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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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NATURAL DISASTERS ROUNDTABLE

A SUMMARY OF THE FORUM ON COUNTERING TERRORISM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATURALAND TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS

INTRODUCTION

Science can play a role in helping with prevention and mitigation as well as recovery and repair. It will make its greatest contribution if we consider our vulnerability to terror attacks and to natural disasters jointly rather than separately. Because our social and economic arrangements have made us vulnerable to both, we can gain from working on them together with a program that involves the social sciences as deeply and as actively as the natural sciences (Kennedy, 2002).

The Natural Disasters Roundtable Forum on Countering Terrorism, held at The National Academies in Washington, D. C. on February 28 – March 1, 2002, promoted a two-way process of knowledge exchange. In one direction, representatives of the hazard research community discussed lessons from past disasters that may help inform efforts to respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. In the other direction, key personnel who responded to the September 11 events, and to the anthrax bioterrorism that followed, helped to define new research needs applicable to terrorism.

The devastating events of September 11 stimulated researchers and practitioners familiar with natural and technological disasters to apply their expertise to the new challenge of countering terrorism. Certainly there are important differences between terrorism and other disasters, the issue of causation in particular. Terrorist acts are deliberate, willful, and criminal, while such “conventional” disasters as earthquakes, floods, and toxic spills happen due to acts of nature or negligence, but not intention. But subject to this fundamental distinction, there are nevertheless many commonalties between deliberate and nondeliberate disasters, particularly relating to response and recovery. As noted by Kenneth Bloem of The Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, parallels exist between many natural and human-induced calamities, e.g., wildfires vs. arson, accidental explosions vs. bombs, airplane accidents vs. aviation terrorism, floods vs. dam sabotage, chemical spills vs. chemical attacks, and epidemics vs. biological terrorism. Experience gained from decades of research on natural and technological disasters may therefore provide useful guidance to those charged with planning for and responding to the threat of terrorism. These relate particularly to issues of organization, communication, search and rescue, coordination of volunteers

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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and donated resources, and addressing the emotional and economic impacts on victims and the larger society.

Despite numerous similarities, there are key differences between natural, technological, and terrorist-induced disasters. Natural hazards can have natural cycles. Also, the location of natural hazards is known to a certain extent, i.e., hurricanes usually hit coastal areas, while earthquakes occur near fault lines. Similarly, technological hazards exist in known locations. However, technological disasters, usually resulting from human error, are difficult to predict. Proper planning, training, and decision making can keep natural and technological hazards from becoming disasters. Although the disasters in these cases are preventable, the hazard is not. On the other hand, with terrorism, the hazard is the terrorist and the disaster results from the attack--both of which are predictable and preventable if science and intelligence are applied effectively (Bloem, 20021; Kennedy, 2002). Also, terrorists often are intelligent enemies willing to sacrifice anything for their cause, and unlike natural disasters, their attacks result in criminal investigations. (Bloem, 2002).

The acquisition and utilization of knowledge is essential for coping with perilous situations. For natural disasters, this may include such things as monitoring fault lines to determine potential danger from earthquakes, obtaining data for forecasting hurricane tracks in order to evacuate potential victims, or conducting research to better understand climate change. For technological disasters, a priori knowledge may include risk assessment of potential infrastructure failures or employee training to prevent accidents.

Similarly, understanding the traits and motivations of terrorists may be essential to countering their actions. According to William Waugh of Georgia State University, four key characteristics of terrorists are their 1) use or threat of extraordinary violence, 2) creation of a psychological impact beyond the victims, 3) selection of specific targets or victims for symbolic value, and 4) belief that their behavior is purposeful. Part of the psychological fear terrorists induce is due to their use of familiar agents and objects as weapons (Lindell, 2002), such as flammable materials, toxic chemicals, biological agents, and most recently, fully fuelled airplanes loaded with passengers. Moreover, it is perceived that terrorism is becoming more violent and deadly. The new age of international terrorism, often religiously and politically motivated, is worsened by access to weapons of mass destruction (Waugh, 2002; Hansen, 2002).

