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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE I PREFACE
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE This page in the original is blank.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE Preface As we enter a new century full of technological promise, there is a renewed emphasis on the role of industrial entrepreneurs with new, innovative solutions to the problems and opportunities of twenty-first century America. Yet the reliance on industrial entrepreneurs and their symbiotic relationship with the federal government is not new. Driven by both the exigencies of national defense and the requirements of transportation and communication across the American continent, the federal government has played an instrumental role in fostering the development of new production techniques and technologies from the earliest years of the republic. To do so, government has often turned to individual entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. For example, in 1798 the federal government laid the foundation for the first machine tool industry with a contract to the inventor, Eli Whitney, for interchangeable musket parts.1 A few decades later, in 1842, a hesitant Congress appropriated funds to demonstrate the feasibility of Samuel Morse’s telegraph.2 Both Whitney and Morse fostered significant inno- 1 Whitney missed his first delivery date and encountered substantial cost overruns. However, his invention of interchangeable parts, and the machine tools to make them, was ultimately successful. The muskets were delivered and the foundation of a new industry was in place. As early as the 1850s, the United States had begun to export specialized machine tools to the Enfield Arsenal in Great Britain. The British described the large-scale production of firearms, made with interchangeable parts, as “the American system of manufacturers.” See David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 6. 2 For a discussion of Samuel Morse’s 1837 application for a grant and the congressional debate, see Irwin Lebow, Information Highways and Byways. New York: IEEE, 1995, pp. 9-12. For a more detailed account, see Robert Luther Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States 1823-1836. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE vations which led to whole new industries. Indeed, Morse’s innovation was the first step on the road toward today’s networked planet. Despite Whitney’s ultimate success and the enormous consequences of Morse’s ground-breaking innovation, the appropriate role of government in the economy has remained a source of debate and discussion in the United States to this day. Perhaps the earliest articulation of the government’s nurturing role with regard to the composition of the economy was Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 Report on Manufactures, in which he urged an activist approach by the federal government to the creation and nurturing of new industries. At the time, Hamilton ’s views were controversial, although subsequent U.S. policy has largely reflected his beliefs. During both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the federal government has had an enormous impact on the structure and composition of the economy through infrastructure development, regulation, procurement, and a vast array of policies to support industrial and agricultural development.3 Between World War I and World War II these policies included support for the development of key industries—which we would now call dual-use —such as radio and aircraft frames and engines. The requirements of World War II generated a huge increase in government procurement and support for high-technology industries.4 Following that war, the federal government began to fund basic research at universities on a significant scale, first through the Office of Naval Research and later through the National Science Foundation. 5 During the Cold War, the United States continued to emphasize technological superiority as a means of ensuring U.S. security. Government funds and costplus contracts helped to support systems and enabling technologies such as semiconductors and new materials, radar, jet engines, missiles, and computer 3 Examples abound. The government played a key role in the development of the U.S. railway network, growth of agriculture through the Morrill Act (1862) and the agricultural extension service, and support of industry through the National Bureau of Standards (1901). See Richard Bingham, Industrial Policy American Style: From Hamilton to HDTV. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998 for a comprehensive review. 4 David Mowery, “Collaborative R&D: how effective is it?” Issues in Science and Technology. 1998, p. 37. 5 The National Science Foundation was initially seen as the agency that would fund basic scientific research at universities after World War II. However, disagreements over the degree of Executive Branch control over the NSF delayed passage of its authorizing legislation until 1950, even though the concept for the agency was first put forth in 1945 in Vannevar Bush’s report, Science: The Endless Frontier. The Office of Naval Research bridged the gap in basic research funding during those years. For an account of the politics of the NSF’s creation, see G. Paschal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. New York: The Free Press, 1997, pp. 231. See also Daniel Lee Kleinman, Politics on the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE hardware and software.6 For example, the government played a central role in the creation of the first electronic digital computer, the ENIAC.7 In the post-Cold War period, the evolution of the American economy continues to be profoundly marked by the interaction of government-funded research and innovative entrepreneurs. Government support in areas such as microelectronics, robotics, biotechnology, the human genome, and in the development of ARPANET (the forerunner of today’s Internet) are providing the underpinnings of a new economy. Individual entrepreneurs and researchers often played leading roles in developing new approaches and new businesses to exploit these research investments.8 The emergence of new Net-based companies and biotechnology firms, the