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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 14 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Its Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Resolution P.Terrence Hopmann The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provides an excellent case to evaluate the development of regional international regimes in the realm of security. This organization is currently composed of 55 member states1 in Europe, broadly defined as extending from “Vancouver to Vladivostok the long way around,” including the United States and Canada and all former Eurasian states that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is the successor to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which produced the “Helsinki Accords” of 1975, often cited as marking the high-water point of the East-West détente that developed in the early 1970s. Since the end of the Cold War, it has evolved and adapted to the post-Cold War environment and has begun to play a primary role in the prevention and resolution of the many conflicts that have appeared in the Eurasian region since 1989. My main argument here is that the OSCE has developed into a “security regime” for the Eurasian region. Its performance may thus serve to illustrate the power of liberal institutionalist ideas about international relations. Using the OSCE as a case study of a regional security regime, I thus propose to examine the proposition that regional security organizations can restrain anarchy in international political relations and promote cooperation to solve common problems and resolve violent or potentially violent conflicts. I will investigate the impact that multilateral organizations can have in managing conflicts and building security at the regional level. Realists argue that international relations are inevitably character-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War ized by conflicts of interest in which changes in the relative power positions of states within an anarchic international system make war and violence almost inevitable, especially during times when system structures become destabilized and power balances break down. Realist predictions about the end of the Cold War generally maintained that the collapse of a relatively stable balance of power founded on nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union would inevitably lead to greater violence and war in contrast to the previous four decades of the “long peace.”2 Many realists feel vindicated in the validity of their theory and its resultant predictions by the many conflicts that have appeared throughout the region formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1989. In contrast to the realists, most liberal institutionalists have argued that it is possible to construct cooperative arrangements among sovereign and independent states within an anarchic international “society”3 on the basis of international “regimes.” Regimes have been defined by Stephen Krasner as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”4 Most early treatments of regimes within the liberal tradition focused on their operation outside the realm of security, especially on issues such as the economy or the environment, and most analyses of security issues were largely conceded to the domain of the realists. A notable exception is found in the work of Robert Jervis, who has argued that it is possible to have regimes in the domain of security as well, defined as “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.”5 Jervis goes on to note that a security regime must facilitate cooperation that goes beyond following the dictates of short-run self-interests in order to qualify. At the same time, regimes are usually accepted by sovereign states because their leaders perceive that their long-term gains from fulfilling the expectations of a regime will exceed the losses they expect to suffer through forgoing temptations to follow short-term narrow self-interest. The theory of security regimes thus falls at the intersection of realist and liberal conceptions of international relations. This argument is stated succinctly by Keohane and Nye: International institutions do not call into question the core of the realist model of anarchy, since they do not have the power to enforce their rules on strong states. But they may challenge some of the implications of anarchy for state behavior, making less likely the competitive, worst-case behavior that realists predict. To the extent that international institutions provide information and coordinate actors’ expectations, the security dilemma that states face may be less stark, and doctrinaire realist
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War predictions of state behavior may be off the mark. International cooperation will be affected by the richness and appropriateness of available international institutions.6 My principal contention in this chapter is that the OSCE came a long way during the 1990s toward forming the core of just such a security regime. It created many of the conditions necessary for regional cooperation to maintain European security since the end of the Cold War. It has articulated shared values to which all of its members have formally subscribed. It has constructed an institutional framework within which all member states may attend to the security needs of one another, exchange information, and facilitate the peaceful resolution of differences. It has also emphasized the development of common political, economic, and social principles based on the ideas of liberal democracy and market economies in an effort to create a “zone of peace.”7 Finally, the OSCE has created a set of structures intended to prevent conflicts, to mediate ceasefires in times of violent conflict, to manage and resolve those underlying issues that have produced violence, and to assist states and regions that have experienced violence to rebuild their security in order to rehabilitate their political, social, and economic structures. The many roles that the OSCE has attempted to fulfill may be evaluated in terms of a model of conflict escalation and abatement, along the lines suggested by Michael Lund.8 Although not all of these functions have been undertaken by the OSCE in the first decade since the end of the Cold War, most of them have been attempted by at least one of the OSCE missions or organs involved in conflict prevention. To the extent that the OSCE can successfully fulfill one or several of the functions identified in Table 14.1, it can make a significant contribution to reducing security dilemmas and promoting greater collective cooperation in meeting some of the many challenges to post-Cold War Eurasian security. Since the OSCE has undertaken virtually all of these tasks only in the period since 1992, it is important to keep in mind that this is an ongoing process and that some patience may be necessary before concrete results are forthcoming. In this paper I propose to assess the overall contributions of the OSCE at this early stage in its history to limiting the escalation of conflicts and promoting the abatement and resolution of conflicts in the aftermath of violence. I will do this largely by comparing a few cases in which the OSCE undertook a significant role in regions of conflict during the last decade of the twentieth century. I shall assess the contributions made by the OSCE to promote more cooperative and less violent outcomes in several of these situations, and I will evaluate reasons for the failure of the OSCE to meet expectations in preventing violence or resolving underlying conflicts in other cases. Before doing this, however, a brief