It is because of both the similarities and the differences between natural and human-induced disasters that a panel of experts – policymakers, emergency managers, first responders, public health workers, physicians, and researchers – assembled at the Natural Disasters Roundtable forum to

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All speakers presentations are referenced as ‘2002’, based on the date of the date of the workshop, February 28-March 1, 2002, when their material was presented.

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

discuss what lessons can be gleaned from experience with both types of disasters. The objective was to consider how to handle future disaster emergency situations better. A summary of the major areas discussed during the forum is presented, focusing on a generalized approach to disaster management, specific lessons learned from past incidents, and challenges and opportunities for improved disaster response.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Whether considering natural, technological, or terrorist-induced events, many of the comments of forum participants focused on disaster management issues related to preparedness, detection, response, and recovery. It is noted that these points of discussion are not meant to be the same four core components of emergency management discussed in the Foreword. Rather, the emphasis during the forum on the need for effective detection measures inspired its inclusion here as a main discussion area, whereas mitigation is not.

Preparedness

“Preparedness equals success.” - Frances Edwards-Winslow, Director of Emergency Management for the City of San José

Preparedness was expressed by Susan Cutter of the University of South Carolina in terms of the “precautionary principle”, the notion of reducing vulnerability before a threat occurs. J. Kenneth Mitchell of Rutgers University asserted that vulnerability is an important but understudied topic in hazard research. He contrasted “vulnerability”, the exposed, dependent state of people and physical systems, to “risk” which is an estimate of the statistical probability of loss or injury. Psychologist Paul Slovic defined “risk” as a term invented by humans to help understand and cope with dangers in life. He and Richard Little, of the National Research Council’s Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment, discussed how risk assessment – the process of determining what can go wrong, with what probability, and with what consequences – is essential to preparedness strategies. However, Slovic warned about the limitations, subjectivity, and contentiousness of risk assessment. He described how perceptions of risk and other social processes cause risk to be amplified (social amplification of risk) such that even small events can lead to ripple effects whose consequences exceed the direct impacts from loss of lives and immediate damages. This ripple-effect model has important implications for risk assessment and decision-making. For example, it implies that prevention of frightening events may be even more important than reduction of consequences after they occur. Slovic also discussed the key role of affect and emotion in determining risk perceptions

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

and pointed to some implications of this, such as strong affective response to possible events, which can overwhelm consideration of the probabilities of these events.

Risk management supplements risk assessment by addressing what options are available for preventative action, what associated trade-offs exist in terms of costs, benefits, and risks, and what impacts current decisions have on the future (Little, 2002). One essential area is risk management of critical infrastructure, the linked system of facilities and activities vital to providing services necessary to support our economy and quality of life; according to Little, the entire system is incapacitated if particular components or subsystem are not functioning. Critical infrastructure (“lifelines”) include electrical power, medical and public health services, transportation, oil and gas production and storage, water supply, emergency services, government services, banking and finance, and telecommunications. Risk management includes determining the most vulnerable infrastructure systems as well as the age and condition of specific structures (Hess, 2002).

Despite rigorous protection of critical infrastructure, natural, technological, and terrorist-related disasters inevitably will handicap systems, thus it is imperative to establish redundancy. Seismologist Stuart Nishenko demonstrated the value of risk management and redundant systems in electric power transmission with the example of the 7.4 magnitude earthquake that hit Izmet, Turkey on August 17, 1999. Power failed within minutes of the earthquake due to damage at a key substation and various power plants tripping off. Power was rerouted through additional circuits that were planned as redundant backups to the power grid in the event of fire or earthquake, and the system was up and stable within four hours after the earthquake. This example illustrates the importance of planned alternatives to reduce the downtime of critical systems and expedite response and recovery.

In addition to large-scale infrastructure, like electrical power, localized infrastructure such as health care systems are equally essential. Public health speakers at the forum such as Eric Noji, Kim Shoaf, Sam Stratton, and Donald Weiss noted that two crucial preparatory functions are maximizing laboratory capacity and creating flexible health care systems. In other words, a healthy dose of disaster planning is needed, yet it is recognized that unusual or extreme situations can and will occur, and responders must be able to adapt accordingly. For practitioners, advanced health care preparation includes:

  • Practice drills;

  • Stockpiling pharmaceuticals;

  • Adequately staffing hospitals and public health facilities;

  • Creating response plans;

  • Training and educating responders;

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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  • Vaccinating against potential or current biological threats; and

  • Establishing comprehensive relationships with fellow organizations and responders so that communication is facilitated and integrative databases are established.

