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OCR for page 7
Background
CISAC's initial study of "Management and Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium" was the result of a 1992 request from General Brent
Scowcroft, then the National Security Advisor to President Bush. The
study was carried out under DOE sponsorship between late 1992 and mid
1995, following confirmation by the Clinton Administration of the man-
date for this effort. The CISAC findings, which were presented in reports
issued in January 1994 and July 19954, included the following:
Besides the dangers well known to be associated with arsenals of
nuclear weapons, the existence of surplus separated plutonium
and highly enriched uranium (HEW) not embodied in nuclear
weapons poses "a clear and present danger to national and inter-
national security."
· This danger consists of three elements the risk that this material
could be reincorporated into the nuclear arsenals of the states origi-
nally possessing it, the risk that it could be stolen for use in nuclear
weapons constructed by other states or subnational groups, and
the risk of impairment of nuclear-arms-control prospects by per-
ceptions that the major weapons powers are retaining the material
in directly weapons-usable form in order to keep open the option
of reversing their post-Cold-War arms reductions.5
4CISAC, 1994 and CISAC, 1995.
5The third risk is of course related to the first one, but it is distinct in that harm arises in
the form of reactions in other countries to the mere possibility of reincorporation of the
OCR for page 8
SPENT-FUEL STANDARD FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS WEAPON PLUTONIUM
· It is more straightforward, in principle, to reduce the risks from
highly enriched uranium than to reduce those from separated
plutonium, because (a) HEU can be "blended down" isotonically
fusing abundant uranium-238) to an enrichment level unusable
for weapons, but no such isotopic denaturing is practical for pluto-
nium, and (b) the blended down HEU can be used as fuel for
commercial nuclear reactors at a profit, while use of plutonium as
reactor fuel under current conditions can only be done at an eco-
nomic loss.6
· Politics and perceptions operate to link the fate of surplus nuclear
materials In Russia with that of surplus nuclear materials in the
United States. Reduction of Russian stocks of nuclear materials
and improved transparency and protection for those that remain
will only be agreed if the United States takes comparable steps.
The needed comprehensive approach to this challenge would
include: (1) a reciprocal regime of verified declarations and moni-
tored reductions of U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons
and nuclear-weapon materials; (2) secure and internationally safe-
guarded interim storage of the materials, allowing withdrawals
only for non-weapon purposes; (3) development of satisfactory
options for the long-term disposition of excess weapons pluto-
nium in ways that make its re-use for weapons unlikely; and
(4) pursuit of new international arrangements to improve security
and accounting for all forms of plutonium and HEU, civilian as
well as military, worldwide.
Two key criteria for judging the adequacy of the approaches taken
for the management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium
are (a) that separated plutonium prior to final disposition be sub-
ject to the same high standards of security and accounting as are
applied to intact nuclear weapons ("the stored nuclear-weapon
standard") and (b) that the plutonium after disposition not be sig-
nificantly easier to recover and use in nuclear weapons than is the
plutonium In spent fuel from commercial power reactors ("the
spent-fuel standards.
.
surplus weapons materials into the arsenals of its original possessors, even if the
reincorporation does not occur.
6The difficulties encountered in implementing the "HEU deal", under which 500 metric
tons of Russian HEU is to be blended down and sold to the United States over a period of
20 years for resale in the world nuclear-fuel market, shows that what is easier in principle
may still not be easy enough in practice. See, e.g., Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently
Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material, A Joint Project of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Harvard University, Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2000 and references therein.
6
OCR for page 9
BACKGROUND
9
· The two disposition methods most likely to be able to meet the
spent-fuel standard on a time scale reasonably commensurate with
the urgency of the task are (a) embodying the plutonium in mixed-
oxide (MOX) fuel and using this once through (without subse-
quent reprocessing) in civilian reactors of currently operating
types, yielding a plutonium-bearing spent fuel destined ultimately
for geologic disposal ("the MOX option") and (b) immobilizing
the plutonium together with large quantities of fission products in
a glass and/or ceramic matrix encased in steel with mass, bulk,
radiation field, and resistance to extraction of the contained pluto-
nium comparable to the corresponding properties of spent-fuel
bundles, and likewise destined ultimately for disposal in a geo-
.
logic repository ("the immobilization option").
Because both of these options face a combination of technical and
institutional barriers that translate into uncertainties about Me pace
at which they could be implemented, the best chances for having
at least one deployable option at an early date In both the United
States and Russia would result from pursuing both options in
parallel ("the dual-track approach") in both countries- including
direct cooperation between the two countries on both options to
maximize progress.
These CISAC findings had a substantial influence on subsequent debate
and analysis on nuclear-materials policy inside and outside governments.
Indeed, they are reflected to a considerable degree In the series of policy
decisions on plutonium management taken by the U.S. and Russian gov-
ernments since 1996,7 up to and including the U.S.-Russian agreement on
plutonium disposition concluded the June 2000 Summit between Presi-
dents Clinton and Puhn.8
7See, e.g., Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, Washington, DC:
Department of Energy, DOE-NN-007, January 1997, pp. 37-39; U.S.-Russian Independent
Scientific Commission on Plutonium Disposition, Final Report, Washington, DC: Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Sep-
tember 1997 (available at http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/atom); Depart-
ment of Energy, Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental
Impact Statement, Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 4 January 2000; and Department
of Energy, Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement (3 vols.
and summary), DOE/EIS-0283, Washington DC: Department of Energy, Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition, November 1999.
8Executive Office of the President of the United States (Washington DC) and Office of the
Press Secretary (Moscow), Joint Statement Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapons-
grade Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation,
4 June 2000.
OCR for page 10
10 SPENT-FUEL STANDARD FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS WEAPON PLUTONIUM
The largest controversies arising from the CISAC findings have been
about the "dual track" recommendation (with some factions, in each coun-
try, favoring one or the other approach to the exclusion of the alternative)
and about the appropriateness and interpretation of the "spent-fuel stan-
dard" (including whether particular variants of the MOX and immobili-
zation options meet it). The first issue has been settled, at least for the
time being, by the recent U.S.-Russian Bilateral Plutonium Disposition
Agreement, which specifies that each country will disposition 34 metric
tons of excess military plutonium as follows: the United States will dispo-
sition 25.5 metric tons via the MOX route and 8.5 metric tons by immobi-
lization, and Russia will disposition all 34 tons via the MOX route. It is
the second set of questions those connected with clarification and
application of the spent-fuel standard—which constitutes the focus of
this new CISAC report.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
separated plutonium