examina-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War TABLE 14.1 Diplomatic Roles at Different Stages of Conflict—Potential OSCE Activities in the Management of Conflict Stages of Conflict Ladder of Escalation Ladder of Abatement Violent conflict Humanitarian aid; protection of noncombatants Cease-fire negotiation Crisis (turning points) Crisis management Peacekeeping, prevention of conflict reignition Precarious peace Conflict prevention Conflict resolution Conditional peace Monitoring, early warning, democratization Postconflict security building Stable peace Peacetime diplomacy Peacetime diplomacy tion of the development and institutionalization of the OSCE since its inception will help establish the context for the subsequent analysis of the OSCE’s performance in conflict management. DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CSCE/OSCE The stimulus behind the creation of the CSCE was a Soviet/Warsaw Pact proposal for an all-European conference intended largely to resolve unsettled issues held over from the end of World War II. Their primary objective was to ratify the postwar status quo in Europe, especially the division of Germany. The CSCE negotiations opened with a foreign ministers’ meeting in Helsinki on July 3–7, 1973, comprising 35 delegations, including two North American countries—the United States and Canada —plus all states of Europe big and small, from the Soviet Union to the Holy See, with the sole exception of Albania.9 The working phase of negotiations took place in Geneva from September 18, 1973, until July 25, 1975. During this phase, issues were grouped together in three major substantive “baskets.” Basket I focused primarily on a set of principles to govern relations among states in the realm of security and on specific “confidence-building measures.” The latter are military provisions intended to create transparency and reduce tensions by requiring countries to provide assurances to potential adversaries that their military preparations are essentially defensive and nonthreatening. Basket II emphasized cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Basket III issues concerned cooperation in humanitarian areas, including human contacts, travel and tourism, informa-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War tion and cultural exchanges, and educational exchanges. It was this basket that covered many of the human rights issues, especially the freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information across national boundaries. The concluding stage of the original CSCE was a summit conference at which heads of state of all 35 CSCE countries signed the Final Act in Helsinki on July 31-August 1, 1975. The Helsinki Final Act, first and foremost, contains the “Decalogue,” 10 principles that should govern interstate relations: (1) sovereign equality of states, (2) refraining from the threat or use of force, (3) inviolability of frontiers, (4) territorial integrity of states, (5) peaceful settlement of disputes, (6) nonintervention in internal affairs, (7) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, (8) self-determination of peoples, (9) cooperation among states, and (10) fulfillment of obligations under international law. The elaboration of these 10 principles, and others subsequently derived from them, has created the normative core for a European security regime. However, the implementation of several potentially contradictory principles has given rise to considerable difficulty. First, the issue of the relative priority of the sixth and seventh principles became a subject of dispute. The effort to enhance individual human rights and the rights of minority groups has necessarily brought the organization to intervene into what many states consider to be their internal affairs, and during the Cold War period the communist states especially insisted that principle six took precedence over all others. With the disappearance of the East-West conflict, however, a broad consensus has developed within the OSCE that, when states have freely accepted certain principles, including those in the decalogue, this gives other member states limited rights of intervention in order to uphold the agreed norms. Therefore, on matters ranging from intrusive inspection to verify compliance with military confidence-building and arms control measures, to provisions for human and minority rights, the OSCE has increasingly insisted on “transparency” and on the right to intervene in the affairs of a member state to implement those principles to which that state has subscribed. In short, the Helsinki decalogue weakened the absolute nature of state sovereignty to a far greater degree than was envisaged at the time the Final Act was signed in 1975. The second value conflict became paramount only in the period since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. As the 15 Union Republics of the USSR achieved statehood while five independent states emerged out of the six republics of the former Yugoslavia, regional and ethnic groups in many of these new states also claimed the right to self-determination. Believing that they had been deprived of this right by the essentially arbitrary way in which the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been divided historically, many ethnically distinct regions in the
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War new states also proclaimed their independence and sovereignty on the basis of the right to self-determination. This came into direct conflict with the desire of the OSCE to recognize the territorial integrity of all existing and new member states regardless of how their borders had been drawn in the past. The inability to reconcile the principle of the territorial integrity of new states with the claims for self-determination by minorities existing within and across the borders between these new states has been one of the most significant factors accounting for the widespread violence in the region since 1989. In addition to the three baskets, the Helsinki Final Act called for a series of follow-up conferences to review progress in implementation of the Final Act and to consider new provisions to strengthen security in Europe. The first CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977–1978 was characterized largely by rhetorical attacks and counterattacks, with Western governments criticizing the human rights performance of the communist bloc countries, and the latter accusing the former of blatant interference in their internal affairs. Nonetheless, this meeting did set a precedent for legitimizing CSCE involvement in the internal affairs of member states when they might have consequences for regional security. The second follow-on meeting began in Madrid in 1980 and lasted for more than three years. At the outset it, too, was stalemated by the intensified debate over human rights and intervention in internal affairs. The Western governments at first refused to move forward on proposals to reinforce confidence-building measures and other provisions to increase security until the situations in Poland and Afghanistan were resolved to their satisfaction and until the general human rights picture improved in the Eastern bloc. However, before adjourning in 1983, the Madrid conference did eventually take up proposals to strengthen confidence-building measures and establish machinery for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Of particular significance was the adoption of a mandate for negotiations in Stockholm under CSCE auspices, known officially as the Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In addition, working meetings were set up to deal with human rights and fundamental freedoms in Ottawa, human contacts in Bern, the peaceful settlement of disputes in Athens, cultural contacts in Budapest, and Mediterranean security issues in Venice. While few actual decisions were taken in Madrid, the CSCE process at least regained momentum. This momentum carried through into the third follow-on conference, which began in Vienna on November 4, 1986. Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power in Moscow only several months before was evident in the improved climate of East-West relations within the CSCE. Thus, the Vienna conference, which lasted until January 1989, responded to the rapidly