Participants especially stressed the latter three activities as cardinal to disaster response. For researchers, health care preparation entails:

  • Analyzing existing and novel pathogens;

  • Studying the weaponization of chemical, biological, and nuclear agents;

  • Parameterizing the transport and diffusion of agents;

  • Developing new vaccines;

  • Improving detection and surveillance techniques.

For preparation purposes in general, nearly every governmental and private organization has a disaster response plan dictating action in emergency situations. For instance, at the federal level, Federal Response and National Contingency plans exist; locally there are numerous city and county emergency response plans which mobilize specialty teams and support functions (Jackson, 2002), and there are incident command structures and mutual aid agreements (Harrald, 2002). Peter LaPorte, of the Washington, DC Emergency Management Agency, even suggested that response plans should be personalized, meaning every individual or family should have an advanced “game plan” in the event of various disasters.

Regarding preparatory logistics, Frances Edwards-Winslow discussed how the city of San José’s emergency preparedness team modified training exercises, forcing trainees to think thoroughly about their actions before carrying them out. This enables the trainees to ‘get it right the first time’ rather than correcting mistakes afterward. She also reported on San José’s policy of the “dual use concept” whereby no equipment or plans are used for a specific purpose (i.e., sarin gas detectors). This concept of systematic usage promotes familiarity with the equipment, ensures regular maintenance, and builds constituency among health organizations. Finally, San José’s foundation for hazard response consists of numerous plans and response units, and their recently added bioterrorism plan was created more easily due to two of these pre-existing plans: the multiple casualty incident plan and the disaster medical/health plan. Thus plans for natural and technological disasters proved applicable to the threat of terrorism.

Detection

Effective execution of the second component, detection, is extremely dependent upon the success of preparedness. As noted by both Donald Weiss of the New York City Department of Health, and Sam Stratton of the Los Angeles County Emergency Medical Services Agency,

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

communication among researchers, physicians, public health workers, government officials, and even veterinarians overshadows all other detection systems in importance. For instance, the West Nile Virus outbreak during Summer 1999 may have been diagnosed earlier if veterinarians and physicians had pre-existing working relationships to facilitate interaction, or if they had integrated databases to facilitate information exchange (Weiss, 2002). For more blatant terrorist attacks such as those on September 11, rapid communication among government officials, air traffic controllers, and even the victims on United Airlines Flight 93 helped avert what may have been additional casualties.

Effective communication is contingent upon sufficient surveillance systems to detect problems. For terrorist-induced disasters, surveillance systems include instrumentation to detect chemical, biological, or nuclear agents, integrated databases, and metal detectors; simple visual surveillance also is key, including being aware of unusual behavior or activities and checking for appropriate documentation. For all disaster types, Stratton stressed the use of information networks, such as ongoing field data collection systems, to show variations in health trends and promptly identify public health threats. Additionally, education, thorough medical examinations, and modern lab systems with adequate capacity are necessary for rapid diagnoses of existing and novel strains, which further facilitate effective information exchange.

Response

Even with comprehensive preparedness and detection measures in place, disasters occur and therefore response is the essential next step in disaster management.

Once agencies are notified of and mobilized for a disaster, prompt, effective response is contingent upon assessment and consequent matching of needs with resources (Stratton, 2002). According to Michael Lindell of the Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center at Texas A&M University, there are key assessment functions that should be implemented immediately after any disaster occurs. They include:

  • Threat detection and emergency classification;

  • Hazard and environmental monitoring;

  • Population monitoring and assessment;

  • Damage assessment.

Threat detection and emergency classification are used to determine how bad a situation is, who responds, and the logistics of acting. Hazard and environmental monitoring provide air quality measurements, biohazard point of distribution and dispersion, and infrastructure-related hazards (gas leaks, downed power lines, debris, etc.). Population monitoring and assessment addresses if, when, and where to evacuate and quarantine people, and includes reporting on the status of injured,

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

missing, or deceased victims. Finally, damage assessment entails determining structural safety to mitigate further injuries or casualties. Thorough execution of all assessment functions is crucial to effectively responding to victims and the disaster site; furthermore, it helps prepare for the final phase of recovery.