latter increasingly focused on genomic-based research, has produced major innovations and promises to be a source of substantial growth. Despite the important role the U.S. government has played in the development of the American economy, there is little consensus concerning the principle of government participation and there is often considerable debate about the appropriate mechanisms of participation. At the same time, in light of the rising costs, substantial risks, and the breadth of potential applications of new technologies, some believe that a supportive policy framework by the government is necessary for entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firms in order to bring new, welfare-enhancing and wealth-generating technologies to the market. Partnerships among industry, government, and universities can be an important element in such a framework. The STEP Mission Since 1991 the National Research Council’s (NRC) Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) has undertaken a program of activities to improve policy makers’ understanding of the interconnections of science, technology, and economic policy and their importance for the American economy and its international competitive position. The Board’s activities have corresponded with increased policy recognition of the importance of technology to economic growth. The new economic growth theory emphasizes the role of technology creation, believed to be characterized by significant growth externalities.9 6 For an excellent review of the role of government support in nurturing the computer industry, see National Research Council, Funding a Revolution: Government Support for Computing Research. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999. 7 Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988, chapters 1-3. 8 David B. Audretsch and Roy Thurik, Innovation, Industry, Evolution, and Employment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 9 Paul Romer, “Endogenous technological change,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, 1990, pp. 71-102. See also Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE A consequence of the renewed appreciation of growth externalities is the growing focus on the economic geography of economic development. With growth externalities coming about in part from the exchanges of knowledge among innovators, certain regions become centers for particular types of high growth activities. Innovators are able to take advantage of the tacit knowledge available in such centers or clusters of activity to acquire relevant technological innovation and to rapidly address other business development issues.10 In addition, some economists have suggested limitations to traditional trade theory, particularly with respect to the reality of imperfect international competition.11 Recent economic analysis suggests that high-technology is often characterized by increasing rather than decreasing returns, justifying to some the proposition that governments can capture permanent advantage in key industries by providing relatively small, but potentially decisive support to assist national industries up the learning curve and down the cost curve. In part, this is why the economic literature now recognizes the relationship between technology policy and trade policy.12 Recognition of these linkages and the corresponding ability of governments to shift comparative advantage in favor of the national economy provides the intellectual underpinning for government support for high-technology industry.13 Another widely recognized rationale for government support of high-technology exists in cases where technology generates benefits beyond those which can be captured by innovating firms, often referred to as spillovers. 14 There are also cases where the cost of a given technology may be prohibitive for individual companies, even though expected benefits to society are substantial and widespread.15 The increasing recognition of the dynamic element of technological 10 Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991, p. 23, points out how the British economist Alfred Marshall initially observed in his classic Principles of Economics how geographic clusters of specific economic activities arose from the exchange of “tacit” knowledge among business people. Annalee Saxenian ’s review of the growth of Silicon Valley provides a recent example of the cluster phenomenon. Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. 11 Paul Krugman, Rethinking International Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. 12 See J.A. Brander and B.J. Spencer, “International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 50, 1983, pp. 707-722, and “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 16, 1985, pp. 83-100. 13 For a discussion of governments’ efforts to capture new technologies and the industries they spawn for their national economies, see National Research Council, Conflict and Cooperation in National Competition for High Technology Industry. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996, p. 28-40. For a critique of these efforts, see P. Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations. New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1994. 14 See, for example, Martin N. Baily and A. Chakrabati, Innovation and the Productivity Crisis. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998, and Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. 15 See Ishaq Nadiri, Innovations and Technological Spillovers, NBER Working Paper No. 4423, 1993, and Edwin Mansfield, “Academic Research and Industrial Innovation,” Research Policy, February, 1991. Council of Economic Advisers, Supporting Research and Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government’s Role. Washington, D.C., 1995.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE innovation, in particular its cumulative nature, has provided intellectual underpinning and incentives for local, state, and national efforts to create competitive advantage for a region, country, or industry. 