greedy” does not imply that the spoiler acts out of greed but rather that it expands its goals and is willing to incur high costs and risks to reach them. 10   Using my definition, it is a tough call whether the Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point. One could argue that the public peace process had achieved the commitment of the Bosnian and Bosnian Croat parties and therefore that the Bosnian Serbs were spoilers. 11   Again, it is difficult to determine whether Aideed was a spoiler by my definition. One could argue that the Addis Ababa agreements between the various clan factions in Somalia constituted a formal peace process and that therefore Aideed was a spoiler. Likewise, although Indian diplomats claimed that Prabakaran provided his consent to the peace agreement in 1987, he never signed the agreement. 12   Alexander L.George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, October 15–16, 1982. 13   Another group, the Twa, comprises 1 percent of Rwanda’s population. A common

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War     figure for the respective populations is 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. Based on new calculations, Howard Adelman estimates that the percentage of Tutsi was greatly underreported, hence the 70 and 30 percent figures here (private communication, Howard Adelman, October 10, 1996). 14   Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 25. 15   Howard Adelman, “Preventing Post-Cold War Conflicts: What Have We Learned? The Case of Rwanda,” paper presented to the International Studies Association Meeting, San Diego, April 17, 1996, p. 7. 16   Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (N.Y: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 198–203. 17   Adelman et al., The International Response, p. 68. 18   Ibid., p. 203. 19   Anthony Marley, U.S. Department of State, presentation at the Fourteenth Annual Africa Conference, Paul H.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1995. Lieutenant Colonel Marley (retired) was the U.S. military attaché to the Arusha peace process. 20   Adelman et al., The International Response, p. 32. 21   Michael Barnett, “The Security Council, Peacekeeping, and Indifference in Genocide in Rwanda,” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 12, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 551–578. At the time, Barnett was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. 22   Ibid. 23   Stephen Solarz, “Cambodia and the International Community,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 99–115. 24   See especially Steven Heder, “The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea ‘Self-Demobilizers,’” in Steven Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds., Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peacekeeping (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 1996), pp. 73–113. 25   Although the Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, the operational plan for UNTAC was not presented to the UN Security Council for approval until February 19, 1992. On February 28 the Security Council approved the mission, and on March 15 the secretary-general’s special representative to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, arrived in Phnom Penh. A small UN holding operation was deployed as a bridge between the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and the arrival of UNTAC. 26   James A.Schear, “Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia,” in Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, eds., Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), p. 253. Schear was an assistant to Akashi in Cambodia. 27   Ibid. 28   Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 51. 29   Under the UN Charter, a Chapter 7 operation permits enforcement against identified threats to peace and does not require the warring parties’ consent. 30   Steven R.Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 170–171; Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 67; and Findlay, Cambodia, pp. 37–38.

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 31   John Sanderson, “UNTAC: Successes and Failures,” in H.Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), pp. 16–31. 32   Heder, “The Resumption of Armed Struggle.” 33   “Document 43: Letter Dated 27 July 1992 from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia to the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Cambodia,” in The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991–1995, UN Blue Books Series, vol. 2 (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995), p. 206. 34   Ibid., p. 207. 35   Ibid. 36   Ibid. 37   “Document 44: ‘Cambodia: Next Steps,’ Australian Paper Dated 16 September 1992,” in The United Nations and Cambodia, p. 208. 38   Ibid. 39   General John Sanderson, as quoted in Jianwei Wang, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia (Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 71. 40   Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, p. 37. 41   Ibid. 42   Gerald Porcell, as quoted in Findlay, Cambodia, p. 63. 43   Ibid., p. 64. 44   Ibid., p. 66. 45   William Shawcross, Cambodia’s New Deal, Contemporary Issues Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p. 59. 46   Ibid., pp. 59–60. 47   Yasushi Akashi, “UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for U.N. Peace-keeping,” Charles Rostov Annual Lecture on Asian Affairs, Paul H.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1993, p. 12. 48   Ibid., p. 13. 49   Shawcross, Cambodia’s New Deal, p. 26. 50   Ibid., pp. 27–28. 51   Yasushi Akashi, “The Challenge of Peace-keeping in Cambodia: Lessons to Be Learned,” paper presented to the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, November 29, 1993, p. 8. 52   Michael Doyle, “Peacebuilding in Cambodia,” Occasional Paper, International Peace Academy, New York, January 1997. 53   Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 111. 54   Confidential interview. 55   Ibid. 56   Margaret Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–1993 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 205. 57   Confidential interview. 58   Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique (Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 81. 59   Chris Alden, “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique,” Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 33, no. 1 (1995), pp. 112–114, and Stephen M.Hill, “Disarmament in Mozambique: Learning the Lessons of Experience,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 17, no. 1 (April 1996), pp. 133–134. 60   Alden, “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict,” pp. 113–114.

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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 61   Mats Berdal, “Disarmament and Demobilization After Civil Wars,” Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London: Institute for International and Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43. 62   Michael Doyle refers to this problem as the “obsolescing bargain of peacekeeping”: as long as few resources are committed, UN influence is high; as soon as the UN commits substantial resources and personnel, its influence wanes (Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, pp. 82–83). 63   Hill, “Disarmament in Mozambique,” p. 137. 64   My impression from interviews with UN and U.S. officials in Maputo at the time is of an unwillingness to seriously consider the possibility that a loser might overturn the election. The refrain I received from both UN and U.S. officials was that “this is not Angola.” When pushed to describe the differences that mitigated against a Savimbi-type outcome, the same officials stated that the elections would take place in October only if both armies were fully demobilized, thus rendering moot any obstructionist behavior. In the end this proved not to be the case. 65   This is an ongoing theme of Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). Hume was the U.S. State Department delegate to the Rome peace talks. 66   Donald Rothchild’s recent work on mediation emphasizes that the granting of legitimacy can be an effective tool in resolving internal conflicts but that there are often high domestic and international costs for actors to declare previously rogue leaders or factions legitimate [Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 9]. 67   This is the thrust of much of Michael Doyle’s latest work on peacekeeping [Michael W.Doyle, “Strategies of Enhanced Consent,” in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 483–506].