Several forum presenters provided specific examples of Lindell’s emergency assessment functions. John Sorensen of Oak Ridge National Laboratory discussed warning systems relevant to emergency classification and population monitoring. He asserted that public response during terrorist attacks is similar to natural or technological disasters, and he defined the process in terms of “hearing, understanding, believing, personalizing, confirming, and finally responding”. Sorensen debunked several myths about issuing warnings, such as the beliefs that (1) panic ensues, (2) people are confused if given too much information, (3) “crying wolf” leads to inaction, and (4) people automatically follow instructions. To increase warning response, he suggests giving consistent, specific, accurate descriptions of the hazard and its impacts using pre-scripted text and visual aids. Public messages should be issued frequently and by multiple sources to reach as many people as possible. Fortunately, this objective has a tendency to be accomplished more easily for terrorist-induced disasters, because mass communication is more plentiful for such events due to public interest (Quarantelli, 2002).

Other examples of population monitoring were discussed by Kathleen Tierney of the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware in terms of group and organizational response, including convergence, emergence, and improvisation. Social scientists long ago identified that there is a spontaneous mobilization of people, goods, and information into disaster-stricken areas. It is inevitable and, in general, the more severe an event, the greater the convergence. While convergence can lead to congestion and hinder operations, such as impact zone access control and security, it does provide an abundance of resources to meet needs including reception and care of victims. For example, Enrico Quarantelli of the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware noted that 94 percent of Americans took some sort of behavioral step – displaying the American flag, donating blood and money, supplying goods, attending religious services, etc. – post September 11 due to the sheer magnitude of the devastation. Emergence, the formation of new, unofficial groups to address newly defined disaster needs, is another phenomenon that occurs in response to disasters. Like convergence, it also is inevitable and directly proportional to the size of the disaster. While it does help ensure that needs are met, established groups may distrust emergent groups’ knowledge, skills, and abilities regarding what needs to be done. While extensive preparedness for all disasters is of the essence, not all contingencies can be anticipated, thus the ability to improvise – apply new technologies, tools, and strategies – during response is of equal importance. In fact, Tierney asserted

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

Figure 1. 3D damage report of Lower Manhattan. (Reprinted with permission from Urban Data Solutions, Inc., 2002).

that “any event that does not require improvisation is not a true disaster”, and that organizations must be able to effectively improvise to manage major disasters. Since adequate preparedness at all scales is impossible, in many cases improvisation may be the key to improving response.

Another of Lindell’s emergency assessment functions, damage assessment, is increasingly accomplished with new technologies. For instance, a Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) system was used post September 11 to give a three-dimensional topographic map of the remaining debris and buildings around the World Trade Center (Tierney, 2002) (see Figure 1). Additionally, as an example of improvisation, the Geographical Information System (GIS) technique used to determine structural soundness after earthquakes was applied to the World Trade Center area for rapid assessment of the surrounding structures (Nishenko, 2002).

Recovery

According to Stratton, the final, and most important component of disaster management is recovery of the disaster site and the people affected directly and indirectly. For all types of disasters, this involves short and long-term efforts. Marianne Jackson of FEMA spoke of many temporary financial projects to assist victims immediately following disasters, including for home repair, mortgage, and rental assistance programs; individual and family grant programs; low interest disaster loans for home or business; and disaster unemployment. She noted additional aid provided by disaster assistance service centers, including crisis counseling, child care service, interpreters, and health care. Jackson also discussed long-term recovery task forces, which (1) promote the flow of information between federal agencies at the recovery area and the national level, (2) provide federal

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

agencies an open forum to exchange information related to recovery issues, and (3) streamline delivery of federal aid. Furthermore, congressional and intergovernmental liaisons provide congressional delegations with continual information and intelligence on developing trends.