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War changing political scene in Central and Eastern Europe and began to adapt the European security framework to the new environment even before the definitive end of the Cold War. Virtually all baskets of the Helsinki Final Act were strengthened, confidence-building measures were further extended, and numerous conferences were spawned to deal with the rapidly changing security environment.10 With the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the CSCE rapidly began to adapt to the new post-Cold War security environment in Europe. Suddenly the possibility of creating a genuine system of “collective security” on the European continent appeared to be feasible. Two major documents were produced by the CSCE in the first year after the end of the Cold War that fundamentally changed the normative and institutional structure of European security.11 The first of these was a report of an expert meeting held in Copenhagen in June 1990 on the human dimension of security that attempted to apply the essential features of Western democratic practices to the entire continent. Specifically, it called for free elections leading to representative governments in all CSCE states open to observation by all member states, equality before the law, freedom to establish political parties, and rights of accused persons.12 The second major document was the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” signed at a summit meeting held November 19–21, 1990. In addition to reaffirming the acquis of the CSCE from the Helsinki Final Act through the various follow-on conferences and expert meetings, the Charter of Paris began the formal institutionalization of the CSCE. Having met as an itinerant series of conferences without permanent headquarters or secretariat, the Paris meeting established a secretariat in Prague (later moved to Vienna). In addition, a Conflict Prevention Center was created in Vienna, an Office for Free Elections (subsequently renamed the Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights—ODIHR) was set up in Warsaw, and a Parliamentary Assembly, made up of parliamentarians from all member states, was created. Annual meetings were to be held at the level of foreign ministers, summits were to be held biannually, and a Committee of Senior Officials would prepare ministerial meetings and could call emergency meetings when required. In short, the CSCE began to take on most of the traditional features of an established international organization rather than a series of ad hoc meetings about security issues. The next major milestone in the post-Cold War expansion of the CSCE came with the follow-on conference and summit in Helsinki in 1992. This was the first meeting at which all of the former Soviet and Yugoslav countries plus Albania participated as full members, increasing the total number of member states to 53.13 The Helsinki conference was preoccupied with the wave of violence that was sweeping across the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and it sought to engage the organization more
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War actively both to prevent the future outbreak of such conflicts and to manage and resolve those that had already broken out. The flagrant violation of CSCE principles by the Serbs during the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina led to sanctions being imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its suspension from active participation in the CSCE. One of the most significant accomplishments in Helsinki was the adoption of a proposal by the Netherlands to create the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Based in the Hague, the high commissioner was mandated to engage in early warning, preventive diplomacy, and informal conciliation in an effort to prevent and resolve some of the most significant conflicts that have emerged in Eurasia since the end of the Cold War, where the status and treatment of ethnonational minorities is a major issue. In addition, a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was created, based in Geneva, with voluntary membership; many key member states have declined to participate, and in the initial six years of its existence it has not taken up any cases. Finally, the Forum for Security Cooperation meets regularly in Vienna to provide a venue for discussion of long-term issues of common security and to negotiate additional confidence-building and arms control measures. Another major advance taken in Helsinki was the decision to establish missions in areas of tension to provide for “early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keeping) [and] peaceful settlement of disputes.” The original intent of the heads of state assembled in Helsinki appeared to largely be to create temporary, more or less ad hoc, missions to deal with conflicts as they arose. However, especially because of continued worsening of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Committee of Senior Officials decided to create so-called missions of long duration, the first few of which were to be sent to monitor the situation in three regions of the former Republic of Yugoslavia—Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina.14 From this time on these missions were normally mandated for periods of six months, although the mandates have generally been renewed every six months with the sole exception of the first mission in Serbia, which was not extended because of objections from the government in Belgrade. The next significant stage in the institutional development of the organization took place at the Rome Ministerial in 1993, which created the Permanent Council, which meets weekly throughout the year to conduct all business between the annual ministerial or summit conferences. It is staffed by permanent delegations of the member states, usually headed by ambassadors, and carries on the continuing work of the organization, especially regarding conflict prevention, management, resolution, and