16 Project Origins The growth in government programs to support high-technology industry within national economies and their impact on international science and technology cooperation and on the multilateral trading system are of considerable interest worldwide. Accordingly, these topics were taken up by STEP in a study carried out in conjunction with the Hamburg Institute for Economic Research and the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, Germany, which produced the 1996 report, Conflict and Cooperation in National Competition for High-Technology Industry. One of the principal recommendations for further work emerging from that study was a call for an analysis of the principles of effective cooperation in technology development, to include lessons from national and international consortia, including eligibility standards and assessments of what new cooperative mechanisms might be developed to meet the challenges associated with the development of new high-technology products.17 In many high-technology industries, the burgeoning development costs for new technologies, the dispersal of technological expertise, and the growing importance of regulatory and environmental issues have provided powerful incentives for public/private cooperation. Notwithstanding the unsettled policy environment in Washington, D.C., collaborative programs have steadily expanded,18 with perhaps as many as 70 federal cooperative technology programs currently under way.19 During the Reagan administration, the program examined here—the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR)—was created as a way 16 The dynamic nature of international competition in high-technology industries is discussed in National Research Council, 1996, op. cit., pp. 28-40. For a critique of these efforts, see Krugman, 1995, op. cit. 17 The summary report of the project (National Research Council, 1996, op. cit.) recommends further analytical work concerning principles for effective cooperation in technology development (see Recommendation 24, p. 8). More recently, David Mowery has noted the rapid expansion of collaborative activities and emphasized the need for comprehensive assessment. David Mowery, “Collaborative R&D: how effective is it?” op. cit., p. 44. 18 In addition to programs such as SBIR, SEMATECH, and ATP, other legislative initiatives sought to encourage cooperation and improve the payoff from federal R&D. Examples include the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (1980), the Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act (1980), the National Cooperative Research Act (1984), and the Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986). These are described in the Introduction. 19 Dan Berglund and Christopher Coburn, Partnerships: A Compendium of State and Federal Cooperative Technology Programs. Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1995, p. 481.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE to capitalize on the innovative capacity of small business and as a means of using federal R&D dollars more effectively. The creation of the SBIR program was not an isolated phenomenon. Concerns about U.S. competitiveness in the 1980s and early 1990s contributed to the creation of a number of cooperative programs. Some targeted particular sectors; others sought to capitalize on U.S. research. For example, to meet unprecedented challenges in the semiconductor industry, the SEMATECH consortium was established, although only after much debate. 20 In the Bush administration, Congress first funded the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) in the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 21 This program gives a significant percentage of its awards to small business but is not focused on small business per se, but rather on the development of new enabling technologies with a broad impact on the economy. The Clinton administration came to office with an emphasis on civilian technology programs, substantially expanding the ATP and creating the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) and the Partnership for the Next Generation Vehicle (PNGV).22 The rapid expansion of these cooperative programs encountered significant opposition, rekindling the national debate on the appropriate role of the government in fostering new technologies. Indeed, broader philosophical questions about the appropriate role for government in collaborating with industry have tended to obscure the need for policy makers to draw lessons from current and previous collaborative efforts.23 Given the considerable change in federal research and development budgets since the end of the Cold War, and the reduced role of many centralized laboratories in the private sector, government-industry collaboration is of growing importance, yet it has seen remarkably little objective analysis.24 At one level, analysis 20 For a review of SEMATECH, see the National Research Council, 1996, op. cit., pp. 141-151. For one of the most comprehensive assessments of SEMATECH, see John B. Horrigan, “Cooperating Competitors: A Comparison of MCC and SEMATECH,” monograph, National Research Council, 1999. 21 For a recent review of the ATP, see Charles W. Wessner, ed., The Advanced Technology Program: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999. 22 For an analysis of ATP, see Christopher T. Hill, “The Advanced Technology Program: opportunities for enhancement,” in Lewis Branscomb and James Keller, eds. Investing in Innovation: Creating a Research and Innovation Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 143-173. For an excellent analysis of the TRP, see Jay Stowsky, “Politics and Policy: The Technology Reinvestment Program and the Dilemmas of Dual Use,” Mimeo, University of California, 1996. See also, Linda R. Cohen, “Dual-use and the Technology Reinvestment Project.” in Branscomb and Keller, op. cit., pp. 174-193. For PNGV, see National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997. 23 Dan Berglund and Christopher Coburn, Partnerships: A Compendium of State and Federal Cooperative Technology Programs. Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1995, p. 481. 24 Richard Rosenbloom and William Spencer, Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1996.