In relation to financial recovery, there is often a surge of donations and financial assistance immediately following natural, technological, or terrorist-induced disasters. However, the monetary flow may not be maintained through to the crucial recovery phase when rebuilding and future mitigation plans are developed. In contrast to this pattern, Michael Byrne of the White House Office of Homeland Security discussed the National Security Strategy, established shortly after September 11. The strategy is required to be long-term and supported by a multi-year, crosscutting budget plan so that recovery and preparedness for future disasters will continue over the longterm. Similarly, LaPorte discussed his ongoing efforts to ensure that the Washington, DC Emergency Management Agency receives the funding it needs to prepare for, detect, respond to, and recover effectively from all types of disasters.

LESSONS LEARNED

Two primary lessons learned from past disasters crosscut each of the disaster management components: the need for effective organization and communication. Several forum participants noted the insularity among all disaster personnel, including policymakers, emergency managers, first responders, public health workers, physicians, and researchers. Distrust, territoriality, and reluctance or inability to share information hinders disaster management and perpetuates insularity. For instance, public health researcher Kim Shoaf noted that the public health sector – a field responsible for protecting the health and well-being of the community as a whole – is not yet readily accepted in the medical and emergency response fields. She asserted that group segregation promotes varying cultures, terminology, and a feeling of righteousness and distrust; this is problematic when different groups are forced to work together in stressful, emergency situations. Mark Penn, Arlington County Director of Emergency Management, proposed that in addition to establishing ongoing relationships, an incident command structure is needed at all levels of government and private sector organizations. Therefore, during states of emergency, a hierarchy will exist to manage agency notification and mobilization, internal direction and control, external coordination, public information distribution, administrative and logistical support, and documentation (Lindell, 2002).

Communication and organization also are needed for successful disaster response when unusual challenges are presented, particularly at the local levels (Noji, 2002). For example, Charles Hess noted that on the morning of September 11 many emergency management directors were attending

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

the National Emergency Management Association annual conference in Big Sky, Montana. Since air traffic was halted, the directors were unable to return to their jurisdictions to manage the disaster. However, effective communication and well-trained, capable emergency management staffs averted what could have been an additional, massive problem.

Forum participants mentioned many other lessons learned related to one or more of the disaster management components. Little observed that the relationships among terrorist threats, vulnerability, and targets are not well understood, suggesting that preparedness may be challenging. He encouraged research and education in these areas as well as implementation of blast-resistant construction and scenario building as necessary pre-emptive measures. Penn credited Arlington County’s timely response to the September 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon to their preparation for Y2K. Their planned redundancy of portable cellular communication literally was set up within minutes so that first responders could communicate. Thus a key lesson learned was that preparation for previous situations unrelated to terrorist events is nonetheless applicable. Another lesson learned which produced a needed change in preparedness strategy occurred at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) following the recent anthrax outbreak. Eric Noji of the CDC and White House Office of Homeland Security noted that the CDC mandated bioterrorism training to improve response time and competence should a future biological emergency occur.

Regarding detection, forum participants discussed the lessons learned from previous viral outbreaks of pandemic influenza, smallpox, and West Nile Virus. In general, the need for surveillance, rapid diagnoses, and integrated data systems were not met in these cases. For instance, the West Nile Virus was difficult to detect because only one CDC laboratory in Fort Collins, Colorado was equipped to test for it (Weiss, 2002). Noji discussed the anthrax outbreak and compared the difference of working with previous viral outbreaks to the classified information constraints of anthrax as “working half blind-folded”. The logistics of criminal investigations and having to work within such restrictions complicate the recovery from terrorist attacks. Weiss described several other anthrax detection problems to be remedied such as false “powder” incidents, and problems related to point of distribution logistics, sample tracking, laboratory testing, and multi-agency coordination.

The unprecedented response of spontaneous, volunteer convergent and emergent groups after the September 11 attacks sometimes were as problematic as they were beneficial. According to Hess, it was daunting to combine highly trained responders with volunteers having little or no experience and whose mental and physical abilities were unknown. Thus, a method of surveying volunteer workers is necessary for emergency response officials to determine their abilities and limitations; this ensures that the organizational response is expeditious and that safety is not compromised. The

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

convergence of materials and supplies, especially those not requested, after the attacks also caused difficulties for response and recovery. This highlighted the need for an improved donation management and distribution system for future disasters (Tierney, 2002; Jackson, 2002).