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War postconflict rehabilitation. At the Budapest Summit in 1994 the member states agreed that the CSCE had become sufficiently institutionalized with a permanent secretariat and associated organs that it could be renamed the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and declare itself to be a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter. This change, however, did not affect the status of the OSCE as a political rather than a legal organization, and it did not grant it a collective legal status under international law. In addition, the Budapest Summit adopted a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which created a normative framework for all aspects of military activity in the region, including civil-military relations, the conduct of warfare, and the behavior of military personnel in combat. Ever since becoming institutionalized formally in 1995, the OSCE has remained a small organization. Its entire budget for 1998 was about 950 million Austrian shillings ($76 million), over a third of which was allocated solely to OSCE activities in Bosnia (not including, of course, the costs of the NATO-led Stabilization Force, SFOR, which were many times greater than the entire OSCE annual budget). The largest single item, about 40 percent of the overall budget, went to support the 14 OSCE missions and field activities. The entire staff, including interpreters, amounts to about 160 persons, making the OSCE an extremely lean international organization in comparison with its responsibilities.15 The U.S. government, nevertheless, has generally assumed a cautious approach to the CSCE and its successor, the OSCE. Indeed, U.S. officials were skeptical about the process even during the initial negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, where, as John Maresca notes, “the United States, deeply involved in bilateral negotiations with the USSR, relegated the CSCE to the second rank.”16 The U.S. government has remained cautious about the potential of the CSCE/OSCE ever since, even though, ironically, the United States subsequently became one of the organization’s most active members and its largest financial supporter. Throughout the Cold War period the United States regarded the CSCE mostly as a forum to attack the record of the Soviet Union and other communist bloc governments on human rights. Even in the post-Cold War period there appear to be several reasons for the lukewarm attitude of the United States toward the OSCE, especially at higher levels in the foreign policy and national security bureaucracies.17 The OSCE is often seen as a distinct competitor with NATO for primacy in providing for security in Europe. American officials frequently believe that whatever strengthens one organization weakens at least the relative influence of the other. In this competition Washington usually prefers NATO for several reasons. First, U.S. policy makers generally believe that in times of crisis it will be easier for NATO to take a decision than the OSCE. Although both
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War organizations require consensus to make decisions, the broader membership of the OSCE may make consensus harder to achieve in Vienna than in Brussels, where American influence has traditionally been more strongly represented. Americans especially fear that the OSCE may be paralyzed by a Russian veto on important security matters, just as the UN Security Council has been in the past. Second, U.S. policy makers generally perceive that the OSCE lacks appropriate means to implement its decisions. Although the OSCE has played an important role in political and humanitarian spheres in Bosnia, for example, it depended on the support of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequently the SFOR to provide security for its own personnel, especially election monitors, to say nothing of Bosnian citizens. Since the OSCE does not have and has never raised peacekeeping forces, these policy makers believe that the OSCE’s dependence on other institutions for providing the muscle needed to carry out its decisions is likely to weaken its effectiveness. On the other hand, the agreements on Kosovo brokered by Richard Holbrooke in October 1998 assigned a major role to an OSCE force that was intended to reach some 2,000 civilian monitors to observe Belgrade’s withdrawal of security forces and the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, representing by far the largest mission undertaken to date by the OSCE. Indeed, it appears that the Serbs and their Russian supporters were willing to acquiesce in an OSCE role in Kosovo at a time when Russia was not prepared to support a UN Security Council resolution authorizing NATO to take military action to dissuade Serb leaders from attacking the Kosovar population. Even though this Kosovo Verification Mission had to be withdrawn in late March 1999, when NATO began a full-scale aerial assault on Yugoslavia, U.S. officials continued to envision a significant role for the OSCE to assist in the repatriation of Kosovar Albanian refugees following the cessation of hostilities. Despite the skepticism of some U.S. officials, the OSCE had become by the end of the twentieth century an institutionalized European security organization. It is charged with dealing with a wide range of activities: preventing violent conflicts, mediating cease-fires, helping to resolve conflicts in regions that had previously experienced violence, and helping to rebuild security in the aftermath of traumatic conflicts. How well it has performed these tasks is very much a subject of debate. As Stern and Druckman (Chapter 2) point out, evaluating the success of interventions in conflict situations is a tricky business, especially since the criteria for defining success are themselves so murky. Furthermore, apparent short-run failures may turn out over time to contribute to a long-term solution to underlying issues of conflict, whereas short-term solutions may break down readily and actually exacerbate conflicts over the long run. My task in this chapter is further complicated by the problem of equifinality—
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War namely, that any particular outcome may be accounted for by a combination of factors, and it is extremely difficult to ferret out the extent to which the involvement of the OSCE may have played a determinative role. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, it is neither fair to give OSCE all the credit for the successful outcomes of crises where it intervened nor to attribute exclusive blame for its apparent failure to solve other complex problems. Nonetheless, in the remainder of this chapter I assess the contributions that OSCE interventions into conflict situations have made in avoiding or ending violence, on the one hand, or averting escalation to higher levels of violence, on the other hand. I focus on the principal instruments that the OSCE uses to intervene in conflict situations, primarily the missions of long-term duration, the high commissioner on national minorities, and the chairman-in-office. While I will occasionally discuss specific techniques that these OSCE representatives have used in their interventions, my main focus is directed toward an assessment of the role that a regional security organization may play to monitor and assist parties confronting different stages of the conflict process. Thus, this chapter does not emphasize assessment of particular intervention techniques, in contrast to other chapters in this volume, but instead concentrates on the general argument about the role of multilateral security institutions in lessening the extent and severity of conflict and in promoting the development of a regional security regime. Finally, since this chapter deals primarily with conflicts in post-Cold War Eurasia, I focus mostly on intrastate conflicts, as opposed to interstate conflicts. The general OSCE role has been defined in terms of responding to internal conflicts that threaten the peace and security of neighboring states and surrounding regions. Indeed, most of the violence that has erupted in this region since the end of the Cold War has carried significant implications for regional security extending well beyond the borders of the states where violence has broken out. Sometimes this is manifested in irredentist claims to unify regions of newly created states with other states (e.g., Nagorno Karabakh with Armenia, South Ossetia with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation, Kosovo with Albania, Crimea with Russia). On other occasions, violence threatens to spread due to the presence of ethnic groups in regions that cut across international borders (e.g., Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Albanians