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE may contribute to a better appreciation of the role of collaboration between government and industry in the development of the U.S. economy. Writing 20 years ago, one well-known American economist, Richard Nelson, observed that Americans are still remarkably uninformed about their long history of policies aimed at stimulating innovation.25 Today, many Americans appreciate the contribution of technology to the current period of robust economic growth.26 Yet there is little evidence that Americans are aware of the key contributions of federal support for technological innovation, from interchangeable musket parts to radio to the Internet. Leaving aside the desirability of having a better understanding of the role of partnerships in fostering new technologies, one compelling argument for assessment is the simple fact that government intervention in the market is fraught with risk. There are cases of major success, such as federal support to the computer or semiconductor industries, where the Department of Defense served as a source of R&D and as a reliable, early buyer of products.27 There are also cases of major frustration. Landmarks would include projects such as the Supersonic Transport and the Synfuels Corporation. 28 Regular assessment is vital to ensure continued technical viability, though cost-sharing requirements can be an effective safeguard. Assessment can also help avoid “political capture” of projects, especially large commercial demonstration efforts.29 Even successful collaborations face the challenge of adapting programs to rapidly changing technologies.30 Assess- 25 Otis L. Graham, Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 250. Graham cites Richard Nelson’s observations at the end of the Carter Administration. The situation may not have improved. Writing in 1994, James Fallows makes a similar observation (see Looking into the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 196). See also Thomas McCraw’s “Mercantilism and the market: antecedents of American industrial policy,” in The Politics of Industrial Policy, Claude E. Barfield and William A. Schambra, eds., Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986, pp. 33-62. 26 For a review of support for computing and the Internet, see National Research Council, Funding a Revolution: Government Support for Computing Research. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999, op. cit. Chapter 7. 27Ibid. See also Graham, op. cit., p. 2. 28 See Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991, pp. 97-148, 259-320. An interesting review of technology development programs, mainly from the 1970s, the analysis is less negative than the title suggests. Indeed, the volume identifies some successful R&D projects such as the photovoltaic electricity program, p. 363. The recent analyses by the Academies of government support for the computing industry underscore the importance of sustained government support. 29 Cohen and Noll stress that political capture by distributive congressional politics and industrial interests are one of the principal risks for government-supported commercialization projects. In cases such as the Clinch River project, they extensively document the disconnect between declining technical feasibility and increasing political support (see op. cit., p. vii and pp. 242-257). 30 One of the strengths of SEMATECH was its ability to redefine goals in the face of changing conditions. See National Research Council, 1996, op. cit., p. 148. See also Grindley, et al., “SEMATECH and collaborative research: Lessons in the Design of High-technology Consortia.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1994, p. 724 and Peter Grindley and William Spencer, “SEMATECH after five years: high-tech consortia and U.S. competitiveness, ” California Management Review, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 9-33 and Horrigan, “Cooperating Competitors,” op. cit.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE ment thus becomes a means of keeping programs relevant. Assessment can also have the virtue of reminding policymakers of the need for humility before the “black box” of innovation. As one observer notes, “experience argues for hedged commitments, constant reappraisal, maintenance of options, and pluralism of advice and decision makers.”31 From an international perspective, understanding the benefits and challenges of these programs is also important insofar as they have been, and remain, a central element in the national development strategies of both industrialized and industrializing countries. Governments have shown a great deal of imagination in their choice of mechanisms designed to support industry. They have adopted a wide range of policies from trade regulations designed to protect domestic products from foreign competition to tax rebates intended to stimulate the export of selected domestic products. Government R&D funding is provided for enterprises of particular interest, and governments sometimes give overt support through direct grants, loans, and equity investments or more opaque support through mechanisms such as tax deferral.32 Data collected by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggest that worldwide government expenditures in support of high-technology industries involve significant resources and are increasingly focused on what policy makers consider to be strategic industries.33 The United States is an active, if unavowed, participant in this global competition, at both the state and federal levels. Indeed, the United States has a remarkably wide range of public/private partnerships in high-technology sectors.34 In addition to the well-known cases mentioned above, there are public/private consortia of many types. They can be classified in a number of ways, such as by the economic objective of the partnership; that is, to leverage the social benefits associated with federal R&D activity, to enhance the position of a national industry, or to deploy industrial R&D to meet military or other government missions.35 31 Otis Graham, op. cit., p. 251. Graham is referring to work by Richard R. Nelson in Government and Technological Progress. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, p. 454-455. 32 National Research Council, 1996, op. cit., Box B., pp. 39-40. 