For evacuation as well as search and rescue operations, more comprehensive population statistics are needed. Estimates of daytime, nighttime, and weekend populations in commercial, industrial, and tourist areas may help determine the methods and feasibility of evacuation procedures versus sheltering in place (Cutter, 2002).

Regarding sheltering in place or the possible need to quarantine, Richard Rotanz of the New York City Office of Emergency Management pointed out the services—food, water, clothing, and financial assistance—that would need to be provided to large numbers of people in scattered locations.

Edwards-Winslow described how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be particularly valuable in providing shelter for disaster victims. NGOs have multi-lingual workers to communicate with ethnically diverse groups, they provide basic medical care to sick people who may be screened out of other shelters, and they can assist special need victims. Communication with and utilization of such groups may alleviate some of the burden of response and recovery.

Finally, Rotanz described celebrity visits to Ground Zero that occurred after the attack on the World Trade Center buildings as a worker morale booster. This type of activity proved to be a valuable part of raising spirits during recovery efforts, but Rotanz stressed the importance of properly coordinating such appearances.

After every disaster, challenging experiences result in new knowledge. They also highlight previous lessons learned but not fully integrated into emergency management plans. Lessons, old and new, must be taken into account in order to improve the management of future disasters. Obtaining a firm commitment from various leaders to interact with one another on a regular basis, and encouraging the shedding of distrust and territoriality furthers improved organization and communication. Joint training exercises, seminars, and conferences could be beneficial in this regard. Other lessons learned, such as the value of tabulating census data for commercial, industrial, and tourist areas, may require new mandates from Congress. Still other lessons, such as managing convergence and emergence, may require new ways of thinking and new approaches to disaster management.

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Many forum participants noted that a window of opportunity exists in the wake of disasters, the length of which may be proportional to the magnitude of devastation. Thus, a time exists to seize opportunities and address new challenges. The following summarizes discussion by forum participants on the links between lessons learned and implementation strategies.

Lindell observed that what may prove to be the most difficult challenge of predicting and mitigating future terrorist attacks is that terrorists are intelligent adversaries. They do their research, they know how to elude or infiltrate the system, and they can exploit the media to their advantage by striking when public preventative or evacuation measures are being undertaken or during a time of low risk as declared by the government. For instance, with the advent of the Internet, a colossal amount of information is available to anyone with a computer or simply access to a local public library. Prior to the attacks of September 11, data about public facilities were available on the Internet for many commercial and industrial sites. The threat of future terrorist attacks prompted the removal of such information from public availability.

The medical and public health sectors bear much of the responsibility for preparedness, detection, response, and recovery. For instance, the post September 11 anthrax outbreak underscored the threat of chemical, biological, and nuclear agents. Detection is complicated for biological outbreaks, preventing rapid treatment or casualty estimates (Noji, 2002). Contagious diseases also are more difficult to contain, and the possibility of needing to quarantine raises legal and ethical challenges (Bloem, 2002). Furthermore, if an extremely large attack or outbreak occurs, limitations of medication and vaccines are an issue. Accordingly, research on biohazard contamination is needed as well as new biohazard-specific emergency response procedures and training (Lindell, 2002). Another challenge is in contrast to the convergence of workers and volunteers that occurred after September 11; the possibility exists that some critical personnel may refuse to work or volunteer if a biological disaster occurs, although this could be alleviated if proper education and preventative measures are in place (Noji, 2002).

The possibility also exists that hospitals may be the target of a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. Accordingly, Bloem highlighted several challenges pertinent to such disasters, including the need for:

  • Communication networks among public health agencies, hospitals, and community physicians;

  • International surveillance and detection systems;

  • Enhanced laboratory diagnostic capabilities;

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×
  • Mechanisms and manpower to distribute mass antibiotics and vaccines;

  • Adequate stockpiles;

  • Adequate hospital capacity to handle mass casualties, especially for contagious diseases;

  • Redundant and backup facilities;

  • A classification system for hospitals based on experience and resources.