in Kosovo and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russians and Ukrainians in the Transdniester region of Moldova). Finally, there is a more general concern about the apparent “contagion” of conflicts in unstable regions such as the Caucasus, parts of Central Asia, and the Balkans. In short, the neat distinction between interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts has been blurred in the postcommunist region. There-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War able to head off the explosion of the Kosovo crisis into full-scale war in 1999 and the resulting humanitarian tragedy that unfolded throughout the Balkans. Finally, as indicated in the NATO-Russian Founding Act, peacekeeping operations in which NATO troops play a prominent but not an exclusive role might be mandated by the OSCE. Since Russia has a voice in OSCE decision making, OSCE-mandated operations, perhaps with Russia and other non-NATO states contributing troops, may be viewed as less politically one sided and may have more widespread political legitimacy than actions undertaken unilaterally by NATO. In this respect the model of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia might serve as a precedent but with the OSCE providing the mandate, especially if a UN decision is blocked by a possible Chinese veto. The OSCE also needs to expand cooperation with the European Union, on which it often depends to finance many projects essential to fulfill its mandate in postconflict security building, for example. Finally, the OSCE needs to negotiate a clear division of labor with institutions such as the Council of Europe that perform overlapping functions such as democratization in the former communist states, so that the two institutions do not duplicate efforts much less get in one another’s way in carrying out their activities. Member states need to recognize that participation in a regional security regime like the OSCE inherently entails the sacrifice of some of the prerogatives of state sovereignty. Too often action on the part of the OSCE has been blocked or watered down by the necessity to maintain support for the work of its missions by countries that are parties to a dispute or by powerful states that back particular factions in some of the ongoing disputes. There are good reasons for maintaining the principle of consensus as the decision rule in the OSCE, since it acts as a safety valve to keep the organization from collapsing due to disputes among its member states. On the other hand, consensus should not be regarded as equivalent to a legalistic veto, and a “substantial” consensus among an overwhelming majority of the member states should be respected by dissenting states. This is especially true for some of the most powerful member states. The United States has occasionally resisted OSCE actions that might have impinged on its ability to intervene unilaterally in conflict situations. And the Russian Federation, which professes strong support for the OSCE as an alternative to NATO, has occasionally blocked consensus or prevented the OSCE from acting decisively in some of the most significant areas where it works, since most of these conflicts fall within Russia’s “near abroad” or at least within its perceived “sphere of influence.” If Russia wants to make a credible case for making the OSCE the centerpiece of the European security architecture,
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War its behavior within the organization will have to match its rhetoric more closely. In short, although the OSCE has developed and promoted a number of important universal norms as a multilateral organization, it is simultaneously a political organization composed of states with their own interests. It has not totally overcome the obstacles created when the interests of powerful states take precedence over the interests of parties locked in conflict or the larger interests of the “international community.” Nonetheless, it has undertaken a wide range of activities to realize common interests in preventing the escalation of conflicts, facilitating their termination and resolution, and aiding in the reconstruction of societies damaged by the ravages of war. In fulfilling these functions the OSCE has clearly surpassed the minimal criteria for a security regime identified by Keohane and Nye in the Introduction to this chapter, namely restraining anarchy and promoting cooperation in situations where peace is unstable and the risk for violence is high. Yet its strength has been in its ability to make modest incremental contributions, alongside other parties, often carrying out the detailed work necessary to make more publicized activities successful. It often operates quietly, outside the glare of publicity, so that the large number of significant contributions it has made to security building in Eurasia have frequently gone largely unnoticed. For the OSCE to achieve its potential, member states must have confidence that their long-term interests will be better served by a stable and secure Europe in order to be willing to forego getting their way on issues that may negatively affect their narrow, short-term interests. The OSCE thus faces a “dilemma of expectations”: if national governments were confident in the OSCE’s potential and gave it the support it needs—not only material but also political—it could become demonstrably more successful in producing clear and recognizable joint security benefits for all of its members. This would reinforce the confidence that member governments and their populations have in the OSCE and their willingness to give it the support it needs. As a consequence, the OSCE might become even more effective at producing common security, in a positive spiral of mounting confidence and capability, perhaps eventually forming a full-fledged security regime. Conversely, in the absence of such support the OSCE will inevitably fall short of the expectations generated for it. This will cause its critics to dismiss it as another weak and ineffective multilateral organization on which states cannot depend to protect their national security. States may consequently withdraw their support from the OSCE and put greater confidence in military alliances and unilateral “self-help.” This would further weaken the OSCE and make it into the helpless organization that
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War its critics said it was all along, reinforcing a negative cycle of diminishing expectations and ineffectiveness. The OSCE alone, of course, is not a panacea for a new, stable, and secure European order, and excessively optimistic expectations could lead to almost certain disappointment and disillusionment. At the same time the denial by realists of the potential of multilateral security institutions like the OSCE undermines the ability of regional security organizations to reach their potential. What is needed is a recognition of the concrete accomplishments already made by the OSCE and support for the optimistic but not unrealistic belief that some modest efforts to strengthen the OSCE could make a significant positive contribution to a more secure common future for all Europeans “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The OSCE as a Model for Other Global Regions Finally, I turn briefly to lessons learned from the OSCE experience in Europe that may be applied to other regions of the globe. The OSCE has become a full-fledged regional security organization as defined under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Although similar organizations exist in some other parts of the world—the Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in Southeast