33 Ibid. Concerning support for small business, the OECD gives a positive review of U.S. programs. See OECD, Technology, Productivity, and Job Creation: Best Policy Practices. Paris: OECD, 1997, p. 21. Germany, for example, has undertaken a series of initiatives to support and encourage development of seed capital for promising firms and the venture capital industry. See Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Report of the Federal Government on Research: Facts and Figures 1998. Bonn, December, 1998. 34 See Chris Coburn and Dan Bergland, op. cit., 1995. 35 See Albert Link, “Public/Private Partnerships as a Tool to Support Industrial R&D: Experiences in the United States.” Paper prepared for the working group on Innovation and Technology Policy of the OECD Committee for Science and Technology Policy, Paris, 1998, p. 20. Partnerships can also be differentiated by the nature of public support. Some partnerships involve a direct transfer of funds to an industry consortium. Others focus on the shared use of infrastructure, such as laboratory facilities.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE The program taken up in this volume—the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) —falls under the latter category. Project Steering Committee The continual importance of government-industry collaboration underscores the need for better understanding of the opportunities and limitations of these programs and the conditions most likely to ensure success. Reflecting the interest of policy makers in this topic, the STEP Board initiated the project on Government-Industry Partnerships for the Development of New Technologies, which has benefited from broad support among federal agencies. These include: the U.S. Department of Defense; the U.S. Department of Energy; the National Science Foundation; the National Institutes of Health; the National Cancer Institute; the National Institute of General Medical Sciences; the Office of Naval Research; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; as well as a diverse group of private corporations, listed in the front of the report. To carry out this analysis, the STEP Board has assembled a distinguished multidisciplinary Steering Committee for government-industry partnerships, listed in the front of this report. The Committee’s principal tasks are to provide overall direction and relevant expertise to assess the issues raised by the project. At the conclusion of the project, the Steering Committee will develop a consensus report outlining their findings and recommendations on the programs and issues reviewed by the project. As a basis for the consensus report, the Steering Committee is commissioning research and convening a series of fact-finding meetings in the form of workshops, symposia, and conferences as a means of both informing its deliberations and addressing current policy issues affecting government-industry partnerships. As the project progresses, the Steering Committee is making recommendations and findings on major elements of its work, particularly in response to requests from participating agencies. This volume includes the first set of findings and recommendations based on the Steering Committee’s fact-finding meetings and its commissioned research, in this case on the SBIR program.36 The commis- 36 A companion volume on SBIR entitled The Small Business Innovation Research Program: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999, provides an overview of the SBIR Program. Other volumes in this series include Industry-Laboratory Partnerships: A Review of the Sandia Science and Technology Park Initiative, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999; and The Advanced Technology Program: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999. The international component of the project was addressed with the conference and report on New Vistas in Transatlantic Science and Technology Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999.
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The Small Business Innovation Research Program: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE sioned research provides empirical support for the recommendations and findings. However, as noted below, responsibility for the recommendations rests with the Steering Committee and not with the individual researchers. A number of individuals deserve recognition for their contributions to the preparation of this report and for their willingness to serve as reviewers. On behalf of the STEP Board we would like to express special recognition to Jon Baron and Robert L. Neal Jr. of the Department of Defense. Their interest and commitment to an objective assessment of the Fast Track was crucial to the success of the project. Similarly, special recognition is due to Peter Cahill of BRTRC, Inc., and Albert N. Link of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for their many valuable insights and contributions. Among the STEP staff, special recognition goes to John B. Horrigan for his contributions to the development of the research plan, his independent analysis of the project results, and preparation of this volume, both initial drafts and in review. Recognition and thanks are also due to Laura T. Holliday for her many contributions to the organization of the 5 May 1999 conference. Subsequently, McAlister T. Clabaugh and David E. Dierksheide played an instrumental role in editing and preparing the report for publication. Without their collective energy and commitment this project could not have been completed. This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC’ s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review process: Dr. James Adams, University of Florida; Dr. William L. Baldwin, Dartmouth College; Dr. Kathryn Combs, University of St. Thomas; Dr. Lance Davis, National Academy of Engineering; Dr. Gerald Dinneen, National Academy of Engineering, Dr. Jeffrey Hart, Indiana University; Dr. Michael Luger, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Dr. Paula Stephan, Georgia State University; and Dr. Cherisa Yarkin, University of California at Berkeley. Although these individuals have provided constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the final content of this report and its recommendations and findings rests with the Steering Committee, listed above, and the National Research Council Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy. Charles W. Wessner
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