Since September 11 some hospitals are conducting preparedness self-assessments to determine deficient areas. They also are encouraging active awareness measures including more meetings, web sites, and technical assistance. Increased training and community-based disaster drills are also being coordinated, as well as coalitions, so that responders are comfortable with emergency processes and each other. Perhaps most importantly, more legislative attention is being paid to meet capacity needs, staff shortages, and funding requirements so that necessary funding prospects are increasing exponentially (Bloem, 2002).

Health practitioners are not the only professionals that are challenged to make changes to better prepare for, detect, respond to, and recover from natural, technological and terrorist-induced disasters. Mitchell highlighted seven understudied disaster topics that apply to the threat of terrorism:

  • Vulnerability;

  • Values;

  • Victimization & visibility;

  • Symbolism;

  • Landscapes of hazard;

  • Metropolitan contexts; and

  • Gaps in existing terrorism research.

He asserted that disasters vulnerability is partly driven by poverty, reliance on new technologies, and additional factors that researchers and policymakers poorly understand. He noted that the effectiveness of terrorism is based on the degree to which it engages human fears and values. Thus, a better understanding of both our values and those of the terrorists may help anticipate terrorist acts so that we can reduce our vulnerability. Research also is needed to understand who are the victims of terrorism and how their reactions to being targeted differ from one another. Symbolism is deeply connected to terrorism such that symbolic people and places often are targeted, again to instill fear and threaten values; but past terrorist targets also become a symbol of survival. Similarly, landscapes of hazards include representative symbols of past terrorist events as well as vulnerability to potential future threats. There is also a need to study large cities, their evolution with technology and global

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×

interaction, their multitude of authority and the consequent vulnerability, and their diverse environments. Finally, Mitchell suggested that past research on terrorism either was too general or too specific to one event, creating gaps in our knowledge; thus, he encourages research of all scales of terrorism.

Another challenge faced from all types of disasters is the need to strengthen infrastructure. Little suggested several research opportunities. To combat progressive collapse, generic design approaches are needed for economical concrete and steel-frame buildings that resist disproportionate collapse. Additionally, first responders need real-time assessment tools to make informed decisions on entering damaged structures. Since human error plays a role in many technological disasters, a better understanding of how systems can be designed to take human factors into account is needed. Finally, there is a general need to develop a better understanding of interdependent systems so that appropriate safeguards can be developed and deployed.

Overall, because the challenges are multiple, Jack Harrald of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management at the George Washington University noted the most important opportunity of all – the need for political and science organizations to conduct interdisciplinary research and applications. Without the knowledge gained from this research and its implementation, preparedness, detection, response, and recovery are much more difficult processes when dealing with natural, technological, and terrorist-induced disasters.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Natural, technological, and terrorist-induced disasters are analogous in many important ways before, during, and after impact. Thus, lessons can be drawn and applied among all three. Policymakers, emergency managers, first responders, public health workers, physicians, and researchers came together at the Natural Disasters Roundtable forum. They shared experiences and concerns, and discussed ways to integrate efforts to improve emergency management in all types of disaster situations. The following recurring issues emerged during the forum.

  • A common approach to disaster management can be conceived for natural, technological, and terrorist-related disasters involving preparedness, detection, response, and recovery.

  • In all types of disasters, communication is needed among policymakers, first responders, public health workers, public service officials, practitioners, and researchers so all groups can work together efficiently and successfully during emergency situations.

  • An incident command structure is needed to effectively manage disaster situations.

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
×
  • Extensive planning and preventive measures are needed for all disasters, but equally important is the ability to improvise solutions for unforeseen problems that inevitably develop.

  • Efficient local response is essential for natural, technological, and terrorist-induced disasters.

Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Suggested Citation:"Contents of Report." National Research Council. 2002. Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10414.
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Countering Terrorism is the summary of The Natural Disasters Roundtable Forum on Countering Terrorism, held at The National Academies in Washington, D. C. on February 28 – March 1, 2002.This event promoted a two-way process of knowledge exchange. In one direction, representatives of the hazard research community discussed lessons from past disasters that may help inform efforts to respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. In the other direction, key personnel who responded to the September 11 events, and to the anthrax bioterrorism that followed, helped to define new research needs applicable to terrorism.

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