Asia, for example—no regional organization has taken on the broad security functions of the OSCE thus far. For example, the ARF has entered into confidence-building measures in dangerous regions, such as the South China Sea, but has been extremely cautious about intervening in disputes that might in any way be construed as falling within the internal affairs of states. Thus, it has avoided any attempt to develop an agreed set of norms comparable to the Helsinki Decalogue, to say nothing of relatively intrusive measures like the OSCE missions of long duration or the high commissioner on national minorities, even though such ideas may be of interest to some states in the region. At the outset, therefore, several cautionary notes are appropriate about the generalizability of the OSCE experience. First, the OSCE has largely assumed many of the functions previously performed by the UN in Eurasia, and in several places such as Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, and Tajikistan there has been some modest competition between the OSCE and the UN. Competition has faded since the early 1990s, however, as the UN has been overwhelmed by so many conflicts that many UN officials are relieved to see the OSCE lift some burdens from their shoulders. Nonetheless, it is far from clear that regional security organizations in other parts of the world will have the resources to replace the UN as the major guarantor of security. Fortunately, in recent years the UN has been
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War able to focus its scarce resources on those regions that most need its help, such as Africa and the Middle East. It thus seems to be neither necessary nor desirable to create regional organizations that essentially duplicate the functions of the UN Security Council in every region of the world, unless it can be demonstrated that regional organizations are likely to be significantly more effective at conflict management than the UN. Second, the OSCE at present is to some degree a creature of its history, especially its origin as an institution intended to overcome the divisions wrought by the East-West conflict. Prior to 1990 the OSCE had thus been a unique institution for East and West to discuss security issues. Since the end of the Cold War it has evolved into an organization that has sought to create order out of the chaos that accompanied the collapse of the communist system, and it is currently able to take advantage of the potential for post-Cold War cooperation to deal with those conflicts that have erupted in large part as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the communist bloc. For this reason many of the lessons of the OSCE are perhaps not relevant to other regions that were situated more on the periphery of the East-West confrontation. With these cautions in mind, there are nonetheless several key OSCE functions that might be adapted and applied in other regions afflicted with difficult conflicts: The OSCE has founded its security role on a firm basis of normative principles, including human rights and democratic governance, that make it more than a narrow security organization. These “shared values” have been accepted by European states despite the substantial diversity of values that existed in the region, at least until 1989. While other regions may find it even harder to identify shared values, this should not be an insuperable obstacle to overcome in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa or much of Latin America, for example. The OSCE concept of “missions of long duration” might also be usefully applied in other geographical regions that have experienced long-simmering conflicts that threaten to boil over. These missions may provide early warning of potential conflicts on the horizon, and they may aid parties to a dispute to avert violence while pursuing negotiations leading to a more fundamental resolution of their differences. One might envisage such a role in locations such as South and Southeast Asia, for example, in Indonesia concerning East Timor and other regions populated by ethnic and religious minorities, in the Philippines with regard to the Moro region, and in Sri Lanka with regard to the Tamil-dominated regions. These multilateral activities might begin largely as observer groups and perhaps expand into formal activities, including mediation and conflict resolution work with the disputing parties.52
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War The regime of confidence- and security-building measures associated with Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, the 1986 Stockholm agreement on Disarmament in Europe, and the Vienna Documents 1990, 1992, and 1994 might also be relevant in other regions, especially where traditional enemies face one another in tense circumstances. Confidence-building measures might thus be especially valuable, for example, between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights, between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region, between Taiwan and China in the Taiwan straits, or between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea. In each of these areas routine military activities by one party risk being perceived by others in their region as provocative and thus might initiate an escalatory cycle that could spin out of control. The high commissioner on national minorities is also one of the most innovative and successful of the OSCE devices for dealing with conflicts that might be imitated with appropriate modifications in regions of the world where nationality conflicts are present, including much of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The key to the success of this model is selecting a high-profile figure of great discretion and impartiality as the high commissioner, so that he or she will be accepted as an authoritative and fair figure by most governments and leaders of national or ethnic groups. This eminent person must be granted considerable flexibility, supporting resources, and the power to intervene on his or her own discretion in issues that many countries will consider to constitute purely internal affairs. Again, it is not hard to envision literally dozens of nationality disputes in Africa, South Asia, or the Middle East where such an individual might act more effectively than national governments or even the UN, especially if the high commissioner comes originally from the region affected by conflict and thus can be sensitive to its cultural values. While each of these specific functions from the OSCE experience might readily be applied in other regions, what will be most difficult to transfer is the entire set of interconnected issues and institutions that together make up the OSCE and even more broadly the institutional “architecture” of European security. The OSCE region possesses more of the background characteristics necessary for the creation of a security regime than any other area of the globe. Simply put, Europe is the most “institutionally dense” region of the world. Insofar as the OSCE is successful at contributing to European security, that is in large part because of its many complex linkages with other institutions such as NATO, the Western European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and so forth. Without these reinforcing institutions to assist the OSCE in fulfilling its functions or to fill in the gaps in the fabric of European security not covered by the OSCE, it is
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War doubtful that the OSCE could have realized even the modest level of success that it has achieved since 1975. Since this environment simply does not exist in any other global region, it is unlikely that any regional security institution can be developed that will be able to replicate all of the many attributes that the OSCE now possesses. That said, the OSCE has invented and developed more fully than any other regional organization certain techniques and institutional structures to deal with violent conflict that might usefully be applied elsewhere, either by regional security organizations or the UN in its activities in those regions of the world in which it still is likely to be the institution of first choice whenever threats to the security of states and peoples arise. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This chapter was researched and a first draft was written while I held a Fulbright senior research fellowship to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria, and a Jennings Randolph senior fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., from September 1997 through August 1998. I am grateful to both organizations for their assistance in making this research possible, especially to Richard Pettit at the Council for International Exchange of Scholars; Stanley Schrager and Ilene Jennison of the Public Affairs Division, U.S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna; Otmar Höll, director of the Austrian Institute on International Affairs; Finn Chemnitz, Diplomatic Officer at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center; and Joseph Klaits, director, and Sally Blair, program officer, of the Jennings Randolph Program of the United States Institute of Peace. I am also grateful to Simon Limage for research assistance and Daniel Druckman, Alexander George, James Goodby, Dennis Sandole, Janice Stein, Paul Stern, I.William Zartman, and four anonymous reviewers for comments on a draft of this chapter. Portions of this chapter are drawn from a larger work being prepared by the author for the United States Institute of Peace Press. NOTES 1 One of these states, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was suspended in 1992 due to its actions in violation of OSCE norms in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Prior to 1995 the OSCE was known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this chapter I refer to it as the CSCE when discussing its activities from 1973 through 1994, but when referring to it generically, or to its activities since 1995, I refer to it as the OSCE. 2 For classic statements of this argument, see John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” in Sean M.Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 1–44, and John J.Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” ibid., pp. 141–192.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 4 Stephen D.Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D.Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2, based largely on Oran R.Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics, vol. 32 (April 1980). 5 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, op. cit, p. 173. 6 Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S.Nye, “Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe,” in Robert O.Keohane, Joseph S.Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 5. 7 See Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205–235; Bruce M.Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for the Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Michael W.Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W.Norton, 1997), chap. 8. 8 Michael S.Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 38. I have modified Lund’s “Life History of a Conflict” to take account of an additional distinction suggested by Alexander George and James E.Goodby, namely to divide “unstable peace” into two categories, “conditional peace” and “precarious peace.” See Alexander George, “Foreword” to James E.Goodby, Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), pp. ix–x. Precarious peace refers to a situation that is highly conflict prone though not yet in a crisis stage, whereas conditional peace refers to a less acute situation where there is a potential for escalation but where acute crises seldom arise. 9 At this point in the Cold War and under the regime of hard-line dictator Enver Hoxha, Albania had severed most of its ties even with other communist regimes in Europe, maintaining friendly ties only with the Peoples’ Republic of China, North Korea, and Cuba. 10 For an excellent and detailed analysis of the Vienna CSCE meeting by a member of the Austrian delegation, see Stefan Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986–1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). 11 Two other documents also were adopted under CSCE auspices in 1990, namely the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the 1990 Vienna document on confidence-and security-building measures. Since these documents dealt mostly with arms control measures, they had less of an impact on the normative and institutional underpinnings of European security while nonetheless strengthening the European security regime through greater transparency, limitations on military activities, and significant reductions of conventional armaments. 12 Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe’s Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Stability (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 210. 13 The number of member states increased to 54 when the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic divided voluntarily into two separate states at the beginning of 1993 and to 55 when Andorra was admitted in 1996; this includes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose voting rights were suspended in 1992. 14 Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma, “OSCE Long-Term Missions,” in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, eds., The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 169. These missions were subsequently withdrawn at the re-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War quest of the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after its voting rights in the CSCE were suspended. 15 This figure excludes the many individuals seconded to the OSCE by member governments, including the bulk of the staff of its missions and field activities. It also excludes the large number of people recruited on a short-term basis by ODIHR, for example, to supervise and monitor elections. 16 John J.Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–1975 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 64. The author was deputy chief of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE negotiations during the period covered in this book. 17 This skepticism has not necessarily extended to the working levels where there is often active engagement with the OSCE and support for its activities, especially by the large U.S. delegation assigned to the OSCE in Vienna. 18 The analysis in this section is based largely on on-site research by the author at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna for two extended periods. In 1992 the author spent a total of about five months in Vienna and Helsinki, observing closely the work of the CSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center at a time when missions of long duration were first being created. He also closely observed negotiations on the Vienna Document 1992 on confidence- and security-building measures; the final negotiations of the Open Skies Treaty; and the preparation, conduct, and follow-up to the Helsinki summit of July 1992. He interviewed senior officials in the CSCE secretariat and senior representatives (generally the head of mission) of most CSCE countries present in Vienna at that time. The author also had a second extended period of close observation of the OSCE from September 1997 through January 1998. During that time he attended most formal and informal meetings of the Permanent Council, including reports by mission heads and the heads of OSCE bodies in both an informal setting and formal presentations to the council. He also interviewed all heads of the OSCE missions during their regular reporting visits to Vienna, and he visited on site the OSCE mission in Moldova, traveling with the mission head to Transdniestria. He interviewed senior officials of the Conflict Prevention Center, the high commissioner on national minorities, and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Vienna, the Hague, and Warsaw, respectively. He has obtained copies of all field reports from the 14 OSCE missions and other field activities since their inception, typically issued about once a month, although the frequency may be more or less often according to the demands of each individual situation. He also obtained copies of all official correspondence between the high commissioner on national minorities and governments where he visited, including all of his recommendations to those governments. Finally, he obtained materials from ODIHR, including all election evaluation reports. The analysis that follows, therefore, is based largely on the author’s personal observation, interviews, and reading of original documents concerning the field activities of the OSCE in several regions of potential or actual violent conflict. 19 Max van der Stoel, “Minorities in Transition,” War Report, no. 48 (January/February 1997), p. 16. 20 Saadia Touval and I.William Zartman, “Introduction: Mediation in Theory,” in Saadia Touval and I.William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 16. See also Chapter 6 in this volume. 21 Lund, op. cit, p. 15. 22 Alexander L.George and Jane E.Holl, “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy,” in Bruce Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 29. 23 In a personal interview in the Hague on November 18, 1997, Ambassador Max van der Stoel, OSCE high commissioner on national minorities, expressed concern about this
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War problem regarding the continuing crisis in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where international agencies have been warning of a potential crisis since 1989 but where by late 1997 the crisis had not yet boiled over into widespread violence. The danger, he noted, was that the international community had become habituated to the crisis in this region and might not respond to new warnings that this crisis was on the verge of rapid escalation until it was too late. Unfortunately, his concerns in this regard appear to have been largely borne out by the intensifying conflict and increasing violence that appeared in Kosovo in 1998, more than one year before NATO began its aerial bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One can only speculate about the lives, resources, and human misery that might have been spared had political leaders in the major states, especially in Washington, heeded the “early warnings” generated by several OSCE missions and officials such as Ambassador van der Stoel in late 1997, rather than waiting almost a year to act, at which time the cycle of escalation had become firmly entrenched and the potential for effective preventive diplomacy had been greatly reduced. 24 George and Holl, op. cit, p. 24. 25 Viacheslav Pikhovshek, “Will the Crimean Crisis Explode?,” in Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Challenges and Prospects (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1995), p. 48. 26 OSCE Mission to Ukraine, Activity and Background Report No. 5, 31 March 1995, p. 9. 27 Ibid., p. 10. 28 Letter from Ambassador Max van der Stoel to Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko, 15 May 1995, OSCE Reference No. HC/1/95. 29 Letter from Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko to Ambassador Max van der Stoel, 30 June 1995, OSCE Reference No. HC/4/95. 30 Foundation on Inter-ethnic Relations, The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention (The Hague: Foundation on Inter-ethnic Relations, 1997), pp. 75–77. 31 Tor Bukkvoll, “A Fall from Grace for Crimean Separatists,” Transition, 17 November 1995, pp. 46–53. 32 Ibid., p. 48. 33 John Packer, “Autonomy Within the OSCE: The Case of Crimea,” in Markku Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 310. 34 Statement by U.S. Head of Delegation Sam Brown, 12 January 1995, to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the U.S. Congress, “Hearings on the Crisis in Chechnya” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 128–130. 35 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 275–282. 36 Ibid., p. 284. 37 Ibid., p. 288. 38 Report of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, 8 January 1996. 39 Tim Guldimann, “The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya,” paper presented at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 11 March 1997, p. 3. 40 I.William Zartman, “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again,” in David A.Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 318. 41 P.Terrence Hopmann, “New Approaches for Resolving Europe’s Post-Cold War Conflicts,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. IV, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1997), pp. 155–167. 42 For a discussion of the difference between these two styles of negotiation, see P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving,”
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 542 (November 1995), pp. 24–47. 43 For a review of the literature on third-party roles, see P.Terrence Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), chap. 12. 44 CSCE Mission to Moldova, Report No. 13, 16 November 1993, pp. 1–3. 45 Foundation on Inter-ethnic Relations, op. cit, pp. 68–70. 46 “Memorandum on the Fundamentals of Normalizing the Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Trans-Dniestria,” annex to Spot Report No. 18/96, OSCE Mission to Moldova, 11 July 1996. 47 OSCE Mission to Moldova, Monthly Report No. 7/97, 22 April 1997, p. 3. 48 See Marjanne de Kwaasteniet, “Alba: A Lost Opportunity for the OSCE?,” Helsinki Monitor, vol. 9, no. 1 (1998), pp. 20–21. 49 Many of these weapons, however, ended up in the hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army to be used in its struggle for independence from Serbia, which turned violent in 1998. 50 Hugh Miall, “The OSCE Role in Albania: A Success for Conflict Prevention?,” Helsinki Monitor, vol. 8, no. 4 (1997), pp. 74–75. 51 The argument that the OSCE has tended to become engaged only in conflicts in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia rather than in Western countries (including Turkey) is made persuasively by Martin Alexanderson in “The Need for a Generalised Application of the Minorities Regime in Europe,” Helsinki Monitor, vol. 8, no. 4 (1997), pp. 47–58. 52 For example, the government of Indonesia has mediated in its role as chair of the Organization of Islamic States and as a member of ASEAN in the dispute between the Moro region populated primarily by Muslim inhabitants and the government of the Philippines, also an ASEAN member state. See Dino Patti Djalal, “The Indonesian Experience in Facilitating a Peace Settlement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),” paper presented at the Preventive Diplomacy Workshop of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand, 28 February-2 March 1999.
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Representative terms from entire chapter: